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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores Female To Male processes of transition through ethnographic and 
qualitative data gathered during fieldwork in the trans community in London, and 
through critical engagement with existing discourses of trans sexuality. Despite the 
greater visibility of Male to Female transsexuality in academic texts and popular culture, 
FTM transition remains largely undertheorised. This research is an anthropological 
contribution to this field, as well as to current developments in social anthropology and 
the anthropology of gender. 
Transition has been traditionally theorised through the sex/gender distinction, where 
sex and gender hold different ontological and political values, and it is understood as the 
passage from 'female' to 'male' in terms of the intersection of a series of biological, 
psychological, social and legal changes. Even though recent discourses of sexuality have 
pointed out the limitations of this paradigm, they still reinforce universal models of the 
relation between sex and gender and abstract categories such as subjectivity, time and 
experience. However, my informants understood that their transitions were complex 
and unique, and that their experience of transitioning was not necessarily exclusively 
about sex/gender. They described their experiences of transition in very different ways, 
where hormones, surgery and other transitional technologies were not mechanistic 
agents in their processes, but part of particular assemblages through which change, 
continuity and time are brought into experience through becoming 'FTM'. Therefore, 
in this thesis FTM is understood as a particular kind of becoming rather than the 
passage between static categories. 
In the first part of the thesis I eA.'-plore existing ways of conceptualising transsexuality and 
transition through a series of theoretical, medical and political' coordinates'. I focus on 
how the emergence of protocols of clinical management of transsexuality were 
grounded in the distinction between sex and gender, and unpack some of the ways in 
which this distinction informed the emergence of political discourses of sexuality and 
sexual formation through which trans people in Britain construct their individual and 
collective identities. In the second part I explore three subjects privileged by the 
participants in my primary research: testosterone, narrative and thresholds. I argue that 
these domains both reproduce categories and the language of linear passage and demand 
a different analytic approach. Each chapter explicates 'FTM' by exploring different 
kinds, scales and temporalities of experience, as well as the kinds, scales and temporalities 
of the relations between them. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis is an anthropological study of Female to Male (FTM) transition based on 
empirical material gathered during fieldwork among trans men in London. Even 
though there are a number of social science studies conducted in the United States 
about FTM transition (Cromwell 1999; Rubin 2003; Devor 1997), in the United 
Kingdom this study is one of very few based on ethnographic and qualitative datal. 
Unlike clinical studies or studies conducted in clinical settings, this thesis is based on the 
premise that transition is a kind of becoming that involves different levels and kinds of 
transformation rather than the passage between the categories of 'female' and 'male'. 
Thus, beyond describing the ways in which transsexuality is produced by people's use 
of medical treatment, this study unpacks different levels of transition experience, 
exploring the becoming that transition involves through analysis of ethnographic and 
qualitative data and through critical engagement with biomedical and academic 
discourses of transsexuality. 
It is now commonplace to understand transsexuality as sex/gender change through 
which, having undergone medical treatment, people are able to access a new gender 
identity and live their lives in their gender of choice. Definitions of transsexuality, 
however, vary historically and in relation to different issues, and recently, traditional 
conceptions of transition are being revised as new gender identities and new forms of 
sexual and gendered expression are being made public (Diamond 2004; Volcano 2000; 
Barker 2007; Hoppe 2008; Bomstein 1994). These new forms of transition emphasise 
social aspects of transitioning above and beyond the use of medical treatment, and 
implicitly question theoretical constructions of transsexuality anchored in biomedical 
treatments and 'sex' changes. For this reason, this study makes a distinction between 
'transition' and 'transsexuality'. The term transsexuality has a particular history within 
biomedicine, where it was developed in the context of diagnostic practices in mental 
1 Ekins and King mention FTMs in their approach to transsexual (1996) and transgender (2006) 
phenomena, and Hines (2007) considers the construction of trans gender identities and their impact 
on traditional conceptions of transsexuality, and the challenges these identities impose on models of 
care and citizenship. Other studies approach different aspects of transition (see Chapter 2). 
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health, and this particular history (that will be discussed in Chapter 3), demarcates 
transsexuality as a passage between genders associated with hormonal treatment and 
surgery. For trans people, and indeed the trans men I interviewed, the term 
transsexuality was also sometimes understood to bear an unwanted stigma, that of a 
mental health disorder. Although this term is sometimes used in some forms of trans 
representation and colloquially in trans communities, many of the participants in this 
research did not define themselves as transsexual. Rather, they defined their processes as 
'transitions', sometimes placing more emphasis on biological change, and other times 
on change at other levels. Thus the kind of transition discussed in this thesis is defined 
not in terms of 'having changed sex' exclusively, but as a broader process of 
transformation that begins when somebody surpasses in any way their 'normal' gender 
attributions, and consider themselves in transition towards other forms of gender 
expression, transitioning from a different body, or transitioning 'in masculine'. 
Importantly, in this sense, transition will be approached as a becoming understood to 
span over non-sexual and non-gendered dimensions of people's lives, where the 
different changes involved in transitioning make sense in relation to broader processes. 
As one of my informants put it, regardless of particular start and end points, one always 
transitions 'the whole way through'. 
In this way, I describe transition in ways that displace, and sometimes problematise, the 
distinction between 'true' transsexuality as defined by Benjamin (1966, and discussed in 
chapter 3), where a series of diagnostic criteria determine the truth about transsexuality, 
and other forms of transition. In fact, I will use the expression 'FTM' to refer to a 
variety of different transitions. Even though in trans communities FTM is sometimes 
used as synonymous of becoming 'male', this research will reflect the fact that people's 
understanding of what it means to become male varies greatly in practice, and that they 
situate the start and end points of their processes in different locations, some of which 
escape the female/male categorical binary. Hence, the main difference between the 
more generalised use of the term 'FTM' and my own is that whereas transition is 
sometimes characterised as a discrete period between a person starting (or seeking) 
gender reassignment and living fully as a member of the opposite sex, in this thesis 
transition will be understood as a kind of becoming rather than an arrival. It will 
comprise different start and end points, and thus encompass processes which involve all 
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stages of medical treatment but also those in which having considered treatment, people 
decide against it and still live as men. 
Thus the term 'sex change' will only appear in the context of a discussion of the 
medical management of transition. The history of the term 'sex change' is charged with 
specific connotations that are not always useful in describing transition experience. But 
my decision not to use the term sex change was importantly about the reluctance th~t 
most of my informants felt about describing their transitions in medical terms. I mean 
this in two ways: first, as will become clearer through some of this thesis' arguments, 
transition was hardly understood as a pathology by the participants in my research, even 
though the use of hormonal treatment and surgery implied a degree of medicalisation. 
Second, starting and ending points were very different for people, and to assume that 
transition was the result of a 'sex change' would be misleading, as some trans people do 
not modify their bodies hormonally or surgically. My informants understood transition, 
furthermore, not only as a way to make life 'liveable' (Butler 2004), but often as the 
celebration of a different, shifting, and 'evolving' gender identity, which was 
understood as an improvement and a welcome addition to an already 'good' life. 
Therefore, and often despite medical pressure to do so, the kinds of bodies people 
became did not always imply forgetting the bodies they were 'before'. Some of the 
ways that trans men celebrated their transition included various acknowledgements of 
their previous gender identities, celebrations of femininity and drag in the context of 
performances and community events, or the decision not to undergo genital surgery. 
However, regardless of their particular transition stage, the participants in this research 
often referred to themselves or others as 'trans men' or 'trans guys'. The reader will 
note I use these terms in the thesis following my informants' usage, not because they 
mobilise them as unproblematic gender positions, but because they continue to use 
them despite these problematisations. 
This thesis takes as a starting point the implications of the sex/gender distinction in the 
biomedical management of transsexuality and the generation of legal frameworks of 
recognition and inclusion for trans gender people. In particular, I explore recent 
contexts in which the sex/gender distinction is mobilised in the management of 
transition, and the ways in which it is used politically to make claims about transsexual 
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identity. The distinction between sex and gender is arguably an intriguing manifestation 
of hylomorphic2 thought. As social theory moves toward the eradication of the 
differences between subject and object, ontology and epistemology, debates around 
sexuality and sexual formation seem to be at a crossroads. On the one hand new 
analyses of sex, gender and sexuality emphasise fluidity, change and process in 
approaching the relation between biology and cultural forms3 . On the other, however, 
knowledge practices have implications in terms of different kinds of sexual politics, 
community building strategies and policy making, and are therefore linked to the kinds 
of life people can actually live. In particular, the relation between biomedicine and 
political models of sexuality in North America and other countries in Western Europe 
establishes continuity between therapeutic models and legal frameworks of 
transsexuality, granting trans people access to civil rights (such as a name, legal 
representation, property, family rights and so on) only after they have undergone 
certain stages of treatment. However, even though these political victories constitute 
steps towards more inclusive models of sexual and gender identity politics, trans people 
are also questioning the boundaries of political and legal representation, and their 
struggle moves towards the recognition of multiple ways of being trans which include 
the use of medical treatment but are not restricted to it. As we will see, these shifting 
understandings of trans identity and the journey of transition are visible in academic 
debates and community practices, and increasingly have an impact on political and 
biomedical frameworks of transition. 
Indeed, the extent to which people can and do use medical treatment generates 
continuous controversies around the implementation of regulative frameworks of 
treatment. Currently, treatment is understood for both trans men and trans women in 
terms of a series of interventions designed to achieve the social recognition of one's 
chosen gender, where the role of biomedicine is primarily understood to facilitate social 
2 Here hylomorphism refers to the idea, initially developed by Socrates in Ancient Greek 
philosophy, but re-elaborated subsequently by Aristotle and the Christian tradition, that substance is 
formed by the inherence of form in matter. In the thesis I use this term in relation to feminist 
developments of the question of sex and gender, and discuss how analyses developed under the 
premise of the separation of matter and form, biology and culture, nature and nurture informed 
approaches to transition in the past decades. But I also introduce this term here in order to situate 
my argument in Part II of the thesis. In the line of Stoic philosophy as discussed by Deleuze (2004), 
I will interrogate the utility of this binary in relation to the becoming(s) involved in transition. 
3 See, for instance, readings of the work of Gilles Deleuze by feminist writers, especially Braidotti 
1994, 2002, 2006; Grosz 2005. 
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integration. According to Whittle, Turner et ai's Eurostudy (2008), the demand for 
treatment has increased dramatically in Europe in recent years. The table and graph 
below correspond to the number of years respondents reported their transition started: 
Graphic representation ofreported cases of transsexuality according to Whittle, Turner et al (2008:64). 
Whittle, Turner et ai's study points out that changes in representation and the 
progressive appearance of trans identities in the public sphere is currently generating 
important changes in relation to both trans men and women's sense of empowerment 
in choosing their gender identities4 . However, this thesis will be suggesting that 
although trans men and women share important common 'issues' especially in terms of 
treatment models and the politics of transsexuality (Ekins and King 1996, 2006), MTF 
and FTM are also very different kinds of transition. Trans men's use of treatment and 
what happens once they can pass5 is specific to becoming male6, and choices about 
visibility and stealth vary greatly among people and depend on multiple decisions, such 
as engagement with sexual politics and support groups, the kind of explanations they 
elaborate in making sense of their processes, or the kind of visibility they engage with, 
trans men often agree that treatment allows them a choice on whether or not to be 
visible. Visibility as a trans man, or in Jamison Green's words, as "transsexual men who 
have lived in female bodies" (2006:506) is in this wayan option that not only concerns 
their use of reassignment treatment but that also defines political agency and the 
creative transformations a lot of trans men feel their transitions are about. In this way 
4 Although they do not specify the extent to which the increasing number of people coming out 
and seeking treatment is the result of a higher demand for treatment or of the empowering effects of 
the legal changes that grant civil rights to trans people in the United Kingdom and other countries 
with similar legislation. 
5 By pass I mean being recognised as members of their chosen genders. 
6 Here I mean primarily the socially and culturally specific meanings associated with being a man, as 
some of my informants remarked that, unlike some of the trans women they knew, their 
experiences of becoming men did not usually have consequences in terms of finding employment or 
housing. 
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transition is not only about their bodies, but extends into other bodies, knowledge 
practices, gender relations and historically and culturally specific practices. It is often the 
case that trans men have easier transitions in the workplace, that they do not have to 
make drastic changes in their lifestyle, and, some argue, that they are treated 'better' in 
public according to their new social status. 
Throughout the thesis I use the term 'trans' in expressions such as 'trans theory', 'trans 
community', 'trans organisations', and 'trans identity'. I use this term as an umbrella 
term to cover heterogeneous aggregates of people, practices or ideas that refer to or are 
articulated around transsexuality and transition in a broad sense. I am aware of the 
problems surrounding this nonspecific use, especially the homogenising effect it might 
have, and that efforts are being made by identity groups in trans communities in order 
to safeguard the boundaries between the scope of different identities, issues and 
collective needs. However, I use this term precisely to emphasise heterogeneity and 
multiplicity in transition processes and to note that they indeed encompass many 
different concrete realities. 'Trans theory' will thus account for theories about 
transsexuality and transition (voiced by trans people and others, as for instance those 
compiled in Stryker and Whittle 2006), over a great historical and geographical span7. 
Throughout the thesis I use the term 'trans community' to refer to groups of people, 
events, material cultures and support networks that trans people identify as either 
representing trans issues, or e:h.;sting to foster the interests of trans people at some level. 
For this reason, my use of the term 'community' does not necessarily obliterate the 
problematisations of this term in traditions of social science (for example Marcus and 
Fischer 1986; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Joseph 2002; Fortun 2001; Latour 2005), but, 
rather, reflects the ways in which people articulate their sense of belonging and 
identification (Anderson 2006; Barth 1969), and the ways they understand relevance 
and boundedness between different aspects of transition. In my opinion the trans 
community is articulated around particular ways of living gender more than around the 
use of medical treatments, however, there are important identity issues attached to the 
use of treatments in some instances, as I mentioned. In this sense, I use the term 
7 It is corrunonly agreed (see, for instance, Hausman 1995; Feinberg 1996; Stryker 2008) that the 
specificity of transsexuality follows particular historical routes, and that these begin with early 
descriptions of sexual inversion at the tum of the nineteenth century (as will be discussed in chapter 
2), and end in the international agreement of a treatment protocol for transsexuality. In practice this 
means that very different transitions are grouped together despite substantial medical, social and 
cultural differences. 
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community because this was the term people used. The predicaments of 'trans identity' 
will be dealt with in chapter 2. 
1.1 Fieldwork 
The trans community In the United Kingdom is pIOneer In Europe in terms of 
complexity, coordination, support, visibility and presence in the political arena. It is also 
extremely diverse. Many organisations, charities, NGOs and projects are involved in 
the development of networks of information, care and support for trans people. The 
Gender Trust, Press for Change and GIRES are perhaps the three organisations more 
closely involved in the production and distribution of information about treatments, 
engaging biomedical and trans communities in the production of collaborative research 
materials designed to facilitate trans people's use of treatments. They also generate 
schemes that directly address some of the problems trans people encounter as treatment 
users (described in detail in Whittle, Turner et al 2008). Even though information and 
support networks are widely distributed, people from across the country usually access 
treatment in London whether they transition privately or through the NHS. Local GPs 
refer patients to the special gender units of Charing Cross Hospital, where they are 
evaluated by psychiatrists and referred for treatment to endocrinologists and surgeon 
teams. In London there is at least one private clinic used by FTMs, and a number of 
new initiatives, including new clinics and extra-clinical services, are currently being 
created to address an increasing demand for treatment. 
London also holds a significant amount of events of varied periodicity, including 
support groups and other community activities, where London residents and visitors 
come together in trans only spaces or participate in trans friendly events. There is not a 
single centralised structure for the organisation of community activities, but event 
listings are made available in support group meetings and online information networks, 
and some through other LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) organisations. 
Thus, some of these online information networks practically act as support groups, 
where members offer other members listings of events and activities, and create wider 
response to different issues relevant to the community at some level, especially political, 
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social or medical. They also generate public engagement with issues of transgender 
health, the struggle for civil rights and transgender art and culture. The events, debates 
and discussions announced are get-togethers that people combine with their daily 
activities, work and families, but are seldom full-time occupations. 
These events imply the existence of local information networks, and incorporate 
numerous communication technologies. They are the result of careful preparation by 
many individuals involved, and the product, as well as an invention, of queer and 
transgender traditions. They are important in different ways for the participants in this 
research, but beyond my informants' engagement, in their happening periodically they 
also 'create' the trans community. They practically articulate the community's disperse 
geographic locations, its heterogeneous interests, and its different material cultures and 
constitute an important site of collective production of change and affect. Importantly 
these different community events, whether temporary or of a more permanent 
character, where people get together to discuss issues, know each other or spend leisure 
time together are most of the times themselves community celebrations, and as such 
they have a special character. Leading a busy life in a city like London, where space and 
time constraints play such an important role in the organisation of cultural life, makes 
those events special in more than one way, imbuing them with exceptionality and 
extending their life beyond the physical time and space they occupy. They continue to 
exist in the ways that people talk about them, plan them and anticipate them. Perhaps 
one of my preferred examples is the International Festival of Transgender Arts, 
organised yearly by the collective Transfabulous from 2006 to 2008, which was a three 
day long celebration that lived in the community the whole year round: some people 
participated in its coordination, fundraising events were organised to support it, and 
hosting a vibrant international community, the festival became itself the beginning of 
new networks of people, information, resources, and artistic and intellectual 
productions. But community events of smaller scale also work in a similar way, 
generating multiple practices and implicating people in various ways. It is for this reason 
that the trans community can only partially be defined through belonging in physical 
spaces, because the community's social life is not articulated exclusively around a 
singular location but rather in the complex networks between different events, people 
8 See www.transfabulous.co.uk for more information, last accessed August 2009. 
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and practices. It could be said that it is this circulation of people, events and practices 
that characterises the rhythm of life in the community, and that this rhythm is arguably 
a distinctive sign of the specificity and uniqueness of the trans community in London. 
The fact that the trans community is itself dispersed geographically generates different 
levels of engagement, both in terms of the ways trans people participate in the 
community's social, cultural and political events, and in terms of their engagement with 
other communities, political movements and lifestyles. For example, trans communities 
in London are involved with some sectors in the LGB (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual) 
spectrum, sometimes fostering common efforts in terms of politics, visibility, equality 
and anti-violence strategies, and sometimes in terms of leisure and cultural activities. 
Yet often trans people are ambivalent in defining the politics of transsexuality in 
relation to the umbrella of LGBT politics. While there is trans representation in the 
LGBT History Month events, as well as in the Pride events, trans people often contend 
that not all the spaces of the LGBT - meetings, bars, clubs, and other social activities -
are trans friendly or even trans aware, which hinders trans people's participation. Trans 
politics are defined in terms of gender identity and not of sexuality, and thus trans 
people are more involved with the LGBT when they identify themselves as gay and are 
involved in gay politics or events despite the fact that there is not always acceptance of 
trans people in gay-only spaces and sometimes being trans entails exclusion from gay 
only events and online communities. 
In London, I have noticed different relations between specific sectors of the trans 
community and the LGBT spectrum. While people generally participated in political 
and leisurely activities in LGBT contexts, participants in this research also remarked that 
not all trans men feel comfortable in LGBT spaces for a number of reasons. Some 
identify as heterosexual and either want to 'go stealth' (be invisible as a trans person) or 
feel that they do not belong in LGBT spaces9. LGBT inclusive politics, some trans 
people contend, have not prioritised the interests of trans people in lobbying for civil 
rights, and the kind of inclusion they envision for trans people is not necessarily the 
inclusion trans people want. Thus the assimilation of trans in LGBT advocacy is not 
exempt of contention, and the internal diversity within the trans community 
9 Namaste (2000) highlights this point in her work within a MTF community in Canada, and 
Cromwell (1999) also notes this ambivalence in his ethnographic work with FTMs. 
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encompasses a variety of positions1o • In my VIew the relation between trans 
communities and other identity politics groups is marked by a double tension: on the 
one hand trans communities endorse a certain identity politics that construct their case 
against marginalisation, poverty, health issues, lack of institutional support, etc; on the 
other hand, different positions within the community continually push the boundaries 
of trans identity, making possible coalitions with other communities, issues, and groups. 
Thus while trans identity politics facilitate the relation between trans people and care 
and service providers, grassroots transsexual politics are chiefly concerned with wider 
issues, making new coalitions and issue based politics a necessary part of their identity 
struggle. Perhaps this 'belonging but not belonging', which some strands in gender 
studies have interpreted as the intersectionality of identity categories (see Monro 2005; 
Roen 2001), had an impact on the proliferation of trans only spaces, and within them 
trans of colour only spaces, gay trans men only spaces and so on, although the 
boundaries of these collectives, as will be discussed, are interrogated in practice. 
FTM London and Trans London are the two main trans organisations11 available to 
trans men12 , although these two organisations have different aims and visions. Trans 
London13 is a mixed collective: it includes trans men, trans women, and trans-identified 
people, whatever their stage in transition. It aims to be a place of discussion about 
gender identity and transition, where people can exchange ideas, talk about their 
processes, and share information and resources. FTM London, however, is only open to 
trans men in all stages of transition, questioning, and genderqueer14 . They meet once 
10 Often mediated by particular organisations. It is interesting to note, for example, the role that 
inclusive organisations have in the management of trans politics. See for instance the LGBT 
Consortium, at http://lgbtconsortium.org.uk/c1/, accessed July 2009. 
II Even though 'trans organisations' comprise projects that work in one way or another towards the 
inclusion of trans people and towards facilitating access to treatments, these two in particular are 
support groups. They are thus different from other lobbying political groups that promote the 
inclusion of trans people, or that work in different areas to facilitate particular aspects of transition, 
including general third sector organisations that have trans awareness programs. 
12 There are, however, other support groups available, such as Spectrum London, where friends and 
family are welcome. 
13 Their website is www.translondon.org.uk, last accessed August 2009. 
14 Genderqueer is the term used by people who identify as neither gender, or as both genders. Some 
trans people sometimes use it to make explicit their intention not to pass, this is, to be read as a 
'natural' member of the gender they choose to embody. It is also an 'umbrella' term for all the 
gender identities beyond the man/woman binary. Nestle, Howell and Wilchins (2002) analyse the 
emergence of this term, and some of the political implications that its widespread use had in 
developing other categories associated with trans identity, such as transgender. 
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per month to offer members information and support, as well as the opportunity to 
socialise with other FTMs, although one does not necessarily have to be a member to 
go to meetings and access information and services. It schedules FTM related activities, 
and every month people explore collectively one theme through a presentation by 
invited speakers or the expertise of a member. 
In addition to monthly meetings, FTM London produces a bi-monthly newsletter, 
where people share projects with others, announce services, and publish pieces of 
creative writing to be distributed among members. The newsletter is a classic medium 
in which trans communities have shared information, news, writing, and services. It is 
believed that activist and pioneer gay trans man Lou Sullivan used the newsletter format 
to effectively create a FTM community in San Francisco from 1987, and that, in this 
sense, the first FTM only group owed much of its existence and growth to the 
newsletter's network building potential. As was the case with other community events, 
FTM London newsletters also transcend their being read and discussed in meetings to 
become active agents in network building. They are also community archives15 , devices 
that not only help maintain a sense of community diatopically and diachronically, as 
every issue is sent to registered members by post, but also help communication beyond 
local communities, as they translate information in a pocket sized portable document. I 
would even suggest that the newsletter is also in a sense a 'magical' object in that it 
represents more than its own value, and insofar as it 'produces' certain kinds of 
transformations. As Cvetkovich says about queer archives, trans newsletters 'are 
composed of material practices that challenge traditional conceptions of history and 
understand the quest for history as a psychic need rather than a science' (Cvetkovich; 
2003:268). In this sense the newsletter could be thought as a distributive potential, at 
once de-centralising and redistributing the community in series of transformative 
interactions. 
FTM London was important for many of the participants in my research, although their 
involvement with the organisation was neither homogenous nor always steady over 
time. With several hundreds of members, FTM London extends its boundaries beyond 
15 The Newsletter was a medium through which pioneering commurutles of trans men 
communicated. FTM International, http://www.ftrni.org/1facts.htm Oast accessed August 2009) has 
been publishing newsletters since 1987, some of which can be accessed online. 
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the people who attend a particular meeting and even beyond London, as people travel 
from afar to be there each month. For a period of 8 months, I attended FTM London 
meetings regularly and took part in their events. Being there had an impact on the ways 
in which I thought of transition, as well as my intellectual and political involvement 
with trans issues, and it certainly informed my analysis in the thtsis. However, for 
ethical reasons, this thesis will not provide explicit ethnographic detail about what went 
on during the meetings, or hints that could identifY members. FTM London is not a 
primary location of this research, and the observational material I gathered attending 
meetings is not directly relevant to the focus of the thesis, although it did inform the 
discussions I introduce and follow in important ways, as one of several fieldwork 
locations. But importantly, FTM London is a trans-only space where it is not assumed 
that members are always visible as trans men in their daily lives: some have made the 
decision to go 'stealth' and live simply as men. For this and other reasons, the 
organisation has a strict confidentiality code, glVen that the establishment of support 
groups is connected to individual and collective decisions about identity, visibility and 
politics. Yet in FTM London I met some of the people who agreed to share their 
narratives. They often talk about being a FTM London member, and about the impact 
the collective had on their understanding of trans identity, visibility, the trans 
community and transition. I have not edited out the instances where they talk about 
their involvement, because, having sought their informed consent, it has remained their 
choice to describe FTM London and to refer to the ways in which it impacted their 
transitions. 
Fieldwork also comprised participant observation in many other activities and events, 
through which I got to know other research participants who would not normally 
participate in support groups as I got progressively immersed in more dimensions of the 
life of London's trans community. Bar Wotever, and all the events associated with the 
community that it represents, was another central fieldwork location where I got to 
know some participants and established continuity with others. Offering a series of 
weekly events, including open performances, film screenings and club nights and 
concerts, Bar W otever is a community-based and community building institution 
central to queer and transgender communities. A number of conferences and one day 
events happened, including picnics, sports days, FTM get-togethers, and performances. 
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All of these helped me get immersed in the community's social life, and were 
intellectually challenging for me. Participating in these events, however, I also helped 
construct them, and these two roles as a researcher and a participant were not always 
easy to juggle. Some special events, such as the Transfabulous Festival, were also sites of 
explicit academic and cultural discussion, providing not only the opportunity to share 
and develop ideas with people but also practical tools of analysis as a result of the 
dialogue and working process they entailed. 
The ethics of being an ethnographer in those spaces at the same time as having time off 
work needed constant negotiation, and sometimes I felt that each of those roles made 
the other more difficult. People were suspicious of researchers who would interfere in 
their leisure times, who would 'exoticise' them and submit their lives to analysis, and I 
realised quickly that my presence sometimes raised this kind of reaction. Activists in the 
community openly suggested that research could easily become intimidating and 
invasive. One participant who agreed to share his narrative after a period of reluctance 
told me as an indirect accusation that it was very common to find people coming to 
events only to get to 'talk to people for my PhD'16, and that this made people feel 
obviously uncomfortable and unsafe. Someone else's mention that some academics 
'appropriate' the new identities and grassroots practices as means of boosting their 
careers, and his disapproval of obtrusive and unethical academia made me aware of the 
problems of researching 'identities' (or being perceived to do so). Being 'around' during 
the early stages of fieldwork raised these kinds of ethical dilemmas, and, although I have 
the infonned consent of those who I recorded in my interviews, it put my own identity 
as an ethnographer under a close examination which I have had to deal with m 
different ways. This kind of awareness prompted interesting concerns, that I got to 
share with some of my info nnants , about the limits of reflexivity in relation to 
anthropological fieldwork (Stocking 1983, 1992; Fabian 1983; Agar 1980). The 
arguments I make in the thesis reflects an ethical position that results from engaging 
with this complexity. 
16 I believe this was the title of an actual performance piece hosted at Bar Wotever before my 
arrival. 
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1.2 Methods 
In this sense, rather than a singular location, my research 'site' was actually a network17 
of locations, events, people, web pages, blogs, networking sites, newsletters, 
newsgroups, art festivals, political actions, narratives, memories and objects18 . This 
heterogeneous, shifting and processual character of fieldwork locations, which became 
apparent and slightly confusing early on in the research process, informed the way in 
which I developed the research design, because it brought forward the constraints of 
the type of fieldwork I was embarking on, and therefore suggested crucial 
methodological issues that needed to be considered in the field. One of these problems 
was delimiting a sample of participants, and here again I encountered the predicaments 
of identity politics. In the increasing complexity of identity geographies in trans 
communities, where identities and identifications shape the trans community internally 
as well as its boundaries against other queer and LGB communities, delimiting 
transition became an matter of concern, given the diversity of the community and that, 
whereas some people identify as trans but have never undergone medical reassignment 
(nor intend to), there are people who have transitioned fully and yet do not see 
themselves as trans (but as men, genderqueer, androgynous or bi-gendered instead). 
This multiplicity in the community, and sometimes in the successive and/or coexisting 
identifications a single person lives by, raised concerns about the role of different kinds 
of empirical material in my study, as well as the role of notions, such as subjectivity, 
identity and individual experience, that had hitherto been understood as analytic keys to 
transition. Importantly, it articulated an important problem I would have to address in 
different ways: that of the entanglement of different kinds of transition, politics and 
knowledge practices. These considerations informed the sampling of participants. The 
final sample is not reduced to those participants who pass what is understood by medical 
discourses as the 'clinical threshold' (who perceive their gender identity as an issue that 
needs to be addressed medically, as will be discussed in Chapter 2), or to what 
17 I use 'network' here in a double way, following Mol and Law's (1994) sense of scale and 
distributive enactment, and Riles (2000) formal sense. 
18 Sarah Green (2002) makes a similar observation in her ethnography of lesbian cultures in London 
and Manchester. For Green, however, the network has a markedly virtual shade: her focus of 
analysis is the impact of information and communication technologies on traditional forms of 
community (see also her 1997 ethnography of London's lesbian cultures) 
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sometimes III trans communities IS understood to be 'transsexual' (as opposed to 
'transgender' or 'genderqueer'), because the limits of these categories often collapse in 
practice, and also because the amount of biotechnology and time spent in treatment is 
not always determinative of the way that transition is lived19 . People have different ideas 
of what it means to be FTM and understand transition in different ways (Diamond 
2004; Kotula 2002), and whereas there is a trans identity that can be explained through 
sex/ gender distinction, there are many other transitions where people live change and 
explicate their processes in different parameters. Boots Potential writes: 
"For a while, I was swindled into thinking, as many of us are, that there is a 
'correct' way to be trans: we have to take hormones, get a GID diagnosis, 
change pronouns, pass, feel like a boy in a girl's body, and get a preppy haircut. 
My inclination is to break the rules or flee from them, and if this long list of 
rigorous requirements was what it took to be trans, I didn't want 
that" (2004:33). 
My informants sometimes expressed similar concerns about more 'traditional' 
understandings of trans identity, and often held complex and shifting identitary 
configurations in relation to what they considered to be 'the trans narrative', that is, 
more 'mainstream', medical or normative ways of understanding trans identity. Sixteen 
were taking testosterone regularly, and seventeen had undergone top surgery 
(mastectomies). Two of my informants voiced similar questionings in relation to how 
transition in a traditional medical sense would help their gender identity, and, although 
they didn't phrase their identification in terms of 'monstrosity' like Boots Potential 
does, they were very firm in not wanting to reduce their processes to medical 
parameters of treatment, including taking testosterone and/or having different surgeries. 
Others, however, did make use of more medical notions of transition, understood as a 
journey to 'manhood' that enables one's body to materialise a gender identity that had 
always been latent. 
Twenty-one voices will appear in the text, however, conversations with many more 
people inspired the debates that I follow throughout the thesis, and their contribution 
to my discussion of transsexuality, the trans community, and transition was invaluable. 
The participants cover a wide age range, the youngest being 21 when our interview 
took place and the oldest 43. Although support groups and community events are open 
19 For example, I met trans men who have not ever used hormones and yet live as men and others 
who, having used hormones in the past, opt for more ambiguous social identities. 
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to people of all ages, age differences were understood to be important especially for 
those transitioning later in life, who were not always that visible in community events 
and projects. Some are activists whose work affects the trans community in one way or 
the other, be it through working in LGBT related trusts and organisations, performing 
in community events, or participating in conferences as academics and activists. Seven 
are regular FTM London members, and some are also involved in other collectives and 
projects, yet others do not use community spaces, and one even made the point that he 
explicitly avoided them because he didn't want to be publicly identified as trans. 
The majority live in Britain, but there is one who migrated to Canada and was only in 
the UK temporarily when our interview took place. Two have come to the UK from 
other European countries to transition, as the biopolitical regulations of their countries 
of origin do not include legislation similar to the Gender Recognition Act under which 
they could successfully live as men, and are now in the process of validating their new 
identities through double examinations carried out in their countries and in the UK. 
Twelve have their male names recognised in their official documents, but two prefer to 
use ambiguous names rather than letting other people assume they speak of themselves 
exclusively in masculine. Two, Pakistani and Spanish in origin, use a name that has a 
double meaning as female and male in order to circumvent legal requirements for name 
change, and in particular having to transition medically before being able to change their 
names. Ambivalent names often sidestep gender regulations, and, both in Spain and the 
United Kingdom, one is allowed to change name within the limits of one's gende0°. 
Finally, of all only two remain ambiguous about (if not openly against) physical 
transition, and have developed over the years ways to be male without hormonal or 
surgical input. All the interviewees embodied different kinds of masculinity, and each of 
them held a qualitatively different idea of transition and its physical, social, biological 
and psychological limits. Yet they lived masculinity in ways that exceed the gender they 
were assigned at birth, and often the gender they were educated into, and in this way 
gender is something they have had to work towards in one or another way. Thus they 
considered themselves to be 'in transition' to some extent, even though they thought 
differently of transition's milestones and 'stages'. They were extremely generous with 
20 Spanish regulations allow a name change within the same gender provided that six pieces of 
documentary evidence are presented before a tribunal, and in Britain names may be changed by 
usage. 
23 
their time and their involvement in sharing their narratives, and I often felt indebted to 
their generosity in ways I could not reciprocate. 
I have changed all of their names in my writing, and, given that I didn't respect their 
choice of name for reasons of confidentiality, I haven't marked their origin or hinted at 
the name they use with a choice of name that could be read as representative. In order 
not to facilitate identification, I do not state their ethnic, gender, race, or class 
'positions' in writing, even though my analysis acknowledges the way that different 
kinds of experience (and importantly, non-gendered and non-sexual experience) 
become crucial in order to understand transition as becoming and process. Yet to make 
those positions explicit is sometimes synonymous of situating someone in a predefined 
category, that most of the times I would be assuming rather than accounting for, as 
these identifications are per se mobile and shifting, and evolve when articulated in 
different events, stages and relations in a person's life. I will clarify this point further in 
the next section, but for now, I want to point out that my avoidance of these categories 
does not mean that there is not a diversity among the voices that speak in these pages, 
but rather, that this diversity does not aim to be representational of every speaking 
individual, and even less of the trans community as a whole. 
1.2.1 Interviews 
In 1972, Nash and Wintrob noted an increasing interest within anthropology about the 
ways in which the ethnographer's experience would inevitably affect the overall 
research results, a process which they encapsulated under the hypothesis that a new 
'self-consciousness' was emerging in ethnography (1972, see also Newton 2000). In 
their text, they point out some important differences emerged in the 'emotional and 
behavioural' involvement of ethnographers and the societies they study, especially after 
the point when the discipline started questioning its empiricist foundations in the 
1960's. For Nash and Wintrob, this qualitative change in anthropologists' understanding 
of the requirements of fieldwork determined the re-definition of the ethnographer's 
role in the field, and subsequently of the need to explicate that role in the ethnographic 
accounts that result from field experience (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Sangren 1988; 
Sahlins 1993). 
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Acknowledging the profound entanglement of ethnography and emotion, perhaps the 
same inseparability of science and passion about which Crapanzano (1980) and 
Rabinow (1977) talk in their reflections on fieldwork, the need of reflexivity was 
important in my research for a number of reasons. First, participant observation and the 
conditions of my involvement in the trans community had an impact on my research. 
On the one hand a certain emotional involvement with the trans community was a 
condition of the research results, insofar as the depth of the interviews and the empirical 
material developed therein relied implicitly in the complicity and trust that informed 
my relationship with my interviewees. On the other hand, that trust had to do with the 
relationship people established with my present and past involvement with trans issues, 
and my condition as both a 'professional stranger' and an 'insider' with respect to the 
questions I raised during the interviews. Second, as Esther Newton (2000) points out in 
her reflections about her involvement in queer communities, this double condition as a 
stranger and insider influenced how the interviews developed and later on the writing 
process. People's trust and the different expectations of reciprocity that populated our 
relations once my fieldwork had finished became a heavy weight to carry through the 
writing process. During writing I had to remove myself from the community in order 
to approach analytically several aspects of fieldwork and the empirical material produced 
therein (interviews, field diaries, and archival materials), perhaps at risk of undermining 
people's expectations, and certainly at an emotional cost. 
Yet the' complicity' that Marcus (1997) thinks is the result of the ambivalent position of 
the ethnographer in the field, could be taken to be more than the irony surrounding 
the relation between ethnographer and informants. Marcus suggests that when thought 
beyond the context of rapport, complicity can become a key notion in defining the 
relationship between the anthropologist and the political coordinates of the 
ethnography. This is because, rather than emphasising the relation of the anthropologist 
with the community in question, following Rosaldo, Marcus inverts the limits of 
fieldwork's mise-en-scene to suggest that it is not the community as a bounded entity, but 
the 'forces that make it change' - sometimes to the point of virtually effacing it - what 
is determinative of the complicity bind. He goes on to suggest that new definitions of 
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fieldwork locations and the progressive decentralisation of fieldwork practices intensifY 
this process. He writes: 
"The basic condition that defines the altered mise-en-scene for which complicity 
rather than rapport is a more appropriate figure is an awareness of existential 
doubleness on the part of both anthropologist and subject; this derives from 
having a sense of being here where major transformations are under way that are 
tied to things happening simultaneously elsewhere, but not having a certainty or 
authoritative representation of what those connections are" (1997:13, emphasis 
omitted). 
This is especially true with respect to the ways in which trans Issues are articulated 
internationally (although I am aware this was not Marcus' intended contrast), and in 
relation to changes that happen at other levels, no least in academic contexts. But 
Marcus further suggests that the anthropologist makes an 'elsewhere' present in 
fieldwork, in seeking that knowledge of the fact that one is subject to connections 
among different domains and spheres without necessarily being aware of the nature, the 
effects or the limits of those connections. The new contexts of multi-sited fieldwork are 
no longer defined by meta-narratives or all-encompassing discourses, but rather by 
those who participate in a research process, and thus the multi-sitedness of the 
ethnography resides precisely in the fact that the ethnographer deals with difference, 
and with the ways in which it is effected by discourses and actions 'elsewhere'. It will 
not need much explaining to say that I represented this elsewhere in more than one 
respect, because of my past in queer communities and because of being foreign, but 
importantly because I belonged to the academic milieu where discourses of 
transsexuality, gender and sexual identity are understood to emanate from. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty-one participants. Some of them 
volunteered to participate in this study at early stages of fieldwork, and others were 
approached after months of participation in community events. I guided each interview 
with a similar question plan; however, the way that people approached my questions 
determined the subsequent development of the interview. Given that the interview 
questions were highly intimate, I soon became aware of the limitations of following a 
strict interview model, as it seemed obvious that the questions that would make sense in 
relation to somebody's transition were meaningless for others. I understood that this 
contradiction could also help raise interesting issues beyond the question-answer 
framework of our encounter, as sometimes people would express surprise at some of 
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the concepts I suggested, and that estrangement could then be addressed per se within 
the interview setting, providing unforeseen new possibilities. For this reason, the 
process of planning the interviews, and of taking time off to prepare each encounter, 
was a crucial aspect of the research process. I believe that framing the questions in 
different terms of what is traditionally considered 'medical' transition was also critical in 
the overall interview practice, and provided an adequate setting to explore people's 
different perspectives on transition. I found my interviewees were generally comfortable 
with this flexibility, and everyone appropriated my questions creatively and answered 
them in a very intimate, personal, generous way. 
As Deleuze and Parnet (2002) suggest, interviews are a way of grasping one of the 
multiple combinations that can emerge from an encounter, because they create a 
common space and time that has a movement of its own. I think in this sense 
interviews were not exhaustive, and did not cover all areas with equal depth, but it was 
part of the negotiations each interview entailed to decide the limits and focus of the 
themes covered. In this way, interviews were contingent time-spaces in which many 
contextual issues defined the extent of people's involvement. 
All of the interviews took place in London, even though some of the interviewees were 
only in London for a short time to access treatment or participate in community events. 
The interview context became a primary location of my research, as it was during our 
encounter that people talked at length about their experiences in transition. Crucially, it 
was in this context that I had their permission to reproduce what was said. For this 
reason the interviews became important in yet another way, as the kind of relation they 
implied became a motivation for people to talk to me. I believe that some of the 
participants consented to be interviewed because they wanted to discuss what they 
considered to be important issues about transition and trans identity, thus making their 
voices 'matter' in the highly theorised discussions and debates about transsexuality, sex 
and gender. I know that others talked to me in order to get me off their backs. And 
some simply didn't mind talking about their journeys, as they believed that sharing their 
experiences verbally, especially in early stages of transitioning, would help situate and 
organise their feelings. 
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Interviews rest in a complex interaction, and involve intense preparation. Yet I believe 
that preparation was not essential in generating a deep and intimate ethos in the 
interview process, but that intimacy was the result of people's trust. As most participants 
had a long history of suspicion of academic and specifically anthropological work, I 
found that trust took more than explicating the theoretical biases and the limitations of 
my research. It emerged as I shared more time with the participants in community 
events, as I progressed interviewing people and as they talked about our interviews with 
others. In this sense those two processes, in which I intervened in different ways, 
allowed the participants to situate themselves in places they could be comfortable with, 
and where they felt their narratives would not become the object of analytic 
'judgement' (as one participant put it). Some of my informants expressed great concern 
about the way that their narratives were used in other studies, especially in medical 
settings but also outside, and this concern dissuaded others to participate in my research 
altogether. Before our encounter, I negotiated the limits of the interview with each of 
them, providing a background for my research and of myself as a researcher. Sometimes 
they were interested in using those contextual frameworks as starting points of the 
interview, although more often the interview would start with their own 
considerations, following a significant transition or community event. Then our 
conversations would cover things they considered important in their transition, the 
experiences that were significant at the time, and the relations between the different 
degrees of change that they noticed as a result of taking testosterone, living as men, 
thinking about their identity through transition, and becoming part of new relations 
and social worlds. 
The interviews took place at their homes or in public spaces, where they were recorded 
onto digital media (minidisc). I mention this because the medium played an important 
role in the interview process, as most of the times it failed, and the interview had to be 
rescheduled. Despite the frustration it supposed for me as well as them, this gave me the 
opportunity to interview many people more than twice, get back to them via email to 
elucidate an unclear point, and in general gave me the opportunity to develop several 
interview structures in order to organise the questions differently and allow the 
interviewees to develop their own ways of establishing relationships in more depth. For 
example, in some instances, having to repeat the interview raised interesting 
28 
problematics, as people would have changed their VIews between encounters and 
answer similar question in completely different ways. In particular, one of my 
interviewees made a great effort in our first interview to summarise his experience of 
transitioning, providing a very detailed account of his desire to change and the personal 
experiences that underpinned it, but when we met again, and despite my efforts to 
phrase things differently, instead of talking about his process, he produced a 'transition 
for dumrnies'21 account instead, contradicting some of the things he had previously said. 
Repeating the interviews after longer periods resulted in having more complex and 
contrasting information, which would then be key to establish connections between 
different areas. 
1.2.2 Literature as primary data 
Thus, although the interview has been defined within more positivist models of social 
science as "an information-gathering tool, designed to minimise the local, concrete, 
immediate circumstances of the particular encounter, ( ... ) and to emphasise only the 
aspects that can be kept general enough and demonstrable enough to be 
counted" (Benney and Hughes 1956:141), precisely the interstitial, "local, concrete and 
immediate" circumstances that framed the interviews and which were discussed in the 
previous section were essential in my research, and important in terms of accountability. 
Not only were these local and situated frames and connections themselves part of the 
data that the interview hoped to elaborate, but also crucially, they collapsed my role as 
an ethnographer/interpreter of the interview data. In fact, the thesis structure was in 
part developed as a result of thinking the connections between the different levels of 
interpretation that were already inherent in my informants' responses. Not only were 
they extremely savvy and articulate regarding everything surrounding their transition, 
but they framed their processes in existing institutional politics, and knowledge 
practices. In other words, people not only shared their transition stories as 'data', but 
they also offered their interpretations of those stories, and, in addition, situated their 
interpretation within the discourses, practices and politics that frame trans identity in 
historical, cultural and academic terms. 
21 This is a term that people used to refer to books and information resources about transition that 
treat the reader as completely ignorant of the basic facts of transition (see, for instance, Kailey 2005), 
paraphrasing the series of educational and reference series published by John Wiley and Sons. 
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In fact, one of the consequences of the 'suspicion' my informants expressed when 
considering whether or not to participate in my study was intricately linked to 
theoretical awareness. The use of theoretical resources as a feedback mechanism to 
construct, negotiate and politicise their identity was complex: medical discourses, as we 
will see in early chapters of the thesis, define transition as a linear passage between the 
categories of female and male, and under this definition transsexuals are offered free 
treatment and, especially since the Gender Recognition Act of 2004, legal and civil 
recognition. However, political discourses about sex, gender and identity proposed a 
radical revision of the relation between culture and materiality that yielded even more 
nuanced political models of identity and sexual formation. These two genealogies 
veritably informed the ways in which people understood their transitions, framed their 
identity as transsexual, transgender or genderqueer, and hence in some way informed 
their motivations and expectations when they talked to me. 
Theory is an important way in which trans people think about their identities and their 
bodies. It is part of the history of transsexuality in many ways, and through theory trans 
people have become a community of expertise by overtaking the representation of trans 
issues from previous medical/feminist/social sciences paradigms. An initiative I co-
coordinated during fieldwork, the Trans Reading Group, confirmed this entanglement 
and complicated it even further, as it became apparent that trans people use theoretical 
sources as explanations about their individual transitions, but also about gender, politics 
and the body. They appropriate theory to negotiate, translate and transform their 
identities in the face of political changes, and use it as a vehicle to generate multiple 
meanings for their transitions. For example, the tension between an understanding of 
western transsexuality as an independent phenomenon in social science discourses and 
the fact that trans people often tum to cross-cultural and historical models of 'third 
gender' constructing their history illustrated this ambiguity, and the ways in which it is 
characteristic of the 'cultural specificity' of transsexuality in the United Kingdom after 
the publication of Feinberg's Transgender Warriors (1996) and other 'third gender' 
literature (I discuss this further in Chapter 2). Therefore, my questioning those 
boundaries and the of the specificity of 'western' transsexuality - and that others have 
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problematised for other reasons22 - is not an issue that derives from theory, but rather, 
stems from the research practice. 
In a sense, people's suspicion about me and my research became an indicator of their 
own engagement with theory at many levels, and this was confirmed in the theoretical 
language with which people approached my questions, the ways in which they 
extrapolated their process to talk about concepts (such as 'the body', 'sex', 'gender', 
'masculinity', etc), and which demanded new and unexpected negotiations of my 
position in practice. I come back to these in chapter 8, but I want to emphasise that 
their reflexivity had an impact on research methodologies, especially the interviews. 
However, it also made me aware of broader links between the genealogies of trans 
representation and the ways in which people are able to transition today. This is the 
main reason behind the division of the thesis in two analytic parts, and of my revision 
of trans literature, medical and (post) feminist as sites of ethnographic enquiry in 
resources in Part 1. Overall, these theoretical threads have informed the ways in which 
people understood their own transitions, and also the ways in which I address it in the 
second part of the thesis. Thus the role of historiography and genealogy is not only to 
frame cultural specificity of the categories and institutions implicated in transition in 
one way or another, but is itself an ethnographic site of enquiry, because of the 
complex ways in which it informs people's understanding of what it means to be trans. 
1.2.3 Ethics 
The structure and arguments of the thesis were developed together, and hence the kind 
of materials that appear in the thesis, and the ways in which I talk about/through them 
are the result of ethical negotiation. This ethical negotiation took place during 
fieldwork as I approached research participants, but also during the writing process as 
ethics became enmeshed in other analytical decisions. Ethics was a direction or an 
opportunity for analysis, and not merely a limitation in terms of access or of the kind of 
thesis could develop. Thus the ethical considerations I outline below are analytic 
22 Towle and Morgan (2002, see also Morgan Holmes 2004) elaborate a critique of the concept of 
third gender. Their main focus is on the ways in which anthropological studies effectively 'create' 
the category of 'third gender' and the problematic connotations of the association between 'third 
genders' and native cultures. 
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choices, and as such, are linked to the aims this project sets out to accomplish described 
in the following section. 
This research was carried out outside clinical settings, and therefore will not treat 
participants as 'patients' nor will it use patient records or other official or confidential 
materiaL Due to the different codes of confidentiality involved in the research, explicit 
ethnographic information about fieldwork sites and events has been intentionally 
restricted. During fieldwork and at all stages of data collection, I have sought the 
informed consent of all participants, and negotiated with each of them the extent of 
their involvement in the project. Whereas I have their permission to reproduce what 
was said in our encounter, I have not given detail on context that would lead to the 
exposure of information they did not want to share. It is for this reason that the thesis 
relies heavily on interview transcripts, which I offered to research participants once the 
interview was over, but does not include ethnographic description of events and 
situations. Most of those who agreed to be interviewed preferred that their real names 
appeared in the study. However, in order to respect the confidentiality requirements of 
participants with greater restrictions, I have changed all their names, and, where 
possible, conte:xtualised their voices by quoting their narratives more extensively, in 
order to make my interpretation accountable and to provide, where possible, continuity 
to their accounts across the thesis. I have also made a decision not to edit their words or 
make major ammendments to the oral style that resulted from the interviews' 
transcription, in order not to alter their narrative flow in a significant way. 
During fieldwork, I contributed to the trans community 1ll vanous ways through 
participant observation in events and discussions, and also by organising discussion 
groups (the Trans Reading Group) where participants in my research and others could 
benefit from organised academic discussion of topics that interested them. However, 
the thesis does not incorporate descriptions of these spaces, nor other ethnographic 
material that stemmed from my engagement in community events, in order to protect 
the confidentiality of those involved. I have intentionally limited descriptions of events 
that could threaten participants' anonymity, and especially where such mention would 
concern people other than those who consented to participate in my research. 
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As a result of the intimacy of the interviews, many of my interviewees became closer 
friends than I would have expected, and I discovered that with some I shared scholarly, 
artistic or political interests. This made explicit concerns about intimacy, and the need 
to negotiate intimate relations in research. For example, even though we agreed on the 
release of interview materials to be used in the writing of the thesis, many conversations 
outside the interview setting complicated the initial statements, adding important 
modifications to interview materials, new points of departure and conclusion. As 
O'Connell Davidson illustrates through her own ethical dilemmas researching sex work 
(2008), consenting to intimate research is not a simple process, and often compromises 
not only the relation between ethnographer and informant, but also, importantly, the 
relation between the informant and her/his own narrative. Consent to intimate research 
involves the negotiation of ways to approach situations in which consent is given and 
then withdrawn, or those in which the relation between ethnographer and informant 
fails for reasons to do with the research process. 
Like O'Connell Davidson I had to disengage from many community activities as a 
result of the writing process, albeit for quite different reasons. The fact that I was doing 
the research while participating in community events compromised my position as a 
community member at first, and compelled me to be cautious about how I approached 
people in community spaces, including potential participants in my study. It was 
difficult to place the boundaries of my involvement in the community and the research 
dynamics I wanted to generate because, even though participation in community 
activities was a condition of my informants' involvement in my project, it became 
difficult to negotiate my presence in community events with the ethical requirements of 
the writing process. I have already described some of the difficulties involved in doing 
fieldwork in queer and trans spaces, especially the contradictions between sharing these 
spaces as a community member and generating research dynamics. I found that it is 
complex to generate research dynamics in these spaces because people construct them as 
safe spaces of interaction. Doing research in these spaces entails a great ethical 
responsibility, which in my fieldwork was aggravated for at least three reasons. First, I 
mentioned that I had inhabited trans spaces before starting the research, and access to 
London trans spaces was granted to me particularly because of my past engagement 
with trans issues. Undoubtedly, belonging in these spaces made me particularly sensitive 
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to some of the difficulties inhabitants of these spaces face in their daily lives as trans 
people, and I felt compelled to be particularly zealous protecting their identities and the 
construction of safe spaces within trans communities. Second, participants' protection 
becomes all the more important when one considers the reception of other studies 
about transsexuality in trans communities, and the ways in which these studies can 
potentially undermine people's safety and make them more vulnerable. Transsexuality 
and transition were exemplar in medical and social studies of sexual formation for well 
over half a century, and this had consequences in figuring a universal and scientific 
meaning of 'trans identity' and of transition, despite the real differences - of motivation, 
of aim and scope - between people's transitions, and limiting their agency as narrators 
of their own process and/or as researchers. Last, but never least, participants in this 
research and others who share trans spaces remain potential receivers of my research, 
and this brings to the forefront new concerns about the translation of the broader 
ethical concerns in real editorial decisions. It is for this reason that the empirical material 
that the thesis incorporates does not reflect observation or participation in spaces where 
participants did not voluntarily and explicitly share their narratives of transition with me 
and allowed for these narratives to be recorded. 
The fact that this research dialogues with trans people complicates matters even further, 
inasmuch as trans people are very aware of the regulative frameworks in which their 
transitions are embedded, and this self awareness enhances their sensitivity about the 
politics of representation of trans issues in their narratives and the contexts in which 
they will be represented, as will become clearer throughout the thesis. As I mentioned 
earlier, trans people are particularly sensitive about the ways in which their transitions 
and their identities are represented in different kinds of narratives, including the medical 
discourses that construct them as pathological in exchange for access to treatments, and 
the myriad scholarly accounts that in one way or another construct transsexuality as an 
object of academic enquiry. But the intimacy of the research process crucially raised 
ethical questions about the kind of contribution my analysis could make to problems 
associated with transsexuality, and about the kind of retribution that an anthropological 
study of this kind must make to meet participants' expectations. These expectations 
were multiple and coexisting, and whereas some participants voiced their wishes that 
my ethnographic engagement with transition would 'adequately represent' their 
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experience vis a vis other medical studies they had been involved with in the past in 
order to further the kind of politics carried out by organisations like Press for Change, 
others expected me to deal with their narratives in a non-judgemental, less stigmatising 
way; while some expected me to continue and further the critical project of queer 
theory and its recent intersection with trans gender studies (that I discuss in more detail 
in Chapter 2), others compelled me to understand their process in spite of this critical 
project and to acknowledge their form of transitioning not as a subversion but as an 
achievement of a stable identity through the embodiment of gender, which is 
sometimes understood as an 'affirmation' rather than a transition. This research was 
therefore situated by participants in the possibility of particular futures, but these futures 
were necessarily multiple and laid outside the scope of what the research could do. I 
soon realised that the framework I would create was not going to be necessarily tuned 
to all of their concerns, or even with other possible reference points we discussed of 
mainly North American transgender and queer theory. In order to engage with my 
informants' transition narratives analytically I had to distance myself from the friendships 
I had built during fieldwork, having, in most cases, to stop seeing the people I had 
interviewed and to cease engaging in community activities. I found my 'place' in the 
community during fieldwork, and especially the different demands of participation in 
community events and politics were difficult to reconcile with the demands of the 
analytic process. As I got progressively immersed in writing the thesis, I felt the need to 
distance myself completely from trans related events, partly due to the weight of 
transition taking over all areas of my personal life, and in part in order to find analytic 
distance to approach transition, and the other kinds of empirical material derived from 
fieldwork in the past tense, more tuned to the ethical negotiations that underpin my 
thesis. 
While these ethical concerns made my task as an analyst especially difficult, particularly 
when it meant approaching my informants' narratives analytically and constructing a 
theoretical framework with which to approach transition, they also represented an 
opportunity to engage with the ways in which existing regimes of knowledge 
production historically theorised transsexuality and transition. The emphasis on defining 
transsexuality as a coherent and bounded identity based upon a physical and social 
transformation is anchored not only on people's sense of completeness after transition, 
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but on the historical primacy of categories like expenence, identity and gender, and 
their association with notions of personhood, agency and the life cycle. This thesis 
displaces that emphasis to ask, with research participants, whether transition can be 
understood in different, albeit many times coexisting, terms, to explore different kinds 
and scales of transition experience. 
1.2.4 Analysis 
The kind of analysis this thesis will embark upon will consider the relation between 
different issues in transition brought up by medical, academic and political traditions in 
order to better understand the weight of these traditions in the making of transsexuality. 
My project aims to contribute to a growing field of academic enquiry into new ways of 
thinking transition, the body, sex and gender, in the line of what recently Stryker 
(2006) has deemed the task of problematisation of transgender studies. Unlike other 
analyses of transition where the analytical focus resides in the development of 
biomedical, (post)feminist or political representation (Hausman 1995; Ekins and King 
1996; Cromwell 1999) the focus of my analysis in Part II will also be on rethinking 
aspects of transition not necessarily developed within these traditions. Thus while my 
project implicitly problematises some of the ways in which transition has been thought 
by these discourses, it will crucially aim to think new aspects of transsexuality. 
There is a growing number of autobiographies and descriptions of FTM transition and 
lifestyle in recent literature, which take the form of individual transition diaries, or 
politically oriented collective accounts of transition which emphasise the ways in which 
FTMs' transition 'to' masculinity - through series of historically and culturally specific 
meanings -. However, while descriptions and portrayals of FTMs and their lifestyles are 
proliferating in relation to different political and representational projects (see Kotula 
2002; Cameron 1996; Devor 1997), my project will be concerned with developing 
new ways of thinking transition, not necessarily only as it is 'lived' by people, but as it 
happens at different levels at which transition matters, including the development of 
treatments within biomedical and pharmaceutical communities of practice, 
intersubjective realms of generation of meaning, and the production and effects of 
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academic discourses about sex, gender and the body. It is for this reason that, instead of 
addressing the impact of people's transitions in the constitution of their sexual or gender 
identity, my analysis in the thesis will attempt to address transition experience as it is 
configured in different assemblages, where I approach the material and symbolic 
configurations of transition in relation to different levels of becoming and practice. In 
this way, I displace the traditional focus on 'transsexual subjectivity', which yielded 
productive analyses of transsexuality and sexual formation within biomedicine and some 
feminist discourses in the past decades, in favour of three devices that encapsulate these 
relations at different levels: testosterone, narrative and thresholds. 
In order to approach those three levels analytically, I first lay the 'coordinates' of 
transition in Part I. Chapter 2 will evince some of the political underpinnings of 
biomedical approaches to transitioning, making clear the reasons why trans social 
theorists have consistently displaced their analyses from those of psychiatrists and 
physicians, exploring in tum cultural, historical, and legal dimensions of transsexuality. 
Participants in my research remarked that their relation with the medical establishment 
was sometimes ambiguous, and that is currently becoming more contentious as people 
transitioning seek recognition for gender expressions outside the gender binary 
privileged by the biomedical protocol of transsexuality. The current protocol, based on 
a triadic treatment that includes psychotherapy, hormones and surgery, is mediated by a 
mental health diagnosis and safeguarded by legislation that requires people to abide by a 
binary gender model and to remain in their chosen genders until death. Whereas this is 
a hard won result of trans identity politics in Britain, Spain, and other countries that 
have used the treatment protocol proposed by the Wodd Professional Association of 
Transgender Health to generate frameworks of recognition of trans identity, other 
organisations within the spectrum of transsexual and transgender rights in Euroamerican 
countries are concerned with wider possibilities of medicalisation and recognition of 
trans identities, not necessarily oriented to irreversible transitions via hormonal 
treatment or surgery in all cases, but recognising ways that people engage with 
treatment and with gender identity are multiple and shifting. Thus, some international 
trans collectives, such as the network Inter-Trans, and local groups, such as the Sylvia 
Rivera Law Project, Guerrilla Travolaka, Les Pantheres Roses or Idaho, are proposing 
new political initiatives that follow the lead of the depathologisation of gay and lesbian 
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identities in 1972. Through a number of different focuses, but particularly articulated 
around challenging the social and moral underpinnngs of 'conventional' transition, 
these groups are reworking transition and gender e}..'Pression beyond the medical 
parameters of 'normality' - based on aesthetic standards developed within the history of 
sexology as the appropriate morphology of the sexes-, rethinking what it is to become 
male in relation to social and moral narratives of nature, sex and gender. 
Analyses of transsexuality within the feminist tradition (see Raymond 1980; Riddle 
1996) evaluated transsexual identities in the context of sexual politics, and in so doing, 
circumscribed processes of transition to their subversive impact in the context of sexual 
politics. In the tradition of radical feminism of the seventies, transsexual subj ectivity was 
understood as a fabricated identity that had pernicious effects on the kind of sexual 
politics historically developed by feminists. Later, however, queer theorists (Kossofsky 
Sedgwick 1991, 1993; Butler 1990, 1993; De Lauretis 1987, for instance) destabilised 
the scope of sexual politics by interrogating the boundaries between gender and 
sexuality, and thus gave a different tum to the relation between the political upheavals 
that led to the civil recognition of transsexual identity and the political project(s) of 
feminism (see Stryker 2008; Devor and Matte 2004). Within queer discourses, the 
question of sexual formation received a different redress, making possible to conceive of 
a different relation between sex and gender. However, and as we will see in Chapter 4, 
and despite the fact that these discourses reworked the categories of sex and gender in 
meaningful ways, queer studies still understand transition, and especially transsexual 
transition, in terms of the formation of an identity, at the same time impossible and 
necessary, where the performativity of gender norms enact the body's becoming-
gender, while at the same time desabilising sex through gendered action. 
Originally, I envisioned my project as the intersection between different discourses 
about transsexual identity that were relevant to the ways my informants understood 
transition in different ways, but my project was not intended to address gender identity 
exclusively for a number of reasons. The complex relationship between trans identity, 
the recent diversification of trans politics in Euro-American countries, and the 
production of gender theory - within cultural studies and social science traditions - has 
affected trans communities, to effects that some critics have highlighted as pernicious 
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(Stryker 1994; Love 2004). Theoretical approaches within such academic traditions, 
these critics argue, focus on describing transsexual identity, and in so doing, perhaps 
unwittingly reproduced a focus on transsexuality that emphasises the construction of 
difference in transsexual identities, highlighting, for example, the importance of medical 
treatment or the social impact of trans people's bodies. As I describe in Chapter 2, a vast 
amount of literature on transsexuality focuses almost exclusively on the formation of 
transsexual identities, as well as on the challenges of sexual transition to the formation of 
subjectivity, and addresses transition processes by examining the relation between 
gender embodiment and historically and culturally specific discourses about experience. 
My project displaces this focus on identity in order to explore transitioning experience, 
not only as it affects the formation of identity, but as it intersects the body and different 
scientific practices, diffracting the cultural meanings associated with movement and 
becoming, with ideas of nature, and with gender and sex. 
In this way, the arguments I develop in the thesis have a different position than existing 
approaches to transsexuality of biomedical and social science discourses. I wanted to 
explicitly avoid the centrality of current political debates about transsexual identity to 
better understand the ways in which differences among different processes of transition 
are created not only as a result of politics, but are entwined with a variety of material, 
social and cultural realities. Specifically, I wanted to give relevance to aspects of the 
process of transitioning not addressed by biomedical and feminist discourses in order to 
avoid reductionist perspectives that obscure the processual and relational nature of the 
process of transitioning. In this sense, the three devices I use to analyse transition 
(testosterone, narrative, thresholds) will serve as points of departure, or as set levels at 
which to approach the experience of transitioning. The displacement of the unit of 
analysis to these devices entailed, I believe, not only to take them as empirical points of 
departure, but also a different engagement with traditional writing styles in 
anthropology. The narratives of those who shared their transitions with me were thus 
approached as empirical material in framing the arguments the thesis makes, but those 
arguments do not aim to describe transition processes ethnographically, but rather to 
contribute analytically to the different assemblages (of material relations, knowledge 
production, institutional policy making and expertise) in which those transitions are 
embedded. 
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Therefore, this research aims to find ways of speaking to and about trans issues that are 
not necessarily representational or oppositional, but rather approach transition through 
the connections between different kinds and scales of transitioning experience. The 
different arguments through which I propose to approach transition are not about the 
identity of the participants in this research, but address assemblages of transitioning 
experience. This approach thus emphasises relationality and the connections between 
different levels of reality over categories and symbolic configurations associated with the 
formation of gender alone, because it aims to explore transition as a becoming rather 
than an arrival. This focus is the result of engaging with various kinds of empirical and 
ethnographic material, as this was the view of transition that participants in this research 
privileged in the interviews they held with me, where they talked about different 
dimensions of the process of transitioning more than their arrival at a particular body, a 
gender or a social identity. In fact, and although other studies emphasise the 'fixity' 
involved in transitioning, and precisely understand it to be essential to the becoming 
involved in FTM transition - as opposed to other kinds of reversible transitions -, my 
study will aim to unpack the ways in which transitioning implies both fixity and 
fluidity, situating different kinds of transitioning experience as processes which involve 
both. For example, important dimensions of transitioning, such as acquiring a new 
name or new civil rights inherent in gender, and having modified one's body often 
irreversibly, are coeval with, and in fact very often the starting point of the becoming 
involved in transition. 
Very often the trans people I met understood their transitions as unfinished, and as 
journeys which had a beginning but not a foreseeable end. Thus the approach I develop 
in the thesis contrasts existing discourses about transsexuality that define transition as a 
passage between the categories of female and male and units of transition experience, 
formed not only through participants' perception of transition but as assemblages of 
varied scale of transitioning experience, where the multiple enactment of clinical 
realities, of support groups and the use of different biotechnologies is framed wider 
processes, policy making decisions, market strategies, and regimes of knowledge 
production. 
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This approach resonates with a number of challenges posed by current developments in 
social theory and in anthropology. Although these concepts relate to each other, and 
exist in particular arrangements, they are not intended to offer a theory of transition, 
but to explore the experience of transitioning as it is distributed in assemblages, or 
shared domains of experience. First, in the line of recent work carried out by 
anthropologists of science, it shifts the emphasis from ontology to relationality (see for 
instance Rabinow 2003; Strathern 1991). Since transitioning encompasses different 
kinds of material and symbolic entities, as well as processes of individual and collective 
identity formation, my project aims to unpack the different levels at which transition 
makes a difference, to provide a new kind of analysis based on the challenges of 
understanding social life as a process enacted differently by different actors and In 
different time/spaces. It is thus my aim to contribute to existing discourses about 
change, identity and process at the core of the approaches to social and cultural life 
developed in anthropology and in social theory, where a new emphasis on emergence, 
process and practice is shifting traditional units of anthropological analysis (Fortun 2001; 
Ong and Collier 2005; Rabinow and Marcus 2008). Thus, this thesis discusses 
transition through a series of concepts developed in uneven fields, but that share a 
common pattern (Whitehead 1978:194) in dealing with process, matter and experience. 
This approach was arrived at by developing alternative analytic strategies to the analysis 
of sex, gender and experience. Poststructural and queer theories (Foucault 1979, 1985; 
Kosofsky Sedgwick 1991; Butler 1990; Weeks 1991; Derrida 1982) displaced the 
formation of sexual identity from inside the individual to the effect of cultural meaning 
and forms of social control. In this context sex or gender are not understood as the 
result of individual choice but as the effect of complex sets of regulative practices. 
Particularly, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick initiated an important turn in her introduction to 
Epistemology oj the Closet (1991) when she theorised the epistemological limits of 
thinking gender and desire, as well the important effects of those limits. She established 
that, if the terms of a debate have an impact in how things can be thought as, indeed, 
Sedgwick argues, the nature/culture debate relied upon assumptions about nature and 
about culture, the historisation of homosexuality already implied coherence -in the very 
definition of homosexuality and its existence as an analytic paradigm- "rather than a 
space of overlapping, contradictory, and conflictual definitional forces" (Sedgwick 
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1991:45). Probing the historicity of the categories associated with homosexuality, 
sexual orientation and sexual identity, Sedgwick argued that the problematics of 
theoretical/political positions behind naming are resonant with the problematics of 
identification with/as a name. 
I developed my own problematisation of transsexuality, and of the categories, 
assumptions and associations that uphold it, as a starting point in my analysis of 
transition. Transsexuality "as we know it", or as it has hitherto been thought, is a 
historicised category where the desire to transition one can voice rests in particular 
assumptions about identity and gender, implies a particular role of psychiatric services, 
endocrinology and surgery, a kind of sexual politics, and a definition of sexual 
formation in relation to political and legal notions of identity. Engaging with the 
multiple experiences of transition of my interviewees, my project is concerned with 
whether transition can be thought otherwise, and with whether thinking transition 
otherwise can enable new theoretical/political possibilities. My analysis departs from the 
interstices of traditional ways of thinking transition, and of the different realities that 
configure it, and think transition through in new possibilities. These are concerned 
with futures that include explaining the past in new ways, to generate the possibility of 
other opportunities of thought, politics and feeling. 
This approach presupposes a different use of theory than is conventional in traditional 
ethnography. The reader will note that in this thesis theory and ethnography have been 
developed together. The development of theory and ethnography as mutually informed 
and mutually constitutive elements has implications in terms of what the reader can 
expect of the writing, and certainly implies the existence of a number of distancing 
devices to desplace the underpinnings of traditional ways of understanding categories 
like experience, identity and temporality, as well as an ethnographic gaze that could 
exoticise participants by not limiting the generalisations that derive from traditional uses 
of these categories. In this way, the theoretical dimension of the thesis became a part of 
the thesis' object, as a number of different discourses about identity, experience, agency 
and gender were implicated in the practice of transition. My ethical commitment to the 
participants in this study required not only that I protected their anonymity, as I discuss 
in the next section, but also that the analysis would not aim to address their identities 
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and their social lives in ways that could lead to replicating the generalisations inherent 
in the 'default' ways of understanding sexual formation, gender identity, subjectivity as 
individual processes. 
Often, writing with theory implies assuming a level of abstraction that might be seen to 
obscure the happenings that led to writing up an episode, using a particular device, or 
indeed the writer's struggle to achieve a particular interpretation, a struggle that is 
generally visible in accounts based on ethnographic methodologies. Yet writing with 
theory already implies that struggle, and opening realities to concepts, and thus making 
concepts 'lures' for change, is itself inherent in analytic practices, where, like Stengers 
points out of scientific cultures, an analyst must be primarily concerned not with an 
absolute vision of reality, but with producing something new within the constraints of 
the scientist's own tradition. For Stengers science is alive in the analyst's 'possibility to 
produce something new in a concrete way' (2003:258), in the possibility of making a 
difference for her colleagues by engaging not only with reality but with the views, 
methods and concepts that set an analytic question in the first place. "In this way", 
writes Stengers, we should not forget that "there is never an answer without a question; 
and that new questions never displace other questions, they are added to the 
others" (2003:261). In this sense, the aim of analysis is not to 'unveil' reality, but to 
pursue ideas within the limits of particular traditions of thought, methodology and 
ethics. 
I am aware that some devices involved in my approach to transition could induce the 
assumption that concepts themselves 'led' the ethnographic description and the writing 
process. However, the relation between theory and ethnography is per se a contentious 
one, and balanced differently in anthropologists' engagement with the complexities of 
fieldwork. Like in Donna Haraway's 'diffraction', this engagement produces knowledge 
by 'making a difference in the world' (Haraway 1997:36). This difference is about ways 
of thinking and their limits, and involve, in any research practice, and of generating 
interferences and interactions. I have tried to elicit this difference not as an ontological 
truth (being), but as concrete sets of relations where different material and symbolic 
entities interact as part of the same assemblages of reality and explanation (becoming). 
Here, the distinction between being and becoming (as, for instance, in transition and 
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transitioning) is primarily analytical, of point of view, rather than a reflection of the 
often contradictory ways in which the trans men understand identity and the limits of 
transition. 
The analytical devices I use in the thesis will help me engage with transition as a 
reality/explanation assemblage situated at the crossroads of different problematics. This 
concern is about 'equipment' in the sense discussed by Paul Rabinow, or about the 
technologies, apparatuses, and devices through which transition is enacted by different 
collectives, and about acknowledging the relations between multiple levels at which 
transition matters, including micro and cellular levels within the body, identity, the 
generation of national legal frameworks of trans identity, transnational pharmaceutical 
markets, and biomedical frameworks of care provision. But it is also about the relation 
between 'equipment' and 'problematisation'. For Rabinow, problematisations are 
crucial to the task of anthropology, because they are "both a kind of general and social 
situation -saturated with power relations, as are all situations, and imbued with the 
relational 'play of truth and falsehood', a diacritic marking a subclass of situations - as 
well as a nexus of responses to that situation" (2003: 19). In this thesis, structure and 
arguments are part of this task of problematisation, and in this sense, the structure of the 
thesis aims to develop an integrative approach that reflects the thesis' findings in its 
analytic structure. 
Thus while my thesis aims to address relations among different levels at which transition 
matters by generating new ways of thinking transition through and against existing 
discourses, concepts and methodologies, this approach has clear limitations, as it will not 
offer descriptive ethnography in the traditional sense, nor a first person account of the 
events and happenings of fieldwork. Rather, my analysis uses empirical material 
gathered during fieldwork to generate a common ground from which I analyse 
transition with the participants in my research. I am therefore guided by their expertise 
and sometimes by their concern, but I do not offer a portrait of them as people or a 
linear account of their individual transitions. The contribution this thesis aims to make 
is to provide a set of conceptual tools to think transition differently, and to contribute 
to rather than replicate the debates about transsexual identity that are already being 
addressed in other areas of transgender scholarship, as described in Chapter 2. 
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1.3 Overview of thesis structure and chapters 
The thesis is divided into two parts, which address different kinds of empirical material. 
Part 1 (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) establishes the 'coordinates' through which transsexuality 
and transition are represented within the field of transgender studies, and in medical and 
(post)feminist discourses. Through highlighting these coordinates, I intend not only to 
situate transition in the discourses and practices that make transsexuality public, but also 
to layout their assumptions about transsexuality as an identity and about the experience 
of transitioning. In fact, although in different ways, both biomedical and political 
discourses assume transsexuality as a discrete transition that begins when someone seeks 
medical treatment and ends with the achievement of a series of physical, legal, social 
and psychological transformations. 
In Chapter 2 I explore the constitution of a field of transgender studies, through 
highlighting the emergence of key issues in different kinds of trans literature of the past 
decades. While I review this literature in order to present the key issues that FTMs have 
thought are at stake in the theoretical and political construction of FTM identity, I 
focus on the ways in which these discourses created an original way of thinking 
transition. Often in this literature there is emphasis placed on the relations between the 
location, historicity and contexts of action of FTM representation and other discourses 
about transition. In fact, as a result of different kinds of politics, autobiographical 
narratives of transsexuality and transition, 'trans' social sciences accounts, and more 
recently, critical reviews of these sources are beginning to be seen as a new 'field' for 
the study of FTM identity, transgender studies are increasingly becoming a resource 
resource for those transitioning. I analyse the impact of the creation of transgender 
studies in the definition of new categories, identities and issues associated with 
transsexuality, and explore the ways in which these new coordinates define transition 
through the distinction between sex and gender, and through the attribution of 
different ontological and political values to nature and culture, biology and behaviour. 
In fact transsexuality became later, in countries where civil recognition for transsexual 
people exists, a legal identity that recognises medical the use of medical treatment in 
order to correct a mismatch of brain and genital sex, or of biology and gender identity. 
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In Chapter 3 I argue that the emergence of the sex/gender distinction was associated 
with the development of sexology throughout the twentieth century. Biomedical 
discourses define transsexuality by grouping a series of symptoms (Barrett 2007) into 
several Gender Identity Disorders (GID) for which hormonal and surgical treatment is 
understood as a 'cure'. In Chapter 3 I unpack this logic by exploring the implications of 
the history of the sex/gender distinction in sexology throughout the twentieth century. 
I trace some of the implications of the distinction between sex and gender in the 
production of categories of sexual 'inversion' and normality, and illustrate the ways in 
which this distinction informed methods of clinical management of transsexuality and 
the aetiological models that explain the condition and its therapeutic logic. I argue that 
a historical emphasis on categories, protocols and causes of transsexuality characterised 
medical discourses of transsexuality in the history of psychiatry, endocrinology and 
sexology in the twentieth century, even though I also show how from their inception 
these different efforts implicated each other in many ways. In this way, my analysis will 
highlight three different stages in the development of treatments: early forms of 
categorisation of sexual inversion and the emergence of scientific/biomedical literature 
about transsexuality and hermaphroditism, the development of systematic medical 
approaches to the question of sexual transition through the development of different 
biotechnologies and clinical relations, and the recent turn to socio-biology that 
characterised biomedical research into the biological aetiology of transsexuality. Having 
set this historical context, I then analyse the Standards of Care Gender Identity 
Disorders, currently the international protocol of gender reassignment used in the 
United States, Britain, and many other countries worldwide. Through four correlated 
milestones (clinical threshold, diagnosis, real- life experience and standards of treatment) 
I unpack the different medical practices that people navigate in order to access 
treatment. 
Chapter 4 focuses on recent critiques of the sex/gender distinction in academic 
discourses, especially on recent elaborations of the notion of matter in some strands of 
(post)feminism. I discuss how the increasing politisation of sex in the past decades was 
linked to critiques of the nature/culture divide emerged in different settings, and focus 
in particular on those that explicitly address sexual formation. I review three different 
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sites of this debate, namely the notion of' corporeality' developed by Grosz and Gatens 
(and applied by others to health and sex debates), alliances between biology and 
feminism, and Judith Butler's paradigm of gender performativity. I revise the different 
political scope of these paradigms, and explore the ways in which they are mobilised 
politically as models of 'subversion'. I consider the model of performativity more 
closely, because of its impact on the development of sexual politics in the past two 
decades. My interest lies particularly in the tension between the theoretical assets 
mobilised by (p ost) feminist models and the concrete ways in which its political 
potential was appropriated by social movements, and specifically by trans movements in 
the United States and Europe. The notion of performativity is important here because it 
offers a different model of politics, based on sophisticated reworkings of the notion of 
agency, and because it is engaged in several traditions of'liberationist' discourses such as 
radical feminism, psychoanalysis and poststructural theory. But my interest in these 
debates is also to some extent 'formal', or in the ways in which theoretical arguments 
not only politicised the body, sex, gender and sexuality, but extrapolated this model of 
politics to the analysis of identity, race, economics and social theory, becoming an all-
encompassing and ubiquitous definition of the politicaL 
In Part 2 (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) I present my informants' narratives of transition in detail, 
and consider how, using the 'coordinates' in a variety of ways, my informants' accounts 
of transition also demand a different approach. I address the experience of transition 
through three different domains that my informants privileged in our interviews, where 
I understand transition as a particular kind of becoming where different levels of 
transition experience are articulated in becoming FTM. Thus I explore transition 
through testosterone, narrative and thresholds. Each of these domains will constitute a 
different analytic lens to discuss transition not as an in-between state, but rather, as a 
multi-dimensional, relational process brought into experience through heterogeneous 
and shifting assemblages. 
In Chapter 5 I take testosterone as a unit of analysis. I use Bensaude-Vincent and 
Stengers' triadic conceptualisation of matter in the different phases of expansion of the 
history of chemistry (structural material-functional material-informed material) to map 
the context of emergence of synthetic sex hormones and their different uses in 
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biomedicine and the industrial expansion of chemistry. Hormones were conceptualised 
in early endocrinological discourses as relational agents within the body, but throughout 
the twentieth century, partly as a result of the experimental methodologies that 
facilitated the expansion of chemistry, they were isolated and measured in terms of their 
functions. In this context, steroid hormones were understood to be independent causal 
agents of sex, and therefore became actors in the generation of increasingly mechanistic 
models of sexual formation. On the one hand hormones were seen to 'encapsulate' sex, 
and to be able to generate sex in contexts of 'lack'. On the other hand, through 
hormonal research biomedicine implemented increasingly mechanistic notions of 
gender as a cultural product, developed by cognitive behaviourists and later by 
ethnomethodologists. In a growing chemical industry where pharmaceuticals were 
increasingly applied in therapeutic models, hormones became both the truth of sex and 
the measurement of gender. 
My infonnants' relationship with testosterone as an agent in their transitions was more 
complex and manifold. Through support and information networks they were able to 
negotiate their rate of'masculinisation' by changing their intake method, and therefore 
by generating different 'chemical times', which were associated to rates of change and 
to different possible transition speeds. They understood testosterone in relation to 
several levels of effects, some located in their bodies, some in correlated social changes, 
some in the association between biological aspects and chemical, political or emotional 
changes. In this sense, hormones were not only mechanistic agents of production of 
sex, but first and foremost relational agents, connectors between different levels of 
reality. In this way I address the role of testosterone and its masculinising potential in 
transition, and discuss different tensions between its predictable and unpredictable 
effects. 
Chapter 6 conceptualises the role of narrative in transition. Existing cartographies of 
transition emphasise how ideas of identity, trans subjectivity and identification are 
, effectively' (or performatively) produced through narrative, and thus these discourses 
conceptualise narrative as the site of biomedical or political 'truth' about transsexuality. 
However, the manifold narratives about transition my informants produced and 
engaged with, evince that the role of narrative in transition is not only associated with 
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narrative's structural properties. Rather, I illustrate that narrative IS ingredient in 
people's transitions in ways that challenge the structural reading of narrative that often 
biomedical and political discourses endorse, and explore the ways in which narrative, 
while having structural properties in that it orders different experiences, is also an 
assemblage that produces different effects in people's transitions. Thus this chapter 
engages with narrative by disentangling some of the assumptions with which certain 
discourses approach the efficacy of narrative, and explores how the role of context, time 
and relationality situate narrative as a kind of transition experience. 
In Chapter 7 I explore thresholds as devices through which expenence becomes 
temporal in transition. Drawing on classic ethnographic conceptualisations of thresholds 
in ritual, as well as the notion of 'passing' voiced by ethnomethodologist and queer 
approaches to transition, I conceptualise thresholds in relation to change and time. 
However, whereas in these discourses, passing is understood as an 'effect' of transition, 
which is sometimes reduced to the 'subversion' of historically and culturally delimited 
categories of sex and gender, I rethink the implications of the notion of passing in 
conceptualising FTM transition as a discreet passage between 'female' and 'male'. I then 
analyse the ways in which thresholds relate to the temporal quality of experience by 
becoming structuring devices in people's transitions. I conceptualise thresholds in 
relation to change and becoming, and argue that thresholds make temporal distinctions 
possible by structuring time in 'durations'. I explore people's conceptualisation of 
transition as a process where change and continuity confonn experiential states through 
which they navigate the multidimensionality of transition. I use thresholds to explore 
movement, endurance and experience, and conceptualise them as points of change that 
challenge the possibility of reducing experience to linear categories. In this sense, this 
chapter challenges the idea that transition is the linear passage between the categories of 
'female' and 'male', and argues for the unity and specificity of the unit 'FTM'. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 I develop some implications of the thesis' analytic structure and 
outline some of the thesis' conclusions. 
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Part I 
COORDINATES 
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This part of the thesis conceptualises transition in relation to a senes of biomedical, 
political and acaademic 'coordinates'. I conceptualise these coordinates as key points of 
reference through which transition has been described in public discourses. In 
reviewing these different genealogies, I intend to layout their assumptions about the 
experience of transitioning and to examine the ways in which they construct 
transsexuality as a pathology and a coherent and unitary identity. These discourses use 
sex and gender as different yet complementary dimensions of subjectivity, and 
conceptualise the experience of transitioning as a linear passage between fixed 
categories. Although these discourses assume, in different ways, that sex and gender are 
ontologically and politically different, ultimately they also share the assumption that 
transsexuality can be universally defined as a mismatch between the two. 
In one sense, it could be argued that the three chapters contained in this part constitute 
a different conceptualisation of the problem of transsexuality, and as such each of the 
chapters in this part is a different strand of literature review. However, although the 
three chapters contained in this part contextualise the debates the thesis addresses, they 
also make the medical, political and identitary coordinates an object of analysis. The 
kinds of concerns discussed in this part are in many ways the result of my ethnographic 
fieldwork in London's trans community, where the close entanglement between 
medicine, identity and politics informs the community's social life. The structure and 
kind of discussion contained in this part will also become relevant for my 
conceptualisation of transition in Part II, where I address my informants' experiences of 
transition empirically and discuss how, even though these coordinates are used in 
different ways, their accounts of transition and their experiences also demand a different 
analytical approach. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 
Transgender studies and the construction of FTM identity 
This chapter explores existing constructions of FTM transition in relation to theoretical 
constructions of trans identity developed within the field of transgender studies. I situate 
trans identity around four interrelated issues that became consequential in trans people's, 
and specifically FTMs', definitions of transition. These issues are important, I will argue, 
not merely because they are representative of different dimensions of trans identity not 
addressed by scientific discourses about transsexuality, but also because of the ways in 
which trans identity and politics are understood in Britain today. A number of 
initiatives I was involved in during fieldwork, revealed the extent to which people were 
aware of different forms of trans representation, and how a number of texts, 
autobiographies and transition diaries became points of reference for those considering 
transitioning. These forms of representation, which cross national boundaries, also had 
an impact on how trans identity could be negotiated publicly, informing policy making 
and and people's understanding of transition and of 'normal trans narratives'. These 
'normal' narratives were often my informants' points of reference in articulating their 
transition narratives. For example, often people situated the beginning of their 
transitions in a symbolic moment where they realised 'they were trans' and from this 
realisation 'accepted' a number of things about themselves, and that they elaborated 
during our interviews as we got to discuss transition, politics, safety, visibility and the 
future. 
Although it has been a common trend in academic discourses to trace the historicity of 
transsexuality to the development of medical technologies (Bolin 1988; Hausman 1995; 
King 1993, 1996), perhaps due to the fact that many studies were conducted by medical 
practitioners and/or in clinical settings, the political history of transsexuality has run in 
parallel with that of the biomedical and biotechnological development of treatments, 
generating multiple connections between the implementation of treatments, the 
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generation of models of access and the struggle for human and civil rights. In the 
United States, as Stryker's Transgender History (2008) suggests, certain events (such as the 
Stonewall riot of June 28th 1969, for instance) were not only milestones but also 
veritable political breakthroughs for the recognition of trans people, and had 
implications in theoretical and literary production, the media, the clinical management 
of transsexuality, and the DSM. In intricate relation with LGBTIQ (Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Trans, Intersex and Queer) movements, trans politics currently oscillate 
between groups that seek the recognition of trans identity in medical and legal 
narratives and a myriad other 'molecular'23 movements that configure trans identity 
differently, be it through elaborating new approaches to transition, or new political lines 
in the context of existing frameworks of sexual politics. And yet, despite the increasing 
politicisation of trans issues in the past decades, the relation between trans identity, 
politics, authenticity and transition is still problematic. 
FTM transition has received little academic attention and is understood by trans people 
and medical professionals to be 'a highly under-researched field'. It stands at the 
crossroads of a number of theoretical and literary discourses on transsexuality, gender 
studies and the social sciences. In this sense it can be said that FTM literature is a mixed 
field, intertwining autobiography, medical texts, sociology and anthropology, and that it 
bears a complex relation to the studies about MTF transition on which much of general 
trans theory relies empirically. Here, these different traditions have been grouped 
around existing debates in trans gender studies that focus on issues. This division is 
somewhat artificial because each of these issues triggered the production of interrelated 
theoretical representation in the last four decades, and in this sense they are neither 
exclusive of each other nor of other issues that I will not be discussing here for reasons 
of brevity24. In this respect, every line of enquiry informed and was informed by others 
23 Here, I am using 'molecular' in Guattari's (1995a, 1996) sense of micropolitics, and to denote the 
shifting constitution of grassroots movements, whose association is not necessarily based on identity 
but on issues. 
24 For example, there is a growing field of video-based trans representation including video-diaries 
of transition, and films featuring trans characters. These experiential accounts highlight the 
specificities of individual transitions, and have become in recent years invaluable resources for those 
transitioning. However, these kind of representations of transition fall outside the scope of this 
chapter because of their changing character, and because the nature of these accounts tend to be 
framed in internet networking sites, which involve different ethical considerations. However, 
international trans conferences and trans categories in film festivals are proliferating in recent years, 
and both groups and individuals increasingly resort to film-making as a narrative tool to 'expose' 
transition in the first person. 
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in a shared context - that of international networks of knowledge practices and political 
action (Stryker 2008) in trans communities, and the production of scientific and 
biomedical expertise about transition and gender embodiment. 
2.2 Transsexuality as a diagnostic category 
Let me begin by situating the ways in which biomedical discourses about transition set 
the stage for academic discussions of FTM identity, especially in the context of 1950's 
sexology and the development of feminist approaches to sex, gender and sexuality. 
These debates became highly controversial, and prompted important replies from 
within the trans community. Biomedical focuses on transsexuality and transition 
throughout the twentieth century the past decades gave rise to the development of 
classificatory, aetiological and therapeutic models of transsexuality, the well known 
triadic protocol based on psychotherapy, hormonal treatment and surgery. 
Since the publication of D. O. Cauldwell's Psychopathia Sexualis (Cauldwell 2001), the 
desire for sexual surgery began to be associated with a mental health disorder, often 
aggravated by different kinds of anti social behaviour. Since then, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of 
Diseases (I CD) have used different categories historically to refer to sexual and gender 
transition. The DSM used Gender Dysphoria in 1980, changing it to the current 
Gender Identity Disorders in its fourth edition (DSM-IV, 1994), whereas the ICD 
currently uses Gender Identity Disorders as an umbrella term that encompasses a slightly 
different distribution of variables compared to the DSM. However, perhaps because the 
incidence of FTM trans sexuality is significantly lower than MTF transsexuality, few of 
these works approached FTM transition empirically. Rather, the increasing abstraction 
of biomedical theories of sexual differentiation included FTM transition in the context 
of exemplary failings of gender identity formation, described since the end of the 
nineteenth century. FTMs embodied the border of female homosexuality (see Laub and 
Dubin 1979) until the publication of Harry Benjamin's The Transsexual Phenomenon, 
where the 'condition' was isolated as a gender identity issue and detached from the 
realm of sexuality and sexual orientation. Since then, publications within psychiatry, 
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endocrinology and theoretical surgery all made contributions toward a medical 
understanding of FTM transsexuality as a specific condition, with a diagnosis and 
treatment of its own, yet the symptomatology of Gender Identity Disorders in FTMs is 
not significantly different from MTFs. In both cases, as described in the DSM and the 
ICD the anatomy of one's sex doesn't match one's "gender role" (Money and Tucker 
1975; Money 1995), or, more recently, one's "gender expression". This displacement 
was, and continues to be, ratified by the Standards of Care of Gender Identity 
Disorders, a document where the majority of the diagnostic aspects and the standards of 
treatment of FTM transsexuality were for the first time detailed and agreed as an 
international protocoL Yet medical literature and often also, as Cromwell (1999) notes, 
research conducted in clinical settings, associated the diagnosis of transsexuality with a 
'failing' of gender formation, disregarding experiential knowledge that had not 
previously been treated as conditional in diagnostic practice. 
At the end of the 1970s the distinction between sex and gender had become the main 
paradigm for the analysis of sexual identity, and the social sciences, especially under the 
influence of ethnomethodology and feminism, distinguished the formation of gender 
from that of sex as the sets of sociocultural meanings that, despite being built on 
biological sexual difference (see Mead 1975; Oakley 1972; Ortner and Whitehead 
1981; Rosaldo 1980; Yanagisako and Delaney 1995), were also the result of history and 
social relations. These approaches unfolded new ways of understanding gender as a 
'cultural construction' versus sex as a fixed biological substance, a model in which 
gender became a cultural imprint and, hence, a condition of the malleability of sex. 
Transsexuality in this paradigm of gender was understood to be a 'mismatch', a 
'splitting' between one's 'gender identity' and one's 'gender role' (Money 1995; 
Benjamin 1966; Money and Tucker 1975; Money and Erhardt 1972). The identity/role 
distinction, became an important asset for treatment policy, even though the identity 
versus role paradigm also unearthed unexpected contention in the arena of se:A'Ual 
politics. Coinciding with the rise of second-wave feminism, Raymond published her 
polemic Transsexual Empire (1980), which had a significant impact on the trans 
community. A declared radical feminist, Raymond postulated the exclusion of MTF 
transsexuals from radical politics, arguing that their female nature, because it was 
surgically constructed, did not make them eligible to enter women-only spaces. For 
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Raymond, as for a part of the British and American radical lesbian movement, trans 
women were impostors waiting to usurp women's political force25 , and their drive for 
surgical intervention, precisely the same drive that doctors understood as the core of 
their pathology, only the manifestation of a perverse political desire. This text, and its 
emphasis on the continuity between notions of 'authenticity' (read innateness) in sex 
and politics, led to a number of interesting replies in what became the most contentious 
debate about the relation between trans people and the medical establishment and, by 
extension, set in motion new debates about the ways in which trans people inhabit the 
social and political effects of transition. In this context there was a proliferation of 
studies where medical, social and legal dimensions of transsexuality were intertwined in 
the pursuit of an 'authentic' transsexual subjectivity. The more conservative, like for 
instance Hausman (1995), argued that 'transsexual subjectivity' is produced in and 
through the practice of medical care, particularly in every trans person's relationship 
with biomedicine and biotechnology, and in the mechanistic interaction of the different 
stages of reassignment treatment and culturally-specific discourses of sex. 
Critiques of this position highlight the contingent nature of the notions of visibility and 
passing in the context of the trans movement in the United States. Stone's Post-
Transsexual Manifesto (1993) challenges Raymond's argument by questioning whether 
'passing' is the ultimate outcome of transition, and others (for example, Nataf 1996; 
Halberstam 1998) challenge the taken for granted stability of the borders between 
lesbian/ gay and FTM/MTF communities (otherwise referred to as the "FTM/lesbian 
border wars"). From the 1980s onwards these debates and political controversies gave 
rise to new directions in trans politics, and were translated into more structured 
lobbying campaigns in the United States and Britain, as well as a higher public 
awareness of transsexuality due to higher trans visibility In the public sphere. These 
debates generated strong responses in terms of the re-evaluation of trans identity and its 
25 This debate has still important repercussions in public debates, as for example the recent 
(Wednesday, 1st of August 2007) appearance of Julie Bindel in the Radio Four series 'Hecklers'. 
Bindel argued, under the auspice of some unhappy transsexual women, that "sex changes are 
unnecessary mutilations", and that both the lack of science behind the diagnosis and the inexistent 
research into post-operative patients downplay the ratios of overall satisfaction that most transsexual 
people express after treatment. Bindel's contention seems to resonate with Raymond's argument, 
insofar as she questions the limits of the construction of gender and the ways in which they translate 
in terms of biological sex. "I don't have a problem with men disposing of their genitals", writes 
Bindel (2004) in her 'Gender Benders, beware', "but it does not make them women, in the same 
way that shoving a bit of vacuum hose down your SOl's doesn't make you a man". Another perhaps 
even better known example, is Germaine Greer's (1999, 2003) anti-transsexual writing. 
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medical and legal definition in the context of civil rights movements. They 
strengthened the definition of transsexuality outside biomedical and feminist agendas 
and developed new spaces where transsexual people could represent themselves in the 
first person, beyond the terms under which these discourses pathologised transition. Yet 
these debates also intensified the distinction between sex and gender in terms of 
thinking transition, and contributed to existing conceptualisations of transsexuality as 
the mismatch between genital and brain sex. 
2.3 FTM Autobiography 
FTMs began writing their own accounts of transition to counteract, sometimes also to 
implement and extend, medical and academic expertise. This usually took the form of 
memoirs and written accounts of transition journeys, although other forms of 
representation such as blogs or video diaries have become more popular recently. In 
general, these texts are narratives based on individual transitions that presume a highly 
inexperienced reader, and expose, with more or less recourse to fiction, the intricacies 
and experiential universes of transition in the first person. In the United Kingdom, 
FTM memoirs of transition date from the 1950s, and probably emerged in that decade 
due to the media coverage of the transition of pioneer transsexuals, such Christine 
Jorgensen, who made world headlines in 1952. Laurence Michael Dillon (1915-1962), 
arguably the first world's FTM, transitioned and lived in Britain before becoming a 
Buddhist monk. Dillon lived a painful life of ostracism and seclusion, as his post-
operative state precluded the possibility of inheriting his family's baronetcy. In 1951, 
and in his capacity as a physician, Dr. Dillon wrote Self: A Study oj Endocrinology and 
Ethics, where he synthesised his ideas about transsexuality. This book was influential in 
the academic milieu of his time, and it also had an impact on the transition of 
contemporary trans people such as, for instance, Roberta Cowell26 . Autobiographies of 
FTMs would not appear again until the 1990s with Paul Hewitt's A Self-Made Man 
(1995) and Mark Rees' Dear Sir or Madam (1996), both autobiographical accounts of 
FTM transition. Finally, in 2002, Will Self and Stephen Whittle published Peifidious 
26 The Times and New York Times covered Dillon's story partially, at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/03/18/books/chapters/0318-1st-kenn.html, and http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/O, 9171, 936913,00.html, last accessed August 2009. 
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Man, an essay on masculinity led by the events of Whittle's own life history, where he 
reflects upon his transition and the politics of transgenderism that he developed both as 
a scholar and an activist. Whittle published extensively about the status of transsexual 
people before the law, campaigning actively in procuring a stretching of the limits of 
equality and the representation of trans people in the political sphere (Whittle and 
McMullen 1998a; Whittle 2000b, 2002). However, as a trans man, Whittle also 
published in 1998 The White Book: a really indispensable manual for inhabiting a trans man S 
being, and it was perhaps this compendium of stories, academic and legal texts, interview 
transcriptions and Whittle's own transition diary that had the greatest impact on fellow 
trans men. In this limited edition crossover between an information leaflet, a historical 
collection and an autobiography - at least this is how some of my informants described 
it - one could find a point of reference from which to measure and calibrate their own 
particular changes, and importantly know what to expect of treatment and anti-
discrimination policy. The White Book was the closest representation available of a trans 
man's experience of transition. 
Albeit not as widely distributed as some of their American counterparts, these accounts 
contextualised transition in broader experiential accounts, and remain invaluable in 
terms of tracing the historiography of FTM transsexuality. Many of these books are 
available to borrow in support groups soon after their publication, circulate among 
members and are often object of discussion. Some participants in this research drew 
extensively on these sources when I interviewed them, and sometimes explained their 
transition through them. For example, one of them explicitly used Valerio's (2005) 
memoir in order to explain why certain events were important in his transition. Valerio 
speaks about becoming one's "type of man", and about becoming "oneself' outside the 
pressures of mainstream gender, but he also addresses cultures of gender resistance. 
Valerio characterises his transition as that of a "radical lesbian feminist" becoming a 
"heterosexual man", and describes the effects of testosterone in his way of seeing the 
world, engaging with politics and evolving into someone new, and yet remaining 
'connected' with the past. Interestingly, the focus of his book is not on issues of social 
role; rather, Valerio contends that hormones are really what transition, and gender by 
extension, are about. Similarly, Khosla (2006) writes about his transition as a passage 
through different medical and social technologies towards the progressive 'unravelling' 
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of his true self His spiritual journey combines a chronology of transition facts with the 
description of other virtual experiences, dreams and fears, displacing the conventional 
meanings of transition far beyond medical treatments, especially the rigid definitions of 
transsexual subj ectivity favoured in psychiatric discourses. Devor's (1997, see also 1989) 
portrait of forty-five FTM trans people also pioneers the view that transition does not 
end when treatment finishes, but extends itself through many significant moments 
beyond the physical and social changes explicitly associated with sex change. 
Comparably, Jamison Green (2004) describes transition as an initiation rite more than a 
'gender switch', and notes that this process holds within itself many different processes 
collective and personal. Finally, photographer Dean Kotula (2002) put together the 
narratives of nineteen FTMs and the description of legal and surgical sex reassignment 
procedures. He argues that becoming male in transition stems from the necessity of 
adapting the body to a gender role; giving voice to a number of different narratives 
(FTMs, doctors, academics) extends the limits of transition to many different stories, 
perspectives and viewpoints, helping to counteract myths of truth of transsexuality and 
the ways in which experiences of transition are reduced to treatment use. 
2.4 FTM identity and the emergence of the 'third gender' In the social 
SCIences 
These autobiographical te}..1:s contributed to spread wider understandings of trans 
identity and to map the experience of transitioning through new coordinates. They 
became a resource in incipient national and international information networks through 
which trans people could compare treatments, opt for private care and different surgical 
techniques. Autobiographies gradually contributed to transform people's expectations of 
treatments beyond the statistical results of their local doctors. Moreover, they were also 
crucial to the development of ideas of what it meant to be trans and to transition in 
relation to identity, sex and gender, because, being written in the first person, they 
emanated a sense of realness and authenticity that other narratives about transition 
lacked. Importantly, however, these ideas were no longer circumscribed to a particular 
location, but began to flow between different locations and contributed to situate trans 
theories of transition as particular supranational accounts that included, in different 
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configurations, experiences of reassignment treatments, legal models of social inclusion 
and community dymamics. The ideas of 'success', initially used in medical discourses in 
the context of the standardisation of the triadic model of treatment (see Chapter 2), 
were now increasingly associated with the lives of individuals who after treatment 
achieved a set of biological, social, psychological, legal, and aesthetic standards. 
Through the work of social scientists on sex and gender and the progressive 
visibilisation of 'marginalised' and 'minoritarian' identities from the decade of the 
1980s, transsexuality would be displaced from medical notions to be defined in terms of 
a "rupture" of the binary "sex/gender system" (Rubin:1975). 
Today, transsexuality can hardly be conceptualised as a 'western' phenomenon; first, 
because biomedical treatments are no longer localised in North America and western 
Europe exclusively, and second, because people from a great variety of origins transition 
and live their lives in gender(s) different from their birth ascription in multiple cultural, 
social and political contexts. Legal and civil rights models of inclusion are increasingly 
lobbying for the approval of governmental schemes designed to help trans people fund 
their sex reassignments elsewhere, as surgical services are increasingly traded in global 
markets. The legal status of transgender people in Europe or the United States is 
gradually found its way into other countries, and became a political model as new laws 
are revised the status of gender identity at national and international levels27 • Yet the 
separation between western and non-western transsexuality continues to be important 
in terms of how the academic definition of transsexuality came to be developed. In fact, 
predominantly American academia (Hausman 1995) described transsexuality as a 
condition developed in Euro-American societies, characterised in relation to 
biomedicine and by the existence of a sort of 'transsexual subjectivity' produced as the 
effect of medical treatment at its core. On the other hand, social scientists have made 
explicit how the simile of transsexuality and other categories of gender variance 
implicitly emphasise a distinction between western trans people and 'third genders' in 
other cultures, even when third genders are not only seen to represent the subversion of 
western binary sexual categories but are also acknowledged as the affirmation of a 
'positive' difference. Analysts such as Suthrell (2004) avoid the direct comparison of the 
27 For instance, gender equality projects promoted by organisations dependent on the European 
Union, or the Yogyakarta Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual 
orientation and gender identity 0[2007 (see http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf, 
last accessed August 2009). 
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Indian figure of hijras to western transsexuality, contending reasons of cultural 
specificity and considering the differences in the kinds of social techniques and 
functions that render the emergence of this form of third gender and western 
transsexuality incommensurable. Similarly, Young (2000) restates that the traditional 
figure of the Albanian sworn virgin is essentially different from the narratives of western 
FTM transsexuality, as it relates to cultural kinship practices rather than forms of body 
modification and exists in close relation to the economic specificities of Albanian rural 
tradition. Sworn virgins for Young are a group strategy, an imposed social obligation 
determined by the lack of a suitable male. In these cases, the privileging of some 
dimensions of these phenomena - social role, cultural historicity, geographical 
specificity, the relations between gender and property, land or kinship, and so on - in 
systems that were understood to exist in isolation from western transition practices, 
foreclosed the possibility of developing a different model integrative of the more 
nuanced articulations of relations and different levels of becoming implicated in trans 
identities. At the core, again, the distinction between sex and gender is but another 
manifestation of their different ontological and political values, where transition in the 
social realm does not have the same effect in making somebody 'transsexual' or 
'transgender' - as does the use of biomedical reassignment technologies (see, for 
example, Valentine 2007; Papoulias 2006, Hines 2007). 
As Herdt (1994) notes, it is precisely these kinds of distinctions that have enthralled 
anthropologists studying the history of sex/ gender minorities cross-culturally, curtailing 
the development of relational analyses into the conditions of emergence of those 
categories and the ways in which they are lived by people. Non-western 'third genders' 
and gender identities 'beyond the binary' are frequently understood to be ancient, 
spiritual, and unchanging (see, for instance, Williams' (1986) analysis of the berdache 
figure) - they are presented as cohesive categories that represent a culturally specific 
phenomenon, yet it is often noted that in relation to western medical narratives they 
represent hybrid or mixed categories in which the sex/gender distinction is far from 
clear. For example, Herdt (1994a) notes that the Dominican Republic Syndrome of the 
guevedoches, which is culturally understood as a kind of 'third gender' by Dominicans, is 
in fact recorded as an uncommon variation of intersexuality in western clinical 
narratives, caused by the deficiency of steroid 5-alpha reductase. This syndrome 
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provokes a second virilisation at puberty in genetically normal males who have female 
primary sex characteristics. Having been exposed to high testosterone levels in utero, 
the organism produces and assimilates testosterone in higher levels, and for this reason 
there is a moment of gender variability at puberty after which they might develop male 
genitalia. In western biomedical discourses, this syndrome is categorised as a rare case of 
'male pseudohermaphroditism', and technically is not a gender identity disorder 
(Chapter 2), although guevedoches often want to live as men and use different 
biotechnologies to do so. It is perhaps these kind of distinctions and the supposed 
uniqueness of their social, political and medical implications that impeded the notion of 
'third gender' from becoming the umbrella term under which gender variant people of 
different times and places would find a common roof, at best classificatory28 but likely 
to produce effects at the level of policy. In this sense, as many trans people themselves 
would argue, the model of third gender could become counterproductive of the 
victories of trans politics. I will come back to this at the end of the chapter, but the 
model of 'third gender' in contemporary transgender politics bespeaks a political tension 
when trans people desire to 'go stealth' and live as invisible members of their chosen sex 
and gender. 
Furthermore, the distinction between western and non-western narratives of transness 
(if transness means here having surpassed the thresholds of normality of one's sex/ 
gender in any way), reinforces many implicit binaries and distinctions, such as medical! 
spiritual, body parts/whole, medical technologies/gender role, historicity/ahistoricity, 
accurate diagnostic categories/'hybrid' categories, passing/visibility (third gender), 
narrative/ deed, profane/sacred, and sex/gender. These distinctions have favoured biases 
in anthropological studies of transition and transsexuality, and implicitly authorised the 
view that transsexuality is not a legitimate subject of anthropology in itself, but only 
serves as a pretext to theorise the relation between sex and gender cross-culturally (see 
Shapiro 2005). Notable exceptions to this, however, are the studies conducted by Bolin 
(1988), whose work abridges transsexuality and its cultural pasts by portraying MTF 
transsexuality as a rite of passage, and Newton (1979), who pioneered ethnogrgraphic 
approaches to female impersonation, and, more recently, those of FTM anthropologists 
28 Here, I mean that the notion of third gender never really materialised beyond analytic contexts 
and cross-cultural analysis. Third gender was taken as an umbrella term, however, in anthropology 
classrooms, where it came to mean the array of sexual! gendered identities, positions, bodies and 
kinship practices outside the categories man and woman, and the principles of reproductive kinship. 
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Cromwell (1999, 2006) and Gooch (2005). Cromwell's work was the first FTM 
ethnography to explore the issues of visibility and identity while consciously displacing 
medical notions of transsexuality. He makes explicit a point rarely spoken about in 
academic narratives of transsexuality, namely the relation of trans people and what they 
construct as "their own history", or, in other words, the "turn to the past" that trans 
people often make in creating collective senses of belonging and tradition. He argues 
that this turn is ambivalent and contentious, given that for trans people the past is not 
necessarily biological, geographical or cultural. The past more often concerns individual 
and collective ideas of identification and sameness - an imagined community (Anderson 
2006). Cromwell argues that for this reason the relation between trans people and the 
alleged 'figures of their past' (like, for instance, the female equivalent of the berdache), 
evinced by trans people's identification with both cross-cultural and historical figures 
(see also Feinberg 1996, especially chapter 2), is not exempt of ambiguities, because in 
building a present for trans communities, the very principle of identification also 
detaches trans narratives from their 'own past'. In this sense, Cromwell also interrogates 
the boundary between trans men and "female-bodied trans people", when the 
definition of 'trans men' responds to the use of medical technologies of masculinisation, 
and 'female bodied trans people' stands for those cases where, albeit a cross-gender 
identification that would in other circumstances have resulted in transition, the person 
has not had sex reassignment treatment and has passed only in certain periods of his life 
or not at all. For example, he records in his analysis the death of jazz musician Billy 
Tipton, who, the media claimed, "lived his life as a man but died a woman" (quoted in 
Cromwell 1999:90), and argues that that although in this case the identity paradox is 
clear, the extent of the sex/gender discontinuity stems not from Tipton's body or sense 
of self, but from the discourses that made him 'man' and 'woman' in the forensic 
investigations that superseded his death. 
British anthropologist Ben Gooch also discusses related issues ethnographically in his 
work on the Gender Recognition Act (2005). Through textual analysis and interviews, 
he interrogates the meaning of being transsexual in the context of parliamentary 
debates, trans activist discussions and trans group narratives. Through these different 
locations, Gooch analyses trans narratives not as fixed, categorical entities defined by 
opposition, but rather as mobile thresholds between "fixity and transition", and 
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understands trans identity as a series of "revealments and concealments", i.e. moments 
of visibility and invisibility that the trans person goes through while being in transition. 
Gooch highlights with these oppositions the political ambiguity of becoming a trans 
man and wanting to become invisible while at the same time regarding one's identity as 
a trans person as politicaL 
2.5 The specificity of transsexual identity. 
From within the social sciences Rubin (2003) and Ekins and King (1996, 2006) have 
also approached FTM transsexuality from a sociological perspective, mapping processes 
of transition through empirical and qualitative research. Ekins and King (1996) focus on 
the social implications of non-binary and non-normative gender behaviour, including 
autobiographical accounts of transsexuality and research conducted in clinical settings. 
They attempt to transcend the classical views on transsexuality that either treat it as a 
biomedical fact or a social construction, by challenging foundational biomedical texts 
and situating their own work as a step towards new 'gender blending' theories. Their 
more recent work (2006) analyses the emergence of 'transgender subjectivities' -
unmedicalised, ambivalent ways of embodying gender - as opposed to medicalised 
transitions that are intended to provide full-time living in the gender of choice. 
However, the distinction between transsexual and transgender in their work evinces a 
strong attachment to medical definitions of transition. In Rubin's (2003) book, 
likewise, the logic of the distinction between sex and gender that underscores 
reassignment treatments underlies trans people's motivations to transition, which 
revolve around the 'betrayal' of one's body as puberty sets in, because trans men 
consider themselves "always already male". These studies, based on qualitative data, 
correlate the role of the social analyst to that of the medical expert, and importantly 
define (transsexual) transition as a sex change based on the role of biomedicine and 
biotechnology facilitating gender reassignment. 
The clinical threshold, initially defined within medical models of transition as the 
symptomatic marker above which one's gender identity becomes the object of 
medicine, is today a rather contentious term in political debates, given that it not only 
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relates to the ways in which medical narratives have defined the 'path' of transsexual 
transition, but also suggests a crucial distinction in terrns of the politics of representation 
and recognition of transsexuality in the public sphere. Separating those who access 
medical treatment from those who do not, the clinical threshold creates a subdivision in 
the trans spectrum between the categories of transgender and transsexual. These 
categories are often sites of controversy and ambivalence in political contexts, as well as 
in the daily life of trans communities, but they become especially controversial in the 
management of trans politics, especially in the contentions of political lobbying 
organisations and support groups. 
Some advocate the separation of both categories in terms of political activism and the 
struggle to improve the conditions of care, as the work of Namaste (2000; 2005) in 
MTF and feminist communities in Canada has brought to the academic debate29 . 
Namaste positions her argument decidedly against what she describes as the erasure of 
transsexual realities from the public sphere and the dilution of transsexual politics in the 
lesbian and gay agenda, an alliance that she found had become detrimental to trans 
communities in Canada. She contends that this inclusion had important repercussions 
for trans communities, such as the erasure of transsexual people's interests in the name 
of their representation within two institutional contexts that focused on representing 
sexual minorities, namely LGBT politics and feminist (and queer) academia. However 
strategic and necessary these alliances might be, she argues that, in reality, her work 
among MTF transsexual people revealed that, "increasingly, transsexuals object to being 
included under a catch-all phrase like transgender. They argue that the health care and 
social service needs of transsexuals are quite specific, and that this specificity is lost when 
people use a vague term like transgender" (2005:5). The recuperation of trans histories 
and their separation from the lesbian and gay, the academic and the clinical framework 
is thus of critical importance. She writes: "I argue that the theories concerned with the 
production of transsexuality have got it wrong: transsexuals are not, in point of fact, 
produced by the medical and psychiatric institution. Rather, they are continually erased 
29 She argues that 'transgender' has been defined to include: "transsexuals, drag queens (men who 
perform as women on stage only, usually in a gay male club or social environment), intersexed 
individuals (people who are born with genitalia that cannot be easily classified as 'male' or 'female'), 
drag kings (females who perform as men on the stage in lesbian cultural spaces), transvestites 
(heterosexual males who cross-dress in women's clothes and who receive sexual gratification from 
this act), as well as people who do not identify with either of the categories 'male' or 
'female'" (2005:4). 
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from the institutional world, shut out from its programs, excluded from its 
reference" (2005:6). 
In contrast, Valentine notes in his ethnography of the transgender category in New 
York that one of the ways in which people relate to the taxonomic classifications of 
biomedicine and social services is precisely to appropriate those categories and 
"generate distinctions for and among themselves" (2007:42)3°. Valentine notes how the 
categories of transsexuality and transgenderism, despite their supposed reliance on other 
categories of' gender identity', do not always occupy a static place in the lives of trans 
people, who eventually use them to convey both their gender identity and their 
sexuality. He argues that the categories themselves are used to express a sort of 
continuum of sex, gender and sexuality that is not reflected by the ways in which sexual 
minorities are treated by medicine and social services. Similarly, I have noted how in 
Britain both transsexual and transgender people are contesting their definition 
exclusively in the (homogenising) terms of biomedicine and social services, and that, 
perhaps due to the increasing inclusion of trans issues in mainstream political agendas, 
these categories are being appropriated strategically in order to create, subvert, negotiate 
and live 'different' and 'unique' realities. Their use in trans communities is hence 
conteA'tual and, even though 'transgender' was originally defined as opposed to 
'transsexual' when the relation with the medical establishment was partial or transition 
had not followed the triadic medical path, today there is a second meaning of the word 
'transgender' that has become important in relation to the clinical threshold. In fact, as 
some trans theorists have argued (Namaste 2005; Wilson 2003) 'transgender' has also 
been taken as an umbrella term, one that would hold the trans spectrum in all directions 
and stages of transition. 
Thus through an emphasis on categories, and the ways in which they enable the 
practice of transition, the clinical threshold shifts the focus from the traditional feminist 
question that asks how the Standards and the development of medical technologies of 
reassignment gave rise to certain fixed notions of 'transsexual subjectivity' (Hausman 
1995), and how the existence of transsexual women affects the development of feminist 
30 FTM London's 2008 brochure, for instance, opens the group's actIVltIes to transgender, 
androgynous, gender-queer, trans men, questioning, transsexual, polygendered, gender fluid, and 
MTM people. 
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politics (Raymond 1980), to the ways in which trans identity is enabled in the relation 
between people, technologies of reassignement, public policy and social services. Far 
beyond the so-called feminist myth of Sappho by surgerfl, the clinical threshold is 
paradigmatic of how social services in different legal frameworks provide care for some 
people, leaving others at the gates of treatment. Consequently, the clinical threshold 
invites not only a consideration of the extent to which a certain medical notion of trans 
identity pervades in mainstream trans politics, but also how some gender identities 
remain institutionally invisible (not regulated), while others are made visible only to be 
later forced to disappear, as Namaste pointed out. The clinical threshold is mobilised 
both as the right of people to change their sex/gender and as an identity boundary in 
policy making. In this political milieu the clinical threshold delimits trans identity and 
privileges a certain way of living transition as the legitimate object of political 
regulation. 
2.6. Ambiguity, process and new forms of transition. 
Trans theorists have also challenged the distinction between biology and the social in 
transition, advocating the redefinition of trans identity beyond the distinction between 
physical, psychological and social transition. In fact, recently, studies from within trans 
communities have also highlighted new and hitherto unexplored aspects of transition, 
generating conceptualisations of trans identity that differ greatly from previous 
paradigms. Take, for example, the groundbreaking work of Jay Prosser (1998). 
Understanding transsexuality as a correlated set of corporeal, psychic and social changes, 
Prosser examines queer theory to devise what is understood as the "matter" of the body 
in cultural theory. He interrogates explicitly how existing notions of transsexual 
subjectivity in the work of academics, especially feminist scholars such as Raymond and 
31 The myth of Sappho by surgery stems from the publication of Janice Raymond's The Transsexual 
Empire in 1979. Under an allegedly ethnographic approach, Raymond analysed the participation of 
trans women in radical feminist politics during the late '70s, concluding that transsexual women 
were a sort of surgical construct designed by patriarchal powers to undermine the political power of 
'women only' activism. Needless to say, this approach was fiercely opposed in the following decades 
(see Ridell 1996; Stone 1993; and in the context of British media Kaveney1980), but it had a 
considerable influence at the time of its publication. It led to the development of a consistent 
'feminist' approach to the subject of transsexuality based on the definition of a true 'transsexual 
subjectivity' (see Bindel 2004, Greer 2003). This quest implicitly reinforced medical discourses of 
transition, and imbued it with academic and politicallegitimisation. 
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Hausman, reduce the experiential universes of those transitioning to the mechanistic 
effects of the use of medical technologies. In contrast, he revises the notion of corporeal 
image (see Chapter 4) to explain the role of the body in transition, and borrows 
Anzieu's (1989) concept of the "skin ego" to analyse the relation between transsexuality 
and narrative. As a material extension of the ego, Prosser argues, the skin becomes not 
only the border between the self and the world (see Benthien 2002) in transition, but is 
also portrayed as coextensive with life as its condition of narrativity. Matter becomes a 
determinant to the possibility of being conveyed in a narrative autobiography, and thus 
the psychic dimension of transsexuality is irrevocably linked to bodily processes. 
In this way he suggests that gender reassignment IS a cumulative set of different 
transitions that could never be conceptualised on one even level, and even less at the 
level of surgery alone. In fact, Prosser argues that the theories that relegate transsexual 
subjectivity to particular uses of medical technologies hold internal incongruities in 
their essentialist formulations, because transsexuality is deeply intertwined in personal 
narratives, which makes every transition different. Instead, he looks at transsexual 
people primarily as authorial subjects, recreating their living space and interrogating the 
conditions of their narrative. He uses the notion of autobiography as a key concept, and 
through this notion situates transsexuality between the body and the social: 
autobiography fills the gap between embodiment and making sense of transition, thus 
healing "the rupture in gendered plots" (1998:9). He also uses literary narratives to 
analyse notions of passing and their subversion through community building and 
representation strategies. Prosser's text presents the process of identification with one's 
body image as legitimising the use of medicine, because matter and psychology are 
interrelated through the skin interface. Sexual surgery, conceptualised as a 
membering", allows the final unity of transsexual identity to emerge. 
" re-
From within the radical sexual cultures of San Francisco, Califia's (1997) Sex Changes 
pioneered the interrogation of the status of transsexuality within anthropological and 
feminist academia, by tracing his own historiography of (predominantly American) trans 
categories, autobiographies, histories of marginalisation and seclusion. Yet, his 'sex 
changes' also open a new space for a different future: following Maljorie Garber and 
Kate Bomstein, he foresees the future of transsexuality in multiple forms of 
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transgenderism, or, in other words, in a system where gender is other than binary and 
therefore holds infinite possibilities of embodiment. Quoting Bornstein, he agrees: 
"Now there's a new generation of transsexuals who are assessing their journey not as 
either/ or, but as an integration, as a whole. In bypassing the either! or construct ... these 
new transsexuals are slipping out from under the control of the culture. And a new sub-
culture is being born" (Bornstein, quoted in Califia 1997:260). As Bornstein suggests, 
this line of enquiry transcends previous models of binary reversibility and hints towards 
the obsolescence of the sex/gender distinction. Similarly, Diamond's collection of texts 
(2004) multiplies the languages in which transition and (sex) change can be spoken, and 
establishes the gravitational centres of transness far from medical transition and the 
compulsory necessity to pass. "I was not looking for a clinical examination of gender 
deviation", writes Diamond. "This system of classification overlooked other ways in 
which people chose to express their gender ... This diversity in experience added to the 
many ways the contributors identify themselves: gender variant, transgender, third 
gender, non-gender, monster trans, MTM, gender-queer, transman, trannyboy, FTM, 
transsexual" (2004:7-8). Bernstein (2006) undermines the notion of passing in his/her 
collection of essays Nobody Passes, which focuses on the consequences of resisting the 
notions of gender deviation/variance. It shows that in many instances gender narratives 
incorporate issues of race and class, and frequently emphasise nonconformity with a 
certain set of rules that is often greater in scale than gender, or at the very least capable 
of transversing different realms and the actions of marginalisation and oppression 
systems. In this sense, importantly, the authenticity of being trans or of transitioning is 
no longer understood to be exclusive to the continuity of body and social role, or of 
past and present, but resides in complex articulations of different scales of phenomena 
and in the specificity of every local and time-specific transition where different things 
matter and others do not. In sum, trans, even when one uses medical technologies, 
hormonal treatments or any other artifice to embody gender, is not currently 
understood as a unified category, at least not exclusively. These newly visible variants of 
gender, made out of many negotiations, do not claim to possess any indivisible or 
unquestionable 'truth', but rather they show that transition is also understood to be 
about crossing different thresholds of meaning, matter, power, connectivity, time, and 
motion. 
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Overall, these studies isolated transsexuality, transgenderism and crossgenderism as a 
matter of interdisciplinary enquiry. With the rise of queer theory within academia, 
which provided not only new paradigms for the analysis of gender, but also a new 
legitimacy for gender studies, new lines of academic research are currently investigating 
the scope, limits and conditions of emergence of trans identities, drawing on both the 
archival literature produced on the subject of cross-dressing and sex change and the 
lives of those who transition (see, for instance, Garber 1993; Halberstam 2005; Shaw 
and Ardener 2005; Fausto-Sterling 2000; Phillips 2006). Perhaps the present-day 
culmination of this new line of interdisciplinary research is the publication of Stryker 
and Whittle's The Transgender Studies Reader (2006), and the inauguration of transgender 
studies as a cross-disciplinary field involving sociology, anthropology, aural and visual 
cultures, philosophy, and gender studies. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Within the various kinds of literature about sexual transition and gender reassignment, 
FTM identity has remained largely theorised through the distinction between sex and 
gender. This distinction, which was taken as paradigmatic of the relation between 
nature and culture, biology and behaviour in the social sciences, yielded theories of 
transition as a passage between genders based on the acquisition of a social identity in a 
gender different from birth adscription. Academic debates about transsexuality became 
prominent with the rise of second wave feminism, and especially during the 1970's 
knowledge about transsexuality and transition spanned over a number of disciplines 
outside biomedicine. In this context, the notion of transsexual identity as a pathology 
located inside the individual was challenged through transdisciplinary analyses of gender 
as socially and culturally constructed sets of practices where transition not only made 
sense as an individual desire to change one's body or social role, but also in relation to 
kinship and labour practices. 
Since the 1950's, FTMs across national boundaries documented their journeys in 
autobiographical accounts that became resources for people considering transitioning. 
The emergence and wide distribution of FTM literature, predominantly in the United 
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States and Britain, established complex relations with medical and academic discourses 
of transsexuality in the past four decades, where in some instances, studies conducted by 
trans people contested existing paradigms of gender formation, contributing to the 
generation of new tools to approach sex, gender and identity. Recently, trans 
scholarship yielded original contributions in the context of the social sciences and 
cultural studies. These new approaches characterise transition not as a linear passage 
between the categories of female and male, but as a journey where particular kinds of 
symbolic and material relations shape people's desire to live as members of another 
gender, and to use biomedicine and biotechnologies in the pursuit of this effect. Here, 
again, the distinction between sex and gender is located at the forefront of the 
definition of transsexual transition and situated as an instrumental asset in sexual politics, 
where the different ontological and political value of sex and gender determine the 
recognition of transsexuality as a legal identity. 
The following chapter will explore the emergence of the sex/gender distinction in 
sexology, tracking the historical development of the triadic protocol of transsexuality. I 
will discuss how the distinction between sex and gender, albeit hidden in different 
terminology, was crucial in the emergence of scientific approaches to sex at the turn of 
the nineteenth century, and that its historical form in biomedical discourses throughout 
the twentieth century informed the biomedical protocol of transsexuality. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 
The medical model of transition 
This chapter discusses the medical logic of gender reassignment treatments by 
contextualising the protocol of care for transgender patients (the Standards of Care of 
Gender Identity Disorders) through which transsexuality is treated in the United 
Kingdom. The medical model of transition, I will argue, is the result of the evolution of 
socially- and culturally-specific biomedical practices in Euro-American countries, where 
the provision of care for transgender patients is associated with the psychiatric diagnosis 
of 'gender identity disorders (GID)'. This chapter will contextualise the biomedical 
categories and practices historically associated with transsexuality, by creating links 
between the development of sexology and the evolution of the regulative frameworks 
of transsexuality in Euro-American countries in the twentieth century. 
The development of a gender reassignment protocol was underpinned by the 
emergence of an analytic distinction between sex and gender in biomedicine, and its 
development in the different models of gender reassignment throughout the twentieth 
century. The sex/gender distinction became increasingly consequential in the 
biomedical discourses of sex, gender and experience in the past decades, informing the 
medical definition of transsexuality as a pathology, the technologies and practices 
developed for its treatment, and the framework of its legal representation. The sex/ 
gender distinction, as Cealey Harrison and Hood-Williams (2002) have argued, is 
grounded in the assumption that 'men' and 'women' are naturally different, and their 
difference resides precisely in the definition of their 'sex' as biologically fixed, natural 
and determinative in opposition to a psychosocial, culturally constructed and, to a 
greater or lesser extent, volitional 'gender'. The scientific, clinical and political 
maintenance of this distinction has shaped the evolution of clinical reassignment 
protocols and their representation in the different classificatory manuals that grant 
transgender people access to medical care. 
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I will begin by tracing the ongm of the sex/gender distinction in the work of key 
figures of twentieth century sexology, and interrogate the ways in which it was crafted 
as a tool to measure and classify sexual normality by establishing correlations between 
biology and behavioui32 . In this context, gender was deemed ontologically and 
politically different than sex, and it came to account for the existence of 'behavioural', 
'cultural' or 'subjective' dimensions of sex in the history of biomedical approaches to 
sexual formation. The distinction between sex and gender in biomedicine led to the 
standardisation of a treatment of transsexuality as a triadic protocol, where 
psychotherapy, hormonal treatment and surgery were constituted as international 
standards33 of treatment for transgender patients. However, it was also the subject of 
important controversies regarding the aetiology of transsexuality, its diagnostic criteria 
and optimum prognosis. 
I will then focus on unpacking the logic on which current models of treatment are 
grounded. Based on the distinctions made in international classification manuals (the 
Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM-IV and the International 
Classification of Diseases or ICD-l0), this logic distinguishes transsexuality from other 
gender-related conditions, and emphasises measurement and linear passage between 
genders as key to the 'transsexual condition'. The logic of treatment is protected by a 
document collaboratively created between trans people and medical professionals, the 
Standards of Care of Gender Identity Disorders (SOCGIDJ34 , designed to provide an 
integrative framework through which trans people can access care and civil recognition. 
However, the logic of treatment constructs transsexuality as a kind of subjectivity 
32 For analytic reasons I have left out of this genealogy the development of the sex/gender 
distinction in the work of first wave feminists, and feminist social science, which were themselves 
productive of new contexts in which the distinction was applied. 
33 As Martha Lampland and Susan Leigh Star's (2009) recent work suggests, standards have, among 
other important characteristics, the power to 'codify, embody or prescribe ethics and values' being 
of great consequence for the communities of practice they regulate. Here the intricacies of the 
Standards of Care for transgender patients will be the starting point to unravel the logic of current 
treatment policies. 
34 I want to emphasise that the discussion contained in this chapter addresses the logic of treatment 
rather than the actual situations in which trans people access care. Trans people's clinical experiences 
are incredibly diverse, and each clinical relation, even when regulated by the standards of treatment 
discussed in this chapter, is understood in different tetms. Whereas some trans people, for example, 
establish strategic relations with their doctors in order to access treatment, others find incredible 
support and encouragement in clinical settings. 
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establishing continuity between the two. Thus, the 'success' of transition is measured in 
terms of 'passing' as a natural member of the gender of choice (see Garfinkel 1967) and 
between the categories of 'female' and 'male' through a particular use of standardised 
and politically-regulated medical and social technologies. In clinical terms, these 
technologies of transition can be accessed after a symptomatic evaluation of sex and 
gender identity through a series of diagnostic techniques, and they consist of the 
modification of secondary sex characteristics by way of hormonal treatment and several 
degrees of reassignment surgery. For FTMs these are predominantly double 
mastectomies (although other forms of 'top surgery' are sometimes performed), 
metoidioplasties and phalloplasties35 (or 'bottom surgeries'). However, whereas the 
majority of FTMs who transition medically do have mastectomies, bottom surgeries are 
not as comrnon36. 
3.2 The difference between sex and gender 
It has been argued that the distinction between sex and gender originated as a result of 
scientific approaches to sex in the seventeenth century (Laqueur 1990). However, the 
development of endocrinology and a new medical interest in sex in the nineteenth 
century were determinant in shaping the extent and scope of this distinction. 
Throughout the twentieth century, biomedical theory and clinical practice provided 
contexts of empirical experimentation where the distinction between biology and 
behaviour became an ingredient'37 in numerous technologies, therapeutic logics and 
classification practices that affected the ways in which sex was understood to be 
associated with human nature and the social order. Perhaps of the most important were 
the management of transsexuality and intersexuality, because, despite crucial 
35 Metoidioplasties and phalloplasties are techniques of genital surgery that produce different 
functional and aesthetic results. Metoidioplasties are based on clitoral lengthening and phalloplasties 
in reconstructing the penis by grafting tissue removed from the arm, leg or abdomen. 
36 In Britain, the Gender Recognition Act (GRA) of 2004 renders bottom surgery unnecessary for 
gender recognition purposes. 
37 I am using the term 'ingredient' with reference to Whitehead's 'ingression'. For Whitehead, 
ingression is the mode in which potentiality is realised in actual becoming, contributing to the 
existence, the concrescence, of a given entity (1978: 23). 
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differences38 , in this context the sex/gender distinction underpinned the generation of 
biomedical practices where sex was produced and maintained through classification and 
intervention (Kessler 1998; Weiss 1999; Mak 2006). In this respect, the sex/gender 
distinction - and especially the definition of a 'sexual identity' - was progressively 
associated with certain parameters of health and normality, and represented as a 
continuum where genitals, chromosomes and behaviour were equivalent with certain 
acceptable 'values' of masculinity and femininity39. In this sense, as we will see, the 
distinction between sex and gender underpinned the medical definition of gender 
reassignment treatments as a linear passage between measurable categories, 
conceptualising transition as the cumulative achievement of a series of biological, social 
and legal assets40 . In this section I explore this historicity by analysing three different 
historical periods where the categories associated with transsexuality, its treatment 
protocol and its defining aetiological models were developed as a result of the 
progressive separation of sex and gender in biomedical analysis. 
3.2.1 Towards a sexual science (1880-1950) 
Some of the major tensions around sex change today can be traced back to the 
emergence of sexology as a field of biomedical enquiry at the end of the nineteenth 
38 Crucially, whereas transsexual people agree to undergo medical treatment, and in most cases 
actively seek it, treatment was historically administered to intersex babies without their consent, 
generating innumerably problematic situations; for instance, see http://www.isna.org/library/hwa, 
last checked July 2009. 
39 Note, for example, that if the diagnosis of gender dysphoria received the name transsexualism with 
the publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980, in 
1994 the DSM-IV established the term Gender Identity Disorders as the new medical category of 
transsexuality. This diagnosis is still based on the old notion of gender dysphoria: a persistent 
discomfort with one's gender attributes and the pervasive desire to live as a member of the opposite 
sex. However, the new psychiatric diagnosis introduces new diagnostic variables of age, whereby 
patients should be diagnosed under the Gender Identity Disorders of Childhood, Adolescence, 
Adulthood, or Not Otherwise Specified. Under the rubric of 'gender identity disorders', 
contemporary biomedical practice aims to identify and correct on the same grounds all the 
'deviations' and 'perversions' (this is the terminology used in the manuals) that exceed natural and 
normal binary constructions of sexual identity. 
40 The association of gendered experience with 'independent' categories is further complicated and 
intensified by the medical definition of transsexuality as an innate and pervasive condition, and 
therefore situating intersexuality (as innate biological sexual ambiguity) at one extreme of the 
treatment rationale and transsexuality at the other, yet abridging all midway positions, aetiologies, 
desires, and all actual processes of transition through the same model of triadic treatment. 
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century, the particular notions of sex that emerged in the context of endocrinological 
experimentation, and the ways in which different sex and gender technologies were 
developed throughout the twentieth century as a result of this enquiry. In a way similar 
to racial and other scientific classifications, definitions of sex in early sexology were 
abstractions in which normality (of sex and sexual formation) was constructed through 
the identification of proliferating series of physical and social abnormalities. It was in 
this period that a new scientific and moral interest in sex and sexuality prompted the 
emergence of new analytic methods that not only resulted in new ways of 
understanding sex in relation to ideas of human 'nature', but also in relation to 
narratives of health, morality and sociality. Crucially, it was in this period, as it has been 
argued (Foucault 1985; Laqueur 1990; 1997), that sexual categories emerged as 
abstractive tools of scientific classification and biopolitical regulation in the context of 
evolutionist models of life (see Darwin 1979; 2004; Bateson and Mendel 1909; Spencer 
1884), kinship (see also Maine 1963; Morgan 2000; Engels 1972), modes of production 
(Wolf 1982), and culture and religion (Tylor 1871; Frazer 1993). 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century the sexology of Richard Von Krafft-Ebing 
(1998) distinguished between 'congenital' and 'acquired' models of sexual deviation. He 
identified congenital homosexuality as an abnormal feeling, an instinct that could be 
manifested in various degrees and stages, which he named 'psycho-sexual 
hermaphroditism', 'homosexuality', 'effemination', and 'androgyny'. Grouping 
symptoms in different disorders, his work not only pioneered the development of a 
taxonomy of sexual 'pathologies', but it also provided a clinical testing context of the 
usefulness of medical intervention and therapeutics based on 'reparative' methods such 
as hypnotism. With those early taxonomic and prognostic distinctions, Von Krafft-
Ebing's work became a vital influence for generations of sexologists to come. 
Merl Storr situates Krafft-Ebing's work in the context of the fin-de-siecle models of 
evolution and race differences (1998:14), where sexual inversion and bisexuality were 
understood as 'uncivilised' stages of human development and associated with native 
cultures (such as native American Indians41 ), and where patterns of sexual normality 
41 Krafft-Ebing refers to the figure of 'bote', a third gender figure among the Crow and 'burdoch', 
third and fourth gender figures among Washington Indians. Later ethnographies and historical 
accounts (Roscoe 1998, for instance) described important differences between third gender figures 
in different native American groups. 
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coincided with socially acceptable Victorian models of sexuality and kinship. In this 
sense, the publication of Psychopathia Sexualis (1886 and 1903 are known, 
internationally distributed editions) and the establishment of taxonomies of sexual 
'deviation' contributed to the scientific questioning of religious ideas of 'sexual nature'. 
In this respect, Thomas Laqueur's Making Sex demonstrated how during this period 
there was an important shift in scientific models of sex, where a model of alleged unity 
between the sexes was superseded by a binary bipolar model based on "a series of 
oppositions and contrasts" (Laqueur 1997:220). The Galenic model of sexual 
homology, Laqueur suggests, was rendered obsolete at the time when the differences 
between men and women became politically important, and thus biology was figured as 
the speculum of a metaphysical reality in which the social order rested. For analysts 
such as Gilman (2006), this early sexological movement was already a scientific 
challenge to the political underpinnings of existing models of sexual difference in that it 
intended to "free the homosexual from the charges of criminal sexual activity or moral 
depravity by medicalising it and thus providing therapy rather than prison as the 
alternative" (2006:xii). With their writings, early sexologists contributed to mitigate the 
social sanctions associated with sexual deviance by proposing a medical route for sexual 
and social transformation42 . 
At the end of the nineteenth century, endocrinology and psychoanalysis shared a 
common effort in refuting deterministic hypotheses of sex, and worked towards 
defining the relations between biology and behaviour in different yet familiar ways. The 
incipient development of psychoanalysis evinced radically new possibilities in addressing 
the relation between the physical and the social in processes of sexual formation (as 
Wilson 2004 and Fuss 1995 discuss, for instance). Psychoanalysis abridged physical and 
social dimensions of sex through the definition of the unconscious as a surface of 
confluence of biology and the psychic, thus privileging psycho/biological models 1ll 
42 For Gilman in particular, this idea of 'transformation' was a scientific response to certain racial, 
social and political ideas of nineteenth century Germany, and was crucial in the elaboration of 
medical discourses of the 'social' nature of sex. Other analysts such as Amidon (2008) attribute the 
political and transformative nature of sexual science in nineteenth century Germany to the 
foundational discourses of biology, defined as 'the science of life' and also, implicidy, as 'the science 
of a "better" life'. 
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theorising desire and sexual formation43 . At the same time, the establishment of 
sexology as an independent discipline within biomedicine in the first decades of the 
twentieth century was also driven by the aim to understand the 'vital impulse' that 
could account for those areas not fully explained by physiology. Endocrinologists such 
as Claude Bernard fostered the idea that the body could produce the chemicals for its 
own survival, and in this way it formed a system only partially dependent on its 
environment44 . 
However, these two discourses were not always compatible in their respective 
understandings of sexual formation, and became increasingly polarised in subsequent 
years. In fact, sexologists tended to frame their practice as a commitment to the 
scientific demonstration of the causes of sexual variance through experimental biological 
research. Furthermore, as Hausman (1995) points out, the hypothesis that gender 
'distress' was caused by unconscious processes of association occurring solely in 
individual existential umverses was the starting point for a number of different 
refutations. For instance, on the basis of the identification of "primary" and 
"secondary" sexual traits, Magnus Hirschfield (1968-1935) established in 1910 the first 
medical distinction between sex and gender (1998). As a sexologist committed to social 
change45 , he was interested in distinguishing between different orders of sexual features 
in order to identify and isolate biological sexual features from those produced by 
43 However, Wilson (2004) points out that, albeit Freud's earliest efforts were directed towards 
understanding the connection between lower and higher nervous systems, his work set the ground 
for a variety of biological reductionisms that would have consequences in subsequent definitions of 
the relation between human physiology and behaviour. Wilson recounts that Freud's early writings 
focused on finding biological continuity at a cellular level between the lamprey and the higher fish, 
proving that their difference was only a mode rif organisation (2004:2). However, this analysis would 
later be applied to assessing the influence of physiology in the investigation of the psychosomatic 
manifestations in hysterical patients. 
44 Analysts such as Canguilhem (1994) and Roberts (2002) discuss the origins of endocrinology in 
more detail. 
45 For a more detailed discussion of the social implications of Hirschfield's work, see Weeks: 1981, 
1991. 
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interaction with the environment46 . Importantly, he distinguished between 
transsexualism and transvestism, and argued that the association between certain 
(gender) behaviours and a drive of sexual metamorphosis, rather than the desire to 
cross-dress alone, was the cause of psychopathia in a patient. Thus, drawing on Von 
Krafft-Ebing's designation of the mania of sexual metamorphosis as metamorphosis 
sexualis paranoica, he identified a symptomatic mental disorder m the case of 
transsexualism, and in so doing advocated the provision of medical care for transsexual 
patients. It is not surprising that Hirschfield's theory had important social and political 
consequences (c£ Weeks 1981, 1991), not least because he established a relation 
between sexual biology and its cultural manifestations, drawing a fine line between sex 
and gender that implicitly became the boundary between sexual science and the scope 
of its social application. This early sexological movement was envisioned as a platform 
of social change, and, just like evolutionist models were developed to contest religious 
and political narratives of nature, Hirschfield founded the World League oj Sexual Riform 
with British researcher Havelock Ellis in 192847 ; in this context they envisioned 
eugenics as a means of achieving social change. Hirschfield's writings conceptualised 
'paranoid sexual disorders' as a type of degeneracy, which implied the existence of weak 
or damaged genes and was thought to have the same root as mental retardation, 
promiscuity or alcoholism. 
Richard Goldschmidt also discredited psychoanalysis and proposed the 'gonadal theory' 
of sex in 1923 (Goldschmidt 1923; see also Amidon 2008), in which he related gender 
differences and the constitution of a sexual identity, as well as wider behavioural issues, 
to processes of hormonal production. His study of intersexuality in the gypsy moth 
abridged genetic constitution and the physiological development of sex in an 
unprecedented way, and between 1911 and 1931 he extended its conclusions to all 
46 These were divided into four groups, A, B, C, and D, or primary, secondary, tertiary and fourth-
order sexual features. Group A would account for germ cell (Ai), oviduct or spermatic conduct 
(A2), sexual protuberance (A3), and sexual groove (A4), group B would be formed of hair (Bi), 
larynx (B2), chest (B3) and pelvis (B4); group C contains orientation (Ci), approach (C2), 
disposition (C3) and manner of activity (C4). Finally, group D would comprise emotional life (D1), 
manner of thought (D2), occupation (D3) and clothing (D4). As seems clear from this classification, 
variations in the first group may produce a great number of combinations or gender variance, 
mediated by secondary, tertiary and fourth-order sub-variations, and other cultural representations 
that Hirschfield understood as external to the individual and therefore not relevant for the purposes 
of this table. 
47 Ellis wrote Sexual Inversion in 1897, where he would address the relation between psychological 
and sexual processes. 
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animals, including humans. For Goldschmidt there was a structural difference between 
zygotic and hormonal intersexuality, whereas zygotic intersexuality was based on 
differences present in the zygote, hormonal intersexuality involved the process of later 
sexual differentiation, mediated by hormones and hormone-producing tissues (see 
Dietrich 2003). 
The tensions between the early sexology's tendency to procure mechanistic and 
biological explanations of sex and psychoanalytic symbolic models of sexual formation 
would pervade in the form of different understandings of the sex/gender distinction 
throughout the twentieth century, which would inform not only biomedical 
classifications of sexual 'inversion' and pathology, but also therapeutic, prognostic and 
aetiological models of transsexuality and transition. In 1949, with the publication of 
Cauldwell's Psychopatia Transexualis in Sexology Magazine, the transsexual was definitively 
associated to a "pathologic-morbid desire to be a full member of the opposite 
sex" (Cauldwell, 2001), and therefore transsexual subjectivity was explained in terms of 
a concrete relation with medical treatment - a 'fierce and demanding' drive for 
treatment -, and specifically by a pervasive' drive for surgical transmutation'. 
Cauldwell adopted Magnus Hirschfield's social and clinical distinction between the 
homosexual and the transvestite, and documented extensively correlations of symptoms 
that would make the increasing use of surgery and other sexual reassignment 
technologies morally justifiable and therapeutically efficacious. The transsexual 
condition could occur in different degrees, measured by the antisocial consequences of 
being transsexual rather than the patient's suffering, and only the gravest and most 
persistent offenders were considered for reassignment treatment. For example, 
Cauldwell's review of the clinical history of the female-to-male transsexual Ear148 , 
where Earl's transsexuality is to some extent understood as the product of his social 
environment (the condition, Cauldwell writes, is proportionately more common 
among the well to do than among the poor), starts by praising the 'excellent moral 
qualities' of Earl's family, who not only led normal, heterosexual, healthy lives, but also 
48 With the exposition and analysis of first-hand clinical material, Cauldwell not only gained a new 
authenticity over his research results, but also initiated a trend of psychological evaluation that 
would have an impact on later medical writings on the transsexual question. For example, the case 
of Earl bears an interesting resemblance to the case of Mrs G, treated by Stoller and his UCLA team 
two decades later. 
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kept Cauldwell up to date with Earl's activities beyond what was exhibited in their 
encounters and correspondence. When describing Earl in his social context, Cauldwell 
writes: 
"The psychopathic characteristic is manifested not, as may be thought, in actual 
homosexuality or transvestism, nor yet in the adoption of a male role and career, 
but in such practices as seduction, parasitism, violation of the social codes in 
numerous ways, frequently kleptomania and actual thievery, pathological lying, 
and other criminal and unsocial tendencies" (2001, online reference). 
Here, the treatment of sex reassignment (understood predominantly in surgical terms) is 
framed as a solution for extreme antisocial behaviour and inconformity. In fact, that the 
transsexual transgresses social norms 'of gender' overlaps his other criminal and 
antisocial tendencies, and the proposal of a 'physical' cure for transsexuality is designed 
to amend potentially dangerous oversights of nature. 
This analytic and clinical legacy still resonates in current treatment protocols, as some of 
its basic principles were reified in subsequent models in which the desire for sexual 
surgery is regarded as a distortion of the mind revealed in early childhood, which could 
threaten to hinder emotional development and maturity (see Cauldwell 2001a; see also 
Lothstein 1983). In this way the main risks associated with reassignment treatments 
were not restricted to the relatively high risk of the patient's physical death at this stage 
of surgical technique developments, but instead understood to reside in the extent to 
which physical reassignment would affect the mind, or, in other words, the behavioural 
transformation that ensued the modification of the patient's body. Despite all efforts, 
there was a high risk that patients would not adapt to an irreversible condition of sex 
'reversal', to a body that could be perceived to be still far from the desired ideal, and to 
the perpetual ostracism from other socially adapted non-transsexual individuals. Later, 
Cauldwell (2001 b) reconsidered his definition of transsexuality as a mental health 
condition, and reworked his theory of inversion in a general theory of sexual formation 
based on his categorisation of 'abnormalities' drawn from clinical experience. In this 
way he postulated that there were two sexes separated by a 'gulf' between them, and 
that this interstitial space was only occupied 'legitimately' by pseudo-hermaphrodites 
and various biologically inherited conditions49 , implying that all other sexual conditions 
49 Similarly, Abraham (1931) reported cases of male-to-female sex change through surgery, which 
was recommended in cases that presented symptoms of self-harm due to a pervasive discomfort or a 
very strong feeling of distress associated with the clash of biology and sexual roles. 
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could safely be reassigned as one or the other sex. In fact, answenng a number of 
logistic preoccupations for his patients, his writings pointed to surgical sex change as the 
clinical solution for the transsexual condition because there was a difference between sex 
and gender and because transsexuality could be aetiologically defined as a mismatch 
between the two. The emphasis on the existence of gender - this 'mental', later 
'psychosocial', side of sex - became an analytic tool to deal with 'troubled' identity 
formations and a means to control sexual health and normality. Gender would become 
the pervasive and processual new nature of sex, which was seen to contradict fixed 
models of biological determination. 
3.2.2 A protocol of sexual reassignment (1950-1970) 
If German sexual SCIence focused on generating abstract taxonomic models that 
accounted for differences in sex (developing notions such as 'primary and secondary sex 
characteristics', 'sexual drive', 'sexual identity', and so forth), and only incipiently 
proceeded to facilitate people's reassignment at a physical or social level (examples of 
reassignment cases in this period include Gilman (2006) and also Meyerowitz (2002)), a 
second generation of sexologists, now in North America, focused on developing the 
technical aspects of treatments. These sexologists were involved in the making of 
theoretical models of sexual formation (Money 1986), but were more interested in the 
clinical application of those models (Kinsey 1948, 1955; Pauly 1965). Their 
understanding of therapy and sex change was based on the assumption that sexual 
identity and gender identity were distinct, yet connected, poles and that treatment of 
sex-related conditions lay in understanding this connection. Through the notion of 
'gender role' they were able to separate biological sex from its behavioural, 'cultural' 
and 'intersubjective' counterpart and develop and test therapeutic sex change and sexual 
reassignment models. The difference between these two lay in whether the condition -
the 'mismatch' between people's bodies and what they understood to be their sexual 
identity - was physical and/or appeared in early childhood. Here, the rationale that 
even though transsexuality did not have a biological basis it did appear in early 
childhood, was enough to justify treatment for consenting adults; however, sexual 
reassignment of intersexed babies, which was performed without the patient's consent, 
was justified in relation to the importance of a continuity between sex and gender. 
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John Money's entire career as a psychologist at John Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore was 
dedicated to the scientific demonstration of the prevalence of environment over 
biologfo in sexual formation (Money 1986, 1995; c£ Kinsey 1928, 1937). He 
advocated the view that 'gender' was determinative, while 'sex' could be changed at 
will. Money was convinced that gender identity, defined as an internal conviction, and 
gender role, constructed intersubjectively, were two distinct dimensions of gender, or 
'two sides of the same coin'51. He developed the notion of gender theoretically and 
clinically within sexology, emphasising the formation of gender identity over given 
biological attributes such as chromosomal, gonadal or genital sex, and argued that the 
influence of the environment, and in particular during the stage of imprint - that is, 
before 24 months old - was crucial and determinative in the development of gender 
identity. During this stage, he argued, it was possible to define gender identity through 
the provision of a suitable framework - a series of controlled 'environmental' factors or 
a gendered education. Given such provisions, the body could be safely reassigned as 
either sex in the cases where a chromosomal or genital tendency towards male or 
female was not clear. Reassignment would be initiated by sexual surgery and 
maintained through a lifelong hormonal treatment, which would at once neutralise any 
chromosomal tendency and ensure the development of an adequate 'gender role'. 
Money's theory that gender identity could be induced through early sexual 
reassignment encountered little resistance in the theoretical and scientific climate of the 
time, where this kind of research was pioneering, and where the rise of cybernetics and 
the development of the feminist political agenda contributed to its popularisation and 
50 Following his PhD thesis, entitled Hermaphroditism: an inquiry into the nature of a human paradox he 
initiated and coordinated numerous initiatives and research programmes, pioneering the field of 
psycho endocrinology. His theoretical breakthroughs led to the establishment of new protocols of 
gender reassignment in early childhood, in cases of intersexuality and other no less unfortunate cases, 
like the famous John/Joan case, where a genital complication after a circumcision threatened to 
produce a 'healthy' gender identity in the future. 
51 Money used this particular expression in the documentary Sex and Money, produced by the 
Humanist League, Amsterdam. 
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unprecedented appraisals2 . The scientific success of his theories fostered new ways of 
thinking about sexual development and gender identity across disparate fields of 
academic enquiry such as neurobiology, anatomy, psychology, feminism, the 
humanities, and the social sciences. 
Money focused much of his career in finding a clinical solution for intersexuality and 
various types of hermaphroditisms3 because he believed that life beyond a binary gender 
identity would inevitably entail a threat to mental health development, become a source 
of permanent unhappiness and increase the likelihood of suicidal tendencies. He 
established that a newborn baby could be medically accepted as a boy when the penis 
size was over 2.5 cm, as a girl when the clitoris was below 0.9cm, but that it was 
medically unacceptable when the genital area was somewhere in between (see Kessler 
2002; Roen 2008). In particular, he argued that intersexuality as a congenital-hormonal 
condition would inevitably produce an identity crisis in the patient, because gender 
identity was understood both as the possibility of sociality and the condition of 
coherence of the internal structure of subjectivity. In principle, reassignment in the sex 
of choice (of the parents) would be easy and without further consequence for the 
development of gender identity during childhood and adolescence, provided that it was 
done during the so-called period of imprint and that it was grounded in the recognition 
and supportive approval of significant others. However, cases such as that of Bruce/ 
Brenda (whose name at birth was David Reimer, was given the names Bruce/Brenda 
after reassignment and is referred to as John/Joan in medical and academic literature) 
show how these premises did not always work. After a routine circumcision, Bruce lost 
his penis due to an electrical discharge, and was reassigned as a female by Money and 
his team, while his twin brother Brian was raised as a boy. However, despite Money's 
belief that he would develop a healthy gender identity (the only gender identity, Money 
52 Interestingly, Money's theory of gender was developed around relationships and the practice of 
love, as he thought that gender identity was ultimately constructed through feedback from others. 
Sexology thus acquired with Money the illusion that gender identity was not only informed, but 
also positively limited by the two possibilities that allow heterosexual/homosexual relationships. 
Money himself was a proud sexual liberationist, an opponent to the limitations of moral order he 
had been brought up with, and a methodologically eccentric scientist - a fact that was not always 
well received by his contemporaries and cost him more than one public scandal (see Colapinto 
2000). 
53 It would be later rather contradicted by the experience of those who were reassigned without 
their consent. See, for example, the visual document Hermaphrodites Speak by Hermaphrodites With 
Attitude, or the well known case of Joan/John in Nature Versus Nurture 1: OJTwins and How David 
Reimer Became Brenda. 
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argued, that would allow him to engage in heterosexual intercourse), Bruce never felt 
comfortable with his imposed gender, and at fourteen started to live as a man again, 
before his relationship with his brother worsened and both committed suicide at a 
young age. 
I will return to this case again in this chapter, but for now I want to highlight that 
through the notion of gender as 'learned' over biologically-given 'sex' (Money 1988; 
1995; Money and Ehrhardt 1972; Money and Tucker 1975; Stoller 1985), doctors 
started to address the complex emotional map of troubled identity formations, and sex 
change soon became a viable solution for cases where sexual discomfort could be 
resolved with a new gender identity. Gender, etymologically related to kin or species, 
was adopted in biomedical discourse and especially within sexology to account for the 
different, the new and the variant, and sex was reduced to 'fixed' biological traits and 
linked to reproductive physiology. Gender could turn bodies masculine or feminine, 
because these psychosexual modes of identification mattered more than bodies 
themselves in accounting for complex differences, tendencies and behaviours54 . In 
1995, Money still defined transsexuality within a binary sexual framework: 
"In the developmental coding of the gender map of both boys and girls, 
masculine and feminine are dualistically represented as positive and negative. 
The positive pole codes for me, for who I am, boy or girl. The negative pole 
codes for not me, for who I am not, girl or boy, respectively. At each pole there 
is a map or schema of what is coded there, one labelled feminine and the other 
masculine. Everybody, boy and girl, man and woman, has both maps, one 
depicting 'me' and the other depicting 'thee'. If the two maps change places 
then one has a gender transposition disorder. One map may displace the other, 
as in the case of full-blown transsexualism, or both may coexist in alternation as 
a phenomenon of dual personality, one masculine and another feminine. 
Another possibility is that the two maps may merge in some degree of 
androgyny or bisexuality" (1995:112). 
Perhaps the greatest contribution to the standardisation of a clinical management of 
transsexuality protocol is Harry Benjamin's. In The Transsexual Phenomenon (1966), 
Benjamin raised some of the key questions that would remain at the core of medical 
approaches to transsexuality in forthcoming decades. Under the auspice of FTM 
millionaire Reed Erikson (see Stryker 2008, Person 1999) and with the intention of 
54 The scientific investigation of sex was carried out simultaneously in several institutions including 
Alfred Kinsey's investigation of sexuality and reproduction (see for instance Kinsey et al 1948), 
Money's research on the limits of sexual identity and Stoller's biopsychosocial method (the 
ethnomethodological approach). 
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giving transsexuality a clinical protocol, Benjamin accomplished exhaustive definitions 
of the different kinds of historically known sexual variance, providing a comprehensive 
list of their characteristics for the use of physicians, patients and the general public. 
These distinctions underpinned his definition of 'true transsexuality' as a rupture in the 
continuum chromosomes-hormones-social gender, and his effort to standardise 
hormonal treatment and surgery as a treatment protocol for transsexuality. Benjamin's 
intervention protocol, later legitimated in the DSM, was based on the premise that 
social gender did not have to match the body, but that it should. He wrote: "I would like 
to remind everyone of an important fundamental fact - the difference between sex and 
gender. Sex is what you see, gender is what you feel. Harmony between the two is 
fundamental for human happiness" (Benjamin, quoted in Grabb and Smith 1979:883). 
Benjamin's radical theory of embodiment was based in the distrust that culture alone 
could redeem a pervasive discomfort with one's body. In elaborating the symptomatic 
nature of the 'true transsexual' category, Benjamin agrees with Money's account of the 
role of the environment in determining the aetiology of transsexuality, referring first to 
irregularities occurring during the stage of imprint55 as the most crucial and 
determinative. However, for Benjamin, 'true' transsexuality, defined in opposition to 
cross-dressing and transvestism, stands for the pervasiveness of the desire to change one's 
body, a desire that cannot be corrected except by sex reassignment itself Precisely 
because the desire of the true transsexual to change her/his body is so strong and her/ 
his emotional pain so overwhelming, Benjamin considered psychotherapy a vain 
endeavour in the clinical management of trans sexuality. "The mind of the transsexual", 
he writes, "cannot be changed in its false gender orientation... Since it is evident that 
the mind of the transsexual cannot be adjusted to the body, it is logical and justifiable to 
attempt the opposite, to adjust the body to the mind" (1966:91). 
Benjamin's protocol is therefore grounded in the separation of body and mind, sex and 
gender. Again in this context, as Califia (1997) notes, the advocacy of reassignment 
treatment became a political position, as well as a scientific challenge for practitioners, 
55 Developmental psychology covers the early stage oflearning, usually between 18 months and two 
and a half years. According to this theory, gender can be modified at this age without emotional cost 
for the patient. Money utilised this periodisation for the establishment of a sex reassignment protocol 
for intersexed born babies. The theory, Benjamin suggests, is based in the work of Australian 
zoologist K.Z. Lorenz. 
86 
in that it opposed the current models of electric shock and nauseating drugs dispensed 
to cross-dressing and trans gender patients. Benjamin himself would stand up against the 
appliance of this 'behaviour' or 'aversion' therapy under the threat oflosing his medical 
licence, and his institute became an important meeting point for sex researchers for 
decades56 . Thus, in the new treatments of reassignment through surgery, biomedicine 
mediated the 'socialisation' of transsexuals by ensuring they could access a social and 
legal identity within the binary man/woman. In this way the distinctions sex/gender 
and men/women would remain key coordinates in the medical discourses and practices 
surrounding transsexuality, underlying the logic of treatment and informing its technical 
development. 
The models proposed by Money and Benjamin would converge in the 
ethnomethodological definition of gender as 'natural ascription' or 'passing', developed 
by Stoller, Garfinkel and their UCLA team. In 1973, Stoller advocated psychotherapy 
for Mrs G on the basis of her psychotic nature, describing the problematic gender 
identity of this patient amidst a variety of antisocial and psychotic behaviours, 
personality disorders and suicidal tendencies. However, Stoller remarked that therapy in 
the strict psychoanalytic sense was an impossible endeavour in the case of Mrs G due to 
the psychotic nature of the patient, which determined that her reactions to the analyst 
could not be systematically analysed, although it remains unclear how exactly the 
symptoms of the two conditions overlapped. For this reason, Stoller suggests that the 
case of Mrs G might not be paradigmatic of the way in which transsexuality needed to 
be medically addressed. However, this case did become representative of the ways in 
which psychiatric treatment could be offered to transsexual people, and thus became 
influential in the attempt to systematise a treatment for gender identity 'disorders' m 
psychiatry. This treatment was influenced, on the one hand, by understandings of 
transsexuality as a pervasive, unchangeable and lifelong condition, and on the other 
hand, by the association between psychiatry and surgery for its treatment (Pauly 1986; 
Benjamin and Pauly 1969, see also Sullivan 2008). In contemporary standards of mental 
health, mental illness was understood to originate 'inside' individuals and to be a 
'private' matter (Bracken and Thomas 2005, Clare 1976), and for this reason the role of 
56 Benjamin formed the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, now the VVOrld 
Professional Association cifTransgender Health, in 1978. Richard Green, Paul Walker, Ira Pauly, Donald 
Laub and Norman Fisk became specialists on transsexuality in this context. 
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the analyst was to attempt to 'cure' the patient rather than facilitate their social 
integration. 
Stoller echoes prevlOus sexologists when he defines gender vanance as an overtly 
pathological condition, which is rendered even more complex by the patient's set of 
psychosocial universes. Insisting on the 'psychoanalytic', thus mainly symbolic, nature 
of this patient's disease, Stoller renders gender 'metapsychological' (see Stam et al. 
1987). This idea gained popularity in academic and clinical sexology in the United 
States since the 1960s and set in motion ways of thinking of gender in terms of 
'achievement'. Garfinkel (1967), Stoller's collaborator at UCLA, reports the case of 
Agnes' remarkable transition in 195857 , when she was sent to their unit for psychiatric 
evaluation. According to Garfinkel, in her understanding of gender, "the natural, 
normal female was for Agnes an ascribed object" (1967:133), manifested not only 
through her positive belief in upgrading her social status through transition in the first 
place, but also in the achievement of social capability for "guaranteeing for herself the 
ascribed rights and obligations" (1967:134). For Garfinkel, sex change seems to be 
about recuperating through different and correlated achievements a sense of naturalness 
that was lost in Agnes' condition, and it was necessary because this lack troubled her 
personal life to the point of needing medical reassurance in the form of psychiatric 
reports and therapy, which she would strive to persistently regain by using medical 
technologies to pass. Passing, or "the work of achieving and making secure her rights to 
live as a normal, natural female while having continually to provide for the possibility of 
detection and ruin carried on within socially structured conditions" (1967:137), was for 
Stoller, Garfinkel and colleagues the ultimate outcome of sex change and the end that 
legitimised the use of surgery upon otherwise undamaged organs. The correction of the 
natural basis of sexual identity and its displacement to genitalia was, according to 
Garfinkel, the very condition whereby 'passing' constituted the ultimate confirmation 
that Agnes could become again a "natural fact of life", that is, a classifiable individual 
within the "cultural environments of normally sexed persons, (where) males have 
penises and females have vaginas" (1967:126) 
57 Agnes transitioned by stealing hormones that were prescribed to her mother; however, she 
persistently denied this fact when participating in Stoller and Garfinkel's study. 
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3.2.3 The sociobiological turn (1970-) 
John Money's Bruce/Brenda Oohn/Joan) case yielded significant controversy that 
recently returned to the public debate after the publication of Colapinto's As Nature 
Made Him: The Boy Who Was Raised as a Girl (2000) and the tragic event of David 
Reimer's death. The book uncovers interviews, therapy sessions, letters, memories, and 
records of David Reimer's birth, his loss of genitalia to a botched circumcision and the 
reasons why his parents decided to submit their son to gender reassignment surgery. In 
fact, unable to deal with the situation otherwise and demoralised by the opinions of the 
doctors that saw David after the catastrophic intervention, his parents found hope in 
Money's expertise, whose theories and clinical reputation had by then been widely 
publicised by the national media. Money offered David Reimer's parents a future for 
their son as a girl and the promise that, were everything to go as expected, their son 
would develop a complete and healthy gender identity: reassignment as a female would 
be the only way in which their son would be able to have heterosexual intercourse. 
They submitted David (then Brenda) to sexual surgery and a lifetime of psychotherapy, 
where she was examined not only by Dr. Money and his team, but also by many other 
physicians, psychiatrists and psychologists within and outside Johns Hopkins. 
Nevertheless, Brenda never adjusted to femaleness, and her pervading gender 
discomfort affected her relations with her family, her development at school, her 
capacity to have friends, and in time forged her view of the medical system as intrusive, 
terrifYing, non-consensual, and unfair. In preadolescence she saw Money for the last 
time, and at age 14 began testosterone injections to be a man again. However, 
disregarding this evidence, Money continued to publish the results of this case as an 
unprecedented and unequivocal success of his reassignment theories and techniques, 
stating that Brenda had incontrovertibly developed the female identity that confirmed 
that gender reassignment was indeed the right decision. 
However, the discovery of the Joan/John case would soon call Money's practice into 
question, starting a scientific war against Money, John and Joan Hampson and the team 
at Johns Hopkins. It was made public when Keith Sigmundson, the physician who 
came across David's case, decided to share the negative outcomes of the case with 
Milton Diamond, a sex researcher committed to prove biological determination in the 
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formation of sex and gender (Diamond 1965, 2004). Together they published what is 
known as the John/Joan report (Diamond and Sigmundson 1997), where they exposed 
ambivalent views on the reassignment of intersexed babies at birth, and defended the 
determinacy of biological factors in contrast with Money's hypothesis of psychosexual 
neutrality at birth. Their report undermines the assumption that genitals are crucial 
elements in gender identity formation (thus questioning the need for sexual surgery in 
infants) in favour of an understanding of chromosomes and the unity of chromosomal 
and hormonal configurations as the basis of the formation of gender. 
This approach informs contemporary discourses of sex and gender in biomedicine and 
the social sciences, where biological data is used to support several social claims about 
identity and sexual formation (c£ Rudacille 2006), through and against which much of 
contemporary feminist theory makes its political arguments (see Chapter 4) and which 
have a significant impact in debates about transsexuality and transition today. Three 
fundamental strands have promoted deterministic, cause-effect explanations of sexual 
identity, sexuality and gender identity using genetics, hormones, or brain structures as 
primary empirical material (Lancaster 2003)58. The transsexual question received this 
kind of redress from neuroscientists and molecular biologists. For instance, Zhou et al. 
(1997), in their study over six male-to-female transsexuals, found that the dimorphic 
58 Genetic detenninism circulated in academic spheres after the publication of Dean Hamer and 
associates' 1993 'pedigree study', aimed to detennine how the trait of homosexuality was spread 
among members of a kin group (see Lancaster 2003). Investigating 76 cases in their first study and 
40 pairs of gay brothers in the second, Hamer et al. concluded that male homosexuality was 
preferentially transmitted through genetic information linked to the chromosomal region Xq28 
from the maternal side. In 1991, a study led by Bailey and Pillard among gay men and their brothers 
(56 pairs of monozygotic twins, 54 pairs of dizygotic twins, 142 non-twin brothers, and 57 pairs of 
adoptive brothers) revealed that the fraternal twins of gay brothers were twice as likely to be gay. A 
few months earlier, Simon Levay had published his study of the gay brain, affinning the existence of 
a particular structure in gay hypothalamic formations. Overtly contesting the obliteration of 
contemporary gender biology discourses, mainly voiced by queer cultural analysts of sexual 
difference, Levay contested the idea of the self-made homosexual by outlining and measuring the 
influence of biological factors in the development and fixation of sexual identity. Even when a 
considerable part of the homosexual community received Levay's theory with appreciation and 
political content, it is difficult not to mention the criticisms that this and other sociobiological 
experiments received from some strands of feminist criticism (Haraway 1995; Hubbard 1990; 
Tomkins et a11995; Shiva and Mosser 1995). Hubbard and Wald (1997, see also Fausto-Sterling 
2000) have explicidy undermined Levay's assumptions on inherited homosexuality, based on the 
criteria of eligibility of the sample (specifically the non-inclusion of heterosexual men and lesbian 
women in the study), and the conscious omission of the fact that all the participants in the study 
were HIV positive, which undoubtedly affected the results. "Their research is painstaking", write 
Hubbard and Wald, "their methods are described in detail and the authors are careful not to make 
extravagant claims in their papers. Their assessment of the work is only betrayed by their readiness 
to believe results that fit their preconceptions" (1997:97). 
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formation of the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (ESTcr in the hypothalamus was 
variable with respect to 'gender identity', albeit invariable with respect to sexual 
orientation. The BSTc is expected to be 2.5 times larger in males than females. 
Although its actual size is understood to vary if exposed to hormonal variations, it is 
recognised that it is related to the formation of gender identity. The BSTc of the 
participants in the study was found to be smaller than in non-transsexual men and 
around the size of non-transsexual women, which led the authors to conclude that the 
presence of higher oestrogen levels is the main cause of BSTc reduction. The fact that 
BST c is mainly developed during the prenatal stages of growth led analysts to conclude 
that the size of this hypothalamic area affects people's motivations to transition and 
constitutes the physical proof that trans sexuality is a biologically determined gender 
identity. 
Counteracting the tendency in favour of the transsexual by choice (See Rudacille 
2006), the view of transsexuality as an innate 'condition' radically affected transgender 
politics and polarised the demand for treatment. Whereas a considerable part of 
transsexual and trans gender communities would agree with the definition of 
transsexuality as a pathology determined by the presence of an 'intersex brain' - a brain 
whose development has been hindered by abnormal hormonal exposure - and because 
governmental policies started developing new areas of coverage for treatment in 
diagnosed cases, this theoretical position became an asset of transgender politics in their 
pursuit of civil recognition. Whereas the majority of transgender people at least 
strategically ascribe to this view, there is a minority who are increasingly advocating the 
demedicalisation of transsexuality, the exclusion of the term 'gender dysphoria' from 
the DSM-IV and the consequent eradication of the need for a psychiatric diagnosis6o • 
The notion of sex as a biological given plays a crucial role in this variant of biological 
determinism as the 'natural' foundation of psychosocial identity (Hausman 1995; 
Meyerowitz 2002; Elkins and King 1996; Oudshoorn 1994). With these scientific 
representations of the body and the measuring of what is not in sight, biology becomes 
59 This is a structure in the brain understood to relate to stress and anxiety responses. 
60 In times where gay and trans genes are being discovered and standardised as 'causes' of 
homosexuality and trans sexuality, and where the news report the advocacy of compulsory 
sterilisation for transsexual people (in order to avoid, they argue, cases of male pregnancy such as the 
media popularised Thomas Beattie), these decisions become increasingly difficult, because, as I refer 
to in chapter three, the increasing professionalisation and intemationalisation of trans politics 
demand the adoption of specific medical models of transition. 
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the condition of narrativity of gender identity, the 'substance' in which gender norms 
inscribe patterns of behaviour. In this way the sex/gender distinction underlies a 
particular clinical relation established between patients and doctors, one based in the 
systematic translation of matter, differential gender relations and values. In the next 
section I will unfold the consequences of this relation by examining the current 
international standards of treatment, agreed by medical practitioners and trans 
organisations. 
3.3 The medical model of transition 
Transsexuality is currently defined as a mental health disorder and classified under 
Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders (GIDs) in the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, 1994) and the International Classification of Diseases 
(I CD-1 0, 1990). These manuals offer a taxonomic description of diagnostic variables, 
and group different GIDs in relation to treatment models; however, despite their 
emphasis on classification, they are meant as compilations of diagnostic criteria and not 
as clinical guidelines. The World Professional Association for Transgender Health 
(WP ATH) covered this gap producing an agreed protocol of clinical practice, the 
Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders (SOCGID) in 1979, which in practice 
became an international treatment guideline for the "psychiatric, psychological, 
medical, and surgical management of gender identity disorders''61. The sixth and last 
revision of the SOCGID was agreed, as were past revisions, by an advisory committee 
formed by medical experts on trans gender health, academics and transsexual activists, 
and was approved in 2001. 
According to the Standards, access to gender reassignment treatment is conditional on 
the psychiatric diagnosis of GID at the beginning of the process, which usually takes its 
first shape in a referral letter from a local General Practitioner, who, having evaluated a 
patient's claim for treatment, passes the case on to centralised units where the patient is 
diagnosed and treated by specialists. Treatment then consists of the modification of 
secondary sex characteristics through hormonal treatment, social/legal transition and/or 
61 See http://www.wpath.org/publications_standards.cfm, last accessed August 2009. 
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surgery. This triadic approach is evaluated once the patient is living as a full member of 
their chosen gender62 through follow-up treatments designed to measure the success of 
reassignment, and to facilitate the social integration of the patient. Although a detailed 
discussion of the classificatory subdivisions of the clinical problems associated with 
gender identity is beyond the scope of this chapter, it may be worth pointing out that, 
in terms of treatment, these are divided according to a 'clinical threshold' which justifies 
the demand and administration of medical care to transgender patients. The Standards 
also stress certain diagnostic prerequisites such as 'real-life experience' tests, problematic 
most of the time among trans people, through which medical professionals are able to 
measure the authenticity of the condition and control access to treatments. These 
diagnostic techniques were developed after the 'medical tum' that followed the 
publication of the DSM III m 1980 (c£ Wilson 1993; Valentine 2007), and which 
resulted in the application of a 'biopsychosocial' approach in psychiatry and the 
development of new models of diagnosis based on observation and the measurement of 
'evidence', which followed a more general tendency within psychiatry to assert itself as 
a 'natural' science (Bracken and Thomas 2005). Under this new model, the sex/gender 
distinction was reinforced with the introduction of new categories of Gender Identity 
Disorders, and the reconsideration of different treatment sequences associated with 
those categories. 
In the forthcoming subsections I explore how diagnostic requisites frame medical 
treatment in the NHS, and how their application endorses treatment models based on 
the progressive elimination of female sexual characteristics and the acquisition of male 
attributes. I then discuss briefly the different treatment models the Standards suggest 
through the three successive stages of psychotherapy, hormones and surgery. This 
structure is intended to layout more clearly some important consequences of medical 
classification and prognosis, and also to reflect the ways in which the structure of 
treatment affects trans people's understanding of their transitions. This section draws on 
official documents rather than trans people's differing encounters with treatment 
62 Methods vary in different medical/political traditions, ranging from psychiatric tests to forensic 
examinations, and in some instances are mandatory to achieve legal recognition. Common tests 
include the examination of aesthetic results of the treatment such as growth/loss of body hair, and 
psychosocial evaluations designed to corroborate that the patient lives full-time in their new gender 
role. In some countries in western Europe, voice tests and genital measurement are also customary. 
Once recorded by a forensic agent, these data are detailed in a legal report and submitted on account 
of the transsexual's name change. 
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models, because it seeks to address the status of transsexuality in contemporary medical 
debates, and in particular the role of psychiatric evaluation in the generation of 'ideal' 
therapeutic and prognostic transsexuality models. In Part II of the thesis, where I 
explore my informants' experiences of transition, I will also address their relationship 
with certain aspects of treatment such as hormonal intake (Chapter 5) and real-life 
experience (Chapter 6). 
3.3.1 The clinical threshold 
As defined by the SOCGID, the clinical threshold "is passed when concerns, 
uncertainties and questions about gender identity persist during a person's development, 
become so intense as to seem the most important aspect of a person's life, or prevent 
the establishment of a relatively unconflicted gender identity" (WPATH 2001:2). For 
doctors, it defines the point where gender becomes the concern of medicine, as it 
cumulatively condenses the symptoms that are susceptible to being diagnosed as a 
gender identity disorder. For trans people the clinical threshold is epitomised by their 
decision to start transitioning. It is passed when one consults a GP and is referred to a 
mental health specialist to be diagnosed according to the DSM-IV and ICD-l0. Those 
who pass the clinical threshold are classified as having a Gender Identity Disorder (Of 
Childhood, Adolescence, Adulthood or Not Otherwise Specified) by the DSM-IV, and 
either Transsexuality, Dual-role Transvestism, Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood, 
Other Gender Identity Disorder and Gender Identity Disorder; Unspecified by the 
International Classification of Diseases -10 (ICD-l0). These classifications are important 
because they stand as guarantors of the success of the treatments and are therefore 
central to the understanding of what constitutes arrival and the extent of treatments in 
medical narratives. In this way they also inform ideas of 'success' shared between trans 
people and medical and political discourses. 'Success' is a key concept that legitimates 
transsexuality as a condition for which a treatment is necessary, effective and free in 
some countries, including the United Kingdom, and it is defined by medical discourses 
as a certain moment after treatment when gender is no longer a matter of concern in 
relation to the patient's ability to produce certain living standards (in terms of mental 
health, the law, work, sexuality, and physical appearance). It often coincides with the 
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'fixation' of gender traits and with the moment when gender identity is no longer 
understood to be in transition, because one of the key outcomes of treatment is the 
stabilisation of the desired gender identity. 
The clinical threshold is essentially subjective, and is evaluated in diagnosis through 
personal narratives of the symptoms. These narratives entail - on the side of the patient 
- the breaking down of any reasons for social discomfort and gender/body dysphoria, as 
well as - on the doctor's side - an explanation of the enablements and limits of each 
treatment in order to achieve an agreement on what is adequate for a specific case. In 
this exchange, certain kinds of narratives of experience (personal, political, legal, and 
otherwise) are required in order to create the desired evaluation. Trans people know 
that it is not a given that they will be diagnosed and referred for treatment, and for this 
reason, when they are not produced spontaneously, successful narratives are plotted 
collectively and shared in support groups in order to extend the rate of eligible cases. 
Understanding the medical logic of this process in relation to this more strategic 
dimension can help situate the clinical threshold, not only as a fixed category that 
mediates the relation between a trans person and the medical institution, but also as a 
labile and living boundary; one that not only connects the inner and outer realms of 
medical transsexuality, but also produces ambiguities and contradictions contingent to 
the event of its negotiation. 
In fact, the definition of the clinical threshold also involves the ways in which social 
services decide on eligibility criteria. These apply in the same way as access to general 
conditions of care and to the regulation of health under the ideal of 'choices'63 in the 
conte:A1: of contemporary health systems. In the United Kingdom, the NHS provides a 
route for transitional patients through the gender unit at Charing Cross Hospital, once a 
case has been validated and appropriately referred by a General Practitioner. As soon as 
a first appointment is granted, usually after a waiting period of several months, the 
patient undergoes the subsequent phases of evaluation and diagnosis that will eventually 
63 The NHS offers through its program Choices the possibility of comparing hospitals and 
treatments for patients. It is the result of recent discussions within the welfare state that characterise 
medical treatments as 'services' where the patient, who used to be subjected to medical authority 
and have a limited capacity of decision, is now progressively entitled to 'decide' on the conditions of 
treatment (see www.nhs.uk, last accessed August 2009). However, medical insurance in other 
Europeans countries also tend to a similar ideal, where the provision of care is gradually framed by 
patients' decisions. 
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result in access to hormones and surgery. Needless to say, in order to access NHS care, 
a patient must be eligible in terms of citizenship. Even though the ideal of access to 
social services in the United Kingdom is of free access for all, it remains the case that 
those concerns about one's gender identity that the clinical threshold establishes as a 
precondition to treatment have to be articulated in rather specific ways, as my 
informants remarked and I discuss in the following sections. Because diagnosis is largely 
based on narratives about experience in the lack of a clear physical symptomatology, 
knowledge of English, if not sheer mastering of the specific gender narratives that will 
make up for success in accessing treatment, could be said to be the first unspoken 
prerequisite to encroach on the clinical threshold. I was told that these narratives 
include strong assertions about one's wish to become the other gender, reference to 
having had felt in the same way in the past, the will to continue treatment in all its 
phases (hormonal transition and surgery), and as little ambiguity as possible regarding 
the definition of one's gender identitf4. 
Other criteria include minimum age requirements and passing a number of diagnostic 
tests designed to make sure there is no risk of co-morbidity or that 'transsexuality' as a 
mental health condition occurs 'alone'65. Were it obscured by the detection of other 
mental or personality disorders, a period of severe depression or any other concomitant 
mental health disorder, the diagnosis would be postponed until those conditions have 
been treated in adequate periods of psychotherapy. Yet concerns about gender identity 
seldom happen 'alone', as gender identity is lived in many, if not all, dimensions oflife, 
and it is only too obvious that aggravates such as depression, isolation and 
marginalisation can easily evolve into complex constellations that may affect the 
'normality' of one's interactions with others, not to mention the results of diagnostic 
tests. 
64 My informants commented that failure to define their gender identity as male was understood to 
obstruct the diagnostic process, and could result in a higher number of therapy sessions. In 
subsequent phases of diagnosis, failure to identify appropriately in the gender of choice could also 
delay treatment. According to my informants, it was important to be 'articulate' and be able to 
anticipate the shortcomings of the first medical interview. 
65 This is because, as Redlich (1981) argues, notions of health in psychiatry are in general "vague" 
and "loose" in their lack of agreement on generally applicable behavioural criteria. These are even 
more complex in the case of GID because here differential diagnosis involves, in practice, complex 
sets of associations based on observation and narrative interpretation. 
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In the NHS, the clinical threshold is usually passed in practice around nine months after 
one expresses his first concerns, as this is approximately the extension of the NHS 
waiting list. For this reason, among others, some trans men regard the NHS route as a 
long and exceedingly bureaucratic process. In London, the London Gender Clinic 
offers a private alternative to the NHS, and offers diagnosis and hormone prescription 
through a faster route. Founded by Russell Reid, now retired, this clinic is now run by 
an experienced doctor, and it is the preferred choice for people who do not want to 
wait or, indeed, want to be treated by a trans friendly doctor instead of a non-trans 
psychiatric specialist. This option allows people access to hormonal treatment 
comparatively sooner, and it doesn't foreclose the possibility of accessing care via the 
NHS for surgery at a later stage. Mastectomies and other gender surgeries are treated as 
private plastic surgeries outside NHS treatments, and are considerably expensive. In the 
forthcoming sections I will analyse the different stages of treatment in their 
representation in the Standards of Care, and I will introduce some points of discussion 
that people pointed out when talking about treatment. 
3.3.2 Diagnosis 
Today's symptomatic configuration of trans sexuality is described in the psychiatric 
manuals DSM-IV and ICD-l0. In the ICD-l0 (WHO 2007, section F64), which, 
incidentally, coincides with recently NHS published research on the aetiology and 
classification of gender identity disorders (Barrett 2007), transsexuality is defined 
primarily as a desire to "live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex" by 
people who wish to have "surgery and hormonal treatment to make one's body as 
congruent as possible with one's preferred sex" (WHO 2007). The DSM-IV (1994) sets 
two different requisites for Gender Identity Disorder: a persistent cross-gender 
identification and evidence of "persistent discomfort" (usually related to the inability to 
function 'properly' in social or occupational areas). In addition, the condition is 
essentially conceptualised as 'psychological', as the diagnosis requires that no evidence 
be found of a concurrent physical intersex condition. The DSM-IV offers a detailed 
section on the diagnostic features of gender identity disorders. For FTMs, it reads as 
follows: 
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"Girls with Gender Identity Disorder display intense negative reactions to 
parental expectations or attempts to have them wear dresses or other feminine 
attire. Some may refuse to attend school or social events where such clothes may 
be required. They prefer boy's clothing and short hair, are often misidentified 
by strangers as boys, and may ask to be called a boy's name. Their fantasy heroes 
are most often powerful male figures, such as Batman or Superman. These girls 
prefer boys as playmates, with whom they share interests in contact sports, 
rough and tumble play and traditional boyhood games. They show little interest 
in dolls or any form of feminine dress-up or role-play activity. A girl with this 
disorder may occasionally refuse to urinate in a sitting position. She may claim 
that she has or will grow a penis and may not want to grow breasts or 
menstruate. She may assert that she will grow up to be a man. Such girls 
typically reveal marked cross-gender identification in role-play, dreams or 
fantasies"66. 
The DSM-IV does not provide a clear aetiology of transsexuality. Rather, it specifies 
subcategories of the general GID diagnosis from the variables of age and sexual 
orientation. This passage suggests that observation and narrative analysis constitute the 
main diagnostic methodologies, and that in order to produce a diagnosis the doctor 
needs to ascertain fantasies and identifications and reconstruct the patient's past. Not 
being related to a physical intersex condition, FTM transsexuality is specifically defined 
as a social incapacity to adapt to certain prescribed behaviours associated with being a 
'normal' girl: wearing dresses, liking feminine attire, growing long hair, wanting to be 
called by a female name, identifYing with female heroes, preferring girls as playmates, 
doing feminine gymnastics, urinating in a sitting position, enjoying the recreation of 
family roles through role-play and dolls, accepting menstruation as a natural and 
exciting feature of puberty, or not having dreams or fantasies where one takes up a male 
gender role. 
Thus, the definition of transsexuality as a social condition is often linked to ideas in 
psychiatry of embodying a 'natural' gender, which is one of the reasons why diagnosis is 
today such a contentious and uncertain terrain67, and underlines the definition of 
reassignment treatments as linear passages between fixed categories in biomedical 
66 DSM-IV, Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders, section 302, entry Gender Identity Disorders, 
can be accessed online at http://www.genderpsychology.org/transsexual/ dsm-iv.html (last accessed 
on August 2009). 
67 I am referring to the revisions of the DSM that are being carried out for the expected publication 
of the DSM-V (I address this issue in chapter 8), but also to some diagnostic incidents involving 
diagnostic procedures that became public after the trial of Dr. Russell Reid, who was accused of 
rushing into a decision at least in 5 of the hundreds of cases he treated throughout his career as a 
private gender specialist, as discussed below. 
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discourses. The psychiatric treatment of GID entails the recognition of certain gendered 
symptoms, and their characteristic grouping in a syndrome, whose diagnosis spreads 
over a number of categories to be finally addressed through a universal triadic 
treatment. In this way, the psychiatric diagnosis of GID situates transsexuality in a 
critical position, given that the signs associated with its identification, at least as it is 
defined in the manuals, are not as easily discernible as evidence in all cases. 
Furthermore, the available time for clinical examination is limited in relation to the task 
of identifying and correlating the evidence of the diagnosis. This evidence includes the 
confirmation of persistent cross-dressing and cross-gender identification, proof of the 
adjustments a patient has already effectuated to live in his gender of choice, and the 
presence of data regarding sexuality and erotic identification. According to NHS 
psychiatrist James Barrett, it also involves observation and scrutiny of the patient's 
'nature', his or her appearance, and his or her 'created features' - diagnostic practices 
scrutinise for elements such as leather chains, tattoos, dog collars and other similar 
details that can illuminate the extent of the patient's fetishistic investment in cross-
dressing, as well as masculinity, femininity or neutrality in the vocal pitch (2007:15). 
Through narrative interpretation and direct observation, the psychiatrist composes the 
puzzle of gender identity, whilst at the same time he ascertains whether or not the 
symptoms meet a certain intensity (clinical threshold) and eliminates other diagnostic 
possibilities (differential diagnosis). 
In short, it is arguable, at least from the perspective of the medical model, that a 
psychiatric appointment will be sufficient to evaluate how and how much the patient's 
experience matters in terms of the diagnosis. It is for this reason that the trans people I 
met wanted to ensure they had the correct answers. Psychiatrists are conscious about 
the increasing diagnostic savvy that trans people deploy in carefully selecting the 
narratives that will make for a successful diagnosis. Even though the line between the 
truth and an instrumental use of diagnostic knowledge by trans patients is subtle, to say 
the least, Barrett believes that, "rather than inventing a 'better' story or seeking the best 
part of their history, some patients present only those parts <if their history they feel to be 
important" (2007:14, my emphasis). Indeed, these inconsistencies are the reason why this 
process is continuously under revision by medical practitioners, service providers and 
specialised organisations working locally and nationally such as the Gender Identity 
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Research Education Society (GlRES) or The Gender Trust. Currently, these 
organisations adopt a model of transsexuality based on "the mismatch between brain-
sex and genital-sex". In its priorities, GIRES remarks that "identifying the biological 
determinants of gender identity and intersex conditions helps society generally to 
understand and accept that those they affect are naturally transgendered. The 
understanding that gender dysphoria is not a fantasy is especially important"68. 
This is one of the reasons why the Standards of Care are such an important and 
contentious document. In fact, the Standards of Care cover the diagnostic gaps in both 
the DSM and lCD with the specification of what should count as evidence for 
diagnosis, and therefore who is eligible for treatment. Thus, they become a mechanism 
of control over psychiatric practice by developing codes of conduct and detailing the 
information that the mental health professional must take into account in order to 
diagnose a case. They are also meant to protect the transsexual patient, ensuring the 
recognition of the condition and what is assumed to be its universally desired treatment. 
The Standards, in conjunction with the work of a number of organisations and trusts 
that support them, also guarantee effectively the social transition of the transsexual 
patient by generating social services and legal frameworks designed to provide equal 
access to work, pensions, social services, a family, and so on. However, the Standards 
also relegate transsexual people to a certain confinement and inscription, one that 
sometimes brings about unwanted repercussions such as the stigma and social prejudice 
endured when one is diagnosed with a mental health condition. 
3.3.3 Real-life experience 
The sixth version of the SOCGlD asserts that it is the responsibility of the mental 
health professional to ensure the accuracy of the diagnosis in order to set in motion the 
most appropriate sets of interventions that will result in gender and sex change. The 
diagnostic process is set in motion through a two-phase evaluation process designed to 
ensure that the patient meets the criteria for treatment. A first phase of this process is 
68 This quote has been extracted from the GlRES public statement on its website. A full list of 
priorities, as well as extensive material supporting their approach to transsexuality, is listed in http:/ / 
www.gires.org.uk/priorities.php, last accessed March 2009. 
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the so-called 'phenomenology', and comprises a symptomatic mapping of the specific 
characteristics of the patient's gender identity, designed to produce realistic 
determinations of the extent of every individual problem. For instance, in the case of 
the GID of childhood and adolescence, this realistic determination entails the 
distinction of a gender identity disorder from a delusional belief, which mayor may not 
be associated with broader psychotic conditions. This gap is systematically dealt with 
through the definition of gender identity as a key concept based on an evaluation of the 
explicit realms of one's experience as having a gendered 'value'. In this way, narratives 
including being born in the wrong body, being already presenting as male, having 
experienced cross-gender identification in childhood, or identifYing with some types of 
heroes and not others all count in this differential diagnosis. Similarly, GIDs of 
childhood and adolescence do not always precede GID in adulthood, and therefore 
these categories are not treated as equivalent in terms of treatment. With adults, this 
phase is evaluated by basic observation (this is an evaluation of the patient by the mental 
health professional) that will determine the need for psychotherapy and ensure that the 
patient meets the eligibility criteria for treatment. 
A second phase of the protocol is what could be classed as psychological and social 
evaluations (tests), formulated to acknowledge and assess the individual needs of the 
pre-transitional patient. These, in children and adolescents, involve a complete 
psychodiagnostic and psychiatric assessment that includes, but is not limited to, a family 
evaluation. In adults, it is about determining the amount of psychotherapy that the 
individual will need in order to start treatment, and is done through programmes 
designed to ensure that the patient meets the eligibility criteria by means of a minimum 
number of psychotherapy sessions. In fact, the Standards make a distinction between the 
concepts of eligibility and readiness. Eligibility is measured in terms of factual 
requirements such as "a person must live full-time in the preferred gender for twelve 
months prior to genital surgery" (WPATH 2001:7), whereas the meeting of readiness 
criteria like "further consolidation of the evolving gender identity or improving mental 
health in the new or confirmed gender role" is understood to be more complicated and 
depend on judgment and essentially subjective values. Readiness criteria involve the 
agreement of the points of view of both patient and doctor. It is perhaps the tension 
between these two concepts that prompts the distinction in biomedical discourse and 
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clinical practice between 'support' therapy, designed to accompany a patient 
throughout the process of transitioning and help to deal with psychological issues not 
necessarily related to the transition process, and 'radical' therapy, the aim of which is to 
"enable the patient to eschew the wish for gender reassignment" (Barrett 2007:97). 
Because of the medical and social risks associated with prolonged hormonal therapy, the 
requirements for cross-sex hormone therapy are based on age (the patient must be over 
18 years old), a demonstrable knowledge of "what hormones can medically do" and 
either a documented real-life experience of at least three months prior to hormone 
administration or a period of psychotherapy specified by the mental health professional 
after an initial evaluation (WPATH 2001:13). In practice, my informants told me that 
real-life experience would be the quickest way to show that you are ready69. The 
constituents of 'real-life' need to be measured in very specific personal narratives, some 
of which are told in the doctor's office and others gathered as a confirmation of what 
happens outside. In other words, access to treatment is conditional on experience 
becoming a measurable and assessable experiment that at once safeguards the pertinence 
of diagnosis and makes psychiatry accountable. 
Some trans people consider real-life expenence inconvenient because evidence of 
having transitioned socially is very difficult to obtain in practice. They complain about 
having to present themselves as male when they feel they do not look male, and having 
to come out as trans in their study or work places when the physical changes are still a 
long way down the line. In the NHS, where the team at Charing Cross worked on a 
revision of the SOCGID to address clinical issues in the United Kingdom, real-life 
experience exceeds the three-month timeframe proposed by the SOCGID, and the 
proposed periods of real-life experience range between six and nine months prior to 
hormonal treatment. The logic behind this augmentation, as described by an NHS 
psychiatrist, is that a longer period of socially reversible changes can have a stronger 
impact on the decision to make partially reversible and irreversible changes, and in a 
way it is itself a preparation for them. In fact, real-life experience was referred to as a 
real-life test in previous versions of the SOCGID and is a system of observation 
69 "I don't think you have to wait two years to get hormones", one informant said, "but they do 
like you to be presenting as male and your work, in this case your college, you do have to get a 
letter from your college saying 'yes I know this person is male and I call him he' and that sort of 
thing". 
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designed to measure the power of narrative and the 'realness' of the meaning to change 
that enables the individual to surpass the clinical threshold. In the SOCGID, real-life 
experience is regarded as "essential", because it makes explicit the negative social 
consequences that transition may have in a person's life7o. It is therefore the doctor's 
responsibility to discuss them with the patient, and to assess accordingly the quality of a 
person's real-life experience in the desired gender. 
The SOCGID, however, argue that real-life experience is not actually a real-life test. 
Despite the evidence that some practitioners take real-life experience as the ultimate test 
for the confirmation of a diagnosis, in theory the diagnosis should precede real-life 
expenence. In practice, it doesn't always do so, and people's encounters with real-life 
expenence are problematic and complex. Real-life experience and real-life tests 
estimate the viability of gender adaptation in a patient's life by assessing, among other 
things, the abilities to maintain full- or part-time employment, function as a student, 
function in a community-based volunteer activity, or any combination of these, and, 
crucially, acquire a legal gender identity in the form of an appropriate first name 
(WPATH 2001:17). The Standards of Care articulate the role of real-life experience 
thus: "[p]rofessionals sometimes construe the real-life experience as the real-life test of 
the ultimate diagnosis. If patients prosper in the preferred gender, they are confirmed as 
'transsexual', but if they are undecided against continuing, they 'must not have 
been'" (WPATH 2001:18, my emphasis). Once passed successfully, "both the mental 
health professional and the patient gain confidence about undertaking further 
steps" (WPATH 2001:18) and trans people are finally prescribed hormonal therapy and 
referred for reassignment surgery. 
3.3.4 Standards of Treatment 
After these two diagnostic prerequisites, sexual adaptation to the gender of choice is 
initiated through specific sets of interventions, which vary depending on diagnostic 
variables such as the patient's age. In children and adolescents, the physical interventions 
are classified according to their degree of reversibility in order to ensure that the patient 
70 As described by the SOCGID, these consequences include employment discrimination, divorce, 
marital problems, and the restriction or loss of visitation rights with children (WPATH:17). 
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does not undergo irreversible changes before experiencing puberty in his or her 
biological sex71 . Hormone inhibitors, or LHRH agonists72 , are the standard fully 
reversible interventions, cross-gender hormonal therapy and real-life experience 
constitute the partially reversible interventions, and surgery, which is not advised before 
adulthood or the completion of a real-life experience of at least two years, is itself the 
paradigm of an irreversible intervention. 
Despite nominal differences, the structure of the treatments in adults is fairly similar, 
consisting of a series of adaptations that require development during the psychotherapy 
stage. In female-to-male patients, these comprise cross-dressing, breast binding, weight 
lifting, the application of theatrical facial hair, padding underpants, or wearing a penile 
prosthesis (WPATH 2001:12-13), which lead to hormonal treatment and surgery. 
Hormonal treatment is generally understood to precede surgery and, in most cases, to 
be its prerequisite, given that surgery is an irreversible transformation, and as such 
entails a special responsibility from both the patient and the medical professional. In 
order to safeguard this responsibility it becomes essential to evaluate what the social, 
familial, interpersonal, educational, economic and legal consequences are likely to be 
when living a new life in the other gender. The new gender presentation, as the 
standards point out, "represent[s] external reality issues that must be confronted for 
success" (2001 :17), and in this way real-life experience often constitutes itself as the 
ultimate legitimating parameter of the diagnosis of transsexuality. Sometimes real-life 
experience is evaluated through real-life tests that resolve the capacity of the patient to 
function in the acquired gender, in the areas mentioned above, and assist both the 
mental health professional and patient in determining when and how to undertake 
further steps. If the new gender is constructed without physical transformation, real-life 
71 This is the general protocol in the United Kingdom; however, increasing scientific investigation 
into possible biological causes of transsexuality (discussed in chapter 1) is fostering treatments of 
hormonal inhibitors in adolescent patients in other countries of the European Union, such as 
Netherlands or Czech Republic. Increasingly these debates are permeating British public opinion, 
see for instance http://www.timesonline.co. uk/tolllife_and_style/health/ child_health/ar 
ticle4359432.ece, or http://www.guardian.co.uk/society12008/aug/14/children.youngpeople, for 
two recent cases, and http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree12008/aug128/ 
sexeducation.gayrights (last accessed August 2009) for Dr. Richard Green's apology of these 
treatments. Gooren (2008) offers an overview of treatments in Britain. 
72 This compound emulates the structure and function of LHRH (luteinizing hormone-releasing 
hormone). LHRH is a hormone that controls the production of sex hormones in both men and 
women. 
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expenence is already validation of transition, because it implies the success of all the 
steps - clinical, social, interpersonal, etc. - taken towards its consecution. 
Given that the referral for surgery develops from previous stages of treatment, surgery 
comes to manifest itself as the last step towards a successful sex change, according to 
medical discourses. Therefore, surgical interventions stand for a certain arrival that in 
the case of FTM transitions is at least double-sided. First, the body is shaped into male 
aesthetic standards, to varying degrees. 'Top surgery', that is, a mastectomy or breast 
reduction surgery, is aimed at the removal of female sexual characteristics, whereas 
'bottom surgery', or the various techniques of metoidioplasty and phalloplasty, 
approximate the body to the morphology of male genitalia. Hysterectomy, as well as all 
its collateral surgical procedures (bilateral salpingo ophectomyl3 for instance) is more 
problematic, however. Decisions to perform these procedures derive from previous 
treatment stages in some cases, but they are other times advisable for medical reasons, 
for instance in the event that the ovaries develop atrophic cancerous cells or fibroid 
cysts due to a lack of oestrogen and progestin production, possibly related to an ovarian 
atrophy in connection with an intake of testosterone (see, for instance, Seal 2007). That 
these procedures are in some instances mandatory, some trans and intersex people have 
also remarked, evinces that these procedures are sometimes used as tools of biopolitical 
regulation. 
Second, and regardless of the particular procedure, surgery remains the most irreversible 
of interventions within gender reassignment therapy, and is thus the subject of special 
measures intended to guarantee that it is 'the right decision'. Even when, since the 
approval of the Gender Recognition Act, it is no longer the case in the UK, in other 
European countries surgery is the threshold beyond which the medical profession is 
accountable for someone's sex change before the law, and for this reason there are extra 
medical (legal) controls in order to preserve the logic of treatment. This is the case in 
Germany, as one of my informants confirmed in our interview, as well as in France, 
where it is customary to perform forensic examinations over the transgender patient's 
body before a legal change of name, only to determine that he or she has undergone a 
determinate degree of surgery and his or her genitals are shaped within the medical 
73 This procedure entails the removal of both ovaries and the Fallopian tube. 
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standards of the sex of choice. However, in Britain, as Whittle suggests in the Mite 
Book, surgery is granted to trans people as an integral part of treatment, and there are 
ways in which people that are denied surgery can access legal support from specialised 
organisations if they decide to appeal (1998:10). The logic of surgery, as Whittle 
remarks, is based on at least three important arguments. Surgery is a continuation of 
hormonal treatment in the triadic model of gender reassignment, and as such it needs to 
be available to patients who have started medical transition. In addition, it has a high 
index of success in terms of recovery. And finally, because transsexuality is considered 
an "inborn" condition in the medical model, "transsexual people should therefore be 
treated equally to any other person born with a correctable inborn disability" (1998: 1 0). 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I laid out the logic of gender reassignment treatments by connecting the 
historicity of the distinction between sex and gender and the current logic of diagnosis 
and triadic treatment. I explored how the medical model in psychiatry that followed the 
publication of the DSM III in 1980 affected the treatment of Gender Identity 
Disorders, and how it created specific points of reference (the clinical threshold, 
diagnosis and real-life experience) in regard to transsexuality and transition. Through 
this model, psychiatrists place emphasis on objectivity, evidence and observation over 
interpretative analysis, and mobilise patient narratives beyond their contextual milieu to 
establish a universal 'proven' transition route that works for trans sexuality and gender-
related conditions. With this move, transsexuality is not only reified as a medical 
condition (in particular a 'mental health disorder'), but also as a universal, coherent and 
unitary identity that is understood to simultaneously mirror and produce the experience 
of transition. 
The clinical threshold, described in terms of persistence and the intensity of a certain 
symptomatic configuration, delimits the scope of the medical management of 
transsexuality, which is regulated through an internationally agreed (between medical 
professionals, trans representatives and organisations) protocol - the Standards of Care. 
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In this standardisation, expenence becomes the experimental ground of biomedical 
taxonomic and prognostic practice, and transition is defined as the passage between the 
two predefined categories of 'natural' gender. 
I discussed how biomedical discourses privilege real-life expenence as both a 
confirmation and an ultimate test in the diagnosis of gender identity disorders, which 
amounts to certain proofs that effectively assess the 'truth' behind trans people's 
intentions to access treatment. Furthermore, sub categorising gender identity disorders 
according to age criteria, the Standards establish a triadic model of treatment based on 
the progressive irreversibility of transition changes. In so doing, they endorse a model of 
change based on linear conceptions of time, where progress is measured through the 
combination of physical, social and legal changes. 
Participants in this research used medical coordinates and the language of linear passage 
to describe their transitions and situate their processes in shared abstract domains. 
Medical coordinates were thus 'milestones' in their processes; they were used and 
drawn upon in different contexts, informing ideas about trans identity and politics, and 
setting the networks in which the biomedical and biotechnological dimensions of 
transition are distributed. However, it could be argued that this paradigm overlooks 
experiential dimensions of transition, where change is perceived as a qualitative and 
unfolding process of creativity, movement, continuity, and ruptures. In the following 
chapter, I address critiques to this model voiced by strands of (post)feminism and queer 
theory, who tried to subvert the sex/gender distinction in their analysis. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 
The becoming political of sex 
In the previous chapter I laid out the logic that underlies the clinical management of 
transsexuality, connecting the distinction between sex and gender with the emergence 
and development of biomedical discourses on transsexuality and transition. I suggested 
that three different historical periods gave rise to different emphases in medical practice, 
and that the development of biomedical categories and classifications, treatment 
protocols and aetiological models of transsexuality had an impact on debates around sex 
and gender formation in biomedicine and beyond. However, I also suggested that the 
experience of transition is not always reducible to the categorical distinctions with 
which biomedical discourses regard sex reassignment as a mental health disorder. For 
example, mentioning my informants' differing relationships with the clinical 
establishment, I considered how trans people often approach the strict diagnostic 
requirements of gender identity disorders with scepticism and in an instrumental 
manner, establishing complex strategic relations with the rationale behind diagnosis in 
order to maximise efficiency in accessing and using treatment. I considered the ways in 
which the medical dimension of treatment is underpinned by politics in many ways, 
and how access to treatment is mediated by complex regulatory mechanisms, as are the 
management of transgender health and the production of knowledge about transition in 
the context of biomedical experimentation. In this sense the diagnosis of gender 
identity disorders reifies the conclusions of other studies about mental health (see 
Canghilhem 1989; Rose 1990; Jones 1994; Foucault 2001), where the distinction 
between the logic of choice and the logic of care (Mol 2008) are not as clear as they 
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may seem in other 'physical' illnesses74 . In my view, this distinction between logics is 
especially timely in relation to the enactment of sex and gender in mental health 
cultures, given that this border is in fact contentious and subject to continuous 
revisions75 . With the concern rising about the role of psychiatry and the use of 
performance drugs in psychiatric treatment (Kramer 1994; Elliot 2003; Fraser 2003; 
Martin 2007; LakofI 2004), the relevance of some of these debates is however not 
restricted to the case of sexual and gender identity disorders. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of sex and gender as objects of biomedical and scientific 
classification, experimentation and therapeutics gave rise to a number of historical 
studies that demonstrated that the relation between sex and gender, biomedicine, 
kinship, and economics is political. As we saw in Chapter 2, the emergence of 
endocrinology in the second half of the nineteenth century fostered new ways of 
thinking and regulating the body in terms of its social (and political) functions (see 
Foucault 1985; Laqueur 1990, for instance). Feminism also studied this historicity, 
approaching sexual identity and sexual formation, and situated the production of sex (its 
'nature') precisely within those social and political networks. Feminist approaches to 
gender and sex thus inspired the redefinition of the political in relation to the body and 
identity, and in relation to the discourses that historically naturalised sex and gender 
relations (see, for instance Strathern 1992; Stokke 1993, Collier and Yanagisako 1987). 
From this standpoint, and influenced by certain traditions in philosophy, feminist 
scholars developed new analytic approaches to the relation between sex and gender as a 
political question. 
74 I am using Annemarie Mol's recent binary formulation (2008) because, despite having been 
coined in the context of a chronic 'physical' illness, it is especially relevant in the analysis of mental 
illness. Mol's argument against 'the logic of choice', a tendency in biomedicine to consider patients 
the 'experts' of their own condition, challenges the idea that treatment could ever be a matter of 
choice. That patients are offered an increasing number of commercial tools to alleviate the 
symptoms of their condition, thereby exonerating doctors' responsibilities, and that treatments 
increasingly rely on social networking tools like support groups or 'expert' groups, Mol argues, 
inverts 'the logic of care', which she defines as the essence of medicine, and which endows doctors 
with the power, responsibility and expertise in decision making in the context of clinical relations. 
75 I mean especially legally. Examples of this legislation are Britain's Mental Health Act 1983, 
amended 2007 or the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which affect the political regulation and clinical 
management of all affected by mental health disorders. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is also evinced 
by discussions about the transition between interpretative and evidence (symptom) based psychiatry 
with the publication of the DSM-III in biomedical and social science literature (Bracken and 
Thomas 2005; Mayes and Horwitz 2005; Menninger 1977; Horwitz 2002; Milton 1983; Starr 1982; 
Young 1995) 
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The coexisting - although perhaps to some extent divergent - conceptualisations of 
sexual politics discussed in this chapter share the common political project of 
problematising 'authorised' and essentialist discourses of sex, especially the correlations 
between the body and the construction of gender proposed by biomedical discourses. 
As such, they challenge the ways in which biomedicine defines transition as a linear and 
cumulative passage between 'female' and 'male'. However, these critiques have a 
different theoretical and political scope, and approach this critical project from 
apparently contrasting perspectives, giving relevance to different political dimensions of 
sexual politics. In the context of contemporary critical and (post)feminist theory, these 
approaches constituted radical theoretical and political reconfigurations of sexual 
ontology and epistemology and were mobilised by social movements as strategic 
investments in social change. 
This chapter thus reVIews some of the main debates around the politicisation of the 
sex/ gender distinction of the past decades, through reviewing a series of critiques of this 
distinction in the social sciences and biology. This discussion aims to highlight 
important critiques of the sex/gender distinction, because in redefining the relation 
between sex and gender, they implicitly challenge the idea of transsexuality as a 
mismatch between the two. However, I will argue that, although they appear to be a 
direct response to biomedical discourses and thus seek to situate their analysis beyond 
deterministic correlations between the body and behaviour, they do to some extent 
reinforce the same analytic categories in their engagement with experience and 
materiality. They articulate sexual and gender formations around different coordinates, 
where reference to these categorical distinctions (the distinction between sex and 
gender, at the very least) remains at the core of their analytical and political project. 
Importantly, in these analyses, as will be discussed in detail, the problematic 
underpinning of the way medical discourses engaged with sex and gender, defining 
those categories as 'independent' yet 'complementary' realms of experience, remains 
unchallenged. The discussion contained in this chapter will thus become important in 
my analysis of testosterone (Chapter 5), narrative (Chapter 6) and thresholds (Chapter 
7) in transition, and to my conceptualisation of these three realms as transition units 
(Chapter 8). 
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Furthermore, the critical discourses discussed in this chapter inform some of the ways in 
which trans people extend and clarifY medical definitions of transition, and the way that 
they define sexual politics in relation to becoming trans. However, despite the political 
potential of the sex/gender distinction critiques posed by post-feminism and queer 
theory, mainstream transgender politics mobilise the distinction between sex and gender 
as a strategic tool in a struggle for social inclusion and the recognition of civil and 
human rights for trans people, and regard these approaches to sex and gender as 
evidence of a political difference between sexuality and gender politics. Either way, 
these discourses have become resources for trans people, and are drawn upon In 
different ways to construct trans identities and public understandings of transition. In 
some instances, post-feminist politics76 underlie radical sexual politics, or inform the 
identity politics of transsexuality in more subtle ways. They are, in any case, mobilised 
as illustrations or critiques of gender formation when trans people discuss ideas of 
transition, identity and what it means to change sex or gender77 . 
4.2 Critiques of the sex/gender distinction 
The post-feminist project was characterised by continued, yet different, grappling with 
sex and gender, and a focus on matter and the body as one of the key means to do so. 
The critique of the category 'woman' as the subject of the feminist political project 
opened new areas of critique in many of the main debates around binary categories and 
the use of constructivist gender identity models across the social sciences and the 
humanities. This critique followed a number of debates about the place of gender in 
social relations, a set of trans-disciplinary debates where anthropology became especially 
prominent in reinforcing the analytic distinction between biology and social role at the 
core of kinship relations (Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974; Moore 1988; Ortner 1981; 
Boddy 1989) and the practice of gender (Rubin 1975, 1993, 1994; Newton 1979; 
Green 1997; Johnson 2005). Referring to certain bodies of knowledge that had already 
addressed this critique in some ways, notably Lacanian revisions of psychoanalytic 
76 See, for instance, Brooks 1997 or Tasker 2007 for a discussion of postfeminist politics. 
77 An initiative I co-organised during fieldwork, the Trans Reading Group, evinced the extent to 
which these discourses are mobilised when discussing gender formation and sexual politics. Rather 
than books written by trans people about transition, the participants in the group were interested in 
post-feminist literature. 
111 
theory, phenomenology and post-structural theory, social theory made use of the 
traditional discourses of biology and the biosciences - distinct from later theories of the 
social body (such as Featherstone 1990, 2000) - to elaborate complex articulations of 
matter and the symbolic in analysing sexuality, sex and gender. 
In this section I discuss three theoretical instances where the sex/gender distinction and 
its theoretical, political and epistemological consequences were recently interrogated. 
For reasons of brevity, I have grouped these critical arguments around (1) feminist 
revisions of notions of corporeality that under the resurgence of phenomenological 
theory in the 1990s proposed new conceptualisations of 'experience', (2) the use of 
bioscientific claims (notably neuroscientific and biological) by social theorists and 
biologists to privilege paradigms of connectivity and relationality in thinking of the 
body as a process, and (3) Judith Butler's tum to Lacanian psychoanalysis to propose a 
definition of sex as itself transversed by cultural relations in opposition to earlier 
feminist1s assumptions of biology as pre-cultural. By examining their postulates and 
contexts of pertinence, I intend to highlight some theoretical claims that became 
important in my research and that, in some way or other, I encountered during my 
ethnographic fieldwork among trans men; these ideas also became the theoretical 
starting point of my analytic approach to transition. It is under this rationale that I 
group and review their claims in this section, both as a way of contextualising the 
emergence of current debates around the status of transsexuality in social theory and in 
order to highlight the ways in which their theoretical underpinnings enable and limit 
political approaches to the body, matter and transition. 
The senses in which sex and gender became political in post-feminist discourses were 
related to a series of revisions of the notion of agency (inspired by neo-Marxist and 
post-structural theory) in relation to the formation of sex and gender as the condition of 
(inter) subjectivity and narrative identity. In this respect, these new approaches 
construct the categories of sex and gender in relation to a variety of social, cultural, 
political, and psychological processes, as well as specific modes of observation and 
78 Butler positions this claim against Simone de Beauvoir's distinction between biological and 
historical (natural) dimensions of sex - where biology is assumed to be a pre-cultural given - in 
Gender Trouble. In Bodies that Matter she draws the same critique in relation to feminist readings of her 
own work regarding radical paradigms of constructivism, including the position of linguistic 
monism, where, in Butler's words "linguistic construction is understood to be generative and 
deterministic" (1993:6) and the presupposition of a subject who' constructs' gender volitionally. 
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knowledge production. Sex and gender in this context became to some extent 
'processual' in two different yet interrelated ways. Both categories were seen to emerge 
in the intersection of regulatory practices (hence that the analysis of sex and gender 
needed to incorporate the historicity of those regulatory regimes) and they were 
understood to be linked to complex articulations of 'the lived', be it in relation to a 
phenomenological notion of experience (as in Grosz and Gatens' corporeal feminism) 
or by rethinking traditional divisions between matter and form and the reinvestment of 
the power of (symbolic) action in matter and the biological body (as, in different ways, 
do feminist biologists and queer theorists). These theoretical approaches, as I explore in 
this section, were in different ways critiques of the sex/gender distinction and its 
implications for social analysis. 
Nevertheless, perhaps the most influential analytic engagement with sex and gender -
certainly the most widespread -, which emerged from this critique, was the notion of 
performativity as developed by Judith Butler in Bodies that Matter (1993). This notion 
was explicitly intended to overcome traditional feminist debates around constructivism 
and the relation between matter and the symbolic. Through the notion of 
performativity, Butler explored the ways in which sex "was gender all along", as the 
work of feminists like Simone de Beauvoir already seemed to suggest (see Butler 1986), 
and specifically whether becoming gender (one 'becomes' a woman) was ontologically 
and politically identical to becoming sex. Butler addressed these questions in her early 
work on the distinction between sex and gender in de Beauvoir's The Second Sex 
(Butler 1986) and Gender Trouble (1990), but it would be with the publication of Bodies 
That Matter (1993) that the question received definitive redress. By developing the 
notion of performativity, Butler displaced the 'rules' of gender to sex construction, 
challenging the pre-cultural notions of sex as a biological given, or, using her famous 
formulation, 'de-substantivising' matter to understand it in a 'verbal' way. Sex thus 
ceased to be an inert surface of inscription to become active in its own formation: the 
notions of 'materiality' or 'materialisation' cover a process of the convergence of 
material and symbolic dimensions, where sex is the never-ending process of citation 
through which the body produces and reproduces gender norms. 
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This framework, despite addressing some of the problems of constructivism in an 
unprecedented way, had important consequences. It provided an all-encompassing 
model of enactment of normativity that gave sex and gender a political value, and 
perhaps despite its own intentions came into practice to polarise the sexes politically as 
well as theoretically. The framework of performativity not only provided a universal 
framework to address sex and gender practices, but also connected the process of sex 
and gender formation to certain knowledge practices of western science, and associated 
gender formation with narrative identity, subjectivity and time. 
4.2.1 Corporeal feminism 
Although the distinction between sex and gender was incorporated into social analysis 
through the nature/culture debate, critical approaches to constructionism and the 
influence of post-structuralism on second wave feminism launched a number of critical 
discourses that intended to transcend the limitations of these distinctions. In this 
context, phenomenology offered theorists the possibility of theorising embodied 
experience from a new standpoint, from where sex and sexuality were approached as 
the result of connections between material bodies, imagination and lived experience. 
Thus, gender started to be conceptualised in relation to 'the lived' as a result of the 
exposure of bodies to cultural, historical and intersubjective meanings, and also in 
relation to its own process of negotiating situations. 
For instance, Gatens (1996) proposes a critical reading of the adoption of gender as an 
analytical category within feminism, and of the ways in which its political efficacy 
decreased as the notion of gender was applied within constructivist analyses of sexual 
difference. Critiquing Stoller's model of gender identity, Gatens contends that the sex/ 
gender distinction is grounded in the older distinction body/consciousness, because it 
implicitly assumes that gender identity is in fact determined by biological tendencies 
and limits, and that experience is constructed through a cognitive pattern of stimulus-
response. Against this binary model, she argues that neither body nor mind are to be 
understood as neutral and passive tabulae rasae in which social 'lessons' are cumulatively 
inscribed. Gatens questions the assumption that meanings are disembodied, and 
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evaluates the consequences of feminist readings of biology as a privileged site of 
signification. Moreover, she recognises that the displacement within feminist analysis of 
the categories man/woman to masculinelfeminine has assumed a total passivity of the 
body, thereby allotting primacy to the ideological - to culturally specific meanings and 
power relations - emphasising a quest for equality between the sexes and leaving little 
space for the development of a 'micropolitics of difference'. With this move, gender 
started to be understood in feminist analyses beyond its sex-specificity, i.e. it annihilated 
'difference' and, in fact, inadvertently advocated the 'masculinisation' of women. 
However, despite that 'difference' remained central in Gatens' account, the 
introduction of her notion of the 'situated body' was also the requirement of a more 
nuanced political agenda. If the distinction between sex and gender is problematic 
inasmuch as it is entangled in political analysis and practice (1996:4), the 'situated body', 
the 'body as lived' or the 'imaginary body' becomes at the same time a tool to contest 
the characterisation of the body as neutral and a medium utilised to analyse the 
historicity and cultural specificity of embodied meanings. With this notion, Gatens 
develops a critique of the sex/gender distinction that is first and foremost political. For 
Gatens, the main issue at stake with the sex/gender distinction is precisely its effect of 
the neutralisation of sexual difference and sexual politics. The sex/gender distinction is 
understood to reify the liberal tradition of 're-education' as a form of radical political 
transformation, precisely by reinstating the distinction in social theory between 
environmentalism and essentialism, and in this way supporting constructivist claims 
behind feminism's struggle for equality. In other words, because "masculinity and 
femininity do not differ with regard to the sexes in terms of quantity only, but also 
qualitatively" (1996:14), the ideal of a 'degendered' society is the wrong political utopia 
(see also Gatens 2000). The emphasis on the erasure of sexual difference behind the 
commitment to economism79 in Marxist analyses of the woman question works against 
sexual politics because, behind a veil of ahistorical and metaphysical equality, the sex/ 
gender distinction relegates its own political requirements to all-encompassing 
categorical differences such as class, discourse or power (1996:17). 
79 For Gatens, economism privileges the analysis of production over other forms of subjectivity, 
therefore neutralising sexual difference. In its definition of a universal human nature, humanism 
occurs in the same erasure, failing to take into account the historical and cultural specificity of sexual 
difference. 
115 
Similarly, Grosz (1994) uses the notion of the body image to counteract the 
consequences of dualistic thought in feminist analyses of sexual difference, with the 
intention to bring the body to the centre of the analysis of subjectivity, so that the 
'neutering' process, also described by Gatens, can no longer be assumed as the substance 
of sexual politics. For Grosz, the critique of the body/mind dualism is at the centre of 
this political project, hence her designation of the inextricability of biological and 
psychological processes: 
"The body image does not map a biological body onto a psychosocial domain, 
providing a kind of translation of material into conceptual terms; rather, it attests 
to the necessary interconstituency of each for the other, the radical inseparability 
of biological from psychical elements, the mutual dependence of the psychical 
and the biological and thus the intimate connection between the question of 
sexual specificity (biological sexual differences) and psychical 
identity" (1994:85). 
The starting point of sexual politics is, here, the mutual dependence and 
interconstituency of biological and psychosocial domains. Drawing on Deleuze and 
Guattari's work (that informed much of her later work, see Grosz 2005), this fusion 
allows Grosz as a way of thinking sexual politics in terms of the becoming together of 
sexual specificity and psychical identity, redefining the political project of feminism 
through post-structural theory. In this way politics is no longer defined through a stable 
final goal; rather, it is structured in an endless and ever-changing political milieu, 
contingent to history and to the shifting geographies of the political. 
The irreducibility of bodily matter and psychological processes that these lines of 
enquiry advocate, evince the intrinsic relationality and processual nature of the different 
levels of matter and significance that constitute the human body. Even when these 
approaches continue to endorse notions of subjectivity and the lifecycle as key units of 
analysis in order to understand experience, they implicitly offer a radical and productive 
questioning of the idea that gender identity can be understood as ontologically and 
politically different from sexual identity and orientation. Instead, this paradigm focuses 
on understanding the ways in which matter is intertwined with, and inextricable from, 
different social and cultural meanings. 
Yet these approaches still emphasise the continuity of experience, where difference and 
change make sense within the process of the formation of subjectivity. In this sense, and 
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as Kruks (2001) notes, these approaches endorse political models that revolve around 
notions of identity and its cultural significance. For Kruks, one of the main issues of 
their agenda is precisely to undennine 'postmodemist' claims that subjectivity can be 
understood as fragmented and reduced to the discursive. For Kruks, the recuperation of 
the notion of subjectivity is an imperative for the feminist project, as is the recognition 
of the body and interiority as a precondition of "feeling with others" (2001 :167). In this 
respect, Kruks proposes to reintroduce material politics alongside the cultural, symbolic 
and experiential dimensions of identity to approach the production of knowledge, and 
particularly the gap between Donna Haraway's (1988) notion of 'situated knowledge' 
and the production of communicable and objectively situated knowledge. Drawing on 
the successful mobilisation of these epistemological and political traditions within 
postcolonial theory, in Kruks' work the unity of the material and the cultural, symbolic, 
and experiential is the basis of a politics of recognition and solidarity, where individuals 
and groups are bound to find areas of common ground with others. 
These critical stances are connected to certain strands in the history of anthropology and 
the social sciences, where the notion of embodiment was developed to convey the 
unity of experience as well as to recognise the active role of matter and biology in 
developing identity and experience. The legacy of the phenomenological tradition 
(Husserl 1983; Hallowell 1955; Merleau-Ponty 1962; Mandelbaum 1964; Csordas 
1994; Moore 2007) assesses the intersubj ective character of experience, where the 
sensorial and lived are inextricably linked to the formation of subjectivity. In this 
context, what matters is the inseparability of matter and culture, and social analysis is 
understood as an extension of psychoanalytic and other hermeneutic paradigms in 
unveiling the role of these connections in the production of identity, the self, meaning, 
and the political as a field of healing (see Csordas 2002; see also Burkitt 1999; Blackman 
2001; Jackson 1995; Colebrook 2000, 2001). 
4.2.2 Feminism and biology 
The nature/culture debate also yielded political contention in terms of the ways in 
which certain biological claims became privileged as evidence of the nature/culture, 
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sex/ gender distinctions, particularly after the sociobiological tum that characterised 
social analyses of sex and gender in the 80s and 90s (see Chapter 2). In the midst of a 
wider interrogation of the politics of knowledge production in the natural sciences (see 
Spanier 1995; Keller 1985; Hubbard 1990, 1997; Haraway 1989, 1995), biologists 
proposed a number of critical arguments that had a significant impact on sexual politics. 
These claims related to the presumption of political neutrality with which the natural 
sciences produced knowledge about the body and human 'nature', and how in some 
instances their appearance of truth and political neutrality actually endorsed political, 
gender biased, historically-specific claims. 
From within the biosciences there has recently been a tum toward reconceptualising 
the relations between biological and psychological, social and cultural processes as 
articulations in which the making of science itself becomes inherently political. From 
this standpoint, biologists have questioned the status of matter and the body in the 
natural sciences and cultural theory, interrogating the power relations involved in the 
construction of biological knowledge and questioning the mobilisation of their 
empirical results in constructing certain claims as the 'scientific' ratification of political 
truths. For example, Fausto-Sterling8o (1997, 2000) and Roughgarden (2004) examine 
the biological construction of binary sexual models in contemporary biological theory 
and challenge the viability of these models in accounting for the 'real diversity' of 
biological sex. Their claim is precisely that a feminist biology needs to become attuned 
to ascertaining the ways in which biological knowledge could - and indeed should - be 
incorporated into political analyses of sex and the body. 
Social theorists have also mobilised bioscientific claims to refigure the body beyond a 
fixed and bound notion of matter, and conceptualised matter as a complex articulation 
of heterogeneous processes through the incorporation of post-structural methodologies. 
For example, contesting existing functionalist claims within the biosciences, Elizabeth 
Wilson (1998) takes account of the oblivion into which feminist studies' focus on 
culture and cultural politics historically led biological matter(s), and how in decades of 
80 Fausto-Sterling (1985, 1997, 2000) has defended the existence of five sexes, basing her 
conclusions on five different combinations of chromosomal and gonadal sex. In addition to men and 
women, according to Fausto-Sterling, herms, merrns and ferms would account, respectively, for 
people with ovaries and testes, people with XX chromosomes and aspects of male genitalia and 
people with XY chromosomes and aspects of female genitalia (see 2000:78-79). 
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development, few feminist studies incorporated biological and bioscientific data. In 
most of these projects on 'the body', writes Wilson, feminism's 'antibiologism' is still 
manifest in that: 
"[T]he body in question is pursued in its socially, culturally, experientially, or 
psychically constituted forms, but rarely in its physiologically, biochemically or 
microbiologically constituted form, the idea of biological deconstruction having 
been rendered unintelligible or naive ... The body at the center [sic] of these 
projects is curiously abiological - its social, cultural, experiential, or psychical 
construction having been posited against or beyond any putative biological 
means" (1998:15). 
In her interrogation of the status of biology within canon debates in feminist 
psychology, Wilson proposes a reformulation of feminist politics based on a new 
strategic alliance between feminism and the neurosciences, which would yield new 
conceptualisations of the relations between matter and the social in terms of more 
complex and more accurate readings of the neurological processes involved in 
cognition. Undermining the assumption that the neurosciences consistently understand 
cognition in terms of the Von Neuman computational model of the mind that 
characterised the cybernetic fold of first-wave cybernetics (see also Tomkins et al 1995; 
Hayles 1999), Wilson develops some of the implications of connectionism as an 
alternative model of cognition. Combining elements of traditional neuroscience and a 
deconstructive methodology, her model of cognition involves the constant negotiation 
or interplay between matter and the metaphysical, as it is the result of the multi-centred 
processes of information transmission. Connectionism, Wilson argues, has been applied 
to a variety of areas outside psychology (such as computer science, engineering, 
medicine, physics, mathematics, anthropology or linguistics), and is defined as the 
"spread of activation across a network of interconnected, neuron-like units" (1998:6), 
where it is the connection between these units, rather than the units per se, that is given 
explanatory importance in the functioning of the network. For instance, memory, 
conceptualised in traditional computational models of perception as the transfer and 
retrieval of perceptual information to and from a series of cluster-like stores, is 
conceptualised in the connectionist model as distributed across a network rather than 
stored in a designated location, and thus information cannot in itself be conceptualised 
as more than the differences between connection weights. 
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One of the questions that Wilson asks is about the kinds of projects that are foreclosed 
in the undermining of biological data in favour of historical and cultural meanings in 
feminist approaches to the body (see also Stokke 1993). Wilson is concerned whether 
thinking biology necessarily leads to essentialism (see also Wilson 2002), a question that 
also became important to trans politics. She addressed these and other questions in her 
analysis of psychosomatic processes (Wilson 2004), where she turns to neurology to 
enquire about the complex conjunction of the body, psyche and historical and cultural 
relations. In particular, in her review of Simon Levay's (1993) Sexual Brain, Wilson 
questions the difference (and its different political consequences) between Levay's 
understanding of sex as a hypothalamic structure and function (as bodily located) and 
feminist and queer understandings of sex as corporeal, embodied and experienced, and 
argues that neurology and a broader understanding of the biology of desire could be a 
privileged site to explore connections between bodily locations and the cultural 
apparatuses of sex. Wilson's argument invites a consideration of the ways in which the 
notion of 'play' could abridge different scales of phenomena and connect different 
processes in a non-functional way. 
Similarly, Hird (2004) argues that the conceptualisation of hormones themselves has 
shifted profoundly in the last decades towards trying to elicit the interactions they 
produce between their materiality and cultural ideas of sex (see also Roberts 2007). 
Hird suggests that this paradigm shift in sex endocrinology that unleashed hormonal 
action from strictly binary conceptions of sex can lead to an open definition of sexuality 
as a set of biological processes beyond the constraints of 'reproductive biology'. Indeed, 
she argues, the variety of sexual practices that constitute the historicity of sex exceed the 
restrictions of contemporary western sex! gender systems, showing, for instance, that 
organic matter is organised and constantly modified by sexual relations at a 
microbiological leveL 
This distinction between levels would not only become important in conceptualising 
matter, but for some theorists is the key to understanding sex. For example, drawing on 
the work of molecular biologists Margulis and Sagan and post-structural theory, Parisi 
(2004; see also Margulis and Sagan 1995) developed a theory of embodiment and sex 
formation, dislocating sex and sexual practices from human-centred models of sexual 
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interaction. StratifYing "abstract sex" into biodigital, biocultural and biophysical levels, 
her work conceptualises sex beyond reproduction, providing a reading of sexual process 
in tenns of affect and, hence, enabling new definitions of sex in relation to wider 
historiographies of invention, emergence and evolution in hypernature81 . These include 
the relations among organisms of various kinds, from bacteria to multicellular bodies, 
framed in the 'technologies of power' that delimit the scope of their interaction. At a 
molecular level, Parisi analyses sex by focusing on the processes of emergence of 
difference, which "conveying the contingency of experience, is constituted by a chance 
concatenation of forces: converging and diverging fluxes that together produce 
something new and unpredictable" (2004:51). Such a reading of sex beyond 
dimorphism and beyond the human holds the potential to transform the ways we 
conceive of biology and the ways in that matter can be thought of in tenns of political, 
social and cultural relations. In fact, new definitions of matter account for new 
relationships between matter and culture, wherein matter is no longer a malleable 
receptor of form, but productive of form in itself This generative process of "belonging 
in becoming" (Massumi 2002:79) necessarily entails a redefinition of politics, or rather, 
as some authors have suggested, of ethics as integral to the process and to the practice of 
science (Latour 2004; Stengers 2000, 2005). 
These new conceptions of the role of science, its new technologies and cultural fictions, 
have deeply affected ideas of kinship and relatedness in recent years. For instance, new 
reproductive technologies (Franklin 1997, see also Franklin 2002; Rapp 2000), bio-
prospecting (Brown 2003; Ferry and Limbert 2008) or the mapping of the human 
genome generated new paradoxes and political challenges, and redirected the political 
assumption of the sciences and their engagement with political discourses, including 
feminism (Birke 1984, 1985, 1995). The development of new reproductive 
technologies, as well the impact of ethnographic work on cross-cultural kinship models 
that challenge the heterosexual matrix in a variety of ways (Herdt 1994; Robertson 
2005; Blackwood 1986, 1999; Jacobs 1997), influenced the critical assessment of kinship 
models (Schneider 1968; Franklin and Mackinnon 2002; Strathern 1992, for instance). 
In this way, a new reading of biology and biological processes in the context of post-
81 Parisi draws on Spinoza's ideas to define hypemature as "an ethics-ethology of bodies colliding 
and mutating" (2004:190). It is thus a self-regulating system wherein the encounters of bodies 
produce relations of the incorporation, capture and identification of genetic material, and, in 
general, all relations that can emerge from the capacity of the body to affect and be affected. 
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feminist theories of embodiment becomes crucial in transcending notions of matter as 
fixed, unified and inert. As Massumi suggests (2002), an ontology of things is not 
sufficient enough a notion to account for the processes of emergence and becoming. It 
is necessary to shift the focus toward an ontogenetic dimension in order to account for 
material processes because if, as Massumi writes, "feedback from the emerged re-
conditions the conditions of emergence, then it also has to be recognised that 
conditions of emergence change" (2002:10). 
4.2.3 Performativity, materiality and the production of gendered subjectivity 
The development of queer theory and its progressive gammg of authority in social 
analyses of sex was informed, in a similar way, by a politics of positionality and 
solidarity initiated by radical feminists and feminists of colour in the United States (see 
Rubin 1975, 1993, 1994; Rich 1981; Lorde 1984; Wittig 1992; Anzaldua 1987; 
Moraga 1993; Cvetovick 2003, for instance). This new approach to sexual politics 
highlighted the political nature of sexual epistemology, and thus contributed to de-
authorise biomedical discourses as the 'truth' of sex (see C6rdoba 2005; Preciado 2002) 
by developing alternative notions of agency. Queer theory was appropriated by social 
movements worldwide as a liberationist discourse, one that had the potential to 
transcend the medical dichotomies of sex and gender, biology and imprint, reclaiming 
political power from the same classificatory practices that had historically maintained 
sexual 'abnormality' as a political category. Among the vast field of queer theory 
(Sedgwick 1991; Tomkins et al1995; de Lauretis 1987; Kipnis 1993; Halberstam 1998, 
2005; Bourcier 2001, 2005; Warner 1993; Abelove et al. 1993; Halperin 1995; Ahmed 
2006) I will be focusing on Judith Butler here, because her argument addresses directly 
the distinction between sex and gender, and promises to offer a solution to the 
contradictions it generated in social theory. 
The work of Judith Butler pioneered this new political reading of sexual identity, based 
in a complex articulation of Foucauldian 'technologies of power', Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, Austin's (1962) speech act theory, and the feminist political agenda 
(Butler reads de Beauvoir, lrigaray, Kristeva and Wittig, among others), and 
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contributed to the elaboration of universal political models of subjectivity, based not on 
experience but on meaning. When, in 1990, Butler wrote that the body is a "variable 
boundary, a surface whose permeability is politically regulated, a signifying practice 
within a cultural field of gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality" (1990: 177), 
her argument that gender was constituted by the repetition of deeds and not by an 
immutable quality opened new lines of enquiry - led by herself and others - directed 
towards the discursive constitution of the "body interior". In Gender Trouble, reading de 
Beauvoir's distinction between the natural and the historical body (see Stoetzler 2005, 
and also Sanford 1997; Chambers 2007) Butler argued that the interior is essentially a 
surface of signification, where gender norms are inscribed as "phantasmatic" and 
"impossible to embody" and matter appears to be a "gendered corporealisation of 
time" (1990: 179). Butler argued that gender is coextensive with the production of 
subjectivity, so that subjectivity is produced in repetition or in the effects of the 
performative power of gender, in a circle of effects where "there need not be a doer 
behind the deed, but the doer is variably constructed in and through the 
deed" (1990:181). Condemned to the endless repetition of identity's impossibility, 
Butler's subject lives interstitially as an effect of discourse and power, as a condition of 
their intelligibility - insofar as the subject is both the condition of readability or 
'schema' and a guarantee of their coherence - and in the perpetual displacement of the 
'truth' of sex and gender to the parody of a non-existent original (1990:175). 
In Gender Trouble, Butler introduces Freud's description of the Oedipal complex as a 
core element in the process of gender formation. Following Freud, she explicitly asks 
about the role of the Oedipal in the process of triggering identifications that will result 
in the fixation of gender subjectivity. She concedes that, like Freud suggested, the 
Oedipal complex can be positive (same-sex identification) or negative (opposite sex 
identification). If, like Freud imagined, this distinction depended on internal 
dispositions within the framework of primary bisexuality (feminine and masculine, 
oriented toward the father and mother respectively), the fixation of gender would 
depend on the successful transferral of libidinal cathexis from the internalised love 
object onto a fresh object. Thus, for Butler, melancholia and mourning are two 
integrally related processes in the construction of the ego, which in the mirror stage (see 
Lacan 2006) invests in ego formation the power and libidinal cathexis previously 
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directed towards the lost object. This investment not only guarantees its preservation, 
but at the same time situates the ego ideal as a solution to the Oedipal complex. From 
that point on, "the ego ideal regulates and determines masculine and feminine 
identification" (1990:80) as a set of taboos and prohibitions, so that every consequent 
identification refers in some form or another to the "originalloss"82. Thus, sexuality is 
formed as dispositions (Butler uses this concept in the Freudian sense), which are the 
result of this "history of sexual prohibitions" (or are coextensive with it), so that 
homosexuality and heterosexuality are formed as exclusionary effects of the Oedipus 
Complex, produced in relation to a genealogy of power relations around which desire 
is organised as a series of displacements. For Butler, "the repressive law effectively 
produces heterosexuality, and acts not merely as a negative or exclusionary code, but as 
a sanction and, most pertinently, as a law of discourse, distinguishing the speakable from 
the unspeakable, the legitimate from the illegitimate" (1990:83-84). 
In addition to this initial model, and perhaps to some extent in spite of it, Butler re-
elaborates her position in Bodies That Matter with the intention to expatiate on some of 
the critiques directed towards her first description of the mechanisms of sex formation 
and the heterosexual matrix. Two of the strongest criticisms referred to the notion of 
matter (Pheng Cheah 1996) and the notion of agency behind her conceptualisation of 
gender as "performance" (see Mahmood 2005). Matter, for Butler (1993), is no longer 
to be understood as either 'nature' - as a fixed, unconstructed and pre-discursive 
ground - or as a mere fiction resulting from the norms of culture, and her argument 
stands as an attempt to surpass the nature/culture, form/ matter distinction in 
conceptualising the relation between the body and the symbolic. Understanding sex as a 
process of construction, which "is itself a temporal process that operates through the 
reiteration of norms" (1993:10), matter is only in the process of being dynamically 
shaped by the productive power of the norm. This new direction in her argument, 
however, was understood by critics to undermine the role of the body and of material 
processes m sexual formation, despite Butler's intentions to revive its theoretical 
foundations. Certainly, in Bodies that Matter, Butler offers a correction of the 
voluntaristic underpinnings of her previous conceptualisation of gender as performance, 
82 Butler writes: '[T]he melancholia of gender which 'answers' the Oedipal dilemma must be 
understood, then, as the internalization of an interior moral directive which gains its structure and 
energy from an externally enforced taboo" (1990:81) 
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and explores to what extent matter can be understood as the production of the effect of 
power. With this in mind, she analyses the processes of subject formation as a double 
movement of excluding what is 'outside' the subject as 'abject' and 'unliveable' and 
reifYing the 'inside' not only over and against the inhuman, but precisely through 
exclusionary means; in her words, "through a set of foreclosures, radical erasures, that 
are refused the possibility of cultural articulation" (1993:8). In other words, subjectivity 
is thus formed always in relation to internalised cultural prohibitions, which are at the 
same time the 'outside' the subject and the means through which the subject's 'interior' 
is formed. 
This process is explained through a complex combination of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
Foucault's theory of power as production and the tum from Aristotle's notion of matter 
to Irigaray's materiality. In fact, following Lacan's argument regarding the fundamental 
link between sex formation and the mirror stage, Butler concludes that "the ego is not a 
self-identical substance, but a sedimented history of imaginary relations which locate the 
centre of the ego outside itself, in the externalised imago which confers and produces 
bodily contours" (1993:75, my emphasis). For Butler, this is to say that the ego's 
identification with an imago creates the 'spatial boundary' that separates the 'inside' and 
'outside' and consequently constitutes the subject in/by 'foreclosure'. The mirror stage 
coexists, or is rather at the same time preceded and exceeded by the process of phallic 
signification, which grants the accession of bodies to sex positionalities by giving them 
access to the symbolic. In other words, the formation of the phallus as a privileged 
signifier indirectly offers a theory of 'mirroring' as a signifYing practice, and in doing so 
becomes an effect, a structural place secured by claims that, by virtue of the penis, one 
is symbolised as 'having'. Butler argues that the signification of the phallus places the 
subject before the law, whereas in the mirror stage, the psychic projection produces 
boundaries and, by extension, the unity of the body in question. For Butler, the 
historicity of the multiple genealogies of signification that inscribe the body is 
subordinated to the necessity of signification as a primary drive83 . It is in this demand, 
in Butler's schema, that bodies can exist as the product of the psychic function, and by 
83 Butler defines this primary drive as "a demand in and for language, a «that which» which prompts 
and occasions, say, within the domain of science, calls to be explained, described, diagnosed, altered, 
or within the cultural fabric of lived experience fed, exercised, mobilized, put to sleep, a site of 
enactments and passions of various kinds" (1993:67, emphasis omitted). 
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virtue of this very demand for language are at once the condition signifying the 
possibility of the psyche's existence and "that on which and through which the psyche 
also operates" (1993:67). It is perhaps in this already complex relation between symbols 
and the symbolising drive, and "the flesh of the world" (Butler uses here Merleau-
Ponty's (1993:69) expression), that the Aristotelian notion of matter becomes 
Irigarayian materiality in forming bodies. Explaining this transition, Butler makes a 
crucial turn that will be the focus of my empirical interrogation in subsequent sections 
of this chapter. Following Kristeva, she writes: 
"[T]he materiality of the spoken signifier, the vocalisation of sound, is already a 
psychic effort to reinstall and recapture a lost maternal body ... Even here, those 
material sputterings are already psychically invested, deployed in the service of a 
fantasy of mastery and restoration. Here, the materiality of bodily relations, prior 
to any individuation into a separable body or, rather, simultaneous with it is 
displaced onto the materiality oflinguistic relations" (1993: 69-70). 
Identification works through the production of a domain of exclusionary beings, the 
production of subjects and the consequent domain of those who do not enjoy the status 
of a subject, who live under uninhabitable zones of exclusion. Importantly, through the 
notion of performativity, Butler introduces process as the key to understanding sexual/ 
gender identity; for the never-ending process of identification and citationality is the 
condition of possibility of the subject - it is the impossible necessary of identity. If 
desire is initiated by the force of prohibition, Butler argues, it is through the pursuit of 
an endless chain of identifications84 where desire "travels along metonymic 
routes" (1993:98), that sex is produced as the repetition of norms, and that the 
possibility of subverting sex emerges as a threat that this repetition could fail. This 
regularised and constrained repetition of norms, says Butler, cannot be understood 
outside a process of iterability that implies that performance is not a single act but a 
ritualised production, and where this repetition is "what enables a subject and 
constitutes the temporal condition of the subject"85. Therefore, for Butler, "sex 
positions are not localities, but, rather, citational practices instituted within a juridical 
domain - a domain of constitutive constraints. The embodiment of sex would be a 
84 These identifications, by their very nature can never be actualised, and therefore remain as 
impossible and necessary in Butler's scheme. 
85 And not "performed by a subject", as some critics understood from her analytical framework in 
Gender Trouble. 
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kind of citing of the law, but neither sex nor the law can be said to pre-exist their 
various embodiments and citings" (1993:108). 
In this endless citation, where the law repeats its own historicity, the possibility of 
subversion arises as "the discursive occasion for resistance, a resignification, a potential 
self-subversion of that law" (1993:109). With the reduction of matter to materiality, of 
the body to the process of citationality of the law, Butler had necessarily to conclude 
that matter and discourse are never entirely different and yet never entirely the same: 
"Always already implicated in each other, always already exceeding one another, 
language and materiality are never fully identical nor fully different" (1993:69)86. 
Lest materiality remains isolated from the discursively functional essence constructed by 
bioscientific discourses and other cultural apparatuses of inscription, Butler leaves 
unresolved the role of biology and how materiality 'matters' in the construction of sex 
and gender (as feminist theorists within biology point out, see previous section), and the 
mutually constitutive roles it shares with processes of subjectification, which for Butler 
are coextensive and share the same temporality. If the referent and signified form an 
"irreducible incommensurability", in Kirby's expression, then Butler's analysis gravely 
problematises the notion of matter itself, which remains 'unthinked' beyond its relation 
to language87 . 
86 As Pheng Cheah (1996) suggests, understanding in this way the body's dynamism is not only 
situating form as the principle of the body's dynamics, but is also conceptualising these dynamics as 
the result of an ontology oflack. For Pheng Cheah, Butler's hesitation to understand the question of 
matter is precisely undermining some of the crucial intentions of her work, namely, to offer a theory 
of gender as the necessary yet impossible result of power in constituting subjectivity and the body. 
87 Kirby noted that "matter for Butler may not be a blank or passive surface, but it is still a surface, 
and one that demands to be interpreted or written upon, by something other than itself It seems 
that matter is unintelligible to itself, and this lack of intelligibility can only be remedied by thought/ 
language" (1997:114-5). According to Kirby, Butler's purposeful substitution of substance by matter 
collapses the nature/culture division by introducing an irreducible dimension of signification, 
whereby differences are produced as internal to "matter" thus understood, and where matter doesn't 
exceed discursive construction (cf corporeality in the previous section). Sensible to the limitations 
of this analytical approach, Kirby coins the notion of corporeography, suggesting that 
"representation is 'sensible' in that biology is not a supplementary ingredient to be included or 
excluded. The body is more than a mere visitor to the scene of writing: the body is the drama of its 
own remarkability" (1997:154). 
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4.2.3.1 The politics of the performative 
Butler's reading of psychoanalytic theory and her argument of gender performativity 
had a crucial impact on local sexual politics carried out by social movements in the 
United States and Britain, affecting trans politics by simultaneously opening new spaces 
for trans identity and redefining identity politics. Her argument displaced the process of 
sex/ gender formation from both essentialist and constructivist models. She used 
psychoanalysis to figure the relation between so-called biological and cultural processes, 
and thus provided a reading of materiality as a process coextensive with language. 
However, Butler also reduced the body to the two coextensive (in her argument) 
notions of vulnerability and agency in thinking material formations through discursive 
and symbolic apparatuses. In the preface to Bodies that Matter, she admits that "the 
thought of materiality invariably moved [her] to other domains", in order to prove 
bodies to be more than fixed objects of thought. 
In thinking of bodies as indicating "a world beyond themselves", as "movement 
beyond their own boundaries" and as "movement of boundary itself' (1993:ix) Butler 
extends the scope of performativity way beyond the formation of sex and gender to 
language, subjectivity, the action of the symbolic, and the notion of the political (see, 
for instance, her later works: 1996, 2000, 2001, 2004, and Butler, Laclau and Zizek 
2000). The notion of performativity (originally applied in the context of language, see 
Austin 1962; Butler 1996) became, in recent social and cultural theory, a paradigm 
mobilised in order to understand several types of relations between epistemological 
categories and material processes, to account for experience as a form of knowledge and 
to devise the extent to which language enacts the realities it describes. In this way, the 
notion of performativity has been applied to biology and the formation ofbio-material 
processes (Barad 2003; Rosengarten 2004), race (for instance, see Matthews 2007), 
emotions (Ahmed 2004), mimesis and identity (Bell 1999), politics and anti-Semitism 
(Butler 2004b), economics (Callon 1998; Mackenzie 2007; Polanyi and Strassman 
1998), and sociology (Law and Urry 2003), among other fields. This ubiquity of the 
performativity paradigm in social research entails a risk of ontological and 
methodological reduction, because it aims to apply the same pattern of analysis, 
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temporality and material-semiotic formation to the relations between very different 
kinds of entities and their relation with the political. 
Butler reduces ontology to the process of materialisation involved in the progressive, 
symbolic constitution of matter. It is in this convergence that the relation between 
matter and the symbolic is actively framed as the field of the political, a relation that is 
never-ending and that develops in linear, cumulative time. In this framework, 
movement is conceptualised in terms of 'achievement' and creativity in terms of the 
reification/subversion of cultural norms. Moreover, the way in which Butler 
understands identities as performative is through her reading of psychoanalytic theory 
and its relation to the process of sexual formation. The formation of sex, although 
coextensive with other apparatuses of subjectivation, is by its nature a process of 
symbolic repetition, which Butler explains with recourse to Lacanian psychoanalysis (as 
I have just discussed) and Althusser's (1972) notion of interpellation. The very 
repetition through which norms reproduce themselves produce an illusion of stability 
and progression that fixes 'identities' as processes of the materialisation of norms. In this 
context, variability occurs as a result of the citation process, and creativity is 
conceptualised in relation to the ways in which 'the real' reproduces or subverts the 
norm. Hence, significance and external norms bind the subject and determine its unity, 
its process of formation and its endurance. 
Consider, for example, Butler's characterisation of transition and her polemic 
description of transsexualltransgender identities in Bodies that Matter. Distancing her 
analysis from the figure of drag performances that led her analysis of gender subversion 
in Gender Trouble, she uses transitional figures precisely to provide clarification for some 
of the misunderstandings that her previous model (of gender as 'performance') gave rise 
to among her critics, and in particular the approximation of Butler's paradigm to a 
constructivist framework through the potential misreading of gender formation within a 
voluntaristic (acting) framework. In Bodies that Matter, Butler explores the extent of 
gender performativity through the 'realness' of trans figures in Jane Livingstone's Paris is 
Burning. Through an analysis of the feature's main character, Venus Xtravaganza, she 
argues that the structures of race and realness are formed through the same process as 
sex materialisation, and situates this formation as a prime example of how 
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performativity works in relation to the formation of gender'l8. Both race and gender 
realness are 'positions', and as such they are the result of the individual's relation with 
the heterosexual matrix, and, in fact, produce the individual as a subject at the same 
time as sex does. Butler insists that sex and race exist only in relation to racism and 
heterosexism, and goes as far as to define Venus Xtravaganza, who has been elsewhere 
represented as a preoperative transsexual, as follows: 'Now Venus, Venus Xtravaganza, 
she seeks a certain transubstantiation of gender in order to find an imaginary man who 
will designate a class and race privilege that promises a permanent shelter from racism, 
homophobia and poverty" (1993:130)89. 
Butler ventures the plot of Venus' life from her own accounts of herself in the feature's 
interviews, and importantly through a reading of the multilayered event of her 
appearance at the (filmed) ball, and articulates Venus Xtravaganza's experience around a 
number of conclusive facts that present her as the epitome of 'realness'. For example, 
through situating her origins in the intersection of poor, Latino and gay masculinity, the 
fact that she cannot pass, and the event of her death at the hands of a homophobic 
client, Butler concludes that the different degrees of realness associated with passing as a 
trope of subversion in relation to the interpellation of the norm are in fact 'just' doings 
of the symbolic. If in pursuing realness, Butler argues, Venus Xtravaganza mobilises 
'dangerous' identifications, it is as an effect of this shift that she will be treated by the 
symbolic in accordance with those identifications, so that, for Butler, her death only 
'mirrors' the ways in which women of colour are treated9o . In this way realness 
becomes an effect of the symbolic order, one in which Venus' identity is reduced to the 
effect of the interaction of symbolic categories and the contexts in which her difference 
triggered intersubjective, evaluative, political action. The life of Venus is constructed in 
a conclusive and cumulative narrative, one that is structured around a series of symbolic 
88 The other two are her analysis of Nella Larsen's novel Passing (1929) and Willa Carter's fiction 
(My Antonia, among others). It is interesting to note that the analysis of Paris is Burning is the only 
mention Butler makes to bodies that have undergone any lasting transition and/or led a life in 
another gender. 
89 She suggests something similar in her reading of Nella Larsen's novel Passing. Here, too, Butler 
operates a similar reduction by applying a purely psychoanalytic model of desire based on a Lacanian 
framework. 
90 Butler writes: "[T]his is a killing that is performed by a symbolic that would eradicate those 
phenomena that require an opening up of the possibilities for the resignification of sex. If Venus 
wants to become a woman, and cannot overcome being a Latina, then Venus is treated by the 
symbolic in precisely the ways in which women of colour are treated" (1993:131). 
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ruptures. Mobilising her desire, understood as lack by this psychoanalytic framework, 
Venus, as well as, by extension, the 'real' transgender subject who dares to subvert the 
gender norms in relation to which he or she exists, is reduced to becoming a symbolic 
signifier, the narration of her own narrative, and as such is addressed socially, culturally, 
materially and in all the different dimensions in which she, or rather her 'transgression' 
-her deed - makes a difference. This point will become important in Chapter 7. 
This ontological reduction has important consequences in figuring performativity as a 
political field. Later (see 2001, 2004 for instance), Butler would address the politics of 
sexual transition in a series of articles of varied scope, which in a way served as a 
conclusion to her work on gender and contributed to her advocacy of ethics in the 
context of a humanist framework marked by her reading of Levinas in Precarious Life 
(2006). Here, Butler addresses the politics of transition through notions of 'autonomy', 
and therefore in terms of the protective frameworks including human and civil rights 
and specific rights of choice of medical treatment, that make transition possible in the 
United States. Butler concludes that "it is possible, and necessary to say, that the 
diagnosis leads the way to the alleviation of suffering; and it is possible, and necessary, 
to say that the diagnosis intensifies the very suffering that requires 
alleviation" (2004: 1 00). Butler here figures the political field in the assumption of a 
universalist framework, one in which the relation between matter and norms holds little 
potential for creativity, because matter becomes the context of enactment and re-
enactment of the norm. 
Some of Butler's critics, and especially Saba Mahmood (2005), pose interesting 
challenges to this conception of the political, in which the ambiguous relation of matter 
and the symbolic is at the same time the enablement and limit of action. For Mahmood, 
the idea of performativity entails a number of important consequences for any 
consideration of agency in reconsidering the political, for, she argues, Butler's "analysis 
of the power of norms remains grounded in an agonistic framework, one in which 
norms suppress and/or are subverted, are reiterated and/or resignified - so that one gets 
little sense of the work norms perform beyond this register of suppression and 
subversion within the constitution of the subject" (2005:22). Instead, Mahmood 
develops this model by proposing to understand agency contingent to the ways in 
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which norms are "inhabited, performed and experienced" (2005:22), beyond the 
consolidation/subversion binary that Butler's model is grounded on. For, as Pheng 
Cheah (1996) suggests, Butler's way of understanding performativity, rather than 
foreclosing the agency of the subject, indicates the need for a non-voluntaristic notion 
of agency, which, perhaps unintentionally, sets the constraints of the subject as a human 
agent through time91 . 
The politics of the performative and the analysis of sexuality in cultural or symbolic 
terms evince wider problems that affect both politics and identities. In fact, as 
Mahmood (2005) suggests, performativity threatens the political inasmuch as its 
connection with the symbolic blinds any analysis of agency grounded in the specificity 
of sociohistorical, economic or religious processes. Mahmood's critique is especially 
relevant to the revision of the Marxist political framework generated in the context of 
an increasing fragmentation of identity politics92 (see Fraser 1997; Butler 1998; Merck 
2004; McRobbie 2009), which questioned the ideas of inclusion and solidarity. Butler 
(1998) notes that the emergence of queer politics in this context, its conceptualisation as 
'cultural' politics and its excision from other social movements have important 
consequences for the definition and articulation of identity politics. Sexuality is 
understood to pertain to the symbolic and to function in a structural, universal 
framework that abstracts sexual formation from becoming and experience (I unfold the 
implications of this fully in Chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
In Mahmood's critique, an important consequence of this reduction is the assumption 
that the symbolic remains a static counterpart to the fluidity of bodies and identities. 
Butler does not account for what happens once a norm has been subverted by a deed, 
as its own historicity would force it to be reinstated/subverted again from the same 
standpoint93 . Mahmood's critique of the liberationist framework of feminism gives way 
to the elaboration of a positive ethics, where the relation between subject and norm is 
relational. She emphasises that this relationality transcends the immateriality of meaning, 
91 And yet, Pheng Cheah remarks, Butler's stress on situating the psychogenetic body as the 
empirical cause of which the process of materiality is but a formative effect reinforces the distinction 
between (inert) matter and (active) form of which she tried so carefully to displace her argument. 
92 Butler mentions the separation of race politics, the politics of sexuality and gender. 
93 For example, consider her notion of "normative codes of gender" and her reading of drag 
practices as "destabilizing" and subversive. 
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as norms become immersed in everyday material practices. Following Foucault, she 
understands agency both in terms of the capacities and skills required to undertake 
(moral) action and the limits posed by historically and culturally specific disciplinary 
regimes (2005:29). In this context, agency is no longer about reifying or subverting 
norms, but is rather the condition of their relationality, the reaction of a creative 
individual to the determination and freedom of a given space and time; in other words, 
it is a condition of experience. 
One of the consequences of this claim is that the scope of politics is perversely 
associated with a particular notion of subjectivity, which Butler would develop in later 
work (2000, 2005), and in which a cumulative temporality is the measure of creativity 
and change. Butler's argument upholds the idea that matter and the symbolic are 
different yet equivalent types of entities, and that from their interaction alone we can 
understand any process of ontogenesis. The emphasis on performativity in social theory 
similarly reduces the notion of effect to a context of' enactment', to a particular relation 
of identity between discourse and the actual world. However, this view overlooks the 
contingency of each effect as a product of a relation, framed within wider processes and 
whose scope varies according to different scales and points of view. Here, the symbolic 
is understood to produce identity in and for itself, disregarding material and experiential 
universes as irrelevant to this formation. Identities thus become 'cultural' products, 
individual and collective standards of normalisation and subversion ready to be 
consumed, and the scope of political action becomes itself the paradigm of this cultural 
reproduction. 
In this sense, Bell's critical engagement with the notion of performativity (2006, 2007), 
for example, introduces an interesting tum when she notes that "to speak of 
performativity in relation to the subject or subjectivity is to focus on the practices of 
this conditioned element within the various matrices by which it is 
sustained" (2006:214). In this sense, and because living the cultural fiction of gender 
secures one's cultural survival in terms of generating the conditions of readability of the 
subject in a social field, Bell interrogates the disciplinary regimes in which gender is 
produced as a system "where genders are distinct, hierarchically related and 
heteronormatively organised" (2006:214). Using the notion of co-extensivity as it 
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appears in Deleuze's reworking of Foucault's dispositi.f4, Bell suggests that the relation 
between subject and norm, which the notion of performativity addresses, is of a high 
complexity, suggesting that it could be understood to escape the psychoanalytic reading 
of the body image where Butler put it to work. Importantly, Bell seems to challenge 
assumptions of the universality of the paradigm of performativity by understanding its 
action contingent to the constitution of subjectivity as the interplay between different 
kinds of belongings and connections. Following Deleuze, she conceives of the task of 
the analyst as "following the tangle of the assemblage" (2006:217), but, importantly, 
also as "following movements of becoming", where a new attention to creativity can 
bring back "the creativity of things, their self-activity, indeed the very insistence of 
life" (ibid.). 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I reviewed critiques of the sex/gender distinction that contributed to the 
definition of sex as political in recent (post)feminist debates. I analysed the ways 1ll 
which new notions of sex as a process (which I grouped around the notions of 
corporeality, connectionism and materiality) challenged the distinction between sex and 
gender in critical analyses of the body, sex and sexuality. However, I also illustrated 
how these models, despite addressing the relation between sex/gender, nature/culture 
in a different way, are still based on the same categorical distinctions that underlie 
biomedical approaches to sex and gender. This is evinced by their engagement with the 
same categorical differences and their development of different models that connect 
these independent yet complementary domains. This idea will become important 
further along the thesis because, beyond the reduction of ontology to the relation of 
matter and the symbolic, Part 2 of this thesis will re-evaluate some of the implications 
of this argument in transition experience, and propose three different analytic 
94 Bell refers to Deleuze's elaboration of Foucault's notion: "These apparatuses then, are composed 
of the following elements: lines of visibility and enunciation, lines of force, lines of subjectification, 
lines of splitting, breakage, fracture, all of which criss-cross and mingle together, some lines 
reproducing and giving rise to others, by means of variations or even changes in the way they are 
grouped" (Deleuze, quoted in Bell 2006:217). 
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standpoints to address to determine the complex relations between different historical 
forces, existential assemblages, creativity, change, and endurance in becoming FTM. I 
will argue that the universalising frameworks of cultural paradigms concerned with the 
production of all-encompassing categories and universal systems of (sex/gender) value 
do not deliver their promise to exhaustively represent sex and gender formation, 
precisely because they do not challenge the binary frameworks in which expenence 
becomes the result of the interplay between matter and symbolic form and of particular 
conceptions oflinear and cumulative time. 
Yet these critiques are important to the analysis of transition in another way, because, as 
I will argue in Part two, transition both endorses and challenges a politics of 
subjectivity, enactment and linear time as it transverses different domains, kinds and 
scales of experience, and as it generates different types of relations. In this sense, these 
existing theoretical axes become particular kinds of 'resources' for the construction of 
trans identities. The next chapter explores how the appropriation of this paradigm by 
social movements in the context of local gender and sexuality politics generated a 
double bind around which trans identities and communities articulate political action. 
If, on the one hand, queer politics of 'sexuality' establish certain symbolic standards of 
denunciation and parody of heterosexuality, marriage and the embodiment of a stable 
gender, then trans people are, on the other hand, the object of a politics of 'gender' 
designed to normalise their social situation precisely in those terms. The next chapter 
will thus explore how the framework of performativity plays to some extent against 
transsexual politics, and how some groups and organisations understand that it 
undermines the human and civil rights of transgender people. 
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Part II 
ASSEMBLAGES, PLOTS, DURATIONS 
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The participants III this research used the sex/gender distinction and coordinates 
described in Part I, both in transitioning and while describing their transitions to me. 
However, the complexity of their experience also demands a different analytic 
approach. Often, trans men characterised their experience of transition as a 'journey' 
that was not understood to begin or end in a predefined point, and where the 
experience of change had multiple interrelated dimensions. These levels, which I 
analyse in the next three chapters, address the experience of transitioning from three 
different positions. These three chapters could thus be understood as different scales at 
which transition occurs, and their different scope is key to understanding transition as a 
multilayered and relational becoming. 
The three chapters contained in this part are not intended to be read in a linear mode, 
as each discusses a different dimension of transition that inevitably maps on to the others 
in many ways. However, their order has been determined in relation to their different 
scope, and in relation to the different contribution each chapter makes to the analytic 
structure of the thesis. Each chapter represents one transition unit, an assemblage or 
level of the overall argument I develop in the thesis. In Chapter 8 I deal with the 
possibilities and limitations of this analytic structure, and discuss it in relation to thesis' 
findings. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 
T: Informed Material 
In Chapter 4 I discussed some feminist reVlSlons of the notion of matter in 
conceptualising the body, sex and gender, and pointed out that part of the project of 
(post)feminism indexed politics to novel theorisations of matter in social theory. 
Elizabeth Wilson's (1998, 2004) analysis of neural geographies, for example, advocates 
the irreducibility of the relations through which recent approaches to neuroscience 
characterise biology and specifically the neural system. Her emphasis on the primacy of 
relationality and connectivity devises new ways in which different dimensions of 
biology can be conceptualised in relation to politically, socially and culturally specific 
relations, beyond binary understandings of matter as a surface of inscription and culture 
as a vital imprinting force. The notion of matter is receiving considerable revisions in 
other areas of social theory after the 'ontological tum' in philosophy and the social 
sciences (Latour 2005; Law 2004; Michael 2000). This tum made its way into 
anthropological theory through the adoption of certain analytic developments in 
science and technology studies and post-structural philosophy, especially in medical 
anthropology (Mol 2003, 2008), material culture (Lock 2007; Miller 2005), economic 
and political anthropology, analyses of the body, and ethnographies of science and 
technology (Haraway 1997; Latour 1988, 1996; Rapp 1999; Martin 1994; Rabinow 
and Bennett 2008). 
In this chapter I follow some of the implications of these analyses, especially their 
emphasis on relationality, to approach the role of testosterone in transition. Rather than 
conceptualising testosterone as a fixed immutable substance, this chapter aims to situate 
hormones as routes and vehicles of the biological, technological and informational 
dimensions of transition by exploring the ways in which they embody particular 
informational routes, from their contexts of production in progressively industrialised 
and global contexts to the ways in which they connect different levels of matter, 
meaning and experience in FTM transition. In this way, I propose to understand 
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testosterone as an assemblage whose historicity lies in contexts that are not necessarily 
physically or historically near. 
Testosterone is often conceptualised in biomedical discourses and by trans men as one 
of the main vehicles of change in transition, and its effects are understood to enact 
transition changes in specific ways (see Kailey 2005; Valerio 2006). In the first part of 
the chapter I briefly describe the production of steroid hormones and their 
experimental correlation with sex and gender values to explore how testosterone was 
developed as a 'functional' material in the context of the industrial expansion of 
chemistry and the advance of sexology in the early decades of the twentieth century. In 
this way, I characterise testosterone in relation to the hypothesis that hormones are 
independent agents that somehow encapsulate the 'nature' of sex and that the intake of 
synthetic hormones can effectively 'restore' a 'natural body' by mimicking its functions. 
The displacement of sex to hormones in sexology is important, I will argue, because it 
gave rise to ideas of sexual 'nature' that reduced sex to the association of organic 
components and their correlative 'functions' (see also Chapter 3) and because these 
ideas informed the ways in which gender reassignment treatments were understood to 
be 'effective'. With this metonymical move, science and technology became more than 
a privileged representation of sex; they came to be the site of its production and 
regulation and, as such, ingredient in the ontology of the molecule as its informational 
environment or the 'field' in which it exists. In this context I explore how hormones 
became 'cures' in biomedicine, and how their administration in sex reassignment 
therapies connected hormones with certain notions of time and progress. I analyse how 
endocrinology's newfound relation between biology and the ideas of environment, sex 
and behaviour prompted analyses of hormonal process through notions of 'normality' 
based on the linearity and measurement (Chapter 3) of sex and gender values in relation 
to hormonal balance. In this way, testosterone is conceptualised as a biological agent, a 
substance associated with ideas of the 'natural body', 'physiological balance', 'strength', 
and 'resistance'. Biomedical narratives and people's ideas associate testosterone with the 
fixation of the body in its secondary sex characteristics (see Chapter 3) - the 
determination of the amount and distribution of muscle and fat, bone structure, body 
hair, skin texture and genital development. In this sense, hormones are understood to 
actualise a body's genetic tendencies and at the same time - as highlighted by 
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endocrinological discourses - be responsible for a great proportion of the changes the 
body goes through in the process ofliving (such as metabolism, reproduction, etc.). In 
these contexts, testosterone has been understood as a functional agent responsible for a 
series of mechanistic physiological interactions and an independent causal agent of sex. 
However, in the second part of the chapter I explore how the role of testosterone in 
transition processes also challenges the conceptualisation of hormones as independent 
functional agents in mechanistic models of the production and maintenance of life. The 
second part of the chapter focuses on my informants' narratives, and how in their 
transitions testosterone seems to connect processes and different levels of experience, 
producing sex and gender in relation to other dimensions of change and endurance that 
affect them at different levels including biology, sexual orientation, social gender roles, 
legal status, narrative, and identity, among others. In fact, in the interviews I conducted, 
testosterone appears to be invested with a consistent power to produce 'malehood', but 
interestingly a malehood defined as experiential and produced through the articulation 
of different dimensions, where bodily changes, becoming stronger, narratives, 
identifications, and individual existential universes become inextricable from 
testosterone itself Testosterone not only seems to be a pervasive motive in transition 
narratives, but also it is effectively the device around which they are articulated as 
ambiguous, shifting and unstable. 
5.2 Independent causal agents 
In this section I examine the process of producing synthetic testosterone in the context 
of the industrialisation of chemistry, and how this process, which was from its inception 
related to narratives of scientific sexology (see Chapter 3), yielded radically new 
conceptions of sex and of the relation between the biological and historically and 
culturally specific sexual meanings. From this standpoint, I will explore the ways in 
which hormones are mobilised as sexual agents in relation to the advance of sexology 
by contemporary biomedical discourses, and conceptualised as the minimal biological 
elements that encapsulate the truth about sexual identity. 
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Endocrinology's early descriptions characterised the endocrine system as a senes of 
complex functional ties within the body, capable of 'producing and maintaining' life. 
For Canguilhem (1994), the discovery of the endocrine system and the emergence of 
endocrinology involved "a veritable mutation in physiological thought" (1994:118), 
which occurred in the nineteenth century where new notions such as the 'internal 
environment' would lead to understanding the body in terms of its 'chemical balance'. 
Experimental methods were designed to measure the nature and function of these 
chemical interactions: Claude Bernard's 1855 notion of 'internal secretion', the 
importance attributed to pancreatic activity by Edward Schaeffer in his 1895 landmark 
paper, or the development of the notion of hormone by Starling in 1905 (Crapo 1985) 
not only constituted steps towards localising and isolating chemical action within the 
body, but also resulted in the generalisation of specific methods of purification and the 
isolation of function 'units'. This would become the basis of the alliance between 
endocrinology and laboratory research, marketing and clinical practice. 
Theoretical endocrinology characterised hormones as the 'messengers of life' (Crapo 
1985; Slater 1978; Roberts 2007); however, this theoretical conceptualisation would 
clash with the experimental research methods of the discipline and with the need to 
localise and associate matter and function for its advance. The process of the isolation of 
hormones and their association with biological traits - and with sex and gender -
started in the early twentieth century and would find a first therapeutic application in 
the 1920s when scientists applied endocrinological findings to the development of a 
cure for homosexuality and hermaphroditism in humans (see Hoberman 2005; 
Hausman 1995; Bland and Doan 1998; Person 1999). The isolation of hormones, 
specifically sexual hormones, contributed to the polarisation of the sexes, as certain 
hormonal functions were associated with men or women exclusively in terms of their 
relation with the structure of physiology and reproductive biology (see, for instance, 
Keller 1985 and Spanier 1995). In tum, this association would affect the development 
of the notions of sex as hormone-specific and produced mechanistically as the effect of 
hormonal activity (Oudshoorn 1994). During the period of expansion that ensued, 
hormones became structural materials of endocrinology, and research focused on their 
biological function and their chemical isolation. In this context, hormonal preparations 
became 'functional materials', i. e. according to Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers, 
materials "used or sought to fill a specific function" (1996: 205). 
141 
Let me briefly examine the ways in which these selective functional correlations were 
used in the development of gender reassignment treatments from the 1950s onwards. 
We have seen in Chapter 3 that John Money's practice at Johns Hopkins was influential 
in the standardisation of gender reassignment treatments. His notion of gender, 
understood as the basis of sexual identity, was in fact the result of experimental 
investigations into the effects of steroid hormones in human behaviour. For example, in 
a test study of over ten 'gonadal females' who had been exposed to high levels of 
testosterone in utero, Money established a control variable with females who had been 
exposed to standard levels of progestin. The test girls resulted "tomboyish" (liking 
"strenuous physical activity, cavorting about on their bicycles, climbing trees, hiking, 
and exploring") (Money and Tucker 1975:70), whereas the control girls would be 
generally more concerned with their physical appearance and tended to choose female 
partners in games. Money and Tucker describe under-androgenised boys as quieter, 
non-competitive and "more likely to become homosexual than the test girls are to 
become lesbian" (1975:72). Prenatal exposition, Money argued, was enough to redefine 
the biological thresholds that determine variation in behavioural patterns. Through 
measurement practices in both the laboratory and the clinic, sex became for the first 
time 'experimental' in humans. 
These experiments consolidated a hormonal relation between sex and gender, and the 
medical model of transition, which relies heavily on hormonal treatments, controls 
gender variability through regulating access to sex hormones. Harry Benjamin's legacy 
and his standardisation of a 'cure' for transsexuality in hormonal treatment (formerly 
considered exclusively mental and submitted to reparative therapy) was based on the 
belief that" deviance was neither degenerate nor psychological but that it was physical", 
which for some analysts (Person 1999:361) led him to conceive the "fantasy of 
changeability" that would result in a systematised and legitimate physical' cure'. In the 
different therapeutic models that ensued, transition entailed the use of synthetic steroid 
hormones to facilitate and produce the conditions of possible sex/gender 'reversal', or, 
in other, more recent words an 'approximation' to the sex of choice. Here, hormones 
became the epitome of the realness of change. In fact, as I explored in Chapter 3, 
interdisciplinary protocols such as the Standards of Care involved the efforts of 
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psychiatrists, endocrinologists and surgeons, as well as counsellors, social workers, 
attorneys, beauticians, and other medical advisors - all of whom wanted to ensure that a 
'real change' was operated beyond the aesthetic. Hormones became agents of the 
continuity of gender identity in the 18 months preceding surgery and also, 
paradoxically, in guarantors of its success. In this respect, hormones became problematic 
biopolitical devices, safeguarding the borders between the sexes and becoming their 
irreducible limits. Consider this excerpt from psychiatrists Laub and Dubin: 
"By establishing certain goals that must be met to achieve the 'reward' of 
surgery, the program becomes a means of behaviour modification aimed at total 
rehabilitation of the patient. The surgeon should be aware that there is a marked 
difference in behaviour between the male-to-female patients and the female-to-
male patients that must be reflected in their management. The male-to-female 
patients have been described as hysterical, narcissistic, demanding, manipulative, 
psychopathic, perfectionistic, exhibitionistic, seductive, sociopathic and 
destructively competitive among their peer group. On the other hand, female-
to-male patients have been described as stoic, independent, reliable, diligent, 
accepting of authority, and more cooperative among their peer group. The 
reader will note that the qualities ascribed to the male-to-female patients are the 
undesirable attributes of stereotyped femininity, while those characteristics 
associated with the female-to-male patients are the most desirable qualities 
associated with stereotyped masculinity" (1979:886). 
As this passage suggests, treatment for gender dysphoric patients was understood to 
reach beyond the 'correction' of the symptomatology of transsexuality insofar as here 
the cure was a physical route of change in contrast with models of conversion or 
reparative therapy formerly used. Therefore, hormonal therapy was importantly 
conceptualised as a means to control the effects of the condition in people's lives. In 
Chapter 3 I showed how psychiatry established strict typologies for the diagnosis of 
transsexuality in the DSM-III, mirroring those of biomedicine, and as behavioural 
control in gender dysphoric patients was considered an arduous and complex task 
among the medical profession, interdisciplinary feedback controls were set in order to 
determine the eligibility of an individual to transition through hormones. Today, these 
controls still regulate trans people's access to treatments and have important 
consequences in terms of informing the clinical choice of timing and delivery method 
of testosterone treatment. 
Timing and delivery are connected in biomedical understandings of the 'masculinising' 
potential of testosterone. The methods currently used in testosterone treatments include 
143 
several intake options such as oral, transdermal, intramuscular inj ection and ge195 , which 
deliver testosterone to the bloodstream at varied rates. Of these methods, only three are 
widely used in medical settings, and subsequently are more thoroughly documented by 
trans people in brochures, blogs, v-logs, forums, newsletters, etc., usually as a 
combination of biomedical data and experiential accounts. Each of these methods has a 
different rhythm, which is measured in relation to the 'kick off (rate of masculinisation 
at the beginning of the treatment) and 'roller coaster' (rate of testosterone variation 
between intakes) effects. The most widespread is via intramuscular injection, which is 
prescribed with variable periodicity. Sustanon, the most popular, has to be injected 
every 2-4 weeks, and it is understood to produce the most effective rate of 'low risk' 
masculinisation, albeit the highest 'roller coaster' effect (see Dobs and Myeni 1999, 
2006; Seal 2007). In contrast, Nebido, administered every three months, produces a 
slower rate of masculinisation, but also fewer changes of mood, energy and sexual 
behaviour. T estogel, an alternative dermal daily application, produces cyclic releases 
every 24 hours. These different dosages and intake methods shift the location of 
hormones from inside the body to the outside, where its action is relocated in multiple 
places, objects and relations, and in this way these different chemical times make 
transition gradual, predictable and steady, at least from a medical perspective. Here, as 
Kuhn (1977 :211) suggests, the notion of measurement becomes a powerful tool, 
demonstrating the biological basis of gender against competing theories. More 
importantly, however, measurement also becomes suspended between predictability 
and uncertainty as speed, progress and success are associated with T dosage. Through 
the narratives that link measurement and effect, substance and function, testosterone is 
imbued with the power to effect transition and produce masculinity. The molecule is 
understood to produce mechanistically one's becoming male in triggering a chain of 
linear causality that links biology to social, emotional and psychological functions. In 
other words, testosterone is assumed to produce gender in a ratio proportional to the 
intake method. 
However, as I will show, my informants' expenences of transition highlight other 
dimensions of testosterone beyond their functionality in a therapeutic context, 
95 I will not discuss oral and trans dermal testosterone treatments for reasons of brevity. Dobs and 
Myeni (2006) and Rhoden and Morgertaler (2004) offer detailed clinical studies of their action and 
effect. 
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importantly because their desire to become male is not understood as a pathology that 
requires a hormonal 'cure', but rather, T is a step to realise their becoming FTM. In 
those transition experiences, testosterone connects different levels of transition and shifts 
as transition progresses, becoming an active agent in the actualisation of material, 
informational, psychological, social and discursive possibilities of the body. In the next 
section I explore how this becoming challenges linear definitions of causality and effect, 
and how the relations between the levels of experience that testosterone facilitates are 
not necessarily linear. 
5.3 Testosterone as informed material 
Through the different kinds of informational environments hormones inhabit, they 
abridge not only glands and cells in the organism, but also biological and political, 
industrial, economic, clinical and therapeutic milieus. They become scientific objects 
from their manufacture and synthetic production in laboratories and their distribution 
in the different forms in which pharmaceutical companies make them available to 
global markets (Petryna et al 2006). As scientific objects they "are not only 'technically' 
manufactured in laboratories but are also inextricably symbolically or politically 
construed" (Knorr-Cetina 1992:115; see also Roberts 2007). Far from being a fixed 
location of the 'truth' about sex, hormones evince the impossibility of separating 
materiality and the complexity of the scientific/medical objects and practices with 
which they are understood to be connected, and the set of socio-historical 
representations that link them to broader processes, analogies and identifications. In this 
respect, hormones are a significant device that can be utilised to analyse the 
convergence of several dimensions involved in the process of becoming - a body, a 
gendered self, an adult, a subject; but also certain categories within the biosciences, a 
measurement, a hypothesis, an epistemic object (Knorr-Cetina 2001; Rheinberger 
1997). Hormones are close to what Isabelle Stengers described as an assemblage: a 
complex object/representation/practice of science. This notion advocates the 
inseparability of ontology and epistemology, and allows an analysis of hormones and 
their role in constructing the sexed/ gendered body at the same time as devices that 
connect physiological processes, as ingredients in certain narratives of health, normality 
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and performance (Elliot 2003) and as discursive apparatuses that inform the scientific 
construction of sexed/ gendered bodies. For, as Stengers convincingly argued, "the 
location of a particular assemblage never constitutes an ultimate or complete 
explanation; assemblages are connected together in multiple ways and create 
communications between what is classically distinguished as different levels of 
explanations" (1997:205). In Chapter 8 I will return to this notion, its implications and 
limits. 
In this section, hormones will also be conceptualised as assemblages in people's 
transitions. My informants' narratives challenge the idea that hormones could be 
conceptualised in isolation, as they incorporate the manifold layers or dimensions where 
hormones 'matter' in enabling different levels of change in transition treatments - in 
contrast to the way in which bioscience and medical knowledge regard the sexed/ 
gendered body as the result of the cumulative mechanistic action of chromosomal, 
hormonal and environmental factors. I will argue that testosterone is a special kind of 
relational agent in FTM transition, one that not only challenges ideas of linear time, but 
also connects different dimensions of experience. In this sense, I characterise hormones 
not as fixed substances that produce an effect on the body, but as themselves the result 
of the assemblages they form in their different routes of interactions. I explore this 
characterisation of testosterone following what Barry (2006), drawing on Bensaude-
Vincent and Stengers' (1996) work on chemistry and Whitehead's Philosophy of 
Organism (1978), calls "informed material". Analysing Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers' 
history of chemistry, Barry suggests that some of the most original features of its 
development lie precisely in that the discipline becomes both a way of producing new 
interactions and a way of monitoring them, because its interest lies "in the fact that the 
properties of atoms and molecules vary considerably depending on the form and 
circumstances of their association with others" (Barry 2006:56). Whitehead, who 
viewed chemistry as a "science of associations and relations" (2006:56), understood 
molecules to be "historical", a "route of actual occasions" or an "assemblage" rather 
than a fixed substance (see also Latour 1999). Molecules are subject to change and 
transformative movement in their routes of interactions, and even though they endure 
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as substances96 to a certain extent, this does not mean that they remam the same. 
Rather, as Whitehead suggests, molecules "extend into other entities, while folding 
elements of other elements inside them" (Whitehead, quoted in Barry 2006:59). This 
process makes it difficult to establish clear boundaries between the molecule and its 
history (its route of actual occasions) and between the molecule and its contexts of 
action. Thinking about testosterone in this way, I will explore how testosterone relates 
to change and transition in the experience of my informants. Accumulating multiple 
levels of history, hormones could be said to carry information at different levels of their 
history and to be the connectors between these different informational levels. 
5.3.1 Chemical time 
Let me start by exploring how the linear and progressive conceptualisations of time 
outlined in therapeutic and biomedical discourses about testosterone constitute an 
'attractor', or a direction, in the unfolding of change in transition. Previously in this 
chapter I explored how hormones were characterised by endocrinologists as 
"messengers of life", effecting connections in the body and maintaining its chemical 
balance, its endurance in time. In transition, as well as other therapeutic models that 
involve a prolonged intake of synthetic hormones, the function of hormones is 
evaluated in terms of progress and balance, and measured in linear time. In FTM 
transitions this is the amount of time people need to achieve some degree of 
masculinisation (which varies in relation to people's expectations of treatment), and 
which is sometimes associated with the intensity, the speed or the progress of hormonal 
treatment. Different methods of testosterone intake and their different' chemical times', 
as we have seen in the previous section, structure transition around different intensities, 
situating the rate of masculinisation and its different rhythms as a matter of individual 
choice. However, if trans men use measurement and linear time to identify differential 
relations between changes and dosage, they are also aware that processes and rates of 
change vary according to the many other factors whose entanglement makes every 
transition unique. In this respect, they highlight that the experience of taking 
96 I am using the term 'substance' to designate the endurance of particular routes, and not their 
ahistorical materiality. Following Latour (1999:151), substance here is intended to unravel the 
maintenance of unity in a particular assemblage; its endurance as a coherent whole. 
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testosterone IS not only about measurable and cumulative changes, but also the 
delimitation of 'states' and 'thresholds' between them (as I explore, in different ways, in 
the next two chapters), where experience is not only the crossing of analytically distinct 
domains, but is also qualitative and affective and therefore not reducible to the 
mechanistic interactions through which different changes are analytically described. 
This becomes evident in the ways in which trans people approach hormonal treatment. 
Trans men hold a significant amount of information about the effects of hormonal 
treatment before transition, because information is made available through specialised 
organisations' publications (GIRES, Press For Change, Gender Consortium) and 
support groups. People make decisions about the medical route to follow (NHS or 
private) and, where possible, about who they want to be treated by and how fast they 
want to transition. Once they are prescribed hormonal treatment, they can also usually 
decide on the intake method, which they are able to adjust in relation to the particular 
effects of testosterone in their bodies and their overall transitions. They think about 
these decisions and share information about them in support groups, information 
networks and through personal communications makes trans people real experts in 
transition. 
In this way, by the time they get to the clinic, they already have an idea of what the 
consultation is going to be like, the questions likely to be asked, the typical physical 
tests performed, and of course the possible outcomes. As they approach treatment and 
during its different stages, they talk about timescales, compare muscle growth, share 
fears of osteoporosis and liver dysfunction, and joke about the possible unwanted 
aesthetic side effects of T, such as premature baldness or obstructive apnoea97 • Yet, 
obviously, people do not hold the same expectations of treatment, of what it means to 
change sex or gender, or of what hormones will do to one's body. Some trans men start 
off with the idea of becoming 'male', yet others seek only to explore temporarily the 
changes that testosterone brings about and use their testosterone prescriptions in less 
prolonged periods of intake. These choices are connected to their ideas of what 
97 Testosterone side effects are considered as serious, especially in potential threats in relation to 
existing heart conditions, liver function, metabolic derangement, and the possibility of 
gynaecological complications due to ovarian atrophy (Seal 2007 offers a medical evaluation of the 
effects of prolonged intake of synthetic testosterone). Some of my informants were aware of 
'alternative', non-synthetic variants of testosterone (such as homeopathic preparations) and 
considered following testosterone boosting diets. 
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constitutes gender identity - sometimes politics, visibility and stealth (see Chapter 4) -
and generally relate more to the social dimension of being trans than to hormonal 
treatment per se, although, increasingly, aesthetic considerations are also taken into 
account. 
Consider how David described testosterone changes: 
Q: When you started your journey, when did you feel things started moving, 
changing? 
A: Honestly, I was so piled up. After my first jump, it was just like two hours 
after my first injection and this spot came up on my face and I was like no! God 
I don't know. After a couple of weeks I saw some friends and then my throat 
felt funny. Obviously I know now it was my vocal chords. They started ... not 
even an uncomfortable sensation, but [it] just didn't feel as it normally did. Felt 
like there was something going on. Spots, I did get very spotty quite early on, 
yeah. Not very pleased about that. There is this White Book, you see that 
Stephen Whittle ... it's a guide for trans men. And he was obviously giving an 
account of his experience. Like the first day you are going to want to eat like 
there is a famine, and the second day you are gonna be really horny and you are 
going to have to take up masturbation as your new hobby, you know, these 
things. And on the second day, I've always had such a big appetite, and the 
second day I was like no appetite, which was really weird, and on the third day 
I just didn't have any sex drive whatsoever. Pleased to say it has come back 
now, full force, but at the time was like wow, what's going on? These things 
that you don't know exactly how they are, you've got a lot of knowledge out 
there you know, common things that happen. But my appetite, that did go 
quite a bit [up], so I got very spotty, sturdy and, well, there's no tomorrow, and 
friends early on said there was a big change in my voice. And I think the next 
day was chunking out, especially the upper body. Especially when I go to the 
meetings up here, cause obviously I haven't seen people for a month time or a 
couple of months, and they are really like, wow, you really chunked out. Hair 
growth ... I've always been quite hairy on my legs and stuff, but now it has 
grown properly and it pops on the tops my legs and my bum, armpits, on my 
stomach, it's coming quite quickly. 
In this passage David reviews his memories of the early days of taking testosterone and 
contrasts his experience with the information he obtained about hormonal treatment 
before starting, notably not medical references but Stephen Whittle's White Book (as 
mentioned in Part I, a book about transition written by an FTM for FTMs). In a 
section of the White Book (1998) Whittle offers his transition diary (pp.21-27) through a 
detailed timeline of biological changes, and David constructs his own transition as a 
similar progression of biological milestones such as voice and appetite changes and 
increased libido. However, despite using the same milestones, David explains precisely 
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that the way he felt his own transition had begun was that those guidelines did not 
apply - at least not immediately or exclusively - to his process; he starts by describing 
how his transition was unique, by describing how the changes were brought into 
experience not necessarily as it was described in available sources (" common things that 
happen"), nor how others perceived it. Testosterone here is not measured in linear 
cumulative changes, but produces different temporalities of change and multiple 
experiences of time (the changes such as spots and increased appetite he notices in the 
days subsequent to his first injection, the changes he notices later on when he meets 
with old friends, the changes people in FTM perceive every month, etc.). These 
different temporalities, rather than happening 'outside' experience, are inextricably 
linked to expectations about the future, desires to be, emotions, capacities and effects, 
which themselves changed, became actualised and were transformed in different 
experiential assemblages of experience through testosterone intake. It is not surprising 
that he, like most of my informants, understood that testosterone enabled the unfolding 
of his 'true self. 
David also said he made the decision to transition after a period of substance abuse and 
in order to deal with a complex discomfort that had undermined his wellbeing for a 
number of years - he did not define this as social, bodily or gender-related exclusively, 
but as an articulation of a number of things. He described his motivations to transition 
as an effort to "link his body to his body image", but in his mind the challenge was the 
effect of the different scales of changes in constructing a male 'persona'. Similarly, 
Freddie pointed out that when he started on T his 'mind' changed, and he no longer 
felt the insecurity he used to feel before. He seldom cried, he had more energy, his life 
was better: he said that even if the masculinising changes - and here he was referring to 
the bodily changes - were gone for good, he would still take testosterone to maintain 
this new "way of feeling" . 
In this sense, the rhythm and speed through which testosterone affects the body is both 
linked to ideas of 'maintenance' and 'going forward', and is at the same time qualitative 
change and endurance. However, although measurement is key in this tension, because 
it affects the relationship between testosterone and experience, the way in which 
testosterone is understood to effect transition is not through the mechanistic model of 
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the acquisition of male characteristics that suppose a linear, cumulative passage between 
genders. Rather, in becoming a part of different experiential assemblages, testosterone 
becomes a relational agent that makes it impossible to distinguish biological change 
from other informational, material, social, or psychological levels. 
5.3.2 T Relationality 
My informants suggested that hormones were responsible for the actualisation of change 
at different levels, and highlighted that hormones effected qualitative changes through 
and beyond their different effects. In their different conceptualisations of transition 
changes, hormones were 'translations' between different kinds of experience98 such as 
hairs, spots, feelings of relief, social encounters, emotions, knowledge, appetite and 
different senses of malehood. David, for example, remarked that these effects are present 
simultaneously but manifested in different rhythms, as becoming male and being 
identified as male had effects on his different states of mood and intertwined in 'circles': 
I suddenly get all like, oh my God, they are gonna know that I have a binder, 
but they don't even care, they don't even know what that is, they are not even 
looking for anything. So I'm kind of like generating these circles, I think that is 
pretty much when I'm feeling physically well, emotionally, psychologically and 
physically, I am happiest than I ever been. When I am not feeling particularly 
well, I think I can focus, on, ok, what I think is the source of my discomfort. 
But this whole journey, yes, I had moments, I had long moments of real 
serenity and real comfort and feeling comfortable in my own skin which I never 
thought that I would have, so in that respect it's been totally, totally worthwhile. 
And I feel like I can be having the shittiest day, and I can just walk in a pub, or 
a shop, and I'll just get called sir, and it just gives me the biggest hip. And I can't 
explain why that is so important to me to be identified as male; it's just this 
affirmation. Yeah. 
In this excerpt, testosterone effects are not the simple physical changes that David 
knows his body went through, because these are not enough to deal with the 
uncertainty of passing as male when going to the toilet at work. His fear that "they are 
going to know that I have a binder", and therefore the fear of being exposed, 'outed', 
as a trans man, is overcome by the realisation that in the unlikely situation that his co-
workers would identify the binder, he has already transitioned and become male, and 
98 Mackenzie (2002) offers a way of thinking these processes of translation as 'transductions', 
following Simondon, and argues that these transformations are at the core of processes of 
individuation. 
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he will eventually be able to surpass this 'circle' of anxiety and be called 'sir' agam. 
Transition enabled moments "of being comfortable with my own skin" as well as the 
identification of the "sources of discomfort", and the change involved in transition 
manifests itself as the affirmation of this difference. Becoming involved in transition 
connects different processes that transect biology as a kind of artefact, as itself 'informed 
material', as I will discuss below, and it is in the different informational layers associated 
with transition changes that testosterone effects change. Even though they have been 
traditionally conceptualised as the 'limit' of culture by biomedical discourses and 
constructivist theories of gender (see Udry 2000; Sperling 1991, for instance), 
hormones are not solely related to the continuity of gender and how it is reproduced in 
relation to shifting social and political meanings (Rabinow 1999). For trans men, 
hormones enable change rather than limit it - even though testosterone can be 
conceptualised as a 'limit' in transition in other ways - and it is sometimes' culture' that 
is understood to fixate the body. Consider Guy's answer to my question about what he 
considered to be the relation between biological and other dimensions of change: 
. .. I think the privilege for me of biological change has been that I can more 
readily express myself to people that I wouldn't have had a hope of being able 
to meaningfully interact with previously. Because there was no way that my 
body would allow me to be known in the precise way that I felt I needed to be 
known in order to be respected. And it's amazing, really remarkable I guess that 
whereas a couple of years ago I didn't trust any of the men in my life because 
they couldn't get over my femaleness, I felt, I can now translate who I am 
through ... without even trying, who I am translates through my flesh in such a 
specific flesh that I feel seen. When I am doing the same things I was before but 
because my body is a bit different, it's like this filtering process, which makes for 
an accurate portrayal of myself And I'm very angry on behalf of that person two 
years ago, who didn't get to have that privilege. It's so random and unfair and 
it's just about flesh. And I don't want to forget that anger either, I think it's very 
political. 
Guy considers biological change in terms of 'privilege', where the biological changes 
enabled by hormonal intake are connected with the new ways in which he is allowed 
to interact with others and establish meaningful relationships. Hormonal change enabled 
a more accurate portrayal of himself, which had unexpected qualitative effects in his 
daily life, and this allowed him to experience the 'privilege' of an accurate translation 
between his feelings and how others read his identity. In his experience, testosterone 
also exceeds the level of biological changes, even though it incorporates them in 
different ways and intersects the many levels at which change is actualised in shifting 
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assemblages of different elements. Rather than defining expenence as the 'effect' of 
hormones, which perpetuates the perverse distinction between matter and culture that 
bestows different sex and gender ontological and political values, my analysis in the next 
subsections will explore the ways in which these assemblages of experience make every 
transition a unique becoming, and how hormones, already embedding layers of history 
before becoming a part of those assemblages, are transformed in the different histories 
they embody. 
5.3.3 Testosterone as a 'route of actual occasions' 
The tension between measurement in linear and progressIve time and the 
unpredictability, intensity and quality of testosterone changes is key, and a recurrent 
way in which my informants described testosterone changes. The decision to take 
testosterone is sometimes seen as a symbolic beginning of transition, and privileged as a 
point of inflection over the realisation that being trans is a medical condition that 
requires a specific diagnosis and treatment; it was the decision to take testosterone that 
led most of my informants to the doctor's office, and not the conviction they were 
mentally ill. For many trans men, the 'first shot' is met with great anticipation, not only 
because it is preceded by complex personal and clinical decision making processes (see 
Chapter 3), but also because it collapses many different dimensions of past and future 
experience. As I have explored in detail, the therapeutic logic of hormonal treatment in 
biomedical discourses provides a 'steady' road towards the completion of a process of 
masculinisation designed to 'get there' in approximately two years. And yet, according 
to my informants' experiences, two years could be three months, three minutes, a 
lifetime. Their experience contrasts greatly with this regulated, linear model of change. 
Consider how Robert spoke about this ambivalence and the tension between the 
anticipation and uncertainty of change: 
It was like I felt, you know, from the moment that I started taking testosterone I 
felt like I was stepping out into this huge void. There were people around me 
that I knew were taking testosterone and hadn't died a horrible death (laughs) 
and had meaningful relationships with people and all that kind of stuff (laughs). 
Before I started taking testosterone, I was kind of... I was presenting 
inconsistently to people, so like ... I went into public toilets one time. I guess 
my relationship with toilets is problematic, and like ... people ... I would still go 
into girl's toilets, and this young kid walked in after me. And I was coming out, 
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and she was ... I remember her like double-taking what was going on and 
walking out, and then as I was like out of these doors and like washing my 
hands her mother came in and said 'what are you doing here, you filthy 
pervert?' And I realised in that moment that my gender presentation had been 
different to the way that I thought it had been (laughs). So yeah, that was like 
another moment, and that was kind of happening quite a lot. And actually at 
times even though it was traumatic it was also a really positive experience for 
me because being read as like [a boy] ... I suppose ... I was making a lot of 
conscious effort to kind of link up to myself, and I'd been read in that way, 
which was nice, you know. 
Robert spoke about T as the element that set his transition in motion. Even though the 
future was uncertain and the consequences of hormonal treatment unclear, Robert 
talked about hormones as devices that helped him develop gender consistency, after 
having been "presenting inconsistently to people" in the past. In his narrative, the 
beginning of transition represents the conclusion of a prior state of disconnectedness, 
where his gender presentation was not perceived by others in the same way he 
perceived it, and in this sense, transition was a new effort to 'link' with himself and his 
desire to become who he wanted to be. In this excerpt, hormones do not merely 
facilitate the arrival of that new state, but in addition testosterone is understood to act 
retrospectively in re-ordering past experience, because in this excerpt he considers 
testosterone the catalyst that made his gender expression work consistently in the 
present. Testosterone brought to an end the situations where a prior gender 
inconsistency got him into trouble, but he knows testosterone will effect a series of 
changes that will eventually facilitate social situations in the future: it will be ingredient 
in those situations in many ways, and will make them different. In this way, 
testosterone is not just an implement to his becoming male, but catalyses effects beyond 
his process of masculinisation, generating at once expected and unexpected changes. As 
a consequence, testosterone encapsulates social meanings in many ways, becoming a 
relational device inextricable from his body, as well as extending into other objects and 
relations. Trans men often cite as examples the instances in which one stops being 
perceived as a woman and starts to be seen as male in interpersonal, medical, and legal 
situations that gradually enable transition as a change "from the inside out" (c£ 
Diamond 2004), generating a chain of effects that may affect different experiential 
assemblages, producing effects at different levels and in different sets of relations. In this 
respect, testosterone cannot be said to exist independently from each of these potential 
becomings in which it is rearranged in new relations. Rather than an isolable molecule, 
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testosterone is here also a route, a senes of assemblages formed m the interaction 
between different kinds of processes. 
I asked Lewis, a trans man in his forties, about his first experiences of testosterone, and 
his main concern was about the ways in which T affected his interactions with others 
and the ways that other people started perceiving him as a man. He told me that being 
seen as man was not as he had imagined it would be, as he was often considered 
significantly younger than he actually was, and was questioned and even challenged 
when buying food or drinks or when interacting with strangers. I was surprised when 
he pointed out that some of these contradictions were accentuated because he 
transitioned at an older age and precisely because of the temporalities of testosterone 
change. I asked him how long it took to feel that he was already male in body, and his 
reply was that the first stages of transitioning were ambiguous: 
Well, that's a funny question isn't it, because the problem of transitioning when 
you are older, it's quite hard, because immediately you lose twenty years when 
you start passing, because then you are a young boy. And I was, I'd been on 
testosterone for a year, and I think I was starting to feel, obviously I already had 
my chest surgery, cause I'd already had that four months, so you know, I was 
starting to pass, although at work of course, 'cause they knew me before, they 
were still calling me 'she' some of them, which was really annoying and quite 
humiliating. It's funny, 'cause you get to that level where it's quite humiliating. 
But the problem, as I said, you know, being 38 or whatever it was, 37-38, is 
that suddenly you get treated like a seventeen-year-old boy. You know, I was 
in the lift, I just went in the lift, and this woman just grabbed me by my shirt 
and moved me to make room for somebody. You know, like a 'come on lad' 
sort of thing. Suddenly you get treated like that, and not served, you know I 
was having difficulty being served food or drinks. So that was quite awkward 
being treated, because ... you can't let go what your mind is. Of course in some 
ways you are an adolescent boy as well, because you are going through a second 
puberty of course, but you know the second time you are used to a certain level 
of respect. So that was quite difficult. So that's the funny thing, 'cause you say 
when did you start feeling male, and well, I started feeling male then, but it 
wasn't the male I wanted to feel. You know, that actually comes a bit later I would 
say. Possibly even two years after starting on testosterone. 
In this excerpt the tension between measurement and the unpredictability of 
testosterone treatment is especially apparent. Testosterone makes almost everyone look 
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younger, producing what many trans men refer to as the 'Peter Pan syndrome'99. This 
is a common consequence of testosterone intake, and one that is often talked about 
among trans men; after a variable stage of hormonal adjustment, testosterone progresses 
in making the body progressively more liminal in terms of gender attributes, generating 
subtle changes to physical appearance and making one look younger, as well as 
producing mood and libido changes that make one 'feel' younger. However, in this 
excerpt, Lewis' reference to the Peter Pan syndrome was inextricably related to the 
uniqueness of his transition - he says his hormonal transition was different because he 
was older, and describes the role of T as affecting different experiential assemblages 
including the humiliation of not being served and being treated as a young boy. 
Situating T in relation to other e)..,})eriential variables, he is suggesting that it made his 
transition different, as the negative effects it produced and which shaped his becoming 
male would not affect a trans boy transitioning in his early twenties in the same way. 
Every trans man experiences testosterone differently in the changes it produces at many 
levels, not only because these experiential levels are 'already' different, but also, I will 
argue, because testosterone is also fundamentally different and shifting in relation to the 
articulation of these changes, and is itself transformed in the actual occasions it produces 
as an assemblage. 
Trans men say that steroid levels affect metabolism, provide higher energy levels, and 
influence appetite, sexual drive, states of mood, weight gain, the development of 
muscular mass, and strength, all of which are articulated in different experiential 
assemblages that form, endure and change in relation to their relative position and scale. 
For example, we have seen in the previous section how the way in which the body 
lives emotions, and its capacity to affect and be affected, are transformed by testosterone 
intake and the effects it produces at the level of the skin, voice tone and muscle 
strength, as well as at the micro level of the cells and organs forming different biological 
systems within the body. Furthermore, we have also seen how different series of effects 
impacting on those physical, social and psychological changes are articulated in every 
99 The 'Peter Pan syndrome' is the commonly held belief that anyone taking testosterone 
experiences a second puberty and will be perceived as an adolescent. This is partly due to the effect 
of testosterone treatment on the skin, and the way in which it changes muscular composition and 
bone structure, affecting facial features particularly. However, other changes trans men accentuate 
when they transition, such as wearing a male or androgynous attire, having a male haircut and the 
absence of either male or female secondary sex characteristics - like beards or make up - also induce 
people's identification of 'adolescent' features. 
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transition. My informants remarked that one needs to learn to live with the effects of 
testosterone, and even though this process entails the pleasurable abandonment of old 
habits they associate with being female, most concede that starting on testosterone was 
virtually starting life anew. Brian put it thus: 
I took my time after coming to London before I saw Dr X. And like I said, he 
said on the first visit that yeah, I think this is a very clear case, I'm going to 
diagnose you as a transsexual, I think kind of, would you like to have your first 
T shot now? And I was like ... hang on a minute, I'm over 40 and I would like 
to, you know, get the blood tests done, 'cause he had mentioned the blood 
tests. And I do believe now thinking back, I do believe that was a test from his 
part. Like I am throbbing in my pants like 'yeah yeah yeah, give me the shot'. 
And I was like no, I want to know how my health is and that everything is ok. 
And it was Christmas time and everything and I got so anxious waiting to get 
the blood tests done, and then the results, and one week before the appointment 
at his office I was really ... I was like shaking, I can't wait, I was counting hours. 
And when the day came I was so calm, it was just kind of like, like it was all 
over already. When there, we had this little incident he didn't have any T, so he 
wrote a little prescription, you know he said there is a pharmacy I always use 
round the comer, you know, drop this there. I was with my then girlfriend, and 
we went to get the T, then we came back, and she was supposed to come into 
the office to learn how it's done because she was ... I am afraid of needles, right? 
and she was supposed to give me my injections, and ... and I usually faint, when 
I see a needle, and ... he said ... and I did warn him and he said, yeah ... it's just 
going to be alright, lean against the desk, drop your pants, and I did and I did 
not think about the needle, like oh there's going to be a needle and you know, 
I was just kind of. .. I'm here. It's happening. And, little prick and it was there, that 
was it. And the funny thing is that we had a little chat, and then we left, and 
thirty minutes after the injection when I went to the tube, it was nine o'clock in 
the evening, wonderful evening, I was like ... I feel good. 
In this passage, Brian narrates his encounter with T through his visit to a private doctor 
and the expectation generated by his conviction that it was better to make sure the 
physical tests were 'right' before starting on T. He then describes the moment of his 
first injection at the doctor's office, stressing all the particulars that made that moment 
unique. Among them, he and his girlfriend had to go to the pharmacy to validate a 
prescription, then the doctor reassured him about his fear of needles, and finally, the 
world was different and wonderful, 30 minutes after he left the doctor's office. It would 
be too simplistic to assume that the becoming testosterone facilitates is 'the same' for all 
trans men, and even that a carefully measured dose produces the same effects in those 
who transition. Hormones are not separable from the multiple meanings they embed, 
and which constitute them as entities from the moment of their production in 
laboratories and in the body and throughout their endurance in the events of which 
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they are ingredients. These meanings operate in 'the field' in which they exist, and this 
is precisely what makes them contingent. Hormones are connected with wonderful 
evenings, encounters, happenings and different kinds of immediacy (Brian's 'I'm here, 
it's happening), processes at different scales that, rather than being external to them, are 
precisely their "route of actual occasions" (Whitehead), their becoming as an 
assemblage. Testosterone 'lives' in these partial objects and connections, and is the 
uniqueness of each of those routes. In other words, testosterone is connected to specific 
ways in which it makes a difference, the ways in which it allows the production of 
gender and the displacement and the erasure of gender, as an enabling and constraining 
mechanism of both differentiating one's body and of disposing of the body as one's 
own. Consider this fragment from a conversation with Russell: 
Q: And when did you notice it was moving, when did you notice a break, like 
something was actually changing? 
A: Well, yeah, in three months. Well, psychosomatically three minutes (laughs) 
after the first injection. You know, everything's changing! Definitely ... but 
realistically, three months. Slight differences in facial hair, in like facial texture, 
voice, body mass, muscle, very slightly between 3 and 5 months, and then 5 
months it was like ... I'm seven months now, so like between 5 months and now 
it's just gone like [really fast], this curve, like directly upwards. Lots more hair 
growth over my stomach and on my legs, real deep voice, lots more facial and 
chin hair, changing my hair line to here (shows his hair line has moved back in 
his head) and slightly longer side bends here, just slightly longer... more hair 
coming through on the sides... massive clit growth... (laughs) absolutely 
massive, like we're talking about ... Fucking amazing. Very horny. Really into 
guys, more and more into men, which I never even allowed myself to dream of 
before, or if I did I felt guilty and dirty, because of the experiences I had with 
men when I was younger, or the jealousy and envy I suppose of maleness. So I 
blocked that, always blocked that from my sexuality, but now it's like COME 
ON! I need to make up this mess! So that's been a massive difference. I'd say 
that happened about three months as well. What else? Muscular change and 
weight change so my legs are becoming more muscly and my arms ... your 
weight distribution changes a bit so... drops off your legs a lot and your hips 
and that happens (pauses). I think yeah, that's most of it ... and like, random 
sizes ... that's the funniest thing, just absolutely random sizes of things, and your 
veins becoming ... because your skin gets more thin, and you get this less of a 
fatty layer of skin, anyway, even if you are a skinny person as a woman you 
have a slightly more fat capacity than a man, so your skin gets a bit thinner and 
your veins get just more prominent, and yeah, so just subtle, subtle, but when 
it's your own body you're noticing more and more, and you're noticing all the 
differences ... and hairy bum, which isn't good (laughs), it's very male, brrrr, and 
just the different way that people treat you, because you pass. 
158 
In Russell's account, testosterone seems to be agam the constellation of things that 
changed in transition, his expectations about malehood, his muscular change and 
weight redistribution, the changes in his sexuality, and the need to 'make up the mess' 
of what he perceives as the limitations of life without transition. These hardly represent 
things on one even level, but comprise all these "absolutely random sizes of things", 
that inform people's ideas of gender and sex in relation to reassignment treatment. The 
actualisation of gender in transition is thus change, a perilous and unstable arrangement 
of elements connected with the experience of a percipient, it is abstract unspoken rules 
of 'passing', it is hairy bums, it is noticing differences, it is sexual drive, juridical 
representation, and it is time and speed. Testosterone connects with all these things and 
helps them happen, limits them and enables them beyond the reversibility model under 
which the biosciences reduced hormones to an epistemic paradigm of sex. After all, 
there are many ways of being male and of living in a masculine way. Gender, as my 
informants put it, is not always an exhaustive binary classification or a clear either/or 
choice, but ajoumey, a bringing into experience, an 'extending' or a 'growing into'. 
Many trans men think of their transitions in terms of doing away with the limitations of 
being either male or female, and through their choices intend to raise an awareness of 
what it means to live with gender 'beyond' the binary. Using hormonal treatments in 
different ways, they question the idea that masculinity is the arrival of a cumulative set 
of changes defined according to medical aesthetic standards. John, for example, who has 
lived as a male since his teenage years, fought political battles to have his male name 
recognised in university lists and legal papers, but once he was in a position to start 
hormonal treatment (he became of age and he had access to a free medical service) he 
decided to postpone it indefinitely. I asked him why, and he said: 
I think [hormonal treatment] it's something that people need, so that other 
people will feel comfortable with me, that's how I feel it. I feel comfortable 
with my body and with myself; it's just that, if I started to transition now it 
would be so that people saw me in the street and knew more clearly if they had 
to treat me as a boy or as a girl. And I like to have that androgyny that makes 
some doubt. That makes them maybe think a bit more than that. So I think it's 
because I feel okay with myself, and that's most important. I'm not going to do 
something so that other people feel comfortable. 
Tim made a similar point when we talked about what it means to fail to embody 
gender. He was worried about the ways in which binary ideas of sex and gender work 
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m popular culture and the media, despite his feelings of disappointment and his 
conviction that a lot of the signs people identifY as 'natural' gender are conventions one 
can live without. He said he feels he has both male and female energies, and that 
'representing' one, the other or both is about individual choice. Conceptualising gender 
as energy and flow, rather than signs or deeds, helps to understand the 'creativity' of 
transition beyond the social, cultural and political constraints of the binary model: 
I think [gender] is taken far too seriously first of all, and it annoys me that I have 
to take it so seriously every time, and that it affects me on a day to day basis. It's 
intriguing to see the world the way it is and how women are, and how 
femininity and masculinity have kind of come about. I don't really understand it 
to be honest, in the sense that I don't really understand why it's been like that 
for so many years, you know? I don't know. I have the feeling that we've been 
lied to. And it's true, we have been. I think [gender] is fluid, you know. I think 
it's energies, you are male and female. I think everyone is. It's up to you how 
you want to represent whatever gender, one other time, you know, it's up to 
you. What annoys me is that I am also a part of it, so for example, is it a 
question of the way that ... I find it very difficult to explain. Is it, like I am a 
victim of myself, like I tend to go for feminine girls, I don't really, I kind of hate 
that in a way. Because it's learnt, I sometimes feel like it's something that you 
grow up to, and women are kind of objectified in like movies and songs and 
poetry, and it's all about how a woman is beautiful and how you should find 
what you think, it tells you how to see a woman and what to find attractive. So 
I'm not sure if it's something purely to do with energy - is it like in essence a 
pure form of feminine energy or masculine energy or is it just what we've been 
taught to identifY and so, you know what I mean? 
5.3.4 Informed material 
Each of these remarks and experiences suggest that, even though testosterone has been 
progressively conceptualised and produced in isolation in the context of biomedicine, 
pharmacology, therapeutics and scientific narratives, in practice it is inextricable from its 
own historicity, and in this sense it is a type of experience, a becoming or assemblage 
rather than a fixed substance. Following Whitehead and Stengers, Barry (2006) argues 
that molecules are not concrete individualised objects, but they are "informed or rich in 
information" (2006:58). "An environment of informational and material entities enters 
into the constitution of an entity such as a molecule" writes Barry, so that, "the 
perception of an entity (such as a molecule) is part of its informational material 
environment" (2006:59). Barry develops a provocative analysis of the ways in which 
chemistry and the pharmaceutical industries produce their objects, arguing that 
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molecules are neither isolated matter nor meamng alone, rather, "the molecules 
produced by a pharmaceutical company are already part of a rich informational material 
environment, even before they are consumed" (2006:59). Rather than inert, fixed or 
bound matter, molecules are particular kinds of routes of interactions. Hormones are 
therefore attached to the treatments of illness and birth control, to notions of care and 
symptomatic improvement of certain conditions - they are a part of different events in 
this context and their life depends on their association with different material and 
informational environments. 
In this sense, there is still a great deal to say about the social, cultural, ethical, political, 
legal, and economic factors that enable and constrain the use of hormones, and about 
the different kinds of effects they produce at different levels, not only as certain 
biological agents of sex in the experimental models of the biomedical sciences 
(sexology, endocrinology, reproductive biology). In the evolution of hormonal 
treatments and the progressive reworkings of their social life, hormones reveal precisely 
that their 'nature' is not to remain unchanged. Rather, as my informants emphasise, this 
nature results from the series of connections among different levels of phenomena that 
hormones are able to enact in their interaction routes, organising experience in 
unexpected and new regulations. For this reason, hormones are partial or incomplete 
objects, and therefore subject to the connections they form with other - also 
incomplete or "unfinished" objects (Knorr-Cetina, in Fraser 2002:6). Fraser further 
suggests that these relations are never quantifiable, "and it is this quality of excess, or 
surplus of effect, which creates the difference, which is transformative of the various 
entities, objects and subjects, of their interactions and relations, as well as the conditions 
of the experiment itself' (2002:7). 
For example, Craig told me his story about hormones, emphasising how notions of 
speed and the change effected by testosterone affected his vital functions way beyond 
the way they produced his sexual transition. This is what he said: 
Well, once you put testosterone in your system you kind of lose control of 
speed and you lose control of other things as well. If you put the testosterone in 
regularly, as you are meant to, and maintain a certain hormonal level, you put 
your line, then connect your line electively and your speed is preset, you 
haven't any choice about it. So I think testosterone, the actual ingesting of 
testosterone, sets the stage, sets the speed of the transition. What then becomes 
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the question is how does the mind, and by that I mean literally the neurons, 
because your mind gets remapped physically and chemically, how does the mind 
keep up and how does the psyche, which isn't about neurons but is about your 
reaction to what neurons are doing, how does your mind and your psyche keep 
up, and how does the relationship you have with the everyday world, that you 
have to continue to interact with when you are transitioning, how does that 
keep up, how do you balance that? So it becomes a juggling act between 
accepting the speed of the testosterone and what it does to the body and the 
mind, accepting that and trying desperately to juggle the other elements I just 
identified. And somehow making a mesh. 
In these lines, Craig explains his view on how hormones affect change, which in his 
experience he identified as three different domains: the physical, the neurological and 
the psychological. With a depiction of the body as a set of correlated systems, he says 
that hormonal intake effectively creates a (physical) rhythm, a chemical time (see 
previous section) or a "preset speed" that "sets the stage" of transition and rearticulates 
these systems in new arrangements ("somehow making a mesh"). He emphasises the 
inseparability of biological, psychological, and physiological dimensions when he asserts 
that the most important challenge for someone transitioning is to "keep up" with that, 
and to manage "your reaction" to the chain effects that unfold, i.e. getting to understand 
those changes in relation to each other, and importantly managing to juggle the 
different domains in which they happen and finding a balance. He continues: 
And I think that's probably very difficult. It was difficult for me, because you've 
lost control. I mean you take control by making the decision in the first place or 
at least it feels like that, ok, I have free will, this is what I need to do, I can do 
this, I am ready to do this. That's taking control. And as soon as you take 
control you put the stuff in your system, you lose control. So it's a very perverse 
contradiction. And I think there were times where I couldn't juggle the psyche 
and the neural changes and the environment with the speed that the 
testosterone set. It set the pace. And it still sets the pace. As long as I put that 
needle in my bum every week the reality is, yes I have freewill, and I can 
choose not to put the needle in the bottom but then I get very sick. I feel like 
death warmed up, you feel like you're dying when you don't have any 
hormones in your body, and that was something I did accidentally. I didn't 
mean to do that, but I experimented with switching from one delivery system 
of testosterone to another because it was recommended to me, and I should 
have... well, I was trying to address the physical by-product of taking 
testosterone, at least that was the hypothesis, by changing one delivery, by 
taking testosterone via intramuscular, subcutaneous injection to gel, which you 
rub on your bum or you thighs or wherever every day, and the purported 
benefit to the gel is that it delivers a small amount of testosterone daily, instead 
of one pin into your bum with a week's worth supply. So it's meant to take the 
peaking out and therefore presumably maybe alter any physical symptoms that 
maybe a result of this unnatural delivery of hormones in the body and brain. 
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Here, Craig starts talking about his decision to change the delivery method he was 
using in order to avoid some of the 'roller coaster' effects of T, and explains his decision 
to replace intramuscular injections by gel. Although he had not been advised about side 
effects of this shift, he did find unexpected complications: 
And when I did that I seemed to forget that I was meant to go and have some 
blood tests and I normally do the blood tests every six months regularly but I 
was very busy at the time and I switched modalities ... I just lost track of it! And 
I started to feel progressively more and more ill instead of better, and I just kept 
with it, and I didn't go to the blood tests and then I finally got to the point 
where I thought that I was dying. I went to have the tests and I had nothing in 
my system, I had a tiny residual amount of oestrogen which was produced by 
the ... I can't remember the name, but it's not the gonads, it's ... will come to 
me later. It was a minute amount of oestrogen, and absolutely no testosterone. 
So all my systems were failing, they were collapsing. And I literally felt, well it 
felt like hyper accelerated menopause or what women describe as the worst part 
of menopause. So I got back to the injections and in a week it was gone, and I 
was back to normal. So circling back you lose control, testosterone sets it, and as 
long as I take it, it controls a large part of who I am and how I interact with my 
world. And it's a matter of making everything else fit with that. That's the 
reality. 
Craig spoke about testosterone as a "perverse contradiction", because if the decision to 
transition and to take testosterone supposed taking control of his situation, the moment 
that testosterone was in his system he lost control of its effects, of the rhythm of change, 
and of the ways in which it affected not only his sex and gender, but importantly his 
vital functions, his energy levels and his ability to "juggle" its changes in psychological, 
biological and social realms. Through his experience with testosterone and the 'mistake' 
of measurement - taking testosterone through the wrong delivery system - Craig 
portrays the effect of T in an endocrine system as the catalyst of wellbeing and health, 
explaining how hormonal balance had effects on other realms of experience. The role 
of testosterone was not only biological here, or metabolic; it affected the complex 
network of connections and interactions of which he was part, depriving him of the 
ability to control the basic "functions" - biological and otherwise - that in normal 
circumstances allowed him to lead a normal life. He says that while on testosterone 
treatment, he had already "lost control" of this process in favour of the chemical 
control of the hormone, and that therefore, life was about following its cycles, and 
restructuring everything else to "fit with that". In this way, he suggests that testosterone 
is chemically related with modes of living, with energy, balance, health, security and 
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change, and that these modes exist at different levels, because they are different 
assemblages in which testosterone produces its effects. T is thus an unfinished object 
that only gains an identity in the connections of which it is part. As a route and vehicle 
of his transition, testosterone is intricately related to change, experience, time, health, 
enablement and constraint; in other words, it is a biological device capable of 
encapsulating a wonderful evening and a new sexual desire, a privilege of being known 
in the precise way one needs to be known, and an unexpected rejuvenation. 
Testosterone embodies contexts of information and action in transition as routes of 
actual occasions, while at the same time, as discussed in the first section of the chapter, 
it also embodies contexts of information that are not necessarily physically or historically 
near. In this respect, testosterone becomes 'informed material': it is transformed in its 
routes of interactions and the different experiential milieus it connects. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Biomedical knowledge about hormones and their effects in the human body 
characterises their action as 'limits' to gender construction. In biomedical discourses, sex 
has been defined as hormone-specific in endocrinology and sexology throughout the 
twentieth century. However, new approaches to science and technology have 
developed crucial notions that help us make sense of biomedical, physiological and 
biological processes in essentially different ways. For example, I have proposed how 
provocative notions drawn from the work of Rhein berger (1997), Knorr-Cetina (2001) 
and Barry (2006) allow a different analysis, where hormones can be conceptualised 
beyond their reduction to causal sex agents in biomedical and scientific models. This 
idea is not new; since its inception, theoretical endocrinology (Crapo 1985; Slater 
1978) has characterised hormones primarily as 'messengers', 'connectors' and agents of 
relationality among the multiple processes involved in the production and maintenance 
oflife. 
T is a vital element in transition journeys, because its action is a catalyst through which 
trans men adjust their bodies to male aesthetic and physiological standards. However, 
notions of measurement, balance and action introduce variability in the effects of 
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hormones in transition. I have shown how the different methodologies of measurement 
that led biomedicine and the pharmaceutical industries to develop different forms of 
testosterone intake had an impact not only on the degree of the treatments' safety 
(minimising side effects and risks), but also how fast one's body develops male 
secondary sex characteristics. They also created qualitatively new ways of transitioning, 
affecting experience at different levels and transforming what it is to be, and to become, 
male. 
In my informants' narratives about transition, the role of hormones in relation to the 
production of sex seems to be specifically about change, relationality and connectivity. 
In trans men's experiences of transition, hormones relate to change and agglutinate the 
power of invention in multiple, colliding levels - not necessarily structured around the 
distinction between biology and behaviour through which discourses about gender 
construct them as an epistemic paradigm. Hormones show precisely how densely these 
different dimensions or domains converge in the production of change in the process of 
living, and how the distinction between their different domains of action is not only 
inherent in testosterone, but also pertains to modes of analytic observation. In this way, 
some trans men also question the very idea of transition as a passage from predefined 
categories and the place that the body occupies in the ubiquitous sex/gender system 
(Rubin 1975). Their experience shows that it is no longer 'enough' to understand 
transition exclusively as a journey between two predefined points. Rather, trans men 
show that the journey is often about wandering, exploring or 'juggling' the different 
levels at which new relations are articulated and become together in transition. Some 
trans men are proud to make visible their masculinity in ways that are not always 
complicit with traditional or normative ways of representing or performing gender at 
the level of the body or of deeds alone. Thus, they challenge the logic of medical 
treatments in a profound and meaningful way, increasingly distancing their 
understanding of transition from the medical representation and prognostic indicators. 
With this displacement, they challenge the role of medicine in transition, and invite 
new ways of thinking how this role could be adapted to accommodate and better 
facilitate a diversity of transitions. 
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This new conceptualisation of the role of testosterone in transition provides new keys 
to understand the significance of biomedical and political narratives of trans sexuality, as 
well as the role of materiality in transition. In the next chapter I will explore the 
entanglement of matter, meaning and experience in more detail by discussing the role 
of narrative in transition. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 
Counternarrative 
Despite being often characterised as a substance capable of triggering transfonnation by 
biomedical discourses and associated with ideas of progress, causality and linearity, I 
showed in Chapter 5 how, in my infonnants' transitions, testosterone was a relational 
device inextricable from infonnational contexts that were not necessarily physically or 
historically near. I explored how testosterone, an important element in my infonnants' 
transitions, produced effects at different levels and how, rather than remaining fixed, it 
was transfonned in the associations it fonned with other molecules, fields and 
infonnational environments. With this characterisation of testosterone, I intended to 
challenge mechanistic models of change in transition, where becoming a man is the 
result of the interaction of a series of independent domains (such as physical, emotional, 
psychological, legal, etc.), and is effected through a series of linear passages. My analysis 
of the role of testosterone challenged the medical assumption that testosterone can be 
understood as an 'independent' or mechanistic agent, and, in so doing, suggested that 
testosterone was part of a particular route of change or assemblage (Stengers 1997), 
where the relationality of heterogeneous elements made every transition unique. 
This chapter discusses the significance of narrative in transition. While clinical studies 
(and studies conducted in clinical settings) have tended to highlight the importance of 
narrative in relation to treatments and prognostic models, narrative also has a central 
role in trans identity politics, where particular kinds of narratives are privileged as sites 
of the 'truth' about transsexuality and transition. In Chapter 3 I reviewed the historicity 
of transsexuality as a diagnostic category and its relation with the maintenance of the 
sex/ gender distinction, exploring the role of narrative and narrative interpretation in 
the diagnosis of GID. In this context, certain gender narratives were explicitly classified 
as pathological and associated with different models of therapeutic intervention in 
psychiatry and sexology from the 1950s onwards. Narrative improved the 
systematisation of the diagnostic machinery and became the ultimate resource for 
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clinicians when they could not 'tell' what in the body was 'wrong'100. Media coverage 
of the first 'successful' transitions (notably Christine Jorgensen in the United States and 
Michael Dillon in Britain) consolidated the public relation between biomedical 
categories and trans narratives, and in this way, the 'true' trans narrative was associated 
with the allegedly neutral and objective scientific gaze legitimised in the clinic as the 
arbiter of transition experience. 
However, when transsexuality became the object of enquiry for the social sciences in 
the 1980s, in part as a contention over the objectivity of medical discourse, but also as a 
result of identitary political struggles in the context of feminist and postcolonial politics 
of difference, narrative started to be reclaimed as legitimate in its own right. In this 
context, narrative became an authentic representation of transsexual identity, the very 
'authenticity' of which was mobilised as an asset for the inclusion of trans issues in the 
political agendas of human and civil rights organisations. In this respect, in an 
unpredicted turn, witness became the main counterargument through which pioneer 
trans writers, performers, film directors, activists and academics contested biomedical 
discourses of transsexuality and its assumption of a universal meta-narrative of transition. 
I illustrated in Chapter 2 how, whereas prior FTM counter-narratives focused on 
experiential and existential dimensions of transition overlooked by biomedical 
discourses (see Rees 1996; Morris 1974, for instance), political visibility yielded a new 
transdisciplinary body of knowledge that after Stryker's introduction to the Transgender 
Studies Reader (2006) was consolidated as 'trans theory' or 'transgender studies'. This 
body of work outlines the specificity of transsexuality vis-a.-vis other sexual and gender 
identities and associates narrative with localised constructions of trans identity. Certain 
narratives of transition are associated with the emergence of trans communities at 
national and international levels, the generation of international health models (such as 
the Standards of Care discussed) and new advocacy organisations. However, especially 
from the 1990s onwards, there was an increasing production of political, testimonial 
and hybrid accounts that interrogated the position of trans identity in the public sphere, 
as well as the relation between trans identity and trans narratives (Diamond 2004; 
Bernstein 2006; cf Namaste 2005; Stryker and Whittle 2007; Kotula 2002). Reflecting 
the tensions of the multiple discourses that historically implemented and limited the 
100 See Mattingly (1998) and Skultans (2007) for a discussion of narrative in the context of clinical 
psychiatry. 
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representation of transsexuality, these discourses challenge the assumption that certain 
kinds of narratives already encapsulate 'identity', 'transsexual subjectivity' or 'transness' 
as cohesive meta categories. In fact, these recent trends use different types of narratives 
as a way of generating different contexts of relevance oflfor trans identity. 
Thus, even though this chapter considers a number of tensions that underlie identity 
politics in the contexts of LGBT and trans politics - where narrative and what it means 
to be trans and to transition are currently being evaluated in terms of granting people 
access to civil rights and social services (including care, work, parental rights, marriage, 
rights to property, etc.) - I will argue that the variety and scope of transition narratives 
demand a different analysis. By pointing out their different temporalities and effects, I 
will interrogate the assumption of a structural relation between time, identity and 
narrative. I will discuss how transition, both as a 'plot' and as a becoming, is a narrative 
vehicle through which people navigate qualitative states and a connective device that 
has effects beyond the cumulative conveyance of meaning. Narrative has effects in the 
manner of being, and these qualitative distinctions that affect rate and scale, degrees and 
intensities, are not reducible to the formation of a unitary identity in narrative, but 
rather, are the result of narrative as a connective experience that challenges the unity of 
identity. 
6.2 The structural analysis of narratives 
Even though the status of narrative is variously interpreted in the context of 
hermeneutic paradigms in anthropology, after the publication of Barthes' Introduction to 
the Structural Analysis of Narratives narrative analysis became an interdisciplinary object 
based on a series of structural principles that were assumed to be common to all 
narratives. Narratives are understood to establish temporal distinctions through their 
ordering of different deeds, actions and differences in a main plot, which sets the spatial 
and temporal coordinates - the chronotope (Bakhtin 1981) - of narrative. Ricoeur 
(1980, 1991) argued that this process of emplotment as temporalisation is inherent in 
any narrative structure, and that it operates in a twofold way. The plot converts events 
into a narrative, where time is "laid out chronologically, a linear time, defined by a 
succession of instants" (1980:171). In this way time becomes the structure of the story, 
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a substance "in which the events take place" (1980:170). For Ricoeur, whose argument 
is indebted to the phenomenological tradition, time has also an abstract dimension, a 
"making-present" (1980:173) a "saying now" (Heidegger, quoted in Ricoeur 
1980:174); time is the structural element through which deeds are turned present in 
narrative101 . Ricoeur conceptualised this double existential dimension of time under the 
twofold "time as passage" and "time as endurance" (1991 :21-22). 
Moreover, Ricoeur (1991, see also Linde 1993; Ochs et al. 1996, 2001; Cohen and 
Weiss 2003; Meyerhoff 1998; Brison 2001) argues that narrative creates the identity of 
the narrator in ascribing deeds to the self and structuring them in a coherent unity, an 
identity in relation to which narrative is self-referential. For Ricoeur, the relation 
between narrative and self is of mutual presupposition, and narrating is a secondary 
process grafted on our "being-entangled in stories" (1991:30), which frames the ethics 
and morality of narrative (see also MacIntyre 1981; Butler 2005; c£ Jackson 2002). 
Narratives are, before anything else, a quest for self-understanding. The double 
dimension of narrative time (time as passage, time as endurance) behind every plot 
, 
presupposes that narrative rests in the assumption of an identity, where a pivotal event 
in the narrative present serves as a point of conclusion to a traumatic or 'discordant' past, 
and where the plot establishes coherence and unity to an otherwise heterogeneous and 
dystopic series of components. For Ricoeur, the possibility of subjectivity lies in 
narrative identity: "Our life, when embraced in a single glance, appears to us as the field 
of a constructive activity, borrowed from narrative understanding, by which we attempt 
to discover and not simply to impose from outside the narrative identity which 
constitutes us" (1991:32). Subjectivity is therefore understood as the intersection of a 
dynamic flow of events with the 'substance' of oneself, capable of evolving 'in passing' 
- identity as sameness, idem - while at the same time enduring as one - identity as 
selfhood, ipse (1991a). 
In this way, narrative becomes inextricable from interpretation. The structural analysis 
of narratives advocates that narrative is analytically associated with structural properties 
101 Narrative theorists establish a distinction between stories and narratives. Whereas stories are 
unstructured and messy, narratives are structured, formulaic and purposeful (morally, socially or 
formally). Porter Abbott (2008) follows Seymour Chatman in theorising this difference through 
narrative time, and, in a way similar to Ricoeur, he characterises the difference between story and 
narrative through the formal characteristics that make a series of events into a 'chrono-Iogic' 
narrative plot. 
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(Ricoeur, see also Propp 1968; Levi-Strauss 1978; White 1987), which make narrative 
an ahistorical and acultural product, because their scope refers to the form of narrative 
and the condition of narrativity. It is this kind of interpretation that historically 
informed the use of narrative as evidence of transsexuality in clinical contexts, where 
transition is understood to be the result of a deficit in people's bodies or an irregularity 
in their behaviour, but is also understood to be a coherent identity that is formed in 
changing gender. In this way, certain types of narratives are associated with certain 
symptoms, objectifYing trans experience in a number of narrative 'requirements' and 
crafting the experience of transition in abstract models. In biomedical and psychiatric 
discourses, the narratives contained in medical histories were turned into exemplary 
diagnostic and prognostic examples, and in this context, narrative and narrative 
interpretation became pivotal in the development of diagnostic methodologies. 
Especially after the 'medical tum' in psychiatry that followed after the publication of the 
DSM-III (1980), narrative became a symptom whereby clinicians could safely operate a 
prognostic translation, and thus, as a diagnostic object, it became 'observable', 
measurable and detachable from experience. 
Thus in terms of treatment and prognostic outcomes, transition becomes the main 'plot' 
of trans people's lives, and all other events are subordinated by the main plot of 
becoming-gender. Transition narratives are thus understood to begin in the traumatic 
experiences that lead a trans person to seek reassignment, and to conclude in people's 
arrival at their desired bodies, identities and social roles, because it is here that the 
'discordance' of past experiences is rearticulated in a coherent identity. Some trans men 
use psychiatric terminology to structure their narratives, and it is their identification 
with this narrative that triggers their process. For example, consider William's use of 
medical language when he spoke of the beginning of his transition, where his view of 
transsexuality as a condition informed the ways in which he figured his transition and 
the ways in which he made it public to other people. He said: 
I suppose [I decided to transition] when I realised about the gender dysphoria. 
Well I suppose I kind of live my life and assume that the things I think and do 
are kind of normal for somebody who was female. But then I just realised that 
they actually weren't. And then I tried to find out information I suppose, and 
read books and ... and then I got the vocabulary of understanding that this thing 
did exist, because prior to that I just, you know, I just kind of did what I did 
really and didn't do anything in particular about it. I suppose in terms of the 
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catalyst of moving forward it was very much the knowledge that the stuff that I 
did and thought and felt wasn't what most people do. 
William first identified with the trans category when he realised that his gender 
behaviour was not 'normal' for somebody who was female, and therefore his need to 
transition was associated with the need to 'mend' that. His identification with 'gender 
dysphoria' - the psychiatric term that defined transsexuality in the DSM-III (1980) -
was the beginning of his becoming trans, because it was after he "got the vocabulary to 
understand that this thing did exist" that his decision to change was triggered. William's 
narrative thus echoes the psychiatric plot of transsexuality, where series of past events 
become the background where the narrator emerges as a 'hero' and through narrating 
his transition provides unity and coherence to trauma and discordance. Even though it 
"wasn't what most people do", the realisation of a difference in his behaviour and 
identifying as 'gender dysphoric' was the starting point of his transition, because it is at 
this point that the 'solution' to his non-normative behaviour was envisaged. 
Narratives of transition contain innumerable whats - what one is and is not, what one 
wants to become, what one desires - which, in clinical and identitary discourses, are 
understood to be relevant to one's identity (as selfhood) in terms of the extent to which 
they influence and structure experience. The structural analysis of narratives privileged 
as a diagnostic tool by biomedical discourses emphasises a consistent distinction between 
'before' and 'after', which is often understood as the temporal structure of transition 
expenences. Obliterating the multiple temporalities of transition (see Chapter 8), 
transition narratives are thus understood to convey different and quantifiable dimensions 
of change, and to progress linearly between a state 'before' and 'after', which becomes 
the condition of narrative identity. Consider Michael's description of transition as the 
'conclusion' of a series of prior states, and how transition becomes the beginning of a 
new life: 
That was a great feeling. When I made that decision I felt much better, because 
I knew, yeah, I can plan a lot. I knew my inner demon; I know why I'm feeling 
like shit. I know what it is, how it is called, how it can be treated. It was a big 
relief for me. Before I didn't know where I belonged to. I have been in every 
subculture you can imagine - punk, goth, S&M, fetish, tried everything, lesbian, 
I didn't know where I belonged. But when I made the decision it was straight 
away. You can't imagine, I don't know if I have a picture with me, I should 
have one, how I looked fifteen years before my treatment, that's me without 
treatment, genderless. 
172 
In Michael's narrative, transition reinforces a strong temporal distinction between 
before and after, and this distinction gives a new meaning to the different events of his 
life, from his pre-transitional sense of not belonging to his post-transitional rebirth into 
a new gender. Transition is the 'real' plot of his life where others have failed, and it is 
depicted as an irreversible becoming that is effected through the transformative effects 
of treatment. However, as I explore in the next section, not all of my informants 
privileged a kind of transition narrative where arrival at a new gender was the main 
identitary plot, or where their transition narratives already implied a 'normal' or 
paradigmatic interpretation. In fact, the variety of ways in which my informants 
engaged with narrative challenged the structural reading (narrative as evidence) often 
performed in clinical contexts. 
6.3 Counternarrative 
In contrast with the medical assumption that transsexual subjectivity is structured almost 
exclusively around the mismatch between sex and gender and is evinced in certain 
'problematic' gender narratives, I suggest that narratives in transition have other effects 
and functions. In Chapter 3 I showed that aetiological GID models assume that the 
'condition' originates within the individual (and can be localised in the body or in the 
mind) and that it develops as a relatively stable, enduring state whose consequences are 
only alleviated in treatment. My interviewees not only challenged this logic in terms of 
their view of transition as a lifelong becoming (I will also be discussing this claim in the 
next two chapters), but in so doing they also called into question the existence of a 
universal narrative of transsexuality (assumed by some biomedical and political 
discourses) of which every transition is an individual variation. In some instances they 
openly interrogated the inextricability of their narratives and the analytic paradigms that 
deem them linear and progressional, and tie their transition with a narrative arrival at a 
coherent and bounded identity. Robert elaborated this point in our interview by 
pointing out that while narrative holds a paradoxical double power to 'order' 
expenence, it is also transformative. As he agreed to put together his memories in 
response to my question about the beginning of his transition, he warned me not to 
take the linearity of his narrative as evidence of a linear identity: 
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Well, I guess ... I guess that question is a bit of a funny one for me because it 
kind of, it pre-empts this kind of narrative, and the way that we see time is kind 
of linear and like progressional, and the way that I deal with my identity isn't 
any of those. But it also reminds me of, I don't know ... the psychiatric narrative 
as well, you know, 'cause it's kind of interesting, but also really controversial for 
me politically. I don't know whether that is (laughs) useful or not but I guess 
that is my answer but also my kind of internal response ... 
Robert's caveat that the way one deals with identity is not linear or progressional holds 
an important contention against the structural assumption of linear time in narrative 
identity. If, as Connerty (1990, see also Bakhtin 1981) remarks, the relation between 
time and narrative is one of reciprocal presupposition rather than supplementarity, it is 
also true that narrative bears a specific relation to social and cultural processes102 , which 
inform the temporality of narrative. It is in this sense that narrative is enmeshed in 
personal and collective histories (Guattari 1995) and the specific content of social and 
cultural schemas (Skultans 2008), which, as such, affects individuals as much as it does 
intersubjective and relational domains Gackson 2002). It is not surprising that, in this 
sense, narratives have sometimes been understood as the outcome of action and meaning 
as the product of microprocesses of linguistic interactions (Arendt 1958:185; Ahearn 
2001). 
This section therefore addresses my informants' different modes of production of and 
engagement with the categories and narratives of transition and explores narrative as an 
assemblage through which transition is experienced, or, in other words, as a 
'heterogeneous machine' (Guattari 1995:48) that produces multiple temporalities, 
memories, events, and feelings. First, my informants' different modes of engagement 
with the trans category evince that they do not always consume a trans narrative as a 
ready-made product, but rather, that they transform what it means to be trans every 
time they engage with existing categories and narratives of trans sexuality. In these 
creative and strategic engagements, they transform the categories and narratives that 
'represent' them, and mobilise them in their becoming FTM. Thus, I will argue that 
102 In fact, Ricoeur distinguishes between three phases involved in narrative: a prefiguration 
(mimesis1), whereby a referent is articulated figuratively, a plot or configuration (mimesis2), and a 
refiguration (mimesis3) that is operated in the reception of the narrative, the moment, in other 
words, when the narrative implodes the reader's imagination. In the process of refiguration, 
mimesis1 and mimesis2 interact with the temporal universe of the reader, effecting this intersection 
through a process of innovation and sedimentation, which becomes "the final indicator of the 
refiguring of the world of action under the sign if the plot" (Ricoeur, quoted in Connerty 1990:393, 
my emphasis). It is in reception that narratives become entangled with wider social, cultural, 
historic, and knowledge practices. 
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narrative, the contexts in which it is articulated, and its relation with other modes of 
communication, has an effect in people's sense of being alive and changeable, and 
changes their capacity to affect the world around them. Finally, I will follow the effects 
and context implications of narratives to explore the different kinds of temporalities 
narrative produces as an assemblage. Narrative creates multiple temporalities by 
articulating different elements, such as referents, relations, relevance and context, where 
change and becoming are brought into experience. 
6.3.1 Naming 
Let me start by considering the significance of names103 1ll transition. All of my 
informants changed their names at some point in their transitions, although some of 
them had already a male or ambiguous name before further steps were undertaken. For 
reasons of confidentiality, I will not discuss their choices here; however, it must be 
pointed out that these choices varied greatly. Whereas some chose an entirely different 
name, some chose to keep a male version of their birth names or to be referred to by 
their initials. Names and the process of naming, as Valentine (2007) also suggests, are 
the result of the convergence of different processes, where names are relational devices 
that bring different kinds of relations into experience including memories, personal 
histories, cultural referents, politics, and imagination. Indeed, and rather than being 
circumscribed to their individual choice of first name, these diverse narrative choices 
also render people's engagement with collective names, especially with the categories 
associated with transsexuality. In the line of Valentine's (2007) examination of the 
effects of names and the process of naming in New York's trans and queer 
communities, my informants' identification with certain categories was not merely a 
way of marking themselves as members of a collective identity, but indeed a way of 
making their processes unique. For Valentine, part of the complexity involved in the 
use, creation and transformation of categories in trans and queer communities is that 
categories are at the same time political tools through which people make claims about 
themselves and the device through which they express their identities creatively in their 
own communities. Engaging with difference and change within the community often 
103 In this section, I discuss categories and names under the heading 'naming'; however, whereas 
categories include names as a class or group, names do not include categories, as categories are 
broader than names in their designation. 
175 
involves breaking or extending relations with categories, as categories mediate people's 
relations with social services, community organisations and health programmes. 
Categories are thus important actors in the community's social life, as sometimes they 
are the link between people and institutions, other times political enactments, and in 
every articulation they perform specific functions within and beyond narrative104. 
My informants' engagement with the category 'trans' or 'transsexual' was complex and 
multilayered, and had manifold effects in their transitions. The 'trans' category was 
often understood as a fixed, yet ambiguous characterisation, where their 'identification 
with' the category was a way in which they constructed their transitions toward others, 
as well as a way of engaging with institutional, identity and health narratives. Beyond 
the commonly accepted meaning of the categories themselves, their process of 
identification entailed a particular relation with their own transitions in which they 
could make the category fit 'uniquely' their individual processes, while at the same 
time, the process of figuring their transitions through the category meant also 
reinventing the category in every identification. Let me illustrate this. 
Some trans men argue that being a 'trans boy' means being 'masculine' and 'femme': 
they use both gender categories to convey - and construct in their relatedness - the 
uniqueness of transition, where embracing masculinity is not necessarily detrimental to 
living femininity coextensively, and where living both categories at the same time can 
be a way to be 'trans'. Guy for instance explained his transition as a process in which a 
series of 'successful identifications' (identifications that had effects) set important changes 
in motion. It was through his 'tentative' identifications that anxiety and intense feelings 
of exhaustion began to subside, and that he could effectively be in a different position 
from which to rethink his feelings about gender. He said: 
I was identifying as genderqueer for about six months which was like quite fun, 
I had a delivery driving job, delivering food, and I would pass on my rounds, 
because of the uniform that I was wearing I guess, and the sunglasses, I was 
convinced the sunglasses were the thing that let me pass; these old John Lennon 
tinted sunglasses, and that was so exciting, I just remember that exhilaration, and 
I remember thinking I never want to forget how this feels. So that was probably 
the first. 
104 The different discussions of standards compiled in Lampland and Leigh Star (2009) evince some 
of these characteristics, where the effectivity of classification and standardisation informs an array of 
everyday practices. 
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In this passage, identification as 'genderqueer' was possible because a senes of other 
processes converged, such as having a delivery job and being able to 'pass' in contexts 
where anonymity, a uniform and sunglasses allowed him to be read as male. But here 
passing is described as a playful process, one that started once he abandoned previous 
ideas of the coherence of' gender', and started to play with his gender presentation. By 
identifYing as gender-queer, which in queer communities is the category that people 
use when they live as neither or both genders, Guy starts to make changes that at once 
initiate his transition and allow him to reinvent what it means to be trans in his own 
becoming. The effects of identification as genderqueer start in being open to changes 
and continue in a series of material enactments that make a difference to how he 
thought he could live, to how he thought of gender and of being trans. In this interplay 
Guy is able to embrace transition as an exhilarating process, one that connects past and 
present in its irreversibility ("I never want to forget how that feels"), but this doesn't 
presuppose a single linear enactment. Through his identification as genderqueer, Guy 
engages with the many possibilities identity holds, and in this way narrative has an effect 
in changing his reality. It allows him to 'play', displacing himself from the familiarity of 
other situations in which he would inevitably be read as female, while producing a 
sense of enablement, a connection with the possibility of living differently, a sense of 
freedom and excitement. 
Guy does not conceptualise his identification as genderqueer even primarily in symbolic 
terms, or as the recuperation of a 'lost object' (the 'symbol' of his masculinity as it has 
been defined by some psychoanalytic discourses), nor does he understand this 
enablement solely as the effect of mimetic faculties (Fuss 1995; Butler 1993). Rather, 
identification initiates a tentative process of reinvention that relies on establishing 
relevance and connectedness among different kinds of processes, which transform and 
create the present. Identification here entails the connection between different objects 
(such as Guy's glasses and his uniform), unexpected and transformative excitement, 
narrative referents, material and symbolic effects. Identification itself also works as an 
invention here, because in its relational capacity it creates relatedness not only at the 
level of the symbolic, as will become clearer, but also in the different levels at which 
narrative becomes ingredient in experience. 
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Further into the interview, Guy said that identifYing as trans was different from his 
previous identification as gender-queer - it had different effects. Consider how he 
describes them in this excerpt: 
The first time I felt that exhaustion began to address was way before I started 
hormones, to contradict myself a bit. And it was when I came out as trans. 
Because I'd been getting angrier and angrier at the way that I wasn't passing as a 
guy, but I didn't realise I was trying to, not consciously, but I was trying to. 
And when I finally could say hey I am trying to do this all the time my mind 
was like no, I'm not trying to do it, and actually, I really feel like I am a boy, I 
could start to [transition, and to pass]... I was instantly less angry at people 
around me, because I could tell them something. So I was giving myself a break, 
you know, by naming myself, and kind of making my life a bit easier. 
In coming out and identifYing as trans, Guy started to transition, becoming less angry at 
people and at himself, and relating to other people's transitions as similar to his own. 
And yet, identifYing as trans here becomes a way of relating to previous experiences 
where he tried to pass as a boy but would not admit it ("I didn't realise I was trying to, 
not consciously, but I was trying to"). In this way, identification had different effects in 
his transition; it marked a change in the way he approached others, and as a 
consequence it made "life a little bit easier" by representing his experience and in 
particular his masculine presentation and his desire to be addressed as a guy, within a 
broader identification as a trans person. In this respect, identification is part of the 
effects of narrative communication, and the process of naming oneself becomes part of 
the actualisation of change. In this way, the effects of people's engagement with the 
trans category are manifold, and are relevant to the specificity and uniqueness of their 
transitions. 
Thus, my informants' transition narratives evince the fact that whereas transition is an 
emplotment device, every time one puts together a narrative, one contextually 
articulates the heterogeneous elements understood to be significant and configures them 
differently. In this respect, and as Fish argues (1979), every narrative is inextricably tied 
to a context which affects the retrospective identification of evidence that determines 
the scope and effects of the plot. In this sense, and even though the identifications my 
informants described in this section produced a sense of progression, in the sense that 
Ricoeur confers to narrative, narrative progression does not necessarily lead to a 
univocal conclusion, but, rather, narrative articulates reality differently every time it 
happens. In this way, transition narratives reifY the assumptions of narrative theory 
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regarding referentiality and the relation between the what and who connecting the 
events that form 'the sequence' of one's life, or, in other words, the assumption that 
from narrative emerges a hero whose identity as a narrator is defined by the parameters 
of unity, sameness, continuity and permanence (Ricoeur 1991 b, see also Barrett 2007). 
However, it will be argued, transition narratives also question this very principle, 
because narrative, understood as a kind of experience, is not always necessarily 
associated with coherence and unity, but sometimes also with diversity, instability and 
potentiaL Narrative can thus be understood as a kind of type of experience, where 
contextual elements are part of narrative as an assemblage. As narrative theorists point 
out, the 'context' in which narrative produces effects can never be univocal and 
'normal' (Fish 1979), and the reception of the narrative plays an important role in 
giving narrative intelligibility. This process entails the receptor's understanding of the 
materiality of narrative and the conventions of narration at a first stage, and the 
subsequent situation of narrative referents in philosophical, scientific or cultural systems 
of intelligibility (Zavarzadeh 1985). Consequently, the process of reception affects the 
way that narrative becomes referential, even self-referential, as some have argued 
(Ricoeur 1991; Ochs 2001), because it is in reception that notions of chronology, 
temporality and identity make sense in relation to what is said and its perlocutionary 
context. 
Through my informants' identification with categories of transsexuality, which were 
themselves varied and contextual, I have illustrated how narrative depends on context 
and that narrative not only ascribes deeds and qualities to a narrator in the figuration 
and reception of the narrative, but also effectively creates conditions of change and 
becomes part of its actualising effects. The process of naming oneself changes people's 
interactions with others, and is an ingredient in the becoming of new time/spaces 
(Bakhtin 1981). Narrative thus revives rather than solves the problem of "the one and 
the many" (as Blackman puts it; 2007, 2008a) inasmuch that it implies a relation 
between different kinds of processes, establishing not only relatedness and coherence, 
but also instability, creativity and change. In this double dimension of giving oneself a 
name (Guy's "I was giving myself a break by naming myself'), identification is not the 
assumption of trans identity as a ready-made product; rather, it is the recreation of what 
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it means to be trans through the transformative association of experience and narrative. 
These connections are not necessarily linear or unidirectional, but stem from narrative 
as a kind of experience that transverses different contexts, including the subjectivities of 
interlocutors, the genealogies of meaning and practice in which narrative is embedded, 
and the different sets of formal principles that underlie it and connect it with other 
knowledge practices. 
6.3.2 Transitioning through narrative 
The first time I interviewed Russell he said that transitioning was his only chance of 
becoming his 'true self. His motivations to start reassignment appealed to an inner 
conviction that any more time without transitioning would ultimately be detrimental to 
his capacity to lead a good life. Instead of the medical term 'gender dysphoria', he used 
the term 'body dysphoria' when talking about an intense and ambivalent relation with 
his body pre-transition, because the feelings of discomfort that prompted his decision to 
change were not about gender alone but about a progressive 'estrangement' from his 
body that affected many experiential domains in his life. He had not known transition 
was possible until he was invited to a FTM support meeting and got to meet other trans 
men. Recalling his first impressions, he emphasised that after the first contact he was 
horrified at the thought of transitioning. He said he started to think otherwise while on 
a journey with a long-term girlfriend, when his 'body dysphoria' became more intense 
due to the conditions of the journey. This situation made him think again about 
transitioning and of going back to a support meeting. 
One of the things that deterred him especially on his first visit to FTM London was that 
he felt he could never identify as 'trans' in the same way he thought all those men in 
the room did. The second time he went, however, after the journey, he had terminated 
the relationship with his partner and had become involved in many different, new 
projects. In this new situation, he recalls feeling relieved when he started to talk to 
other trans men and as a result of this exchange (of "feeling their energy", as he put it) 
he started to think that transition could end his body dysphoria. Encountering trans 
men with whom he could identify, and even feel attracted to, affected his acceptance of 
transition and transsexuality, both as processes and prospective catalysts of change and 
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improvement that before were understood to be beyond the scope of his problems. It 
was after that second encounter with FTM London that he felt a progressive liberation 
in identifying as transsexual, and realised that transition was a way of "being who [he] 
always was', of "having the body [he] always knew [he] had" and of "being able to 
grow". Russell's encounter with transition was mediated by narrative in different ways 
(the lack of narrative and pre-transition isolation, the narrative exchange that made him 
change his mind, the different narratives through which he figured and refigured his 
transition thereafter). Narrative and the process of narrating had a particular role in his 
process of inventing a new future, and situated that future in different contextual 
situations, meanings and material relations every time narrative happened. Thus, 
identifying as transsexual became a 'liberation', where narrative enabled him to change 
and to "be who [he] always was". 
Similarly, Craig said about transition: 
So where I wanted to climb trees and play with guns, and dream of being a 
cowboy, and of having girlfriends, and of being a hero, and of doing wild and 
wonderful things, none of those internal envisionings matched with the 
identity that was allocated to me, which was female, and not an adventurer, 
and not a cowboy; none of those things. 
Craig wanted to be an adventurer, climb trees and be a cowboy, but these internal 
envisionings were not what were expected from him. On the day of our interview, he 
told me one of the reasons he decided on transitioning was that, growing into 
adulthood, he understood he could not be what he wanted to be if he were to attempt 
to meet other people's expectations ("the identity that was allocated to me"). 
Transitioning was envisioned as a subversion of this order of things, and as a way of 
living otherwise. Transition changes inverted other people's expectations of his gender 
embodiment; they were a response to his 'allocated' identity and to his failure to 
produce it, but it was also the multiple possibility of becoming a body, a hero and of 
doing "wild and wonderful things". 
Transitioning allowed him to rewrite the social and cultural meanings associated with 
his body and through which his identity "as a female, and not an adventurer, and not a 
cowboy", could be resignified; however, this rearticulation of his gender narrative 
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became part of the many assemblages through which change was actualised in transition 
and, thus, his own narrative of transition became entangled with the different contexts 
in which it had effects, affected other people's narratives, in which it made a difference 
or in which it allowed him to do things. Narrative is thus not only a mode of ordering 
and conveying identity, but an ingredient of change in that it has a different scope and 
context every time it is articulated. Narrative makes things matter, it is an assemblage 
that includes the creation of different meanings, ascription and enactment. Rather than 
being a structural result, it makes identity possible in that it happens at different levels, 
affecting intersubjective, personal, collective, political, and legal domains. 
Craig's identification with cowboys and heroes draws on the kind of narrative where 
identity is produced as a result of a main plot; however, his narrative is also different in 
that it folds into other stories through which he navigates transition's different states. 
For example, he referred to events in his childhood as crucial points that had an impact 
not only in his decision to transition, but also in the particular route it took once it 
started. He said: 
There was never any consistency. There was always a contradiction. The earliest 
memories I have is being about three-ish, two and a half, three-ish, three and a 
half, and being in Brighton and going out into the neighbourhood and playing 
with a couple of children on the street, and one of them I remember was a little 
black girl. So this is the early sixties in Brighton, and there weren't actually that 
many black people in Brighton in that particular neighbourhood. But she was 
my friend, she would play with me. And it's only in retrospect that I realise 
there was a commonality of outsidership. And, you know, I wasn't ofay with 
how people treated me, which was as a little girl. And she was coloured. And 
we were both sort of, we were both outsiders. And we would spend some time 
together on the street. I remember I had one of those little ... I can't remember 
how you call them, two wheels and a platform, yeah, and I loved that. And my 
grandmother would take me over the road into the little over-passing, the green 
that was passing the neighbourhood, and I would climb the trees and my 
grandmother would sit on the bench and keep an eye on me. And I remember 
that most of the time we spent outdoors, in that neighbourhood environment 
was essentially on my own, but you know being watched over by my 
grandmother and occasionally I would have this interaction with this black girl, 
so there was never any consistency or continuity. The consistency was the sense 
of being disconnected from how I felt inside and it's hard to remember how 
you felt inside when you were three, so that must be taken into account that I 
retrospectively recreate again. But I do remember that sense of disease or 
conflict between myself and the rest of the world, and that sense of 
disconnectedness continued throughout my life, and I found ways of focusing 
on other elements in my life that decreased the anxiety that resulted from being 
aware of that disconnectedness. 
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Craig begins his narrative by describing his childhood in a Brighton neighbourhood in 
the 1960s. He was raised as a girl, which was not the way he felt, and this inconsistency 
led him to feel an "outsider" and to be "disconnected" from other people around him. 
In the above excerpt, he navigates this leitmotif of "disconnectedness" through a series 
of memories. He told me that, retrospectively, he believes that sense of 
disconnectedness had to do not only with his vision of himself as a person, but also the 
fact that he could not reconcile that vision with the role he was given by everybody 
around him. He says this disconnectedness, the form of his difference, was similar to 
that of a little girl who became his friend, who was also 'different', even if not exactly 
in the same way he was. Thinking of his disconnection in relation to hers, Craig is able 
to restore the sense of connectedness because they are both outsiders, they belong 
'together'. But the sense of disconnectedness he describes in childhood continued in 
adulthood, where his way to move forward, to belong, in his words, "to survive" and 
"to progress naturally into adulthood", was precisely to connect with other 'outsiders' 
and in this sense belonging in 'not belonging': 
So, pre transition, it's just a mish mash, but the thread that runs through it is 
never feeling right. Never feeling at home. With occasional moments of 
connecting. .. I would have occasional moments of feeling more outright, or 
more at home than normal, and that was the result, or was achieved by making 
contact with elements of society which were also outsiders. So that little black 
girl, that relationship with her continued throughout adulthood, by my 
connecting with queer community, leather community, outlaw community, 
drug community, gender fuck community, intellectual bohemian community. 
So I found ways of making some sort of connection with other outsiders who 
were extremists in their own way. And peripherally, momentarily I would have 
a reduction of that sense of disconnectedness. But that's called displacement, I 
believe. 
In this belonging by not belonging Craig started to connect with other people, and 
therefore his transition narrative was associated with other narrative-mediated contexts. 
Engaging with different communities of 'outsiders' he not only made his difference 
productive, but the precise way in which he structured his narrative and the way that 
he understood it to be similar to that of other outsiders determined the way in which 
he lived with transition. His identification of other displacements and of particular 
differences in other outsider communities that were similar to his own allowed him to 
find a succession of temporary 'homes'. Those connections were crucial in his 
transition, because they established the route through which transition made any sense 
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at all. In other words, in his narrative the figuration of inconsistency is more than the 
point where transition is envisioned as change towards a foreseeable end - the narrative 
conclusion - but the catalyst of other modes of communication in which he could find 
a "peripheral, momentary reduction of that sense of disconnectedness". In this way, 
narrative informed his transition and the way he acted and engaged with people, ideas 
and collectives10S . In other words, the chosen narrative device of inconsistency refers to 
all future identifications, connections, relations and belongings, rather than only the 
disjunctions attributed to the narrative past which frame action in the present. 
In Gary's account, the relation between narrative and other forms of communication 
and 'connectedness' is similar. The past he describes in his narrative was also painful and 
involved isolation and disconnectedness. This isolation was an enduring state in Gary's 
life, and, although it was relieved when he started transitioning, he says it never 
completely disappeared: 
I've been in therapy since I was 26 because I realised back then that I think my 
feeling of difference from everybody that I knew started bothering me and I was 
feeling very sad all the time and I realised I was quite suicidal as well, and I had 
eating disorders for years, I kind of did the whole lot like anorexia and bulimia 
and all of it but never really understanding what it was about. So I kind of found 
this way 'cause I never got being a woman at all, you know it just didn't work 
for me, I couldn't understand why people wanted to get, you know to put on 
make-up or wear clothes that were attractive to other people. I just didn't get 
that at all, I couldn't get how women would talk together, I couldn't get ... I 
grew up quite alone. I was in all girls' boarding schools and never fit in there. 
And then at home I was all the time horse riding so I didn't have friends at 
home at all, and not really friends at school because people found me too 
strange I think, too difficult. And then when I went to university I was already 
bulimic by then, so ... or became bulimic during my first degree so back then 
that kind of let me off the hook of socialising because I spent all my time at 
home eating and throwing up and stuff And then I started therapy, and after 
about five years of therapy I stopped being bulimic, but still ... 
Like Craig, Gary talked about a sense of being alone, convinced he would never be 
able to 'fit' or secure a safe social life. He could not get being "a woman at all" or make 
105 The connection between connectivity and narrative is not my own. Felix Guattari (2000, 2009) 
explored the role of narrative in the context of his psychiatric practice at the La Borde clinic. For 
Guattari, the power of narrative to heal is not that it provides 'meaning' but that in itself is social, 
multiple and involves not only narrative figuration, but all forms of communication, which are 
essentially forms of connection. For Guattari, inconsistency is a sign of the strength of connective 
processes and their relative denseness, because it is the fracture of consistency that allows "the 
capacity of entitative devices of opening towards other formulas of combination, other axiomatics, 
other abstract mechanisms; in summary the capacity to abandon a regime of passive connectivity to 
access an active and processual connectivity" (1995:128, my translation). 
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his presentation attractive to other people, and being in a girls' boarding school he 
could not find other environments where people would not question him or "find 
[him] too difficult". The constraints and discipline of a conservative education were 
often an impediment to his acceptance of difference and undermined his capacity to 
socialise and make friends, which led to frustration and seclusion. However, amidst this 
profound distress there were phases where he felt he was doing "useful work" or had a 
good time going on holiday with people, even when most of the time he did not feel 
strong enough to socialise. This narrative past informed the way in which he lived his 
transition years afterwards and in fact had a transfonnative effect in envISIoning 
transition as a 'new possibility'. Here, narrative reversed that forced disconnectivity 
with a new and unforeseen capacity, in which Gary could reinvent himself in new 
connections: 
So, transitioning for me, or at least realising that I was trans and that I could do 
something about it was like a new start, a new possibility. There's something, I 
mean it's really weird, I'm sure everybody goes through this, there's a little bit 
of me that hopes that by transitioning everything will be sorted out and of 
course it isn't because there is still lots of other crap going on, but there's 
something which is fine now, and I think it's about the way that people see me. I 
don't have this feeling that I'm never been seen properly and I am beginning at 
last to figure out who I am as well because you know, the fantasy me, the Gary 
inside me. I've had to kind of let go of him a bit because I'm never gonna be 
like him, because of course your fantasy self you know you can have it however 
you want to, and you know in reality that's not actually possible. I'm never 
gonna be six feet and beautiful, anything like that, so ... but again in letting go 
of him it's like I had to start to figure out really who I am. 
This fragment suggests that Gary's identification as a trans man and his telling himself 
the story of his own becoming, was important because he could then "do something 
about" the things that troubled him in the past. Letting go of his previous story of how 
things should have been, his decision to transition changed the ways in which others 
saw him, which gave him access to new and different forms of communication and 
relatedness. Narrative was thus an assemblage that allowed him to be part of new 
'societies'106. But in order that this could happen, Gary had to let go of his own 
106 Here, I am using A.N. Whitehead's notion because it displaces the traditional meaning from 
exclusively human, intersubjective milieus. Whitehead's notion, in turn, accounts for relations 
between different kinds of order(s). The distinction of what is an 'individual' and a society gets 
blurred by contiguity, and is distinguished only in terms of scale. "A society is a nexus which 
illustrates or 'shares in' some kind of social order", writes Whitehead (1938:203), a social order that 
he defines as the sharing of a common characteristic. Defining societies thus, Whitehead argues that 
'man' is such a society, as is a cloud and any given event, and as such it acquires a history by 
changing in creating and being affected by different circumstances. 
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narrative about himself, his fantasy self, in which becoming six feet tall and beautiful 
would solve all his problems. Letting go of that fantasy self (''I'm never gonna be like 
him, that's not actually possible") was the beginning of his real transition, because it 
allowed him to be open to the changes (the way in which he could affect and be 
affected by becoming at different levels) that happened beyond the constraints of the 
plot through which he had previously figured the future. This new sense of 
connectedness is thus a new "sense of alivenesss, of changeability" (Massumi 2002:36, 
see also Thrift 2008; Tomkins, Sedgwick et al. 1995) that is not limited to Gary's 
relations with other people, but that generated multiple associations and temporalities. 
For Gary, this connective present had multiple consequences. Having been able to 
make sense of the future in the new possibility of connecting with people, other 
narratives and other narrating possibilities, transition also helped him devise new 
directions: 
And now there's other stuff going on as well which is new, like just being 
older, and I knew that if I did go and try to get some work again, you know, 
I'm going to be fifty next year and I haven't worked so many years during my 
adult life, you know, the longest I've ever stayed in work is like eight years. So 
I suppose there's all that stuff coming in too and I suppose that's part of, you 
know, when you are talking about transition anyway, this kind of going 
towards your third age of your life, when you start moving to that, that's a big 
transition too, so like when you think okay maybe I've got 10 years left, 
maybe I've got 20 years left what do I want to do with that? And what I do 
now is I don't spend time doing stuff that isn't feeding me, you know, I'd 
rather do stuff that I want to do that doesn't pay anything, than stuff just to 
earn money. 
In this excerpt Gary talks about the effects of both his previous disconnectedness and 
transition in terms of future work, in terms of getting older and in terms of doing 
something worthwhile. Narrative here is an assemblage - a complex heterogeneous 
machine in which feelings, events, relations and memories produce effects from their 
togetherness. In this sense, articulated in other forms of communication (see Guattari 
1995, 2009), identity is no longer grounded in the distinction of inside/ outside, but is 
the result of feelings, memories, events and temporalities that emerge as a result of 
narrative in transition. I have shown how for Craig, narrative worked through other 
forms of communication, generating assemblages that affected and were affected by his 
transition. In Gary's case, however, narrative worked through and against his process 
and he had to let go of the constraints of his narrative of the future in order to 
transition. Furthermore, in Gary's narrative, transition, understood as a becoming rather 
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than as arrival, is a vehicle that connects the past and future by pointing out 
connections between narrative and experience. 
6.4 Narrative-assemblage 
In the previous subsections I analysed some of the different effects of narrative in 
transition experiences, and suggested that narrative is not only a structural device that 
'orders' events, but can also be understood as an assemblage that connects 
heterogeneous elements and that happens in multiple dimensions. In the prevIOUS 
section I illustrated how narrative, grounded in other modes of communication, affects 
people's sense of being alive and changeable, and thus that it is a type of experience 
whose role in people's transitions is complex, because every plot has a different scope. 
In this final section I explore the extent of these different temporalities in three 
transition plots, which, albeit differently, signal the ways the ways in which narrative 
time results not from the formal properties of narrative, but of its function as an 
assemblage in my informants' transitions. 
Robert phrased his motivations to start transitioning: 
I guess when I was like really small, in primary school, people would sort of line 
up like girls and boys, and that always felt a bit funny. We used to play ... I used 
to play football, we did it in the little gym, we were like sort of crazy with small 
balls and stuff, and I remember one time they were separating the teams 
between shirts and skins and I wasn't really sure what the skins were but I was 
like everyone wants to be on the skins side and I was like yeah, me me me! I'll 
be on the skins side and then like I realised obviously the guy who was like 
taking it was really shocked (laughs): "No, no, no, you can't be on the skins 
side", and I was aware of my difference you know, so I suppose being aware of my 
difference was like sort of when I started to think consciously about... I'm 
going to use the word gender, even though it has lots of connotations. Yeah, 
when I first became aware of gender, was ... when I didn't fit in, when I was 
confronted by those things, and I guess when I started to think about ... about issues 
to do with transition. 
Robert considered transition because, he says, he was "confronted by" gender and 
realised he did not fit in. As a child, when he could not play on his chosen side in 
primary school, he was excluded from the team he wanted to be a part of, and this 
made him aware of a 'difference' that throughout the years would become a motivation 
of his decision to change. But interestingly, not being able play in the skins team does 
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not produce the 'disconnection' other trans narratives refer to, but rather a split 
between two ways of being that he thereafter lived simultaneously, who he 'wanted to 
be' and who he 'had to be': 
I was very aware that being other than feminine was actually wrong, and that 
was sort of crossing the boundary and digressing so I used to ... I used to kind of 
think about it quite rationally and I would say all right well, I can have like the 
time when I need to be me and that would be like when I'm sleeping and then 
I'll have like half the day like, when I'm me, and then half the day when I'll do 
all this sort of stuff that is like jumping about my everyday life. 
Being aware of the paradox that he could not live like he wanted to when he was 
conscious, Robert describes transition in terms of achieving a certain quality and as a 
way of establishing continuity between the two states. Robert said he first thought he 
could be transsexual whilst watching a documentary where transsexual men were 
represented at different stages of transition. He was watching it with his parents. He did 
not at the time think he actually was like them, but watching these men speak about 
their transitions certainly changed something important; it made him consider the 
possibility that he might want to transition, even though he knew his parents would not 
like it. He was imagining another future where becoming male would erase his prior 
experiences of difference: 
Mmm, and then I guess it came from another year that I watched this 
documentary called, eh ... mmm .. .I can't remember, it had three characters in, 
and I watched it a second time more recently, which is more interesting kind of 
thinking about what I was thinking at the time. But it had like, it was only 
mainstream TV and it had like three main characters in it and they were ... they 
were all trans men actually! I think, going through these different stages of like 
"conventional transition" in inverted commas. I watched it, and it was all a bit 
crazy in my mind, and I asked my parents, like, well, if I was like trans, you 
know, what would you say if I was trans. And they were like "Oh, don't be 
ridiculous". And I kind of knew, it was kind of unspoken, that we couldn't talk 
about it again, you know. So I kind of knew, I knew that sort of trans people 
existed, but I didn't really identifY as trans, I don't think then, you know, in the 
terms that were like presented to me, in the terms of the documentary ... That 
didn't match up like who I was, and I did start thinking about sexuality and stuff 
from then and I was always really kind of open, I guess like I didn't really care 
whether. .. what I was sexually, but I guess the fact that I was contemplating 
that was important at the time, like I'm not trans but I might be like ... I might 
be gay, and that's ok, you know. And then, I don't know ... there's so many 
different points, you know, so many different points, and I'm still thinking 
about it now, you know, there's no kind of beginning or no end like it's always 
like I'm always in this process. 
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In this excerpt, the process of narrating and the identification of stages where 
'consciousness' or 'awareness' are significantly changed are mediated by narrative. And 
yet, watching trans men's narratives, thinking he might be trans and talking to his 
parents about it, were three different assemblages in which narrative had a different 
quality, temporality and effect. "There's so many different points", Robert says, that he 
is always in the process of making and remaking his narrative. Telling and retelling the 
story, Robert suggests, he is not only understanding change differently, but, as I explore 
in the next chapter, also making sense of change by establishing thresholds between 
different states. Narrative time entails the creation of different sequences and levels of 
relevance that 'explain' those sequences retrodictivelyl07, and in so doing it changes the 
present by creating a type of immediacy and a connection or assemblage. For Robert, 
narrative is a condition of "being always in the process" of figuring and refiguring 
relevance. 
Similarly, John said that narrative was the medium through which he could 
communicate his being trans to others, and was also a central factor in generating 
belonging and familiarity among his close friends: 
First it was a bit weird, because I felt like I wanted people to treat me as a boy, 
talk to me in masculine, and because I was really... I thought I was really 
strange because I wanted people to treat me as a boy and I was really conscious 
about how different I was from other people, or how different I thought I was 
from other people. I started telling my friends, and there was a circle that called 
me John and treated me as a boy, but out of that circle they treated me with no 
gender. And there were problems with other people, and then other people, 
teachers, friends that weren't so close, family, everyone treated me in feminine. 
And I still feel uncomfortable when somebody doesn't know I'm trans and I 
have to explain it. That's why now where I live is very comfortable, because 
usually talking about gender is something so daily, it's something that we do 
every day, and so everyone that I know a little bit already knows that I'm trans 
and I don't have to explain it. Because a man that identifies as a man doesn't 
have to explain every day he is a man, so why do I have to do that? People just 
assume roles and things and I like that, because of how I talk and with whom I 
go, people can already assume I'm trans, and once they assume I'm trans, they 
can see what kind of trans I am depending on how I talk or how I say I feeL 
107 This causality is "causal efficacy" in Whitehead's terms (1978:19,236,239), and it refers to the 
impossibility to separate 'mere' sensations, emotions, awareness, purpose or appearance and to define 
these qualities as independent. Whitehead's philosophy overcomes this "fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness" through the notions of actual entity, nexus and prehension. For Whitehead, actual 
entities are effects and effects are "conditioned actual entities", feelings and the "perspectives" in 
relation to which actual entities are perceived (see also Latour 1999). 
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Narrative for John seems to be necessary for negotiating his gender and his experience 
of transition with others. Through narrative he could not only make his transition 
available to others, but he could also make his kind of process obvious, because "they 
can see what kind of trans I am depending on how I talk or how I say I feel". Narrative 
thus becomes an ingredient in daily situations and has a particular role beyond the 
affirmation of masculinity; it becomes an assemblage through which he transitions. 
Tim's transitioning also involved a similar engagement with narrative, where his 
engagement with 'external', as he conceptualises them, 'rules' or narratives of gender 
informed his transition route. Growing up in East London, Tim found that many of the 
things he wanted to become clashed with his family background, where gender 
distinctions were important and associated with acceptable behaviours. He emphasises 
that the way in which he feels these desires are in the present have not always had the 
same form, but that they shifted along the way as 'reactions' to particular situations: 
I don't want to do anything. Another thing is that I don't wanna do anything. I 
don't think it's me who needs to do anything. But it's weird because it's been 
going on for such a long time. I find myself thinking that there is something 
wrong with me. And even at one point in a year I have to remind myself it's 
not, there's nothing wrong with me, if there is something wrong is, you know, 
the way that we live in this world is wrong. Because I'mjust doing what I have 
to do, I am just living, I am just existing, I'm being. So I don't think there's 
a ... and I think I'm trying to be as true as I can. I'm not like one of these 
people who disillusion themselves, you know? So I'm not convinced by this 
'I've always been like this'. But there's kind of like two options really, that's 
how I see it, and I just remember thinking oh I am like that, but the truth is if I 
had been given a full range of options like you know this is slightly more like 
this, you know, it's quite possible that I would choose someone, that I would 
be closer to something else in that scale. I'm not saying that those are the 
ultimate, I'm not saying that male and female are the extreme either, because 
maybe this is the right way and they have gone off to the ... maybe they are the 
middle. You know what I mean? 
Tim's assertion "I am just existing, I am just being" proposes that yet another 
interrogation of the transition could be the only solution to the way he feels. He says 
that he doesn't think there necessarily has to be a problem in being as he is, and yet 
towards the end of the passage he portrays an imaginary scenario where, were things to 
be different and had he been given other choices, perhaps his struggle would not be 
articulated as it currently is. Time here represents more than the succession of events in 
his life; time involves, as Whitehead (1985) suggested, derivation and experience; in 
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other words, particular routes of change and different levels of relevance at which 
change makes a difference108. 
The different functions and effects of narrative in this becoming as 'living', and the 
connections narrative creates as an assemblage, make it difficult to think of transition 
exclusively as a single narrative or identity. Rather, the variety of my informants' 
narratives and the different scopes and effects of narrative in their processes show 
precisely a displacement from those assumptions. Wayfaring throughout different 
temporalities, their narratives show multiple and shifting configurations of the scope and 
effects of transition. This way of understanding transition has consequences in figuring 
identity, which is no longer based on sameness or the privileging of one single plot, 
where a hero emerges as a solution to a series of adversities, but lies precisely in the 
multiplicity of the signifYing chain. In this sense, narrative bridges virtual and actual 
worlds by generating transition as many interrelated 'transitions' at many levels, and 
producing effects not only at the level of explanation, but also as different kinds of 
human, material and symbolic experience. In this respect, time is the transformation of 
qualities and not an empty narrative receptacle. I will be exploring this in more detail in 
the next chapter. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Structural analysis109 set a new analytic focus on the relation between narrative and 
identity by spreading some of its basic questions about narrative - what is narrative, 
how it operates and why - outside the traditional field of literary theory enquiry (see, 
for instance, Levi-Strauss 1966). This shift affected theoretical discussions in history, 
psychology and psychoanalysis, anthropology, philosophy, economics and 
sociolinguistics. As a result, and despite the fact that narrative was selectively associated 
with debates about cultural history (White 1978; de Certeau 1984, 1986; Rosaldo 
1989), Kreiswirth (1992) notes that narrative also became a field in its own right 
108 Whitehead writes: "Time is known to us as the succession of our acts of experience and thence 
derivatively as the succession of events objectively perceived in those acts. But this succession is not 
pure succession: it is the derivation of state from state, with the later state exhibiting conformity to 
the antecedent" (1985:35, my emphasis). 
109 And formalist analyses before that, see Propp (1968), Bremond (1973). 
191 
beyond specific historical debates (Olafson 2001 or Ricoeur 1979, 1980, 1991a, 1991b; 
Whorf 1939). Importantly, however, the structural analysis of narrative establishes 
complex links between time and narrative that would inform the use of narrative as a 
hermeneutic paradigm and as a method of scientific analysis. I have shown that the 
particular use of narratives of transition in medical practice emphasises certain narrative 
properties, such as linearity, self-referentiality and univocal emplotment, that reinforce 
particular relations between narrative and identity. This association has important 
consequences. First, this kind of interpretation implies that narrative identity is inherent 
in the act of giving an account of oneself implies that identity could not exist outside 
this process of speaking, and thus making oneself understood through narrative. This 
assumption, which is reified in the clinics, support groups and community organisations 
where trans people, if only strategically, are understood to subscribe to certain narratives 
of transsexuality, is highly problematic theoretically insofar as narrative analysis levels 
out many of the dimensions or strata involved in the process of living - a becoming that 
becomes part of one's identity only through narrative. Some of the most extreme 
consequences of this argument are evinced in the impossibility of queer theory as a 
discursive paradigm to give an account of other non-discursive dimensions of people's 
experiences of sex and gender, as some critics of Judith Butler have repeatedly pointed 
out (see Cheah 1996). If identity is discourse and produces its effects only discursively, 
then there are only discursive possibilities of representation of oneself in action, and 
discourse becomes the limit of who one is. 
This chapter focused on describing the different roles of narrative in transition. Whereas 
the 'structural' properties of narratives that assume a relation between identity, time and 
narrative are sometimes drawn upon by trans people in explaining transition, I have 
shown that the role of narrative is more complex and multilayered. The scope of this 
exploration, however, is not restricted to the manifold ways in which trans people 
engage with narrative in their daily lives, but highlights important methodological issues 
that concern the role of narrative in social analysis and, in particular, anthropology. 
Narrative has been crucial in the development of anthropology, partly because, 
especially after the narrative tum in the human sciences, it was privileged as a 'natural' 
medium of communication, and because it has been deemed paradigmatic of the 
relation between people and history. The 1992 GDAT (Group for Debates in 
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Anthropological Theory) debate, titled The past is a foreign country (Ingold 1996), 
provided an interesting site of discussion about the relations between memory and the 
process of writing history, and discussed how the interaction between history and 
memory at once recreates and limits the present. Ingold writes in his introduction to 
the publication of this debate that "if, as history, the past lies behind us, as memory it 
remains very much with us: in our bodies, in our dispositions and sensibilities, and in 
our skills of perception and action" (1996:202). 
In this chapter I suggested that the concern with the analytic properties of narratives 
cannot be as great as to obscure the ways in which narrative is ingredient in multiple 
relations, cultural and historical processes. Methodologies of narrative reconstruction 
acknowledge this double dimension of distance (historical past) and the implications and 
effects of the past in the present (past as memory), bringing together individual, 
collective and historical processes through narrative analysis by eliciting the ways in 
which experiences, thoughts and encounters are selected as 'significant' when making 
sense of any aspect of one's life. For instance, Skultans (1998; also Carsten 2007; Pine 
2007; Tarlo 2003) demonstrated the extent to which narrative can connect individual 
and collective experiences, thus becoming a crucial analytic tool to draw the 
significance of those connections. Narrative becomes crucial in navigating the 
intricacies and intensities of historical processes, connecting the construction of past and 
present. Skultans suggests that this process rests upon a double mechanism that regulates 
the relation between time and narrative: "Narrative operates at two levels," she writes. 
"At one level it insists upon immediacy and the fusion of the past with the present. At 
another level structural devices are used which distance the experience from the 
present" (1998:22). However, narrative analysis also entails the risk of encapsulating 
cultural constructs as structural, universal and natural principles. This "fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness" (Whitehead 1938:64; Bateson 1958:263) takes for granted 
particular relations between narrative, time and identity, and is reified in analytic 
contexts where narrative is understood to have particular values in social life. 
Throughout the chapter I suggested that narrative is an assemblage that implies multiple 
temporalities, which are framed by the different contexts in which narrative is 
articulated, its varied scope and effects. In the next chapter, I explore the temporal 
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dimension of transition III more depth by exploring change as 'passing' certain 
thresholds and inhabiting certain states. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 
Thresholds 
In the last two chapters I explored testosterone and narrative as analytic domains, and 
through the different scope of these units, I approached transition as a becoming that 
happens at multiple levels. In different ways, transition was conceptualised through 
these domains as a particular kind of experience where the relationality of transition 
changes problematised conceptualisations oflinear time and linear change. In particular, 
through my informants' different transition narratives, I explored the ways in which 
their transition questioned biomedical ideas of progression and linearity. In Chapter 5 I 
argued that the kind of experience of change testosterone brings in transition is both 
predictable and unpredictable, because it is routes of change within and outside the 
body. In Chapter 6 I suggested that narrative is an assemblage in people's transitions, 
rather than only the expression of the coherence of identity, and that it also happens 
over different levels, where memories, events, feelings, and temporalities emerge as a 
result of different kinds of narrative in transition. 
This chapter continues the exploration of the last two chapters by addressing the 
temporal dimension of transition. I start by considering different understandings of the 
notion of 'passing', because this notion, associated in popular culture with a deceiving 
act of being recognised as what one is not110 , is commonly understood to be a social 
outcome of transition, where after having undergone a series of changes one is 
recognised by others as a member of one's gender of choice. Passing as male usually 
takes place after the alteration of the secondary sex characteristics including the' erasure' 
of feminine behaviours and the adoption of male ones. Passing is thus understood as the 
effect of artifice and in some instances, despite triggering the social recognition of 
gender, it is sometimes understood merely as mimicking the 'realness' of gender. In this 
110 The notion of passing, also used in the context of racial ambiguity (Larsen 1929; Piper 2001; 
Ahmed 1999; Newton 1979), was considerably revised by queer theorists, who originated new 
contexts in which this notion came to account for processes of gender production, affecting not 
only transsexuality, but also all processes of gender impersonation (see Butler 1990, 1993; 
Halberstam 1998; Tyler 1998; Sedgwick 1991). Here, the notion of passing is understood as 
evidence of the constructedness of gender and is associated with performativity (see Chapter 4). 
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sense, 'passing' as male becomes a threshold through which transition itself becomes 
'real', because it is through passing the passing threshold that people become de facto 
male. In fact, in Part I of the thesis I discussed how, defining transition as a passage 
between the categories of female and male, biomedical and legal discourses define 
transition through functional models of progression and measurement designed to 
recognise and validate differential gender relations 'in time'. In particular, as we have 
seen in Chapter 3, medical treatments set several milestones through which transition is 
effectively actualised such as the record of certain bodily and social changes, which are 
grouped into psychological, hormonal, surgical, and social 'real-life experience' 
measurements of masculinity and transition changes, and are enforced, acknowledged 
and made visible in the clinic through different sets of rewards (a positive result from a 
real-life test gives a trans person access to hormones, two years' hormonal intake gives 
access to surgery, real-life experience and hormones are a prerequisite for a Gender 
Recognition Certificate to be issued under the Gender Recognition Act of 2004, etc.). 
Thus, in biomedical discourses, thresholds are designed to think about transition as an 
independent and quantifiable phenomenon and to provide a series of guidelines 
through which progress and success can be measured. However, while thresholds are 
sometimes understood as positive and objective measurements in epidemiological and 
scientific discourses, the notion of threshold was developed differently in 
anthropological and social theory. 
In this chapter I depart from some of those developments in order to situate my 
analysis of transition thresholds. I will argue that thresholds are particularly relevant 
analytic tools to address change in transition, because, unlike categories and categorical 
differences, thresholds are living boundaries in which the processes of changing and of 
making sense of change converge. Across the chapter, I explore different uses of the 
notion of threshold in discourses about experience where 'passing' thresholds epitomises 
change and transformation. First, I discuss how ethnomethodological approaches to 
gender initiated a pervasive tendency to understand certain signs, symbols and 
ascriptions as pivotal in the construction of gender. It is in this way that the notion of 
'passing' became relevant to gender studies in the 80s and 90s and that passing was 
progressively associated to realness and recognition. Thresholds were particularly 
relevant to anthropological studies of ritual, where the tripartite structure of 'rites of 
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passage' (Van Gennep 1960; Turner 1967) inspired anthropologists to rethink the 
relations between individual transformations and the continuity of social processes. 
Here, thresholds became significant in relation to modes if observation of change, because 
they were understood to break the continuity of process in analytically distinct domains, 
and thus map the effectivity, functionality and causality that bind a given domain with 
others. Nevertheless, the focus of this chapter will be on the ways in which thresholds 
make transition temporal. I explore how the participants in my research situate 
transition thresholds in multiple locations, where the passage of time is coextensive with 
change and becoming. I will argue that these thresholds separate different kinds of 
temporality, constructing different states by marking differences and variations in the 
different levels at which transition happens. Drawing on Whitehead's atomic theory of 
time, which advocates the coextensivity of space, time and motion, I use thresholds to 
address the relations between movement, endurance and experience. 
Transition thresholds bind experiential states characterised by both change and 
continuity, and it is through these states that people navigate multiple dimensions of 
transition. In this sense, in the line of my analysis in previous chapters, transition 
thresholds at once reinforce and challenge the language of linear passage through which 
biomedicine and other discourses about experience define transition as a difference and 
a passage between two states. This chapter therefore returns to some of the arguments 
laid out in Chapters 2 and 3; however, through the different ways in which thresholds 
make experience temporal, this chapter specifically challenges the assumption that 
transition could be conceptualised as a linear passage. In fact, I will explore how the 
relations between thresholds and time pose two important challenges to linearity. First, 
the fact that change is no longer understood to happen in one even level challenges the 
definition of FTM transition exclusively as a passage from 'female' to 'male', because 
people's experiences of transition as a 'journey' and as their own and unique becoming 
often do not have a predefined beginning, as, for example, people often understand that 
the beginning of their process is not necessarily 'female'. Second, the implications of the 
'irreversibility' of transition vary in relation to their different arrival points. 
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7.2 Thresholds, gender and the problem of change 
Passing has become a universal notion through which medical and trans communities 
worldwide are able to assess the efficacy of transition. In both settings, passing is 
understood as the intersubjective recognition whereby somebody is read as a 'natural' 
member of the sex/gender they embody, especially when it is not the sex/gender they 
were ascribed to at birth. As a social effect of transition, the notion of passing is not 
exempt of contention, and it has become the starting point of many controversial 
debates about transsexuality, especially about the effectiveness of the use of medical 
treatments and the extent of their 'success'lll. This meaning of passing, initially 
proposed by ethnomethodologists (Chapter 4), has been commonly replicated by social 
research on both MTF and FTM transition (see Bolin 1988; Bloom 2003; Ekins and 
King 2006), and is now widely accepted as both a measurement tool to assess the 
efficacy of transition as the 'end' of transition. The notion of passing is grounded in the 
assumption that sex resides in the genes-hormones-genitalia continuum. Until the 
introduction of the notion of gender, transsexuality simply represented the break of this 
continuity, regardless of the domain in which it was identified. However, after the 
development of medical, hormonal, genital, and behavioural notions of sex, specifically 
through the coining of new notions like 'gender' and 'sexual orientation', the 
distinction between sexual identity and gender identity, and so forth, transition was 
conceptualised primarily in relation to the intersubjective situations in which gender is 
read by others. Ethnomethodologists in the 1970s appropriated the notion of gender in 
order to break the continuity of this binary, in their claim that the ontological and 
political status of 'sex' is coextensive with the 'acquisition' of gender, as experimental 
and clinical research on sex, confirmed in practice. Passing was thus associated with a 
'successful' performance of gender, which, regardless of the ascription at birth, was 
understood as an 'achievement' (see Garfinkel's 1967 and Stoller's 1985 descriptions of 
Agnes' transition). 
111 Although sometimes the success of treatments is measured through certain aesthetic parameters 
such as the results of surgery and hormonal therapy, success is increasingly understood in relation to 
the extent to which trans people are able to lead 'normal' and fulfilling lives alter treatment as 
'natural' members of their chosen sex and/or gender. See, for instance, Lynn Conway's definition of 
success at http://ai.eecs.urnich.edu/ people/ conway /TSsuccesses/TSsuccesses.html, last accessed 
August 2009. 
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The concept of passing has received considerable revisions within queer theory. In fact, 
and simplifYing matters considerably, passing was associated with certain performances 
of gender inasmuch as gender was the effect of the citation and imitation of normative 
gender attitudes, bodies and behaviours (Butler 1991; de Lauretis 1987; Tyler 1994) 
and the destabilisation of their symbolic limits (Sedgwick 1993). In this way, queer 
theorists proposed that gender, instead of being a stable cultural construct, resided 
precisely in the possibility of passing, in terms of both gender performance and in terms 
of 'crossing' gender (see especially Butler 1990, 1993; Cordoba 2005). The trope of 
gender crossing was privileged in recent queer and trans discourses as a ritual process in 
which the individual navigates a milieu of signs, as s/he is 'marked out' and 'marked in' 
in performing gender. Thus, the idea of passing in queer theory destabilises rather than 
affirms the sex/gender continuum, as it entails movement among and within recurrent 
and culturally recognisable signs and symbolic configurations. In this symbolic 
interpretation of passing and the way it is put to work in the framework of 
performativity (see Butler 1993:143-167), as I have also pointed out in Chapter 4, the 
relation between agency and gender is limited to a reification/subversion logic and 
implicitly, as recent critiques of this model have suggested 112 , inasmuch as the 
destabilising effect of passing is privileged as subversive and politically more valuable, 
trans people are reduced to either passing and affirming the sex/gender continuum (the 
teleological and temporal end of transition) or to not being trans at all, but rather 
embodying genderqueer identities, which are understood to challenge 
heteronormativity in their specific intention not to pass. Trans people's modification of 
their bodies is understood as the physical limit of subversive passing, because it 
produces the naturalisation of the man/woman, heterosexual/homosexual distinctions. 
In this way, paradoxically, trans people's passing becomes at the same time a privileged 
trope of crossing and political subversion and the undesirable consequence of 
normalisation. 
Studies of FTM transition use elements of the preceding theories in defining what 
passmg means for trans men. For example, two recent approaches to this notion, 
despite having originated in different contexts, share important points in their 
112 Mandy Merck, for instance, offered a consistent critique to this aspect of queer theory in her 
presentation 'The Impasse in Queer Theory' at the Feminist/Queer Desires: Past, Present & Future 
conference at Goldsmiths College (1 ph June 2008). 
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definition of passing as the process of 'naturalisation' of gender. The first, voiced by 
anthropologist Jason Cromwell, reads as follows: 
"Within transsexual discourses passing means becoming unnoticeable and 
unremarkable as either a man or a woman. Blending as normal means that one 
has succeeded and become a 'real' man or woman. With 'realness', an 
individual is no longer a member of the stigmatised group of transsexuals; she or 
he has completed 'transition' and is now 'just a woman' or 'just a man'. To do 
otherwise is to fail" (1999:39). 
The second definition comes from a non-transsexual social scientist, Henry Rubin, 
who published a study of FTM transsexuality in 2003. Rubin's notion of passing is 
articulated around the distinction - allegedly crucial in his ethnographic research -
between 'butch women' and trans men, as it was through this distinction that his 
interviewees identified as transsexuaL He writes: 
"Ed's criterion is the one most FTMs in this study prefer: the tension between 
his body image and his material body. His male body image came into conflict 
with his anatomy and with how others interacted with him. It is not enough for 
him to pass as a man in the world or be able to do the things men 
do" (2003:94). 
Both approaches emphasise the symbolic nature of passing, although they do it in 
different ways. Cromwell's realness and the naturalisation of gender through passing is 
'the end' of transition, as people are thereafter men or women alone. For Rubin, 
however, passing seems to be the beginning, because for his informants passing was 
precisely the desire that led them to transition. In both cases passing is understood as a 
stable and intersubjectively validated set of identifications related to the recognition of 
manhood grounded in the distinction between appearance and being. This distinction, 
in Cromwell's work made explicit in the binary of being seen/being read, and in 
Rubin's text in the body image/material body distinction, where passing seems to be 
determinative to the definition of identity in visual terms, holds a risk of assuming 
identity as a set of symbolic configurations ready to be consumed (see Chapters 3, 6 
and 8). Here 'realness', as the link between sex and gender, represents the erasure of 
the ontological and political differences that hold the poles of the sex/gender 
continuum apart. 
Importantly, these definitions do not account for passing as a marginal and ambiguous 
process or, rather, as dependent on transition changes of varied scope and kind. In fact, 
in recent queer non-academic discourses, testimonies and narratives, the claim that 
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"nobody passes" (Bernstein 2006) indicates that these univocal definitions of passing 
have perhaps obscured that the relation between gendered experience and gender 
categories is also 'unstable' (see also Riley: 1988), and that passing can be seen to 
indicate more ambiguous and inter-dimensional crossings. 
7.2.1 Ritual thresholds 
Indeed, in anthropological theory, thresholds have been characterised as ritual markers 
of different stages of social life (Van Gennep's (1960) and later Turner's (1967) model of 
rites of passage), and applied not only in the analysis of ritual, but also to critical 
approaches to the constitution of national identities (Barth 1969; Anderson 2006), 
transitions between political regimes (Burawoy and Verdery 1999), or processes of 
subjectivisation (Obeyesekere 1981; Moore 2007; Hsu 1978). The tripartite structure of 
Van Gennep's rites of passage offers a model of change and emergence where a series of 
symbolic thresholds structure the passage between different stages of social life, and thus 
become epitomes of transformation. Ritual studies have shown the relevance of 
thresholds in conceptualising ritual practice within culturally-specific symbolic milieus, 
where change is understood to be at the core of life and where patterns of change in 
ritual practice are taken as models of and for wider cosmological beliefs. These studies 
provide an understanding of change beyond concrete ritual experiences, extrapolating 
patterns of change from the context of ritual and performance practices (Turner 1992; 
Kopping 2002; Schechner 1993). They pose important questions about the centrality of 
ritual practice in social life, and about the role of ritualisation in techno-scientific 
temporal and cross-cultural models of reality. 
Let me consider briefly the significance of thresholds in ritual analyses of change in 
anthropological literature, because here thresholds collapse a double power to 'effect' 
change and 'mark' passage. For instance, Bloch's (1992) depiction of initiation rituals 
among the Orokaiva of Papua New Guinea highlights that their division in different 
stages where a series of events develop, creates, as Iteanu points out, a series of 
exchanges "between humans and spirits, between different humans belonging to 
different groups, between animals and men" (1992:22) that imbue meaning to every act 
201 
of the Orokaiva. The ritual represents a senes of stages where these exchanges take 
place. It commences with the invasion of the village by outsiders wearing feather masks, 
understood to represent spirits or ancestors, who violently interpellate the children, 
grouping them on a platform of the type on which pigs are killed, as they assault pigs 
and trees. The children are then covered and taken to a hut outside the village, where 
they are told they have become spirits of the dead, and they undergo a series of ordeals 
and learn about secrets, dances and symbols. Finally, after a time of seclusion they 
return to the village as hunters of pigs, perform a triumphant dance and start 
distributing meat from the same platform where previously they represented hunted 
pigs. With this example of initiation rituals among the Orokaiva, Bloch offers a reading 
of ritual practice in relation to several categorical distinctions relevant both in the 
context of the ritual and in Orokaivan cosmological models such as the binaries village/ 
bush, pig/spirit, bird/pig, life/death. The relations among these categories are key to 
understanding how, when an initiate becomes a man, he "does not merely return to the 
world he left behind. He is a changed person, a permanently transcendental person who 
can therefore dominate the here and now of which he previously was a part" (1992:5). 
For Bloch, these initiation rituals effectively convert initiates from prey into hunters, as 
these distinctions collapse in ritual symbolism, the costumes of actors, their masks, the 
bodies of the initiates as they do in social life. Thus, continuity and change interplay 
and in fact inform action by enabling and restraining agency. In fact, as a ritual marker, 
violence connects the different levels involved in ritual and is crucial for the ritual to 
produce any effect. By situating symbols as cartographic points of reference that 
connect individual processes and abstract systems of socialisation, spatialisation and 
temporalisation, anthropologists associate change with a certain deployment of symbols, 
because to some extent change is enabled by their successive and cumulative 
articulation. But in fact, symbolisation becomes the analytic limit that marks the set of 
events that constitute a life stage and, consequently, the series of differential relations 
through which change is effected and measured. In this way, in Bloch's exposition of 
Orokaivan male initiation, the initiate undergoes a process of erasure of his social status, 
a process marked by violence and in which categories and states become ambivalent and 
ambiguous, so that the initiate ceases to be inscribed under the continuity of a 'person' 
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and can thus become initiated and reborn, because only by virtue of passing the 
threshold is he susceptible to being re-inscribed in a new state. 
Bloch's reading of Orokaivan initiation rituals as essentially transformative - not only of 
the individual, but also of the social order - is done through the sequencing of three 
stages, which was used by Van Gennep (1960) and later elaborated by Turner (1967) in 
their analyses of rites of passage113. Anthropologists used this model widely to account 
for transformation and the sequencing of life or religious events (see, for instance, 
Grimes 2000; Kaelber 1978) was also explicitly used in accounts of sexual transition, 
especially those of ethnomethodological persuasion. In cross-cultural analyses of 
transition and transgender cultures (Bolin 1988; Roughgarden 2004; Nanda 1997; 
Herdt 1997; Kulick 1998; Sinnott 2004, among others), there is a recurrent disposition 
to situate an event as a pivotal representation of transition and to understand this event 
as the rite of passage through which transition is actualised. This ritual event is usually 
understood to condense material and symbolic changes and to produce effectively an 
end and a beginning. This point can be understood as a threshold between two 
different states, before and after, male and female, dead and alive. As in initiation rituals, 
passing this threshold becomes the epitome of change, and thus the threshold reveals 
the effects of change in that it yields a new order, marking one's ingression in a new 
social status, a second life, or a 'new self. For example, following Nanda's work on the 
hijras of India, Roughgarden (2004; c£ Suthrell 2004) situates this threshold in the 
performance of Nirvan surgery, which effectively produces the status of hijra even 
when the person has lived fully as one before that moment. Surgery is understood to 
convey one last definitive turn where the hijra's condition becomes irreversible and she 
"is reborn as a 'true' hijra and empowered as a disciple of Mata" (2004:346). Nanda 
(1997), however, remarks that Nirvan surgery is not the only threshold of change 
around which hijra identity is articulated. In her account, ceremonial dances performed 
for the birth of a boy child, where hijras make claims on intersexed infants, are also 
important thresholds, although she discredits the popular belief - mostly voiced by the 
Indian press - that hijra membership is established through those ceremonies. Instead, 
she argues, membership is established out of an "expression of a desire" to become hijra 
113 This passing is characterised by a stage of separation, a liminal stage and a stage of incorporation, 
each of which is dominated by a series of symbols, which act as abstractive elements in the 
transformative process and imbue the ritual with a social character. 
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that is usually communicated in preadolescence or early adolescence under certain 
conditions of poverty, ill-treatment due to feminine behaviour or after a period of 
prostitution. This decision then becomes the catalyst of a series of processes and hence 
it is understood to formalise hijra membership and effectively create hijra identity. 
Similarly, Bolin (1988) understands transition as a rite of passage in her work on male-
to-female transsexuals in North America. As was the case in the male initiation rituals 
discussed above, transition for Bolin becomes a way of being reborn, where 'passing', in 
her account allowed by medical treatment and surgery, is not only the modification of 
the visible sexual characteristics and the erasure of male sexual marks, but also a spiritual 
journey. Through van Gennep's three-stage model, Bolin argues that medical 
reassignment is itself the rite of passage that effectively constitutes biologically born 
males into females, because transition is essentially the acquisition of gender in terms of 
appearance, manners, work choices, and other similar social variables; assets which can 
only be accessed cifter gender reassignment treatments. Rites of separation include the 
detachment from a previous life as a male and the progressive adoption of female roles, 
appearance, manners, and work. After a liminal period of hormonal treatment and 
surgery, trans women are incorporated into womanhood through their full-time roles as 
women. Bolin's work challenged medical ideas that trans women should necessarily 
embody stereotypical femininity, as it was generally believed at the time. Furthermore, 
transition, as both a staged model of change and as a series of differential 
transformations, becomes for the first time experiential, a journey where different 
psychological, physical and cultural dimensions collide. In this way, transition is 
understood as the start of a new life, and a way of being reborn. 
7.2.2 Thresholds in social theory 
However, despite the anthropological focus on thresholds as crucial ritualisations that 
stage the lifecycle, recent conceptualisations of thresholds displace this focus on human 
life. Contemporary social theory recently developed several notions of boundary in an 
attempt to offer an alternative way to address the limits of classification in scientific 
practice (see Star and Griesemer 1989; Bowker and Star 2000; Ritvo 1997; Gould 
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1996; Stoler 1995). These analyses problematised classification in different 
epistemological and techno-scientific regimes, and gradually displaced the emphasis on 
the 'function' of categories and classification systems to their effects. Thresholds here are 
important in defining the relations of causality and demarcation, and the more 
philosophical concern about their status is part of an important critical approach that 
aims to make power relations underlying techno-scientific and political regimes explicit 
in social theory. By criticising traditional cause-effect patterns seen to contradict the 
complexity of reality and to obscure the resistance of facts to adapt to rigid schemes, 
these approaches attempt to develop new models of social life (see De Landa 2006, 
2008 for instance). In this sense, thresholds invite new models of causality such as 
statistical causality that can refer to relations between groups of variables and processes 
of actualisation (De Landa 2002), because the contents of the causal models already 
need to include conditional probabilities, given that the models "we derive are not 
contained in the fundamental laws that explain them" (Cartwright, quoted in De Landa 
2002:159). Luciana Parisi's unorthodox account of evolution and her definition of sex 
in the non-linear coexistence of what she distinguishes as the biophysical, biocultural 
and biodigitallayers of the virtual body-sex (2004:12) explores the notion of threshold 
as the limit of the endurance of a system, situating thresholds at the core of ontology 
and ontogenesis. In fact, following Kauffinan, she suggests that change happens in 
relation to a threshold around which the rate of variation accelerates. These "critical 
thresholds of change" (2004:54) challenge the assumption that "natural selection sets the 
gradual accumulation of variations in order" (2004:54). Kauffinan's thesis goes further 
in suggesting that change may respond to a spontaneous 'ordering' - from a previous 
chaotic state or as a mechanism of adaptation - and that this ordering process is perhaps 
also subject to evolution, as are other levels in complex systems. For Kauffinan, systems 
are capable of adapting when "they achieve a 'poised' state near the boundary between 
order and chaos, a state which optimises the complexity of tasks the systems can 
perform and simultaneously optimises evolvability" (1993:173). 
Through these different conceptualisations I intend to highlight the multilayered and 
mobile nature of thresholds, which constitutes the main analytic difference between 
thresholds and categories when analysing change. Where anthropological studies 
emphasise the role of thresholds as ritualising devices, the notion of passing developed 
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within ethnomethodological models of gender identity relies on privileging certain 
thresholds to measure the effectiveness of the acquisition or 'achievement' of gender, 
understood as the materialisation of symbolic gender meanings in the form of bodily 
changes and changes of social role, and where passing those thresholds becomes the 
epitome of the realness of change. These definitions have in common the tendency to 
condense gender into a series of intersubjective recognitions. Science studies, however, 
increasingly relate thresholds to new models of causality and ontogenesis. Underlying all 
of these definitions, thresholds mark the ingression of experience in ontologically and 
politically different states. 
7.3 Thresholds as invitations to change 
My informants said that in their transitions, thresholds made movement visible by 
translating passage into differential relationsl14 in which change was effected and 
perceived; they used thresholds to indicate movement between states. Thresholds 
existed in relation to different levels of relevance in their transitions, allowing them to 
distinguish between different layers of their process, interweaving those layers in 
different ways. For some trans artists, such as photographer Sam Nightingale for 
instance, thresholds allowed the translation of one kind of experience into another. 
Nightingale, whose work analyses liminality in relation to bodies and material 
environments in transition, unfolds this entanglement through different "modes of 
translation" between experience and photography, in which the relation between 
experience and representation is not necessarily one about 'truth' but rather about 
effect, continuity and derivation. In his work, these translations are understood as 
experiential thresholds, which m his images take the form of intersections, objects 
situated in transitional spaces, or visual signs that indicate a world beyond what is 
actually represented in an image11S . For Nightingale, in this sense, thresholds can be 
understood as markers of change that affect the continuity of experience. 
114 I define differential relations as relations among heterogeneous components that are linked to 
rates of acceleration and change (see, for instance, Deleuze 2002:170-192; Parisi 2004). 
115 In particular, his series Liminality can be accessed at www.samnightingale.com/gallery-1/. last 
accessed August 2009. Olympic Changes, his most recent photography installation, was shown at 
Shoreditch Town Hall in April-May 2009. 
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In my info nnants , different ideas of passing and the ways in which it was effected 
through certain transition changes, thresholds were also discontinuities. For instance, 
William needed to go "all the way" in order to feel he was passing, but his feeling of 
having become male started well before he developed 'a male persona' socially: 
Because it's one thing to say to people 'look, I'm male, you must call me a male 
name' when they can see breast and female. So whatever I felt I was, I didn't 
want to progress, I almost held back the progression of it, until I could appear 
more convincing to people, so it was less difficult for them to appreciate what I 
was trying to say. So by the time I had been on honnones for six months and I 
had a mastectomy and recovered from that I was much more physically 
plausible for other people. See, for me it was quite a hard time. Still living with 
the fact that I was essentially working as female, adopting a kind of a more male 
persona socially but still not fully being out to everybody about what my plans 
were, very few people still knew at that stage. Which is quite hard, because 
most people take you for something that you are not or treat you in a way that 
is not what you want, so ... that is the sort of friction you get. 
For William, passing was not only the desire to be recognised as a natural male, but was 
also about communicating transition efficiently to others and situating his transition 
within existing sexual, interpersonal, collective, and institutional narratives (as discussed 
in the previous chapter). In the above excerpt, he explains that adopting a male persona 
entailed both achieving and communicating different levels of change; the differentials 
of change he refers to (physical characteristics, mental states, a legal status, and so forth) 
are united in his need to become 'plausible' for other people, and thus to be able to 
work and socialise as a man. Passing thus refers to the immediacy and complementarity 
of transition changes, to the transduction of certain types of change into others, and the 
negotiations that change gives rise to. 
In contrast, Tim's intimate recollection of a time when he almost got assaulted provides 
an interesting counter-example, as he had to pass as a woman despite feeling and 
passing as male: 
I seem to put people in an uncomfortable position sometimes and because they 
are uncomfortable they make me uncomfortable, and for many years I found it 
quite, I mean, I liked it when people mistook me for a boy, secretly I liked it. 
Only when I got into trouble you know in school, people wanted to have 
fights with me because they thought I was a guy, and I was like "Nooo, I'm a 
girl", so I used that. I used that to save my ass, how could I betray that? My 
body's also saved me from many situations like this one time I was walking 
back from my friend's house very stoned, like 3 or 4am, and these two rude 
boys came along and they had their fingers, their hands in their pockets and 
they were like pointing, eh, give us your money. And I was like I don't have 
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any money. And then they realised, "You go to my school, don't you, you are 
a girl!" And they didn't mug me, they just, you know, had a little chat and left 
(laughs). So yeah, I kind of liked it but then for example as I got older I felt like 
I was living a lie. And that I was really kind of getting away with living a lie. 
In this situation, where gender saved him from being attacked, Tim suggests that 
passing is to some extent limited by context, and thus happens 'from the outside in' (c£ 
Diamond 2004). When interpellated by old classmates, gender was in a way a 'given' 
in the encounter, and passing, in this case as a girl, was a strategy deployed in order to 
avoid being abused. Then his own relation to passing (when he was a young boy and 
later on in life) is ambiguous and ambivalent, as sometimes he "secretly liked it" but 
other times felt it was a lie. This contextual and ambivalent nature of passing, 
underemphasised in definitions of passing as the 'naturalisation' of gender, is important 
in Tim's account, because here passing is not only understood through the above 
mentioned distinction between appearance and being, but rather, evinces an 
ambivalent engagement with gender. 
In my informants' accounts, passmg IS not exclusively understood in terms of 
naturalising a binary gender role; rather, as trans activist Richi Wilchins (2002) suggests, 
it is also understood as a drive for gender exploration beyond the acceptance and 
naturalisation of gender categories, which is performed qualitatively in relation to the 
different scales at which transition is lived. Indeed, my interviewees understood passing 
both as the 'fixation' that results from the recognition of others and the experience of 
progressive and sequential changes. They talked about passing in relation to their 
understanding of change in different processes (physical, emotional, social, 
psychological, legal, medical, etc.), where transition and becoming male made 
noticeable differences in their lives. In our interviews they explained how change 
happened by setting certain transition events as milestones, thresholds or markers of a 
before and after. These markers were not the same for everybody - for some people 
they were the first situation in which they were recognised as male (even before 
hormonal treatment), or the first time they asked people to treat them as male; for 
others the first T injection, and yet for others the moment they came out, had surgery 
or organised a political action. These were representative experiences in their accounts 
of transition, but were chosen arbitrarily and performed different functions every time 
they were articulated in narrative (Chapter 6). People had several of these markers in 
208 
order to account for different 'states', and for this reason the choice of markers changed 
in relation to different contextual situations in which thresholds were used to convey 
their e)'.'perience of change. These markers changed in relation of what they perceived 
to be the limits of those states. For instance, Fabian situated the beginning of his 
transition precisely at the point where he had done all he could to not transition, and 
he could not do anything else to be happy living as a girl. He said his transition started 
with the identification of the limit of a given state, a limit beyond which he said he 
could not live without changing, and in this way, the limit becomes a threshold, an 
invitation to change. Thresholds were, as Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise them116, 
subjective evaluative criteria that group a series of meaningful events in a given state 
and the limit beyond which a given state changes into a different one. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, it doesn't matter what those two states are, and whether or not they 
correspond with the ways in which they are perceived when they are established, 
"what counts is the existence of a spontaneous marginal criterion and marginalist 
evaluation determining the value of the entire series" (Deleuze and Guattari 2004:484). 
In this way, thresholds inform people's experiences of change as markers that determine 
the end of a series and a change of state (in relation to a particular series of meaningful 
events), but at the same time are invitations or lures (Whitehead 1978:25) for the 
actualisation of change. For example, consider Gary's account of the beginning of his 
transition: 
I mean, we talk about this all the time in FTM London with other people like 
actually what is transition and when does it start, and it was when my mother 
died probably because that's when I started being able to actually think about 
me without her will being imposed on who I was, without any fear of how 
she'd react to it and stuff like that, so ... And I think as well being older I was 
less afraid of difference, and I think it all came together at the right time, that I 
was less afraid of anything that wasn't totally normal. And I'd been working at 
Justice as an administrator - Justice is this law and human rights organisation -
and I think just learning more about human rights and stuff like that I think it 
all really helped to become much more aware of people and difference. I think 
probably that was when it started, although actually talking about transitioning 
and understanding it, that only started when I met other trans guys. It was a big 
116 Deleuze and Guattari approached the notion of limit in their work on collective mechanisms of 
'capture', or in other words, processes of collective change beyond the micropolitical. They argue 
that, in order to consider any point a threshold, it is necessary to locate the power in relation to 
which a certain series exists. Arguing that the limit exists in relation to thresholds of change, they 
write: "[T]he limit designates the penultimate marking a necessary re-beginning, and the threshold 
the ultimate marking an inevitable change" (2004:484). 
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thing when I came to a room full of thirty other trans guys and realised you 
know, they are real, this is possible. For me FTM was so amazing that way 
because there were people going through every different stage. And I 
remember during the evening Hugh Armstrong came in and I thought what's 
this man doing in this space, and realising that he was trans. So I think that's 
when it started. 
Gary has two different thresholds to determine the beginning of his transition; when 
his mother died and he was able to think about transitioning without fear of her 
disapproval, and when he met other trans men and started to take seriously the 
possibility of transitioning. It could be argued that understanding these thresholds in 
relation to the series they separate is crucial to understanding his becoming FTM, 
because both thresholds 'tell' how change made sense in relation to the impact of 
certain events in Gary's life. However, importantly, the marginal evaluative criterion 
through which he established limits and interruptions was also his 'invitation' to 
change. In this representative passage, Gary needed to 'gain' awareness before he could 
transition, because prior to that he could not face difference positively and he could not 
think of his own future as a man if that would entail his mother's rejection. In this way, 
transition was enabled once he passed the thresholds of his mother's death and of 
meeting other trans men. These arbitrary and contextual thresholds were not just 
milestones of change, but his cue to go forward. These thresholds are points of the 
inflection through which he defines his transition as 'his own' and 'unique' becoming, 
and thus the beginning of transition is passing those thresholds, which at once become 
the markers and part of the effects of change. 
As we have seen in the previous subsection, anthropology's analytic reading of ritual 
practice situates recognition and marginal evaluation at the core of the definitions of 
process. For example, as I have described above, readings of ritual suggest that these 
'recognitions' are often performed through specific symbolisations that effectively 
become the markers of process by delimiting a series of binary oppositions such as self! 
world, foreign/domestic, sacred/profane distinctions, thus laying the course of action 
by structuring behaviour in semiotic and symbolic chains. Ritualisation thus explains 
process through symbols and the way in which they convey relevance in many 
different ways. Similarly, in transition, ritualisations, marks and identifications condense 
manifold meanings and through these markers explain process and change. Consider 
this passage where Lewis speaks about the ambivalence of the feeling of arrival: 
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I mean, it depends what stage, which arrival you are talking about really I 
suppose, isn't it? I've arrived at a stage where I am a hell of a lot happier than I 
was, although then I didn't really notice that I wasn't very happy. It's funny 
that, cause I think when you are in your twenties, you don't really know 
yourself anyway, which I think it's quite interesting just how many people 
decide to transition in their thirties, actually. I mean, I did really, mid-thirties 
was when I really realised it. Most people in their twenties are just all over the 
place, they don't really know what to do with their lives, or what they are, who 
they are, who they like. Not a very good time I don't think the twenties ... 
(laughs). I think in the thirties is where you really start thinking, you know, 
finding out what you like and what you don't like, and then life gets better from 
then on. But I mean I am forty-two now, and I really realised in my early 
thirties, 31-32, but if you think about it, actually... but then you see, I was 
going to say actually taking steps, but psychologically I was already taking steps 
because I started to tell friends, or, prospective potential lovers that I was a 
male-identified lesbian, that's what I used to say, or dyke, male-identified dyke. 
So they knew where I was coming from, you know, that I felt more 
comfortable in that role. Which was funny sometimes to them because I didn't 
when I appeared female, I didn't actually come across as a masculine person 
visually very much, 'cause I didn't really like the butch image, I didn't really like 
the androgynous image. But so, and I felt, you know, what shall I say? I think 
that they were sometimes surprised, but they usually accepted it. 
Lewis distinguishes between several levels of passing in this excerpt, including the 
distinctions that age, as well as previous identifications and belonging, had in passing in 
transition. Passing the threshold between his twenties where he was "all over the 
place", and his thirties, when life started getting better because he knew how he wanted 
to live is both an invitation to change and a marker of process, and delimits different 
qualitative states in which sex and gender, his presentation in erotic relationships and 
the way that he related to 'butch' and lesbian cultures were symbolic and semiotic ways 
of articulating his becoming 'male' in transition. This excerpt shows that passing that 
threshold was contextual ("it depends which arrival you are talking about really") and 
that it happens at different levels, rather than only at one meta-level of the 
'naturalisation' of a binary gender role. In this way, passing is a structural device 
through which to make sense of experience in terms of continuities and interruptions, 
differences and variations. In the next section I will argue that this kind of passing has 
implications for understanding time, as thresholds are the temporal structure of 
experience. I will then discuss how transition is made sense of as variations that are 
measured through passing thresholds, determining the coextensivity of change, time 
and experience. 
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7.4 Becoming temporal 
In his Anthropology of Time, Gell (1996) navigates the work of anthropologists and their 
descriptions of temporal models and frameworks of time. Following a range of 
examples of various practices, rituals and experiments, he analyses the emergence of two 
parallel time systems, which he groups into a and b series (1992:157) and which 
account for what he understands as two different 'dimensions' of time - one objective 
and with clear distinctions between before and after, the other subjective and 
contingent to becoming and change. This model was developed from ethnographic 
accounts where certain symbolic configurations are understood as thresholds that mark 
distinct stages in the cultural chronographies that structure individual and social life. 
However, this clear-cut distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' temporal 
dimensions assumes that differences in temporality only 'matter' at the scale of the 
individual and of bound collective totalities, and practice, so Gell argues in the last part 
of the book, results from a series of exchanges between the two. This framework helps 
Gell to elaborate a pertinent critique of the assumptions made by different theories of 
progress, including economics and cognitive theory, and to propose important 
theoretical foundations for anthropological approaches to time. However, Gell does not 
fully relate time and experience in his analysis, where 'objective' and 'subjective' 
temporal dimensions refer primarily to different human modes of observation of time, 
but not necessarily to other levels of change and becoming. 
As limits of the endurance of systems and invitations to go forward, thresholds make 
experience divisible, atomic and epochal. In producing exchange between spheres, 
orders and experiential universes, thresholds are more than staged discontinuities, 
because they effectively structure time in different durations117 . A duration here, as 
Whitehead suggests, is the field of any given event, and as such it is the link between 
experience and a given standpoint. In other words, as the actualisation of any perceiving 
117 The notion of duration was developed by philosophers of process as a way of challenging linear 
conceptions of time (Bergson 1911, 1942; Whitehead 1938, 1978). Whitehead defines duration as 
the extension of time, the field of the event. 
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entityl18, time is dependent on position. My infonnants talked about different kinds of 
time in transition, associated with different becomings. For example, in the previous 
section Lewis emphasised that progress and movement depend on the "kind of arrival 
you are talking about", and Gary set the "beginning" of his journey in the thresholds 
after which he could focus on his future differently once he made sense of particular 
relevant issues of his past, and, as we have seen in the previous section, he situated 
transition thresholds in his mother's death and his meeting of other trans people. In the 
following passage he expands on the characterisation of the beginning of his transition 
by describing transition as a type of 'rebirth' that ensued a particularly difficult situation; 
that of having been entangled in intense and progressive isolation and the frustration of 
not being able to move on. The implosion of transition in his life changed his social 
sphere, his relation with his body and the things he thought were relevant. He said that 
transition should be about "personal timing" or, in other words, about articulating the 
things that matter at a particular point to someone, and not only about fulfilling the 
linear requirements of an abstract model of time posed by, in this case, medical 
protocols of treatment: 
I guess if I date it from the beginning, to realise with my therapist and I've been 
really ... I mean my therapist has been really amazing because he wasn't, I was 
one of the first trans people he'd ever worked with, and he is a very good 
therapist, and he was very good at just helping me to think about it and figure it 
out and I could tell him what I'd learnt and we could talk about it, so I think 
the first bit, when I first realised I was trans I was devastated. I just thought God, 
I'm totally fucked now, that's it. It was at the same time as being ... I had 
enough, I just couldn't deal with living the way I had been, and I got to a place 
that was quite isolated again, so ... it was a crisis point. I realise now that other 
people seem to reach that point as well, especially those of us who are older, 
having been struggling with something going wrong for a long time, and I think 
there just comes a time where your unconscious kind of says oh for Christ's 
sake, notice this. So there was ... Because I had been ready for I think, closer to it 
than I had ever been before, I'm talking about committing suicide, I think 
realising that there was a choice, that I had a choice if I was brave enough to 
take it ... it was really exhilarating to think about taking the choice. 
Here, transition is envisaged as a way out of a state where things were wrong, and the 
decision to change is precisely what changes the sequence of 'wrong' events in 
118 I want to emphasise that all entities perceive. For Whitehead, experience is 'prehension', and all 
actual entities, including the experiencing subject, arise from the environment(s) in which they feel. 
He writes: "The things which are grasped into a realised unity, here and now, are not the castle, the 
cloud, and the planet simply in themselves; but they are the castle, the cloud and the planet from the 
standpoint, in space and time, of the prehensive unification. In other words, it is the perspective of 
the castle over there from the standpoint of the unification here. It is, therefore, aspects of the castle, 
the cloud, and the planet which are grasped into a unity here" (Whitehead 1938: 87). 
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announcing the immediacy of change. For Gary, this process was effected when he 
decided not to ignore what was 'wrong' anymore, with his realisation that "there was a 
choice" and that he was actually "brave enough to take it". This realisation is the 
threshold after which the past is ascribed a different value, and after which he has 
'already' changed the wrong sequence. In this sense the threshold brings time into 
existence - it is the becoming temporal (the temporal extension) of subjectivisation. 
With this determination to do something to change, there is a change of duration that 
collapses the sequence of events that he previously ascribed to his past, present and 
future in his narrative, and the very prospect of "taking that choice" becomes 
"exhilarating". He continues: 
To do it and to transition ... and I'm not a brave person, like I said I come from 
a really conservative background, so I hadn't had any role models before, I 
hadn't met another trans person before I went to FTM London. That was like, 
to give myself permission to take that risk, that was like really big for me. And I 
was on a high for ages and Matt, Walter and stuff were great because I was able 
to go and visit and talk to them, 'cause I just needed to find out really, really 
fast. And because it felt like all these years had been dead, and you know, I 
hadn't got any time to mess around. And thank goodness for Dr. Atkinson, 
because there is no way I could have gone through the NHS system. You now 
have somebody say "Okay, prove it" or anything like that. You know it was 
what I needed to do at the time and I was quite happy to take responsibility for 
it. You know, it was like do this or die sort of thing. So, the first FTM London 
meeting I went to was the beginning of August. And I had my first, I went to 
see Atkinson in September and had my first T injection in October. So the time 
gap between meeting the first trans person and starting on T was quite small, 
but I put a lot of talking into that. A lot of research, a lot of reading, a whole 
summer. 
In this second part of the passage, he describes the process of "giving [himselfj 
permission" to start transitioning, both by visiting a private doctor and by taking the 
risk of meeting other trans people and engaging in their activities. And between two 
chosen milestones (which he identifies as the first visit to the doctor, and the first T 
injection) time did not have the same productive value as it used to in the past. In a 
relatively short period of time, Gary says, a lot of things happened. A lot of changes 
caused by talking, researching, reading, meeting people. This period lasted "a whole 
summer", but this expression denotes more than the succession of days between the 
two border events that he situates at the beginning and end of this period. Gary is 
thinking about time as an intensive state, which changed in intensity as changes 
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happened, rather than a linear extension where these changes developed and where 
time has space-like characteristics in that it is the 'container' of experience. He added: 
And I think the high kind of lasted, because then testosterone kicks in so fast 
that's amazing. And again the timing was really good because Peter Green was 
running the voice classes and I managed to get in. So I went to the first class 
with him two weeks after my first injection. So that meant that I had more 
social time with trans guys as well, so we were meeting every week and there 
was like six of us and we'd go to the pub afterwards, so it was really good. And 
it kind of encouraged me to get involved in FTM London, so my social life 
took off and I made friends with people like Raphael and Steve. So I had friends 
in my life for the first time in ages and ages. So that first 15 months I was in a 
continuous high, I think. Because my body was doing everything I wanted it to 
do. So my running took off, I mean it was a totally different experience. I mean 
I've always enjoyed running, but it had been really hard work to get to a point 
of ecstasy. Whereas now, even when I've been sick I can get back to it in like 
three or four runs, you know, my body is totally different. And running up hills 
is a pleasure now, I'm always sad to have to run down them again to have the 
chance to run back up them. And cycling is just fantastic and hills are not a 
problem and I can cycle down to London several times a week, when before it 
used to kill me, you know, I just wasn't strong enough to do it before. And 
because of that I could eat whatever I wanted so you know ... I still have 
problems with food sometimes but because I was exercising so much food just 
wasn't an issue at all. Like everything is great. 
For the next fifteen months, he is "on a high", meeting people, getting involved in the 
trans community, doing "everything that [he] wanted to do". He discovered he had 
more energy to do the things he "just wasn't strong enough to do before", and because 
of that there was a shift in the ways in which he articulated past problems and events. In 
this narrative, change perceived as 'outside' and change lived within are coextensive 
and represented verbally as permeable interrelated dimensions; everything became 
'different' when change brought new assemblages into experience. He noticed bodily 
changes when exercising and eating, joined voice workshops and became active in 
FTM London. Being conscious of change provoked a doubling of that experience of 
change, where time is understood as itself productive of the change represented in 
narrative. In this way, his experience of reality is process, and through experience time 
is reorganised and rearticulated entirely in relation to the different dimensions and 
universes that are opened up by this progressive change of capacity. He concludes: 
I thought I was going to have chest surgery straight away but actually it ended 
up taking me like fifteen months from when I started on the T, but that's just 
my timing I think, I was really scared about the whole... I mean I was quite 
scared about starting the hormones but I think the extra thing of surgery, of 
somebody actually cutting your body and having no control of what the results 
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were going to be like I found that really frightening. And I think that's one of 
the reasons why I decided to go to Belgium in the end because it gave me that 
extra breathing space because I knew that they'd give me a date which was 
some time in the future. And when I actually went to have it, it was the right 
time. So that's often what I say to people personal timing is really important and you 
should really trust it. And even if it takes you far longer than you think you need, 
that's the amount of time you need. But also if you need to move fast you need 
to do that as well, and if it means that you need to borrow some money to do 
it, then maybe that's the right thing to do. But I think there's also been like, 
there's something about for the first time really, really taking responsibility for 
myself as well, and that's kind of reinforced every time that I inject, 'cause I self-
inject, every time I do it feels kind of, repeats that action, that this life that I am 
living now is totally up to me and there's nobody else to blame. And ifI fuck it 
up then that's me, it's not about Mum, it's not about my parents, it's not about 
my family, you know, it's just me. And that's such a relief, you don't have to ... 
You know, there isn't anyone else to blame, there isn't any blame, it's just 
decisions I make. 
In this thorough account of transition, Gary talks about time essentially as 
'experience' (as durations), by situating passage and transition in the effect of 
experiential assemblages, change and continuity. He describes his process through the 
things that mattered in different stages of his process, his fear of hormonal therapy, the 
time he needed in order to have chest surgery, and the time he needed in order to feel 
"it was the right time". His remark on the importance of "personal timing" at the end 
of the passage indicates how time is not understood as a quantitative mode of ordering, 
but rather as the arrival of the things that need to happen in order that transition can 
take effect, and these are not only different in every transition, but different in its 
different stages. Time is thus experience because it is a mode of engagement, a 
becoming of heterogeneous assemblages. 
7.5 Variation 
In the prevlOus sections I illustrated that in my informants' narratives of transition 
change and time are understood as coextensive with experience. One of the 
consequences of this association is that movement, and the differential relations through 
which it is measured, can no longer be considered 'in itself, because it is first and 
foremost a relation between states - a variation which comprises a qualitative change 
and an interruption in perception. It is this interruption in perception where certain 
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differentials define movement in relation to what is at rest. In the example above, Gary 
described his change in terms of getting to "surpass" a state of isolation and become 
more and more immersed in social networks, physical exercise, reading, hormonal 
treatment and surgery. His suggestion that it is important to follow one's timing, 
understand one's process and take responsibility for its development indicates that, 
albeit the definition of what counts as a duration is variable, even perhaps arbitrary, the 
structure of how change is perceived follows a double dimension of location and 
abstraction. In this sense, change is understood as a derivation from one state to another 
and involves space, matter and extensivity, and also, as we have seen, the establishment 
of the relations of seriality or relevance, such as the sharing of a quality, a bond or a 
mark of similarity. 
In this section I depart from similar concerns in thinking of transition as process, and 
revisit some of my informants' remarks on transition as 'becoming specific' in order to 
layout some of the relations they understood to shape their processes. I will begin by 
discussing another excerpt from David's narrative, where he identifies some of the limits 
and effects of transition and the ways in which these limits informed his understanding 
of transition both as a route and a derivation. In fact, at the time of our interview he 
defined his being trans in relation to "not being a butch woman". When he decided on 
transitioning this distinction between butch women and trans men seemed very 
important, because identifYing as trans provided new arrangements for some pre-
transitional identifications (meanings, desires and 'natural urges', he named them) that 
could have led him to be otherwise. Thus transition, instead of being thought as change 
and discontinuity, generated continuity with pre-transitional feelings and identifications 
with masculinity and the possibility of constructing those identifications in new and 
more positive assemblages. He said: 
But it's like the more time goes on, the more I appreciate that it is okay to be 
me. Some days I am really camp, and other days I might be really like [male] 
blokey bloke. But it's interesting though because I think from a very early age I 
just wanted to do typically male activities. But then as I was growing up, I 
realised I was really attracted to females, I was female bodied, there was a label 
for that, and I was trying to be that. And there was a whole like, I was actually 
trying to be that just didn't ... So any of these ... these natural urges that I had 
that kind of made me have this really short hair or wear certain clothes, I 
wouldn't do it, 'cause I didn't want to look like a butch woman. For me, it just 
didn't feel well. So it was a part of me, just dressing, and it's been really allowing 
myself to be me, the way I always wanted to. It's okay. And now I see a gender 
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counsellor, a couple of years ago and she was like, I'm sure you've got lots of 
suits, and I was like no I have not. And I was like 'cause that would make me 
look like a butch woman and that's not how I want to be seen, that's not what I 
am, you know. So just allowing myself And also being mindful of other people 
as well, like my family, it's like I know, I don't think they'll ever disown me, 
there have been a number of things all over the years. I thought this might be 
the one, but no, they are still there. My mum is having a bit of a difficulty to 
accept but it's like trying to be mindful of them. I know that I am changing but 
there is not a reaction to the changes. One of my sisters, she is like getting 
deeper and deeper, and when I see her, she is like "Oh my God, you have really 
chunked out". But like my mum won't say anything about it, which is quite 
interesting, really. 'Cause then I'll never know if that's a good thing or a bad 
thing. 
In this passage, David says that he was attracted to "typically male activities" from a 
very early age, but that he refrained from following these "natural urges" in order not 
to be read as a butch woman. Later, in therapy, he corrected his therapist'S assumptions 
that he would have been a cross-dresser pre-transition, stressing that being 'himself was 
precisely not to do with not having other forms of continuity with masculinity and 
male embodiment. Throughout the passage, David defines transition as "allowing" 
these continuities to develop and to see the limits change in the different stages of this 
process. These limits changed post-transition to a new need to be "mindful of others", 
which is obvious, for example, in that he remains silent before his mother's silence, and 
that he prefers not to know "if that's a good thing or a bad thing". These limits are 
crucial points of analysis in considering how agency is thought of and lived through 
experiencing change. David's narrative shows that the specificity of transition does not 
reside in the sum of phenomena articulated within it, but in that this articulation 
provides new 'matters' of different constitution, new events and enduring patterns. 
These emergent and shifting assemblages generate at the same time a mode of 
becoming and a new mode of engagement, and have effects at different levels including 
the body, the development of relations with others, capacities and effects in the present, 
and expectations about the future. David said explicitly that the rules of embodying 
gender are different as he occupies different places and that those places are not entirely 
independent, but work together in specific ways. They have different limits as he passes 
certain thresholds and as he considers the particulars of his experience in relation to the 
multilayered nature of his experience of sex and gender. 
218 
In a similar way, John talked in our interview about passing and the ways in which 
gender performance encountered limits outside transition: 
I think well, it depends on the person ... I think passing is a question of who 
you have in front, basically. If that person wants to see you as a girl he will see 
you as a girl, and if he doesn't then he doesn't. And yes, I can do certain things 
to pass, but it's mostly about who you have in front. My Spanish grandma has 
seen me with boxer shorts, with hairs on my legs and with short hair and she 
still treats me as a girl, because she wants to see me as a girl, because I never 
explained anything about me being a boy. So it's just... and I think also is easier 
to pass at my age, because you can still be fifteen. It's like that, when I'm forty I 
won't pass ... Not unless I do a treatment, I think it's more a question of that, 
because I'm in that age where I can still be fifteen. I go to a bar outside my 
house and I go and buy tobacco, and twice I've gone and both time the man 
said, are you of age? And I said, "Do you want me to show you my ID?" And 
it's like, I think the first time was like, "No, no, it's okay, I'm letting you get 
tobacco although I know you are not ... " and then the second time I showed 
him my ID and he went, "Are you sure this is you?" And I said "Yes, yes". And 
the day that I went to get my new ID card, I went with the old one, and there 
was a photo from a few years ago, but I mean, it's still me, you can still tell. So I 
go up to the desk and I show myoId ID card. And she says, "Is this you?" I 
said, "Yes". And she looked at the name, she looked at the gender, she looked 
at the photo, everything, and said, "Are you sure this is you?" "Well, yes, I am 
quite sure". So yeah, I have a bit of a problem with that. I think I have more 
problems now that I've come back from hyper masculinity also, because I don't 
mind about, I do control myself more in certain situations, but not usually, and 
people can speculate more. I think it depends on the day, and depends on the 
way that people make you feel during the day. And if you are more sensitive to 
that or not. 
In this first half of the extract, John takes his experience of passing as a starting point to 
explain how he negotiates his masculinity. He recounts how in different settings this 
negotiation is different, and how even in a single setting, it still "depends on the day", 
on how situations make you feel and on the assemblage between existential universes 
and the symbolic 'background' with which other people read behaviours, clothes, age, 
and intentions. In the first half of this passage he frames this negotiation in 
intersubjective meanings, but progresses by identifying the regulatory forms that limit 
his masculinity, such as kinship (his relation with his grandmother), age and certain 
readings of gender in relation to age in the context of biopoliticallimits of agency (as 
when buying tobacco or renewing his identity card). In this respect, as he points out, 
context plays an important role in how gender is read, enabled and restrained, and 
therefore in the ways in which the negotiation of gender takes place. These contextual 
variables are not only manifold, but evolve from one configuration to another as they 
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are articulated in different assemblages. In this sense, when he talks about the limits of 
passing (somebody's strong ideas, as were his grandmother's, about his identity as a 
'woman', or the uncertainty of not knowing whether he will pass when he is forty), he 
is not only pointing out the limits of transition changes, but also identifYing the extent 
to which becoming is contingent to the possibility of negotiating situations. In this 
sense, agency determines the specificity of his mode of becoming. He continues: 
Because if I'm okay, if I'm feeling okay, the last thing I want to do is take 
hormones, it's the last thing I want to do. But ifI have a really bad day I'm like 
I have to take them now. I had the same problem, Peter said to me, well, I 
know I can ask Peter to get me more hormones, because he can get as many as 
he wants, and he doesn't use the entire dose. So I could take his gel and since 
I've known him he has offered. And I just don't want to know anything about 
it yet. I think once I had a conversation with Peter, we were talking about if 
when we are forty years old wearing a binder after so many years could be a 
problem, and talking about the possibility of having surgery, chest surgery. And 
I realised that I don't know, I don't know what can happen in 30 years but I 
feel like I really don't want to do chest surgery or any kind of surgery but it is 
totally what people make me feel, I mean. I don't want to do chest surgery 
because I have a trauma from going to the beach, for example. I want to be able 
to leave that trauma behind and then if I really feel like it, then do it, but right 
now I feel that I wouldn't want to do it anyway. 
In this second part of the passage, John rethinks in the limits of agency by turning to 
the way in which he lives his gender in the narrative present, which is presented as 
crucially different from, albeit to an extent related to, the way in which he used to live 
it in the narrative past. For a trans person whose transition did not involve hormonal 
or surgical input, this could be understood as an unusual tum, because, in a way, he is 
already 'coming back' when he still has not 'arrived' physically, and when, moreover, 
he has had the chance to do it both within the medical system and outside and yet has 
chosen not to. In fact, he states that his way of subverting gender was to negotiate his 
femininity as a trans man. In his narrative this process is understood as the negotiation 
of hypermasculinity and as a need to resist the social pressure that compels him to do 
it. For example, he says that before undergoing surgery he wants to be able to deal 
with his trauma and be able to undress in public, instead of thinking about surgical/ 
hormonal transition as the only way in which he would be able to overcome it. 
John introduces a crucial element into his discussion of agency in relation to transition 
changes, for, once he could 'hide' behind a structured gender performance skilfully 
built in many social spaces - family, circle of friends, workplace, university - now his 
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attention is no longer fixed on the performance of gender, but, rather, on the rest of the 
day's contingencies that make one have a good or a bad day. These events are at the 
very least multilayered and are essentially about "crossing domains" (Strathem 1991). 
They involve complex experiential constellations, which, although limited by culturally 
and historically specific practices, norms and trajectories, emerge as inventions and 
responses by which people become simultaneously subjects, actors, citizens, lovers, trans 
entities, genders, grandsons, etc., and entangle these relations and connections in ways 
that exceed categorisation. The limits of agency or, in other words, the tension 
between the enablements and constraints of transition, lie precisely in the multiplicity of 
experiential assemblages and in the fact that they refer to each other in unexpected and 
meaningful ways. In this sense, every one of these acts makes a significant difference 
beyond the conditions of social acceptability that validate those acts with respect to 
their own past (other contexts in which that same act was articulated differently or its 
process of iterability), because it is no longer about becoming abstract or establishing a 
relationship with abstractive or normative apparatuses, but rather about the complex 
and multilayered process of becoming specific. John summarised it when he mentioned 
that, precisely because he has a trauma from going to the beach, he wants to be able to 
leave it behind before taking any decision about his chest and not the other way 
around, so that chest surgery becomes a new production, a connective operation rather 
than simply the limit of his female embodiment or an act designed to convey 
consistency to his 'identity' as trans or male. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The ritual structure of rites of passage defines thresholds in relation to ritualised and 
staged ways in which different cultural systems mark ingression in different life stages. In 
doing so, these models abridge change, time and experience, and offer a reading of 
social relations in terms of process. Ethnomethodological approaches to gender in terms 
of ascription similarly place thresholds of meaning as significant in terms of 
'constructing' gender through bodily changes, signs, symbols, and behaviours. 
However, in these models 'a lifetime' remains the unit of analysis of process, and 
change is understood in terms of a 'modification' or a 'transformation'. In this chapter I 
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have discussed the significance of thresholds in transition narratives and the ways in 
which they make transition temporal. This temporalisation is not necessarily linear; 
thresholds mark discontinuities, differences and variations that happen at different scales, 
and span over different kinds of experience. I have argued that time in transition is 
becoming FTM, and not the 'container' or the substance in which transition events 
develop. In this sense, time makes experience 'irreversible', a route of becoming. 
Furthermore, thresholds raise interesting questions about emergence in relation to the 
different kinds of negotiations it entails, because they involve positions, enablements 
and limits. 
In the narratives of my informants, however, change often represents a break of 
continuity that makes the structure of lifetime vs. event unnecessary and questionable, 
and therefore challenges a linear conception of time. This is because, first, change 
provides a new standpoint and every change marks a new beginning, a station of 
experience in a new time-space. In this way, one's becoming is coextensive with other 
becomings, and yet, as Whitehead suggests, one's becoming makes time divisible, as 
change is perceived in different scales and durations. Moreover, very often my 
informants thought of transition not as an end in itself but as the rest of their lives. It is 
in this sense that this thesis focuses on transitioning rather than transition, and intends to 
convey in its structure and analytic ethos the ways in which people thought about 
becoming men, FTM, transboys or transmen as verbs rather than nouns: 
I've never had a strong sense of not enjoying my body, so it wasn't a reaction 
against anything, it was more about how I wanted to live and how my body 
would facilitate that I suppose. So I guess once I made the decision that living as 
a girl was one thing, and living as a man was another choice. I think a clear 
thing for me is that I never said I want to be a man, I said I want to live as one. 
Just political and different ways, and quite difficult ways, ways that happen to 
have a lot of criticism and I am happy about that. So I think it's been about 
making my body something that I was going to enjoy rather than I wasn't 
enjoying it already. So already had six out of ten, and I wanted ten out of ten, I 
think. I've been thinking about that, I suppose for me it wasn't about physical 
change, but about how I was in the world, I think. Cause it wasn't ... I think for 
a lot of people when they transition it's about passing, and that wasn't an issue 
for me, I could pass. So my body wasn't a barrier in that sense either. 
In this passage, Chris makes clear that his transition wasn't about becoming something 
prescribed, it wasn't about 'being' a man, or passing - it was about "living". It is in this 
way that transition is an event that can only be defined in terms of its own past and its 
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future, and through the enduring patterns of continuity and change that it articulates in 
becoming. This thesis argued that the categories used to define it and to constrict it to a 
predictable and systematic process fail to account for the complexity of people's 
engagement with change, with the different kinds of entities that are relevant to their 
becoming and which include people, relations, objects, concepts, their shifting positions 
and assemblages. 
This chapter concludes part II of the thesis, in which I have unpacked the process of 
transitioning in three different levels: testosterone, narrative and thresholds. In the next 
chapter I analyse how, despite addressing the experience of FTM transition similarly, 
the arguments presented in this part are different in scale and scope, although they 
implicate each other in many ways. I will explore the different kinds of negotiations 
that emerge from transitioning as a process, as well as the limits of transition experience, 
which will culminate in an evaluation of the consequences of the analysis I carried out 
in the thesis. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
This chapter examines the scope of different analytic units in the thesis and discuss some 
of the implications derived from the arguments proposed. The chapter is divided into 
two sections. In the first, I address the similar analytic positions developed in the 
different chapters and parts, and explicate how, rather than contrasting theories, the two 
main parts of the thesis engage with different yet complementary dimensions of 
transition. The three arguments in Part II are not intended to be read as exclusive of 
other dimensions of transitioning, and even less as an analytic alternative to the models 
of transition discussed in Part I. Rather, the analytic structure of the thesis, itself the 
result of ethical decisions, is intended as a metaloguel19 to the discussions introduced 
therein. The second section addresses briefly some analytical implications of the thesis 
to contextualise the position of the different chapters in relation to different kinds or 
levels of transition experience120 , and discuss the implications of their connection for 
the practice of anthropological research. 
8.1 Transition units 
Throughout the thesis I discussed transition in two different parts. Part I focused on the 
'coordinates' through which existing discourses about experience, gender, health and 
the body define transition. I described different academic and medical practices that 
make transsexuality and transition public, and reviewed the history of the different 
concepts, logics and relations that make transition ingredient in western biomedical and 
legal narratives. 
119 I am using Gregory Bateson's (2000:2) expression about the contribution of a conversation's 
structure to its general themes or subjects, to note that the thesis' structure is relevant to the subject 
it addresses, and, in this case, contributes to the argument it makes. 
120 I use the notion of experience not in the sense given by the phenomenological tradition (Husserl 
1980; Heiddeger 1962; Merleau-Ponty 2002), in that it is not anchored in the development of a 
unitary subjectivity, but rather, as will become clearer later on in this chapter, stems from different 
kinds of becoming, not necessarily only human. Thus I use experience more in the sense given by 
empiricists (Whitehead 1978; James 2003), where experience is not necessarily tied to human 
perception. 
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In Chapter 2 I outlined the emergence of transgender studies and discussed different 
kinds of contributions that displaced transition from the diagnostic and prognostic 
narratives of biomedicine. This transdiciplinary field contested biomedical and scientific 
definitions of transition and transsexual identity, emphasising aspects of transitioning 
hitherto overlooked by discourses of trans sexuality, and opening spaces for new 
emergent transgender cultures. While geographies of trans activism undergo important 
changes that affect the ways in which trans people are able to participate in politics, a 
number of assumptions about the medical management of transsexuality have recently 
become the subject of arduous debate, such as the status of transsexuality as a mental 
health disorder, and the double bind implied by the association of legal and biomedical 
frameworks of transsexuality121. On the one hand the kind of politics through which 
trans organisations strive for the recognition of trans identity (which includes, but is not 
restricted to, human and civil rights and forms of distributive justice) emphasise the 
unity and the specificity of transsexual identity versus 'other' sex and gender 
positions122 . This framework ensured civil recognition for transsexual people in the 
United Kingdom, and became influential for policy making at a European level and 
elsewhere. It also benefitted transsexual people in more subtle ways, for instance, by 
facilitating mobility across national boundaries, as a result of which trans patients can 
currently consider treatment options not only in relation to local availability, but in 
relation to a variety of technical aspects and their desired results. Usually these options 
depend on private insurances or self-funding, however, some of the trans men I 
interviewed had found ways to get the NHS to fund their surgeries abroad123 . 
121 I am referring to the double tension currently being faced by practitioners and trans people 
before the forthcoming revision of the DSM. If, as grassroots organisations across North America 
and Europe contend, transsexuality should be declassified, then this deregulation implies a risk for 
the provision of free treatment for trans patients. 
122 As evinced, for example, in the reaction of some collectives to the latest Equality Bill (published 
on April 27th 2009), where transsexuality is not defined exclusively in clinical terms, and where 
people seeking reassignment, those living permanently in their new gender roles, and those 
providing protection in the workplace for someone who is transsexual or living in a new gender 
role, are protected in the same terms. The inclusion of a wider spectrum of gender minorities, 
proposed in this version of the Bill, was seen as curtailing UK transsexuality policy, where 
distinctions of age and other identity particulars were subject to distinctive policies. 
123 Especially in phalloplasties, being able to choose a particular practitioner has many important 
consequences, as results are very different aesthetically, in terms of sensitivity, and importantly in 
terms of technique. Results are particularly associated with surgeon teams, and whereas in the 
United Kingdom genital surgeries are performed in three stages with good results, Belgium currently 
offers phalloplasties in one single surgical intervention. 
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However, on the other hand, coalitions between trans and other Lesbian, Gay and 
Bisexual politics, as we have seen, are also sometimes understood as an enablement, 
rather than a limit to trans politics, and in fact it has been argued that the political 
association of gender identity and sexuality fostered the viability of transsexual and 
transgender politics since Stonewall (see Stryker 2008). In fact, the tension between the 
politics of gender and the politics of sexuality is complicated further as trans activists 
within grassroots community groups and organisations reclaim visibility for queer trans 
people (see for instance N ataf 1996; Cromwell 2006; Hines 2007), an identity that was 
largely denied in medical models of transsexuality, while mainstream organisations in 
the United Kingdom (such as Press for Change or the Gender Trust) emphasise the 
separation between gender and sexuality as two different kinds of politics. These groups 
lobby for maintaining the specificity of transsexual politics around facilitating access to 
medical treatments and civil recognition, thus focusing on trans people's social 
integration as members of their gender of choice. Others however understand the 
politics of transition above and beyond civil recognition, and situate sexuality and 
gender politics at the core of their critical political project. In both cases a kind of 
identity politics is at play, where people's identity as transsexual (understood in medical 
or symbolic terms, and often as a combination of both) is at the core of the definition of 
transition as political, and of the claims about the authenticity of transsexual and FTM 
identity. 
In Chapter 3 I argued that the logic of gender reassignment that underpins the medical 
model of transition in Britain is informed by a historical emphasis in sexology on the 
distinction between sex and gender, a distinction that also became important in analytic 
practices outside medicine as paradigmatic of the relation between nature and culture. 
The evolution of this distinction in the context of shifting forms of medical 
classification, diagnostic practices, and clinical and prognostic expertise remains crucial 
in the current model of triadic treatment, the Standards of Care of Gender Identity 
Disorders. 
Policy making organisations use this model based on psychiatric classification ad on 
prognostic gradations that depend on age and the intensity of the symptoms to regulate 
the provision of care for transgender patients in the United States, Britain, and many 
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more countries worldwide. The protocol of gender reassignment effectively regulates 
the provision of care in private and public settings, even though its different 
requirements can be sometimes bypassed in order to accommodate patients' needs124. 
This protocol in fact delineates the medical routes that most trans people use to 
transition, albeit to different extents. It shapes the clinical relation, enabling the 
negotiation of speed, intensity and reversibility in treatment. But, most importantly, it 
lays out explicitly the connections between biomedical and political, legal and 
theoretical frameworks of transsexuality, where the Standards of Care, initially devised 
to protect transgender patients, are now the link between physical and social transition. 
Whereas the Standards have improved access to medical care and facilitated trans 
people's struggle for human and civil rights, the universality of the protocol gives 
viability - and visibility - only to male and female sex/genders, leaving other forms of 
transition and gender expression unprotected. In some instances, the universality of the 
Standards has been understood to contravene specific priorities of national health 
services, and specific regulations have been set at national levels. 
In this way, Chapter 3 unpacked the relation between different concepts currently 
associated with treatment developed by communities of practice of transgender health. I 
connected the historical development of the sex/gender distinction in sexology to the 
distinction of treatment stages, where 'sex' is understood to be ultimately produced 
through surgery and 'gender' by prolonged hormonal treatment. In sexology as in 
current biomedical practice, sex and gender, the body-matter and its social and cultural 
meanings, are in fact understood to be independent realms. The sex/gender distinction 
also informed much of the academic debate about experience throughout the twentieth 
century, generating important debates in social studies of kinship, the body, psychology, 
sex and gender that affected the ways in which transsexuality and transition became an 
object of analysis in the social sciences. However, the question about the relation 
between sex and gender was dramatically polarised in biomedicine and the social 
SCIences. In Chapter 4, I particularly focused on some challenges to this distinction 
developed within (post)feminist analyses of the body, and outlined their promise of 
124 However, not without consequence. In London, recently, private consultant and expert on 
transsexualism Russell Reid was found guilty of misconduct when five patients accused him of 
misdiagnosing their cases and rushing them into treatment. The majority of Reid's patients, 
however, were happy with his diagnostic requirements and chose to be treated by him precisely 
because of them. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/societyI2007 /mayI2S/ 
health.medicineandhealth2, last accessed August 2009. 
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radical critique and political subversion, but argued that, perhaps unwillingly, their 
attachment to sex and gender as analytic units reproduced the scope and centrality of 
the categories and distinctions they sought to transcend. Through notions developed 
within particular philosophical traditions, these discourses defined transition in terms of 
a particular formation of sexual identity and gendered subjectivity, and in particular in 
terms of the irreducibility of bodily matter and sexual meanings, and as an identity 
associated with political discourses of sex and sexuality. In this context, as we have seen, 
transitioning was understood to 'reify' or 'resist' dominant normative discourses of 
gender, because it was seen as a result of the action of different biological and cultural 
technologies. 
Thus the different' coordinates' of transition map onto each other and in fact form part 
of the same networks in which the practice of transition is distributed; these 
'coordinates' are relevant for trans people in many ways, and exist in the institutional, 
clinical, legal, political and representational practices. When put on a grid-like structure, 
these coordinates allow the 'measurement' of transition in linear and cumulative time, 
facilitating people's access to human and civil rights through demarcating the passage 
between the categories of malelfemale, liminal/ gendered, becoming in this way crucial 
reference points to navigate the multilayered social meanings associated with sex, 
gender and transition. 
The arguments contained in Part II of the thesis, however, did not address transition in 
the terms used by biomedicine, nor did it use the different categories and distinctions -
between transsexuality and transgenderism, or between transsexuality and transvestism -
emphasised by identity politics125 . The arguments introduced in this part, rather than 
being 'about' the participants in my research and their identity as transsexual, developed 
from a different analytic position, and explored the process of transitioning by making 
connections between different kinds of units. I discussed the different processes that the 
participants in my research considered important in the interviews they held with me in 
relation to specific positions (testosterone, narrative, thresholds), not all of which were 
structured around individual transitions or identities. In particular, I approached the 
125 Note that the distinction between these categories is also being questioned in recent clinical 
(Ekins and King 2006), ethnographic (Valentine 2007) and sociological (Hines 2007) studies of 
transition. 
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experience of transitioning through three arguments that implied different kinds, scales 
and temporalities. They combined trans politics, knowledge practices, individual stories 
and concerns about transition, and the relation that I established with my informants 
during fieldwork, in different 'units' of transition experience. I argued that, unlike 
categories, those units - or assemblages -, were in fact indivisible clusters of 
anthropological enquiry, and suggested that their analysis is key to understand 
transition. 
However, despite the fact that they need to be separated for analytic purposes, these 
different kinds of experience happen together in transition, and for this reason the three 
chapters contained in Part II were intended to be read cumulatively rather than linearly. 
I started Part II by examining the biomedical definition of testosterone as an isolable, 
quantifiable object whose function in the body is to produce 'gender', and discussed 
how, possibly as a result of endocrinology's experimental method, this view was 
established by correlating measured doses of T -substance and certain values of gendered 
experience. Thus I noted that hormonal action in gender reassignment treatments is 
conceptualised in relation to prognostic outcomes, measured in terms of biological 
effects, and linked with social changes associated with being (and becoming) male. 
Biomedical narratives present hormones as quantifiable and predictable' cures'126, whose 
function is to produce 'the opposite' sex and gender in the body, and to guarantee a 
timeline of transition changes through steady and periodical intake. However, the 
participants in my research highlighted not only that testosterone action was sometimes 
unpredictable, but also that the assemblages it created in their actual transitions 
extended over different levels of experience. Exploring their different experiences of T, 
I argued that testosterone is a relational agent that connects physical, psychological, 
legal, emotional, and aesthetic dimensions of transition, and that they are also 
connectors between the body and other, material and non-material environments. In 
Chapter 5 I analysed several contexts in which the molecule is ingredient, and that 
constitute its history as a route of actual occasions, from the 'discovery' of testosterone 
as a sexual agent to the industrial expansion of chemistry and the progressive inclusion 
of synthetic testosterone in narratives of care, wellbeing and enhancement, and again 
126 It is surprising that, whereas sex-specific hormone replacement therapies are administered widely 
(see, for instance, Hoberman 2005; Roberts 2007), the use of steroid hormones is so heavily 
regulated when it will have an effect on gender and sexual identity. 
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from the measurement practices that resulted in the conceptualisation of its 
masculinising potential to the evenings, the hairs and voice drops that were important 
or even life transforming in my informants' transitions. Those, I argued, are dimensions 
of the life of the molecule that demand a different thinking of experience and matter, 
causality and time, and by extension of identity, affect, context and relationality. 
In Chapter 6 I continued this exploration by addressing in a similar way the role of 
narrative in transition. In biomedical discourses and psychiatric practice, narrative is 
theorised as a 'symptom' of trans sexuality and considered a prerequisite to access 
treatment. I argued that the principles ascribed to narrative by structural and formalist 
analyses, and where narrative is understood to produce the unity of subjectivity, 
affected the ascription of value to transsexual narratives in clinical settings. Here the 
narratives of trans people are linked to particular diagnostic interpretations where 
narrative is understood as a symptom, as evidence of the truth of transsexuality. The 
right narrative is a precondition of a successful diagnosis, and thus some narratives about 
experience, such as having been 'born in the wrong body' or having a brain that 
doesn't match one's genitals are understood to be privileged expressions of 
transsexuality ('true transsexuality', Benjamin 1966), while other narratives are 
considered 'not serious' enough to represent transition by doctors and analysts alike (see 
Barrett 2007, and also Ekins and King 2006, especially the conclusion, c£ Gorton 
2005), and their value counts differently towards accessing treatment. It is in relation to 
this ideal identity that the universal triadic treatment protocol makes sense, where 
treatment is understood to mitigate certain pasts, and to produce particular narratives 
about the future. However, this structural analysis privileges a relation between 
narrative and identity, foreclosing the importance of context and reducing the value of 
narrative to its effects on the formation of subjectivity. Although this kind of 
interpretive analysis is widely deployed in discourses about identity in the context of 
democratic representation (and the 'radical' politics that contest them), those particular 
narrative interpretations legitimise problematic assumptions about the 'nature' of 
experience. Narrative thus becomes a privileged 'location' for both medicine and 
politics, because different stories are understood in their particular clinical, political and 
identity value. 
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One of the consequences of this reduction is that, mediated by narrative, identity 
becomes a product for consumption, an asset, a resource127. Narrative facilitates the 
development of political claims about transsexual identity, yet it also entails, I believe, 
the conversion of transition experience into abstract categories, reified in different 
contexts in the assumption that people participate in a readymade identity. Thus, my 
critical engagement with narrative was informed by a consideration of the effects 
levelling narrative and identity in transition, and of the limits of the performative in 
laying out relations between narrative and experience, which is especially critical 
because transition happens at different levels. This analytic position reflected that my 
informants' ideas of the 'value' of transition and why transitioning was worth doing 
were in fact extremely diverse, as were the kinds of contributions they thought their 
narratives about transition were making to my ethnographic narrative. For example, I 
noticed that some of the people I interviewed would often want to 'correct' what they 
had said before in the context of our interview, and others, conversely, situated their 
processes in some 'school'128 in order to frame their experience in existing regimes of 
knowledge production, so that I could better understand their contribution. The role of 
narrative in my informants' transitions was complex and multilayered, and the different 
ways that they engaged with narrative evinced not only that narrative does not exist 
independently of other domains in social life (Moore 1988), but that the relation 
between narrative and experience is complex and not always reducible to a structural 
model of enactment. It is my contention that the value my informants imagined their 
stories would have, which in part framed their motivations to share them with me, was 
the result of their engagement with existing knowledge practices, but was also the effect 
of the creativity of their bodies, their becoming-specific in transition meeting hope and 
social change. 
Far from being exclusive of biomedical/ clinical uses of narrative, the problem of the 
relation between narrative properties, action and history affected social analysis in the 
past decades, and became especially problematic after the 'cultural tum' across 
127 I mean resource in the sense that Ferry and Limbert specify in their introduction to Timely 
Assets: something generated (constructed) through human action for use in cultural worlds (2008:6). 
Identity, even if only partially material, becomes in a similar way dependent on naming practices, an 
act of appropriation and demarcation. 
128 Different 'schools', they said, believe that being trans is completely different things, and advocate 
either biological or social aetiologies of transsexuality. 
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disciplines in the humanities and social SCIences. Narrative analysis and the role of 
narrative in social research was the focus of important predicaments regarding the 
questions of universality, identity, and interpretation raised by the hermeneutic 
tradition129 . However, the social sciences are still particularly indebted to certain 
developments in narrative theory130, and to recent revisions of notions of identity, time 
and history, which, having developed out of disciplinary bounds, affect understandings 
of the value of narrative and of its status as the empirical substratum of social theory. 
This is the context of emergence of the notion of narrative identity predicated by 
narrative theory, which is based, as we have seen, on what narrative is rather than what 
it does, emphasising structural properties over context, action and relationality. 
My analysis of narrative in Chapter 6, however, pointed at ways in which narrative was 
ingredient in transition experience in different ways. First, the importance of names and 
categories in my informants' transitions evinced that, while there is a distinction 
between names and categories, in transition categories were lived, appropriated and 
experienced in a way similar to names: through engaging and identifYing as 
genderqueer, transsexual, trans gender, FTM, etc, my informants characterised their 
transitions as their own unique becomings. Even though narrative ordered different 
experiences and provided unity and coherence to their 'expressing' and 'translating' 
who they are and the problems they encountered, these narrative properties were 
contingent to present conditions (narrative and non-narrative) in many ways. Thus the 
way they felt and the context in which they spoke, their desires, their preoccupations 
and anxieties to be appropriately represented by their own narratives and so forth, and 
the relevance of these different states in particular situations, all shaped narrative in 
important ways. Hence I argued that in different contexts (clinical and otherwise) 
narrative was itself a kind of transition experience. Some participants voiced concerns 
about the extent to which they felt 'trans' narratives cannot - and could never - really 
represent their transitions fully. In this way, rather than reducing narrative to its effects 
129 I am referring to the hermeneutic tradition in philosophy that is understood to have started with 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and was particularly relevant to social analysis through its impact on the 
definition of the 'human sciences' as interpretive (as discussed, for example, in chapter 2 of Marcus 
and Fischer 1986, or in Sontag 1987, Hartman). In Chapter 6 I covered this tradition briefly in 
relation to narrative interpretation to address the role of narrative in transition, the biomedical uses 
of structural analysis of narratives. 
130 Particularly anthropology, for instance linguistic anthropology (Hymes 1972, 1977; Tyler 1978, 
1987; Duranti 2004; Wilce 1998) and a growing interest in narrative in medical anthropology 
(Wilce 2003; Martin 1994; Napier 2003). 
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in producing subjectivity, or in representing trans identity universally, I addressed the 
role of narrative as a device of invention capable of triggering change. This efficacy 
however is not reducible to a model of enactment based on citation and the collapse of 
matter and symbolic forms, but rather, expands over different kinds of experience, and, 
perhaps closer to Hacking's definition of the 'looping effects' of psychiatric classification 
(Hacking 1995), is unpredictable in its engagement of abstract and material entities, and 
never fully graspable under a general model of enactment. 
In Chapter 7 I explored change in relation to temporality and experience. Rather than 
understanding transition as a passage between abstract categories of female and male, I 
argued that the becoming involved in FTM transition was the bringing into experience 
of different durations, which happened at many levels as the result of differential 
changes. Discussing my informants' accounts, I highlighted that different changes were 
often understood in 'serial' associations, where thresholds were understood as 
separations between different states. Thresholds were both markers of change and 
invitations to go forward, and as such demanded an analytical focus on change as 
emergence in transition, and on the states people limit and enable through different 
transition thresholds. Whereas in biomedical discourses the notion of passing is still 
anchored in Garfinkel's (1967) idea of a convincing gender performance, and grounded 
in the distinction between real and imaginary, material and symbolic, nature and 
artifice, through Whithehead's atomic theory of time I argued that passing is related to 
temporality and change. The way that change happened in my informants' transitions 
implied other meanings of passing, not necessarily always around the experience of sex 
and gender, but about the manifold ways in which thresholds generate new ways of 
being and organise experience in meaningful series. I illustrated how thresholds make 
time epochal, dividing experience in durations that correspond to different 'stages' of 
transition. Passage means the emergence of different assemblages of experience, 
characterised by their connection with other assemblages, and by their sharing of a 
common temporality. 
For this reason one of the analytic challenges of this thesis was to conceptualise 
translations between different kinds of transition experience, and to ascertain their 
different temporalities and scope. The analytic division of the thesis in units - chapters 
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and parts -, and the relations between them reflects the thesis' findings insofar as units, 
like transition levels, work together and produce effects in their interaction. Thus while 
the chapters contained in each part map onto each other, the two parts define transition 
through the interaction between medical, political and academic discourses, different 
clinical practices and the experiential worlds of those who transition. Through these 
different units I analysed transition as a kind of becoming that contrasted with what is 
sometimes conceptualised as, and indeed is sometimes thought as a discrete 
transformation. In addition to medicine's therapeutic logic, the findings of this research 
show that transition is often understood by those transitioning as a journey that matters 
in itself, rather than only in relation to arriving at a new body, a new position, or a new 
gender. Trans people conceptualise the experience of transitioning as an irreversible 
becoming where their visions of change not only affect their own bodies, but extends 
into other bodies, objects, and relations. In this sense the structure of the thesis aims to 
reflect the thesis' findings, functioning as a metalogue to the discussions introduced 
therein. 
8.2 Assemblages 
Despite having a similar structure, thesis' units (chapters and parts) address different 
levels of transition experience, characterised by the inextricability and becoming-
together of processes and knowledge practices. The arguments in the thesis explore the 
ways in which transition entails the emergence of new relations and intimacies, where 
transition is characterised by the transformative associations between different levels of 
transition effects, and the collapse of different realms of transition changes. Participants 
in this research emphasised that, in addition to the predictable changes they expected 
from using treatments, transition spanned over other, unexpected realms of experience, 
including the changes they imagined transition would bring, those derived from using 
different biotechnologies in treatment, 'coming out' socially and establishing new 
relationships with and through the body. In the interviews they held with me, 
participants often looked back at the moment when they decided on transitioning, and 
a sort of temporal clash invariably occurred as they referred to the ways in which they 
now think they became, post-transition, the future identity they once imagined. Brian 
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did, as he looked out of the window of his living room where we met. He was 
recovering from chest surgery at the time, and spoke about transition in relation to the 
experience of having lived in different countries for a number of years. Having 
'transitioned' geographically was important when he decided to live as a man, as was 
when he decided to do it in England: 
My decision came rather late. I think I was around 30 when I kind of could put 
a name on it ... I come from a small country, and it's not so trans aware ... at least 
back then it wasn't. So it took a long time to understand what the feelings were 
about. And having brought up to kind of. .. we played with the cards that we're 
given, that was what my mum always used to say. So you kind of try to just live 
with it, and I was 42 years old I believe when it just became too much. And I 
made the decision, that I had to do something about it, and at that time I was 
living in Spain, and I think that had a very strong ... it had a lot to do with it 
because women look like women and men look like men and the area, the grey 
area between the kind of ... there's no unisex mode. You have women's clothes 
and men's clothes and whoever looks something ambiguous ... you get stared at. 
Where I come from we are covered most of the year because it's so cold and 
people dress in unisex fashions, so it is possible that I could have just kept on 
going a bit further in my country ... Because I earlier said that [transition] it's 
not for the others and it kind of contradicts what I said that the Spanish society 
is so different. But I think I was kind of made more aware of my body because 
of the warm conditions, you have to kind of expose more of yourself, and you 
look at yourself in the mirror and that way I had to face myself, and I couldn't 
hide anymore. 
Brian was made aware of his body because of warm weather conditions while he was 
living in Spain, which generated a higher rate of exposure to others' gender judgement 
and which in turn affected the ways in which he looked at himself ("you look at 
yourself in the mirror and that way I had to face myself'). Living among people whose 
appearance was visually polarised in terms of sex, 'where women look like women and 
men look like men' seemed a crucially different visual economy of gender with respect 
to how gender looked where he grew up. It was in this new environment that he 
realised he was trans, because looking at himself in the mirror he 'couldn't hide 
anymore'. His previous experience of migration facilitated his decision to transition in 
London, where he could access private treatment and thus avoid Spanish waiting lists. 
But later on in our interview, he told me that his masculinity was already there before 
transition changes adjusted his body to male morphology. He said: 
Well, testosterone has to be the most important thing, and I base it all on the 
chemical balance, because it just kind of keeps me there every day, it makes me 
Jeel like I should Jeel and there is no way I can explain that sentence. But it just ... 
But for me the effects of T, I believe that your maleness, your manhood is not 
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in your pants, it's kind of in your head, is inside you, but of course we see 
ourselves, the outside world is kind of like a mirror reflecting our image back to 
us. And funny enough I made an avatar, you know what an avatar is, back in 
2004, when I started doing my research on transition things. Made an avatar, 
and he was this cartoon, he had short hair, a receding hairline, little goatee and 
glasses. And face shape was pretty much like it is now. I accidentally found that 
avatar like two months ago. I was like, oh my god I look like that avatar. And 
back then ... do you want to see me back then? 
Brian invited me to go back in time and see how the future was 'already there' at the 
moment that he decided on transitioning. Through a series of pictures of himself at 
several transition stages, he told me how transition was the actualisation of an ideal 
future. He had effectively become that avatar, with short hair, goatee and glasses, 
through which once he envisioned the future. Following Barthes and Kracauer, Lury 
(1998) argues that photography makes possible the re-reading of one's identity with a 
temporality that is 'retrodictive in nature', given that, as Barthes suggested, the 
photograph seems to become 'an illogical conjunction between the here-now and the 
there-then' (Barthes quoted in Lury 1998:85). Lury suggests that this temporal loop of 
the photograph allows a re-possession of one's identity at the same time that it permits 
the detachment of "the subject's very consciousness, memories and body from him- or 
herself' (1998:86). Photography situates identity at the crossroads of different temporal 
dimensions, mediated by memory and processes of fictionalisation. Brian's avatar 
confirms Barthes' idea that the 'here-now' is represented in the 'there-then'. The here-
now was there-then what Lury, following Carole-Anne Tyler (1994), calls 'future 
perfect': a projection of a desire that works not only epitomising change, but 
enunciating and making real the future in the present. Constructing his identity 
through the collapse of multiple temporal dimensions, Brian's 'future perfect' 
determined his decision to transition as a way of making life worthwhile. 
The collapse of temporal dimensions in Brian's reading of his own image illustrates the 
way in which transitioning is actualised in relations. The experience of transitioning is 
populated by units that result from the weight of connections among heterogeneous 
components, and that form transformative associations with other units through shared 
contexts. Throughout Part II I argued that people's identification with trans sexuality 
transforms their past in relation to a future transition, in relation to a different future, 
where their identification as transsexualltransgenderl genderqueer became a threshold of 
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change, not necessarily just as the effect of the performativity of language in a narrative 
context, but in terms of allowing a reconfiguration of experience in new relational 
assemblages, each of its own scale and temporality. Thus part of thinking the future that 
transition creates comprises re-thinking the different temporalities that emerge in the 
becoming together of different levels of transition and their relation. 
Recent developments in the anthropology of science (Edwards et al. 2007; Pickering 
1992; Moore 2006; Franklin 1995) have been concerned with mapping the 
convergence of different orders in the constitution of the present and the ethnographic 
encounter. For example, Rabinow's (1999b, 2003) definition of assemblage, and his 
later reworking of the concept in relation to political apparatuses and the Foucauldian 
task of 'problematisation' (2003), seems to situate assemblages at the core of 
anthropology's method within the ecology of the social sciences. If one of the 
methodological challenges for anthropology is to rethink fieldwork in relation to the 
multi-sitedness and the empirical heterogeneity of the ethnographic encounter, then the 
notion of assemblage, which Rabinow uses to map the multiple, movement and 
relevance appears to be the logic commonplace to rethink anthropological analysis in 
relation to the problems of scale and complexity. Among interesting examplesl3l, the 
work of Rabinow and Marcus' (2008) on fieldwork temporalities and their mapping of 
an anthropology of the 'con-temporary' emphasises the necessity of generating tools to 
make anthropology relevant to rapidly shifting contexts and environments (see also 
Moore 1996). 
Recently, Ong and Collier used the notion of assemblage to conceptualise a tension 
between the "broadly encompassing, seamless and mobile" and the "heterogeneous, 
contingent, unstable, partial and situated" that characterises the actualisation of global 
processes (Ong 2005:12). In a similar sense, my use of the notion of assemblage in Part 
II of the thesis intended to reflect the tensions between different kinds of transitioning 
experience and the broader, often also broadly encompassing, seamless and mobile 
contexts in which this experience comes to matter. For instance, I contextualised the 
temporalities that hormones create in the transitions of my informants within the 
temporalities of treatments in global pharmaceutical markets and scientific analysis, 
131 For instance, Fortun's (2001) reworking of advocacy after the Bhopal disaster. 
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where hormones became resources in particular therapeutic milieus, and argued that the 
two are connected, even if they do not share a historical or physical context. Following 
Stengers, I defined assemblage as an 'object/representation/practice' emphasising her 
remark that assemblages are also explanations whose location is never complete 
(Stengers 1997:205), because assemblages are relational, and create links between 
different levels of practice and different levels of explanation 132. In this sense the notion 
of assemblage is a tool to address the question of relationality (including the analytic 
'problem' of dealing with the status of relations, see Bains 2006). Assemblages resist the 
compartmentalisation of experience insofar as their becoming arises from the 
connections between different realities. 
In this sense, my use of the notion of assemblage in the thesis situated the irreducibility 
of different contexts in which different levels of transitioning 'matter', and the ways that 
these conte:A1:s are connected with other assemblages, realities and debates. This kind of 
mapping was intended particularly to problematise the dichotomy between theory and 
the value of individual experience especially in relation to heavily theorised aspects of 
transsexuality, and those aspects considered critical for the generation of regulative 
regrmes of treatment. Take the idea of irreversibility in transition for example. In 
medical discourses, irreversibility is a condition to access treatment, and transsexual 
people are encouraged to think about their decisions to transition as irreversible in a 
number of treatment stages, as we have seen in Chapter 3. However, whereas for some 
trans men irreversibility is associated with surpassing pre-transitional periods of suffering 
and distress, which sometimes entail ambivalent, if not openly conflictive relations with 
their (,wrong') bodies and with being 'stuck' in them, trans people's understanding of 
irreversibility is also associated with different meanings they attribute to the future they 
create through transition. In this respect, some FTMs conceptualise their relation with 
their bodies post-transition as the condition of their 'true' gender identity, where they 
can actually be themselves and participate in new futures, and not only as the guarantee 
of the durability of transition changes. For example, Michael said that, post-transition: 
132 See also Bateson 1958, 2000, and Deleuze and Guattari's definition of "assemblages of desire" 
and "collective assemblages of enunciation" (2004:25), where they conceptualise assemblages both as 
productions and collective representations. Patton (2000) notes that in Deleuze and Guattari's 
poststructural thought, assemblages' double nature as connective ontologies and collective 
enunciations is anchored in abstract machines, and that in this way assemblages do not exist 
independently from the virtual. 
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I become calmer and calmer. At the beginning when I started to change, it was 
like hard, because to tell it at work and everything, it was like yeah, riding in a 
roller coaster without seatbelts. Really extreme. You have to adjust yourself and 
find your self image in everything, it was like a rough ride, much pressure. Now 
I start to calm down and once I had my full surgery the only thing I need is my 
hormones for a lifetime. I don't transition anymore. I have to accept... for 
example, it took me so much effort to ignore my female body but doesn't take 
any effort to forget about it. I don't know how it feels to have periods anymore, 
I don't know how it feels to have breasts anymore, I don't know how it feels to 
have high waist anymore. Just goes like ... formatting your hard drive. When I have 
full surgery I will forget I was born as a girl. I will forget, I am pretty sure. 
Michael emphatically pointed out that transition was a 'really extreme' change. It 
comprised the beginning of a new life as a man, a life away from his native Germany, 
and a life of embracing answers to conflicts he had been living with for many years. He 
said that transitioning became his way of ending a state of gender liminality, which was 
characterised by a painful relation with his body and the frustration of being 
'misrecognised' by others. Michael conceptualises transition as 'irreversible' when he 
says that once he has a phalloplasty he will not know what it is to have a female body 
anymore, because transition is like 'formatting your hard drive'. His desire to go 
stealth, and not to be recognised as a trans man at all, situates transition as an 
interruption, a break of continuity, a rebirth. Michael imagines this future as one in 
which living as a man and having transitioned means he could forget he was born in a 
female body. Unlike the irreversibility of the medical model, change here is a result of 
his becoming, a break of continuity after which everything is different - in a sense it is 
a 'true' variation (see Chapter 7). Thus irreversibility is here envisioned in relation to 
the new futures transition creates, futures that entail connections at many levels, some 
of which cannot be accounted for if we take the transition of an individual, his point 
of view, as a unit of analysis. 
Assemblages map relations between levels of reality, and make those relations an explicit 
object of enquiry. In so doing, they also make accountable the position from which 
connections are relevant to each other. This is the scope of the assemblage, and also its 
limit. Assemblages are in this sense different from other 'processual' theories of the 
body, sex and gender, in which identity is constituted through the interaction between 
different symbolic regimes. I am particularly thinking about the differences between the 
approach I have developed in the thesis and other models such as intersectionality 
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through which gender formation and transsexuality were thought. In my VIew, the 
main difference between those analyses and my own is that, whereas in intersectional 
analysis the different 'oppressions' that result in subjectivity and social action are 
theorised in relation to each other (Monro 2005; Haritaworn 2008; Hines 2007), my 
position implies a different conceptualisation of experience, where differences in level 
do not necessarily result in unity at the level of the subject (for example, a subjectivity 
marked by the superimposition of different symbolic regimes such as gender, race, class, 
etc), but rather, in shifting relations between domains of experience and knowledge 
practices, which also happen at other levels. In other words, different kinds of units are 
generated as a result of manifold relations and material environments rather than only 
by the shifting form of social and cultural meanings. Indeed, my use of the notion of 
assemblage in relation to experience explicitly questions the reduction of the experience 
of transitioning to the categories through which it was historically defined. Unlike 
categories, assemblages are localised and relational realities, but are not susceptible to be 
subsumed under structural models of social action. It is not through a particular 
configuration of different identity categories133 that I have come to understand 
transition in view of the results of this research. 
In this way, my project was concerned with generating connections between different 
levels of transition practice, enacted differently by a transitioning individual, biomedical 
and bioscientific communities of practice, social services and academic discourses. Thus 
the assemblages of transition experience that have been described throughout the thesis 
are not necessarily concerned with ethnographic description, but rather, with 
ethnographic engagement with different becomings in transition and their relation. The 
need to articulate different dimensions of transition experience, or those dimensions 
differently, is also highlighted in many ways by trans people, who challenge the 
reductionist models that advocate transsexuality as a mechanistic and predictable effect 
of material, cultural or symbolic relations. The results of my research show that multiple 
realities exist in relation to different kinds of value in FTM transition, and that, 
increasingly, transitioning is understood through multiple articulations of these realities, 
133 See, for instance, Puar's understanding of assemblage as a paradigm shift from intersectionality in 
Terrorist Assemblages (2007, especially the conclusion), where assemblages make a difference by 
pointing at the shifting 'rearrangements' of categories that result in shifting and not easily 
disassembled identity configurations. These assemblages serve Puar to map connections between the 
realms of nationalism, race, homosexuality, violence and affect. 
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where, for example, the importance of medical treatment is not the same when one 
starts to transition and when one has already been living in their chosen gender for a 
number of years. Thus, even though the scope of every transition varied in relation to 
different situations, it was often understood, as Russell emphasised: 
... a bit like an evolution of yourself and an extending, a growing into. I don't 
like the term sex change at all, I think it's black and white, I think it's medical, I 
think that you know ... saying that there is only two is very binary, you go from 
one to the other. And people always ask me all the time oh yes, oh well, you 
know ... 'What happens ... have you finished with your surgery?' or 'When do 
you finish transitioning?' And I'm like ... no one ever finishes, we are all going 
through a transition that is called life, you know from there to there, the whole 
way through. And this is just a part of my life, it's not ... I'm not going through 
a sex change; I am not even considering lower surgery anyway. This is just me 
growing into my adult life, this is just me growing up, with some different 
experiences to other people, to other men around me. But it's not so obvious as 
black and white sex change. 
These different positions are the result of specific kinds of transition expenence 
distributed in many levels of practice. Thus the position of transition coordinates is 
relative in different experiential assemblages, and this is an important reason why the 
empirical analysis of this research had to include an extensive discussion of transition 
coordinates as primary data, in order situate and contextualise different kinds and limits 
of transition-becoming. Recently, activists in the trans gender movement started to 
reclaim 'other' levels of relevance of transition than those represented in institutional 
and mainstream transgender politics. George, a trans activist who explores transition 
extensively through photography, writing and activism, maintains that transition is 
above all else a set of 'aesthetic' changes, and, as such, he compares it to a new 
hairstyle134. He rejects the idea that transition can 'only' exist as a medical condition, 
and challenges the medical expectation of irreversibility that underpins the 
administration of treatments and the criteria of legal recognition established by the 
Gender Recognition Act and similar legislation. Crucially, his transition does not 
comprise a single 'irreversible' change between opposite categories, categories that he 
does not feel he inhabited in the first place, and which are understood to emanate from 
134 This position is also held by other activists, who are proposing interesting new approaches, 
see for instance Ashley Crawford's 'post-gender' concept at http://news.bmezine.com/ 
2007108/04/ashley-crawford-post-gender-bmenewsl Oast accessed August 2009). Other 
examples include Diamond 2004 or Sullivan 2006. 
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the body or the self135. For George, transition could not be conceptualised (at least 
exclusively) as 'individual' precisely because it spanned over the relation between 
different kinds, and different temporalities of experience. He thus defined transition 
more as a drift than a linear passage, stressing that it was grounded in concerns and 
values that were not always represented in transsexual identity politics or medical 
descriptions of transsexuality. In fact, he is not alone in criticising the 'normal trans 
narrative'. A range of activists in transgender movements worldwide criticise the effect 
of the 'normal trans narrative' in commodifying trans identity, and they have expressed 
concerns about the 'price' one has to pay to belong to a community and to participate 
in community narratives. Jules Rosskam's film Against a Trans Narrative136 is one example 
of this critical engagement, but participants in my research also insisted that transition 
was a specific route of change that made sense at particular moments in their lives and 
in terms of a specific derivation, where, rather than existing in isolation, sex, gender and 
transition existed in relation to other events and possibilities. 
This uruqueness of transition was emphasised in our interviews, as we have seen 
throughout Part II, and celebrated collectively as a sign of diversity and creativity, 
which is already creating a new future in the social life of the community, as it might in 
biomedical and political legislation. For example, as a result of transition David did not 
achieve an incontrovertibly 'male' state, but localised transition changes as different 
moments of change and continuity that he defined as plateaus, and described change as 
navigating those intensive states. He said: 
I find myself saying, especially recently, I don't know, it's kind of like plateaus. 
So there's not a huge amount of changes going on, there's subtle changes going 
on, but physically there is no real huge changes like in the first six months. And 
sometimes I feel really male, and sometimes I still feel really female. How do I 
know that I feel male, how do I know that it's female? So I just say that, I think 
it's easier to identify. 
Feeling 'really male' and 'really female' are two intertwined effects of David's transition, 
two different intensities reminiscent of Bateson's plateaus (2000:113): intensities which 
might result in a climax (in the sense of having a direction or an aim) but which 
135 The challenge of 'individual' as a unit of transfonnation, the effects of which are at the same time 
produced and measured by a series of technologies, will become important later on in this chapter. 
136 This film premiered in the 2009 London Lesbian and Gay film festival, and is not currently being 
distributed in the United Kingdom. More information about the movie can be found at 
www.againstatransnarrative.com. 
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nevertheless characterise states or sequences which do not. Once the physical changes 
are achieved, transition becomes a new state in which continuity and change are 
coextensive intensities, however not as a mere repetition of pre-transitional feelings. In 
this sense, change and variation are not necessarily articulated in relation to changes in 
specific domains, such as gender or sex alone, but in relation to achieving certain states 
defined by connections between different domains of change, that result in 'plateaus'. 
David conceptualised those connections by pointing out the multiplicity of shifting 
locations, positions, material and symbolic changes involved in transition: 
And I think, you know, I am questioning myself like why is it so important to 
be seen as male? And I think that is a very personal thing. I don't know actually, 
cause I think I get too caught up in what other people think. I've kind of 
opened my mind about being attracted to men, and that's something that I 
never spoke about. And also being in touch with a lot of FTM guys, 
pretransition, transitioning for years or whatever they are and I am attracted to 
them. And it's like so, makes a lot of sense, but it is just getting in touch with 
yourself For me it has been just accepting myself and just being open. I think 
that's important. I think that's a good thing if you really allow yourself to 
explore. I went to a trans weekend ... One of the workshops was taboos, I don't 
think I ever spoke about this, one of the taboos was trans guys having kids, 
either before they transition or after. I can't imagine myself stopping the 
hormones to have a baby, but somebody else might, and that is their journey 
and that is wonderful for them. Everybody is so different. That's just wonderful. 
So I've always known that, but I guess the more people I meet now ... Kate 
Bornstein was saying you can be whatever you want to be, just don't be mean. 
And I'm like, exactly that, exactly that. Cause I think about the people I have in 
my life. And they are lovely lovely people but they are fucked. Just that's the 
way they are. Emotionally you know. And that's not what I want. I don't think 
I could do this 'war' cause just doesn't figure. And I know there's various 
cultures where they have more than two genders, it's not fixed. 
David conceptualises change and continuity in transition as the fluid navigation of 
different 'plateaus'. His transition affected his sexuality, his moral judgement and the 
way in which he approached different intersubjective commitments in the context of 
his relationship with members of the trans community. Transition here has an ethical 
scope, where David has to negotiate new situations such as being attracted to guys, 
accepting other people's decisions, 'allowing yourself to explore'. The value of his own 
transition is constructed in the possibility of this negotiation, where having become 
male is not the only cause or effect of transition, but the starting point of new 
negotiations. He, as we have seen, feels very male and very female intermittently, and 
this position is in a way the result of the connections between feeling that male and 
female 'are' the irreversibility of transition, the way that his becoming was 
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transformative in many different scales. In this way, his becoming 'FTM' is different 
from becoming 'male', it is a 'new' kind of experience. David challenged the idea that 
transition is only the passage between genders understood as fixed categories, he is not 
even sure of how he embodies either gender, and does not think transition is mainly 
about this differentiation. With his interrogation 'how do I know that I feel male? How 
do I know that I feel female?' (see Riley 1988, 2000; Sedgwick 1991, 2002), he resisted 
reducing transition to gender. When he said transition was about 'accepting myself and 
just being open', the becoming involved in transition rearranges the many levels at 
which transition matters, some of which affect one's becoming 'imperceptible' and 
changeable at an individual level, and others that implode wider practices and relations. 
Thus, although the involvement of different collectives in transition is inevitably 
embedded in politics (in terms of, for example, the politics behind treatments, identity 
politics, the politics of sex research), and despite the fact that transition's different 
dimensions entail a variety of political decisions for those who transition (regarding 
biomedicine and visibility for example), I have illustrated that transition is brought into 
existence in multiple and interrelated levels, which are not necessarily all political. 
Indeed, it has been my intention throughout the thesis to point out that transition 
makes a difference beyond the politics of sexuality and transsexual identity described in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
I have already mentioned that my encounter with research participants, and with other 
members of the trans community entailed constantly renewing negotiations, not least 
because of the contingencies of the research practice. The ethics of researching 
transition not only comprised the negotiation of relations with people during fieldwork, 
but spanned in different ways over the writing process, informing the discussions 
introduced in the thesis and the kind of contribution I thought my analysis could make 
in such an extensively theorised/politicised field (or fields). I want to offer the results of 
this research as a new reworking of the problem of transition, where the 
methodological and ethical issues derived from the research process are reflected in the 
thesis, and determine the position of the arguments (Haraway 1988). It is in this sense 
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that my account is not meant to be an 'alternative' to other discourses about transition, 
nor is it free of caveats137 . 
In sum, it is in its construction of the problem of transition that my research makes a 
difference. My thesis aimed to contribute to the generation of new ways in which to 
think transition, the different relations it entails, its different futures. My analytic 
displacement from transition to transitioning is the result of my engagement with my 
informants' characterisation of becoming FTM as a unique and complex process in 
which the interaction between (bio)technologies, memory, time and change produced 
transition as a unique becoming, transformative not only of them as subjects, but also of 
events at other levels, of different aspects of themselves, other people, institutions and 
discourses, politics and social worlds. In this sense the effectivity of the research process 
contributes to the constitution of the object, collapsing ontology and epistemology, as 
the role of analysis is not only to recognise the multiple positions from which reality is 
approached, but seeks the recognition of reality as multiple (see Mol 1999) and subject 
to intervention and performance. However, as a new reworking of an old problem, the 
research is also an event (Stengers 2000) generative of a different future in unforeseeable 
encounters, readings and interpretations. Instead of focusing on determinants and on 
predictability, research has a role in generating new ways of posing problems and of 
thinking through them. In this sense, it has been my intention to rethink the problem 
of transition instead of offering solutions to the ways it has hitherto been posed, and 
thus my project was concerned with possibilities, rather than probabilities138 (see 
Stengers 2003), that reflected the ways in which the participants in my study viewed 
transition as a becoming rather than an arrival. 
137 And particularly, of the contention that there is a stark contrast between the fixity of a 
medicalised body (the body as it is conceived in the concepts, techniques, and identities produced 
through biomedical practice) and the fluidity of post-structural discourses of the body and gender. It 
has been my intention to explicidy question this tension through the thesis' structure, and the 
division of the thesis in different units where biomedical, (post)feminist and political forms of 
thinking transition, the body and agency were intertwined. 
138 Here I follow Stengers' distinction, where 'to "think" is to create possibility against probability. 
It doesn't mean hope for one or another thing or as a calculated attitude, but to try and feel and put 
into words a possibility for becoming' (2003:246, see also Evens:2008). 
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